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2025 DIGILAW 382 (KAR)

Preethi's v. T. T. K. Prestige Limited

2025-06-13

H.P.SANDESH

body2025
ORDER : H.P. Sandesh, J. Crl.R.P.No.266/2022 is filed by the accused challenging the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 01.07.2015 passed in C.C.No.15680/2010 and judgment of confirmation dated 23.10.2019 passed in Crl.A.No.1000/2015. 2. Crl.P.No.7694/2022 is filed by the accused challenging the order dated 23.10.2019 passed in Crl.R.P.No.600/2015 allowing the revision petition and enhancing the fine amount to Rs.24 lakhs. 3. The factual matrix of the case of the complainant before the Trial Court invoking Section 200 of Cr.P.C. for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (‘NI Act’ for short) is that the complainant is a Public Limited Company engaged in manufacturing, marketing and selling of Prestige Range of kitchen utensils. The accused No.1 is the proprietorship concern represented by its proprietor accused No.2. The accused was appointed as authorized dealer and the complainant has supplied their Prestige range of products as per the purchase orders placed by the accused and the accused was liable to pay the value of the goods supplied for them. Towards the said payment, the accused issued a cheque bearing No.649099 dated 19.12.2009 drawn on ICICI Bank Ltd., Malleshwaram Branch, Bangalore, for a sum of Rs.15,32,008/- and it came to be dishonoured on its presentation for encashment as “funds insufficient”. The same was intimated to the accused through the legal notice by demanding for the payment of cheque amount. The accused by giving vague reply failed to pay the cheque amount and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. Hence, the complainant filed a private complaint and sworn statement of the complainant was recorded and cognizance was taken and summons was issued against the accused. The summons was duly served on the accused and she failed to appear before the Court and hence NBW was issued and she was secured before the Court and thereafter enlarged on bail. The plea was recorded and in the plea she did not accept the claim and claimed to be tried and hence and complainant examined its authorized representative as P.W.1 and got marked the documents at Exs.P.1 to 23. The statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and she denied the incriminating evidence that she has got defence and examined herself as D.W.1 and also examined one witness as D.W.2 and got marked the documents at Exs.D.1 to 3. The statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and she denied the incriminating evidence that she has got defence and examined herself as D.W.1 and also examined one witness as D.W.2 and got marked the documents at Exs.D.1 to 3. The Trial Court having considered both oral and documentary evidence placed on record, answered the points for consideration in the affirmative and convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.15,42,008/- and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of ten months. 4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction, the accused filed Crl.A.No.1000/2015. The Appellate Court dismissed the said appeal and confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court. 5. The complainant also filed Crl.R.P.No.600/2015 before the Revisional Court challenging the sentence contending that the sentence imposed by the Trial Court is meager and it requires enhancement. The complainant’s revision petition was allowed and ordered accused Nos.1 and 2 to pay fine of Rs.24 lakhs and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of ten months and the judgment of the Trial Court was modified enhancing the fine amount. 6. Being aggrieved by both the orders, the accused has preferred the criminal revision petition and criminal petition. In Crl.R.P.No.266/2022, prayer is made to set aside the judgment of confirmation passed in Crl.A.No.1000/2015 and to acquit the revision petitioner. In Crl.P.No.7694/2022, the petitioner has prayed this Court to set aside the impugned judgment and sentence dated 23.10.2019 passed by the LV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore in Crl.R.P.No.600/2015 and to acquit the accused by setting aside the conviction order passed in C.C.No.15680/2010. 7. The main grounds urged in Crl.R.P.No.266/2022 is that the debt/liability of the petitioner was not a legally enforceable debt. It is contended that on 06.08.2009, the petitioner issued a letter to the respondent stating closure of their account and the petitioner is ready to clear the due outstanding amount from the respondent. Thereafter, there was no response from the respondent and the witness P.W.1 also does not know about the said letter issued by the petitioner. Wherefore, the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court failed to consider the same. The said document is marked before the Trial Court as Ex.D.3. Thereafter, there was no response from the respondent and the witness P.W.1 also does not know about the said letter issued by the petitioner. Wherefore, the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court failed to consider the same. The said document is marked before the Trial Court as Ex.D.3. It is also contended that a legal notice dated 16.01.2010 was issued calling upon the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.15,32,008/- and the petitioner had given the reply to the said notice on 02.02.2010, wherein request was made to the respondent to produce the credit notes and ledger statement to close the same. The respondent deliberately with malafide intention filed the above case to harass the petitioner. The copies of the legal notice dated 16.01.2010 and reply notice dated 02.02.2010 are marked before the Trial Court as Exs.P.9 and 10 respectively. Both the Courts failed to consider the same. The learned counsel contend that both the Courts failed to consider the chief examination of D.W.2 as well as Ex.P.3(b), wherein it is specifically contended that the cheque was issued for security purpose and cheque was handed over by D.W.2 to the respondent as security and this aspect has not been considered by both the Courts. 8. In Crl.P.No.7694/2022 it is contended that the Revisional Court committed an error in considering the material on record and similar grounds have been urged in the said petition also. It is contended that both the Courts failed to take note of the material on record and fails to consider that it is the settled principle that in a criminal case, the respondent has to prove beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Sessions Judge has failed to appreciate the irregularities and divergent facts available in the documentary proof provided by the respondent in support of his case. Both the Courts have committed an error and the Revisional Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction also failed to consider the material on record and erroneously passed the order enhancing the fine amount without any basis. 9. Both the Courts have committed an error and the Revisional Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction also failed to consider the material on record and erroneously passed the order enhancing the fine amount without any basis. 9. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in Crl.A.No.73/2007 in the case of A.C. NARAYANAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.15, wherein it is held that while holding that there is no serious conflict between the decisions in MMTC Ltd. and another v. Medchol Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and another v. Indusind Bank Ltd and others, the larger Bench clarified the position and answered the questions framed that the power of attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the Court in order to prove the contents of the complaint. However, the power of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions. The learned counsel would contend that P.W.1 was not having any such knowledge. 10. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in Civil Appeal No.9642/2010 in the case of MANISH MAHENDRA GALA AND OTHERS v. SHALINI BHAGWAN AVATRAMANI AND OTHERS, and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.28, wherein discussion was made with regard to the judgments in the cases of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra) as well as A.C.Narayanan (supra). It is held that, to resolve the controversy with regard to the powers of the general power of attorney holder to depose on behalf of the person he represents, this Court upon consideration of all previous relevant decisions on the aspect clarified that the power of attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the Court but he must have witnessed the transaction as an agent and must have due knowledge about it. The power of attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transaction cannot be examined as a witness. The functions of the general power of attorney holder cannot be delegated to any other person without there being a specific clause permitting such delegation in the power of attorney. The power of attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transaction cannot be examined as a witness. The functions of the general power of attorney holder cannot be delegated to any other person without there being a specific clause permitting such delegation in the power of attorney. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court the discussions made in paragraph No.29 of the judgment. 11. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in Crl.A.No.270/2022 in the case of M/S. TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S. SMS ASIA PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER. Referring this judgment, the learned counsel brought to the notice of this Court that in the said judgment also the cases of A.C.Narayanan, MMTC, Vishwa Mitter v. O.P.Poddar and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani was discussed. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court that in paragraph No.10, extraction was made with regard to the judgment in the case of A.C.Narayanan i.e., paragraph Nos.29, 30, 33, 33.1 and 33.2. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.14, wherein discussion was made with regard to the manner in which the complaint is drafted and also discussion made in paragraph No.17. The learned counsel would contend that this judgment is aptly applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 12. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam passed in Crl.M.C.No.8287/2022 in the case of RAZAK METHER v. STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.8 of the judgment, wherein also A.C.Narayanan case was discussed. 13. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No.5583/2022 in the case of M/S. RAJCO STEEL ENTERPRISES v. KAVITA SARAFF AND ANOTHER and brought to the notice of this Court the detailed discussion made in paragraph No.11. 14. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court passed in Crl.A.No.830/2014 in the case of M/S. INDUS AIRWAYS PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS v. M/S. MAGNUM AVIATION PVT. LTD AND ANOTHER and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.13, wherein the Apex Court in detailed discussed that the Cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an existing debt ore liability. LTD. AND OTHERS v. M/S. MAGNUM AVIATION PVT. LTD AND ANOTHER and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.13, wherein the Apex Court in detailed discussed that the Cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an existing debt ore liability. The payment by cheque in the nature of advance payment indicates that at the time of drawal of cheque, there was no existing liability. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court the discussion made in paragraph No.19 with regard to the criminal liability under Section 138 of the NI Act. If a cheque is issued as an advance payment for purchase of goods and for any reason purchase order is not carried to its logical conclusion either because of its cancellation or otherwise and material or goods for which purchase order was placed is not supplied by the supplier, the cheque cannot be said to have been drawn for an existing debt or liability. 15. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of KUMAR EXPORTS v. SHARMA CARPETS reported in (2009) 2 SCC 513 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.25, wherein discussion was made that the complainant did not produce any books of account or stock register maintained by him in the course of his regular business or any acknowledgement for delivery of goods to establish that as a matter of fact woolen carpets were sold by him to the appellant. 16. The learned counsel referring these judgments would contend that these judgments are aptly applicable to the facts of the case on hand and hence this Court has to exercise its revisional powers and set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and the Revisional Court. The learned counsel would contend that both the Courts failed to take note of the fact that the cheque was issued towards the security and witness is also not a competent witness. In reply notice, it is specifically stated about the defence. Ex.P.6 is the notice and Ex.P.10 is the reply notice.The learned counsel would contend that in 2009, the petitioner has not purchased anything from the complainant/respondent. 17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant would contend that in reply notice, the petitioner has not stated anything about that the cheque was issued towards the security. Ex.P.6 is the notice and Ex.P.10 is the reply notice.The learned counsel would contend that in 2009, the petitioner has not purchased anything from the complainant/respondent. 17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant would contend that in reply notice, the petitioner has not stated anything about that the cheque was issued towards the security. The learned counsel contend that the transaction is admitted that it was a credit transaction and the very contention of the petitioner that the cheque was issued towards security is not correct. The materials are supplied and hence the cheque was given. The issuance of the cheque is also admitted and in the reply not pleaded about the defence which was taken. The admission on the part of D.W.1 and D.W.2 is clear and the same was discussed by the Trial Court as well as the Revisional Court. The fact that it was a business transaction is not in dispute and the said transaction was taken place for a longer period. 18. The learned counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the list of dates and events that cheque dated 19.12.2009 was issued towards legally enforceable debt due. The fact that the cheque was returned with an endorsement “funds insufficient” is not in dispute. The demand was made and not complied the demand and hence, the complaint was filed and cognizance was taken. The Trial Court having considered the material on record directed to pay an amount of Rs.15,32,008/-. The Sessions Judge also was pleased to dismiss criminal appeal and allow the revision petition. Having taken note of the fact that the transaction was of the year 2009, rightly directed to pay the fine of Rs.24 lakhs. The learned counsel would contend that this Court directed to make the payment while suspending the sentence and accordingly the amount of Rs.10 lakhs was withdrawn and also the petitioner has tendered the DD for an amount of Rs.5 lakhs to the respondent before the Court and the respondent has duly encashed the aforesaid mentioned DD received on 14.11.2024. The learned counsel contend that scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction is limited. When there exists no patent factual defect or error of jurisdiction or legal infirmity or perversity in the judgment by the Trial Court, the question of exercising the revisional jurisdiction does not arise. The learned counsel contend that scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction is limited. When there exists no patent factual defect or error of jurisdiction or legal infirmity or perversity in the judgment by the Trial Court, the question of exercising the revisional jurisdiction does not arise. The Revisional Court should not dwell into the proportionality of quantum of compensation awarded by the Trial Court unless the prosecution have shown special circumstances for the same. The undue leniency should not be shown to the convict especially in case of concurrent findings. 19. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. JAGMOHAN SINGH KULDIP SINGH ANAND AND OTHERS reported in (2004) 7 SCC 659 , wherein it is held that the Revisional Court is empowered to exercise all the powers conferred on the Appellate Court by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 401 of Cr.P.C. Section 401 of Cr.P.C. is a provision enabling the High Court to exercise all powers of an Appellate Court, if necessary, in aid of power of superintendence or supervision as a part of power of revision conferred on the High Court or the Sessions Court. Section 397 of Cr.P.C. confers power on the High Court or the Sessions Court, as the case may be, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court. The revisional powers of the High Court cannot be exercised as a second appellate jurisdiction and the High Court is required to exercise self-restraint in revisional matters. It is contended that the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any such error and thus in the absence of the same, this Court must refrain from re-examining the facts or re-assessing the concurrent findings. 20. The learned counsel also relied upon the order of this Court passed in Crl.R.P.No.200068/2017 in the case of BABU v. JAVINDRASINGH and also in the case of A. BABU v. MANJAPPA.T reported in MANU/KA/3915/2021, wherein the Courts refrained from interfering with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court. The Hon’ble High Court has specifically noted that there were no factual defects, error of jurisdiction, legal infirmities, or manifest perversities in the findings arrived at by the Trial Court. The Hon’ble High Court has specifically noted that there were no factual defects, error of jurisdiction, legal infirmities, or manifest perversities in the findings arrived at by the Trial Court. It is also contended that the Revisional Court should not dwell into the proportionality of quantum of compensation awarded by the Trial Court. The respondent was contractually liable to pay 18% per annum on the delayed payment, however the Sessions Judge while adjudicating the matter, has duly taken into consideration the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of MAINUDDIN ABDUL SATTAR SHAIKH v. VIJAY D. SALVI reported in (2015) 9 SCC 622 and imposed the interest of 9% per annum. Even if the same is considered, the quantum of compensation aggregate to Rs.36,37,238/- as on 26.03.2015. 21. The learned counsel submits that in the case of KAUSTUBH INFRA SPACE v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND AND OTHERS reported in MANU/JH/0305/2024, the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi observed that in the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2011) SC 745, the Apex Court has considered the provisions relating to compensation and has recorded the finding with regard to discretion to direct payment of compensation. 22. The learned counsel contend that undue leniency should not be shown to the convict, especially in case of concurrent findings and relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of NAGPAL TRADERS v. DAVINDER SINGH reported in (2017) 11 SCC 431 , wherein an observation is made that this Court has on several occasions cautioned the Courts that undue leniency should not be shown to accused facing charges under Section 138 of the NI Act. 23. The learned counsel also produced the tabular representation regarding interest that if it is taken at 18%, it would have been Rs.57,42,469.66/- as on 26.03.2025 and if it is 9%, it would have been Rs.36,37,238.83/- as on 26.03.2025 and if it is twice the cheque amount, it would have been Rs.30,64,016/-. The learned counsel contend that the Revisional Court has also not granted the interest and lesser fine amount is awarded. 24. The learned counsel contend that the Revisional Court has also not granted the interest and lesser fine amount is awarded. 24. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of SRIPATI SINGH (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HIS SON GAURAV SINGH v. STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ANOTHER reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 1002 and relied upon paragraph No.17, wherein it is held that the dishonour of security cheque will attract presumption under Sections 139 and 118 of the NI Act. 25. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of BIR SINGH v. MUKESH KUMAR reported in (2019) 4 SCC 197 regarding presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. The learned counsel also relied upon the order passed by this Court in the case of H.N.RAVI v. GURUVEGOWDA reported in MANU/KA/0310/ 2022 and relied upon paragraph No.21, wherein it is stated that the High Court has got suo-moto powers of enhancement under revision jurisdiction, of course after giving an opportunity of hearing to the accused. 26. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mainuddin Abdul Sattar Shaikh (supra), wherein it is held that compensation should be twice the cheque amount to achieve the object of Chapter XVII of the NI Act, which is to increase the credibility of the instrument. 27. The learned counsel referring these judgments would contend that there are no grounds to invoke the revisional jurisdiction. 28. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Ex.P.22 shows that the payment was made. The learned counsel submits that in the reply notice, the petitioner had asked to furnish the statement, but the respondent has not issued any statement. The learned counsel submits that 11 invoices are for the period from 24.12.2008 to 31.12.2008. The learned counsel submits that the payment was made and difference would be only Rs.6,40,882/-, since they had made the payment of Rs.34 lakhs and odd. The learned counsel contend that even during the course of cross-examination also, it is suggested that liability is only Rs.8 lakhs. 29. The learned counsel submits that the payment was made and difference would be only Rs.6,40,882/-, since they had made the payment of Rs.34 lakhs and odd. The learned counsel contend that even during the course of cross-examination also, it is suggested that liability is only Rs.8 lakhs. 29. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant would contend that power of attorney was given in terms of Ex.P.1 and authorization was given in terms of Ex.P.2 and reply was given in terms of Ex.P.10 and interference of this Court is not required as no case is made out to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. 30. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent and also considering the principles laid down in the judgments relied upon by both the learned counsel and also considering the grounds urged in the criminal revision petition as well as criminal petition, the points that arise for the consideration of this Court are: (i) Whether the Trial Court and the Appellate Court committed an error in not considering the material available on record and whether this Court can exercise the revisional jurisdiction? (ii) What order? Point No.(i): 31. Having considered the material available on record and also the principles laid down in the judgments referred (supra), it is very clear that scope of revision is limited. If any finding is patently error regarding exercising of jurisdiction and the scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction is to examine its correctness, legality and propriety of the order. It is not in dispute that the complainant is represented by its power of attorney holder and he reiterated the contents of the complaint during the course of his evidence and got marked the documents at Exs.P.1 to 23. Ex.P.1 is the power of attorney, Ex.P.2 is the resolution of giving authorization, Ex.P.3 is the cheque, Exs.P.4 and 5 are the bank endorsements, Ex.P.6 is the legal notice and the same was served. Exs.P.7 and 8 are the postal receipts, Ex.P.9 is the postal acknowledgment, Ex.P.10 is the reply notice. It is important to note that Exs.P.11 to 21 are the tax invoices, Ex.P.22 is the statement and the complaint is marked as Ex.P. 23. It is important to note that when the cheque was presented, the same was dishonoured on the ground of insufficient funds. It is important to note that Exs.P.11 to 21 are the tax invoices, Ex.P.22 is the statement and the complaint is marked as Ex.P. 23. It is important to note that when the cheque was presented, the same was dishonoured on the ground of insufficient funds. It is important to note that the main defence of the accused is that the cheque was issued towards security and not legally recoverable debt. Accused No.2 got examined herself as D.W.1 and also relied upon Exs.D.1 to 3. Exs.D.1 and 2 are the letters issued by the complainant with regard to the new year scheme and Ex.D.3 is the letter issued by the accused for closure of account and to furnish the ledger statement. 32. Having perused the material available on record, it is not in dispute that the cheque in question belongs to accused No.2 and the accused also not disputed the signature. The accused also not disputed the issuance of legal notice and also having transaction with the complainant. It is the contention of the accused that some credit notes are not given by the complainant and the entire statement related to accused is not furnished. It is important to note that Exs.P.11 to 21 are the tax invoices and the same are not disputed and those invoices are of different dates. It is not disputed that those invoices are not duly acknowledged by the accused. The invoices disclose that the materials are received by the accused by affixing the signature including the seal of the proprietary concern. It is important to note that the complainant has produced the account statement as per Ex.P.22, which discloses the opening balance and closing balance. Having perused Ex.P.22, the accused was due in a sum Rs.15,32,208/-. The main contention of the accused is also that the credit notes related to the accused was not furnished. It has to be noted that on going through Ex.P.22, each and every transaction that the accused had with the complainant is mentioned. If really the accused is having credit facility, ought to have produced the statement of account maintained by them when the credit facility is availed by the accused from the complainant and no such material is placed before the Court. Per contra, the complainant produced Ex.P.22 and in order to counter the claim of the complainant, nothing is placed on record. Per contra, the complainant produced Ex.P.22 and in order to counter the claim of the complainant, nothing is placed on record. These materials are taken note of by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court while appreciating the material available on record. No doubt, the Revisional Court cannot re- assess the material on record. However, the Court has to take note of whether there is any perversity in the finding and ignored any material available on record while considering the material on record. The scope is also very limited. 33. The principles laid down in the judgments referred supra relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that P.W.1 must have the knowledge about the transaction. The fact that he is the power of attorney is not in dispute since power of attorney was given in terms of Ex.P.1 and authorization was given in terms of Ex.P.2. It is important to note that the transaction between the complainant and the accused is based on the documentary evidence. Exs.P.11 to 21 are the invoices under which the materials are received by the petitioner and the petitioner not disputes the said fact. The only contention is that credit notes were not given. When the invoices Exs.P.11 to 21 are produced and apart from that, the account maintained by the complainant is placed before the Court in terms of Ex.P.22, the very contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the witness P.W.1 is not a competent witness cannot be accepted. P.W.1 has given the evidence based on the documentary evidence on record. It is rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that specific defence was not taken in the reply notice, which is marked as Ex.P.10 that the cheque was given as security and only during the course of cross-examination, the said defence was taken. This reply was given on 02.02.2010 and in the reply notice, except stating that on several occasions request was made to submit the credit notes and statement of account, no such credit notes was given and the same was taken note of by both the Courts. Ex.P.22 is very clear with regard to the transaction and the same is also supported by Exs.P.11 to 21 invoices. Ex.P.22 is very clear with regard to the transaction and the same is also supported by Exs.P.11 to 21 invoices. There is an admission on the part of D.W.1 regarding the signature found on Ex.P.3 and she was the sole propertrix, admitted the invoices and all the invoices bears the seal and signature of Preeti’s and Preeti’s firm was registered under the Sales Tax Rules and categorically admitted that she does not know about the exact amount due from the complainant towards Preeti’s and also admission was given that she can produce the copies of the debit notes submitted to the complainant Company, but the same is not placed on record. All these materials were taken note of by both the Courts and appreciated the same. 34. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of A.C. Narayanan (supra) and other judgments with regard to knowledge of P.W.1 is concerned and when the transaction is not disputed that there was a credit facility and continued the same and signature was admitted on Ex.P.3 and when the cheque was given towards the security also, the very contention of the learned counsel that there was no any liability and to accept the said defence, there is no material on record. Even the principles laid down in the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is also very clear that if no rebuttal evidence under Section 139 of the NI Act as against the claim made by the complainant, the question of disbelieving the case of the complainant does not arise. 35. It is important to note that criminal petition is filed challenging the enhancement of the fine amount. The fact that transaction was taken place in 2009 is not in dispute and also in terms of the account maintained by the complainant, due was more than Rs.15 lakhs and having taken note of the said aspect, the Revisional Court also taken note of the transaction and even considered 9% interest as held by the Apex Court and even not considered 9% of interest in entirety and only directed to pay a fine of Rs.24 lakhs including the cheque amount of Rs.15,42,008/-. The very contention of the petitioner with regard to the cheque was issued towards security and not legally recoverable debt also cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sripati Singh (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, wherein in paragraph No.17 it is held that a cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the state of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow. 36. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bir Singh (supra) is also very clear that presumption is rebuttable and onus lies on the drawer to rebut it by adducing cogent evidence to the contrary and in the case on hand, mere defence was taken that there is no liability. Hence, the very contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that witness P.W.1 is not competent and ought not to have convicted cannot be accepted. It is also well settled that High Court has got suo- moto powers of enhancement under revision jurisdiction, of course after giving an opportunity of hearing to the accused. Hence, the very contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that witness P.W.1 is not competent and ought not to have convicted cannot be accepted. It is also well settled that High Court has got suo- moto powers of enhancement under revision jurisdiction, of course after giving an opportunity of hearing to the accused. The Revisional Court also having taken note of the material available on record and transaction was taken place in 2009 and liability is also of 2009, while disposing of the revision petition taken note of the said fact into consideration and directed to pay the fine of Rs.24 lakhs as against the order of the Trial Court, wherein only cheque amount was ordered to be paid and while exercising the revisional powers taken note of the judgment of the Apex Court. When such being the case, I do not find any error on the part of the Trial Court and the Revisional Court in appreciating the material available on record. Hence, no grounds are made out to exercise the revisional jurisdiction to come to other conclusion having considered the grounds urged in the revision petition as well as the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra. Hence, I answer the point in the negative. Point No.(ii): 37. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER The criminal revision petition and criminal petition are dismissed.