ORDER : Per : Justice Binod Kumar Dwivedi This writ appeal under Section 2 of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been filed assailing the order dated 09/02/2007 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.6116/2003 (O.A.No.40/1999), whereby the writ petition has been dismissed. 02. The appellant/petitioner was appointed as a Police Constable on 18/08/1992 and posted in DRP Lines, Khargone. While undergoing training at Tigra (Gwalior) he was served with letter dated 24/03/1994, wherein he was given one month notice and his services were terminated w.e.f. 12/05/1994 under Rule 12 of the M.P. Civil Services Temporary Government Servants Rules, 1960. 03. The said termination order was challenged before the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal by the appellant in O.A.No.1028/94 during the pendency of which he remained unemployed and which was ultimately decided by order dated 24/06/1997, wherein his O.A. was allowed and his termination order was quashed and direction to reinstate him was issued and though the appellant was entitled for back-wages from the date of termination from service i.e. 12/05/1994 till his reinstatement on 30/06/1997 the tribunal only advised the department to consider his case for payment of back-wages and granted liberty to the department to initiate enquiry and to proceed in accordance with law regarding the alleged misconduct and thus, creating further barrier for smooth carrier of the appellant. 04. Pursuant to the liberty granted by the Tribunal, a charge-sheet dated 13.07.1998 was issued to the appellant under Police Regulations 64(5) and 64(11) alleging three charges: (i) Unauthorized absence from duty on 11.02.1994, (ii) Indecent behavior with a woman (Halimabi, wife of Maksud Khan), (iii) Misbehavior and assault with Halimabi and other family members. The charges stemmed from a personal neighbourhood dispute relating to drainage water and not from any act committed during the discharge of official duties. 05. The appellant denied the charges in his written defence asserting that the alleged incident never occurred and that he had not participated in any quarrel and that he was not informed as to who had been appointed as the enquiry officer and was also denied a defence assistant. The enquiry officer conducted the inquiry without appointment of a Presentation Officer and no preliminary statements of witnesses were supplied to the appellant and their testimonies were also recorded in his absence. The enquiry officer conducted the inquiry without appointment of a Presentation Officer and no preliminary statements of witnesses were supplied to the appellant and their testimonies were also recorded in his absence. The appellant contended that the departmental enquiry stood vitiated due to violation of principles of natural justice and procedural lapses. 06. The enquiry officer submitted his report finding the appellant guilty of all charges and issued a show cause notice subsequent to which a final order of removal from service was passed by respondent No.3 / Superintendent of Police, Khargone on 26/10/1998. Aggrieved the appellant filed an departmental appeal which was also rejected by respondent No.2 / DIG, Indore Zone by order dated 15/12/1998 without granting an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. 07. The appellant thereafter, approached the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A.No.40/1999 challenging the orders dated 26/10/1998 and 15/12/1998 which upon the abolition of the M.P. State Administrative Tribunal stood transferred to this Court and was registered as W.P.No. 6116/2003 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by impugned order dated 09/02/2007. 08. The writ court held that the Departmental Enquiry had been conducted in accordance with procedure and that no serious prejudice had been caused to the appellant. The writ Court observed that the charges were duly proved in the enquiry and that the petitioner had fully participated in the proceedings, including cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. 09. The argument that the Departmental Enquiry was vitiated for want of criminal prosecution under Police Regulation 234 was also rejected by the writ Court with the observation that the continuation of disciplinary action was not dependent upon initiation of criminal proceedings and that the charges although involving private misconduct were unbecoming of a police constable and warranted disciplinary action. 10. The writ court dismissed the contention of the appellant that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate and held that the penalty of dismissal was justified and not warranted any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has preferred the present writ appeal seeking quashment of impugned orders along with consequential benefits. 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that Halimabi has lodged a forged report only against the appellant, which was not proved as Halimabi was not examined in the inquiry initiated against the appellant. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has preferred the present writ appeal seeking quashment of impugned orders along with consequential benefits. 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submits that Halimabi has lodged a forged report only against the appellant, which was not proved as Halimabi was not examined in the inquiry initiated against the appellant. Material discrepancies appeared in the statement of witnesses during inquiry were ignored for holding the appellant guilty. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision in the case of State of M. P. Vs. Banesingh reported in (1991) 16 ATC 514 (S) to bolster his point that main charge is not relating to official duties. Appellant could not have been removed from the service due to private dispute between the neighbours. Learned Single Judge has erred in holding that the appellant was not entitle for back-wages from 12/05/1994 to 30/06/1997, which have been illegally denied. On these submissions, learned counsel for the appellant prays for allowing the appeal and granting the reliefs as claimed in OA / WP. 12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents supporting the impugned order submitted that the appellant was in police service where it is expected from him to be more cautious and in more discipline than the public in general. He took up a quarrel with the complainant during duty hours, therefore, due inquiry was initiated and concluded and on the basis of the evidence available on record, he was held guilty for misconduct and therefore, he was removed from service. The aforesaid order has been upheld by the appellate Court. Hence, no interference is warranted. 13. Heard and considered the rival submissions raised at bar by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 14. From perusal of the record, it is apparent that as per Annex.-A/3, which is charge shee in the Departmental Enquiry, three charges were framed against the appellant, which are as under:- 15. So far as the charge No.2 is concerned, no cogent evidence is available on record to prove that the appellant has outraged the modesty of sister-in-law (Bhabhi) of Maqsood S/o Hanif Khan. So far as the charge No.2 is concerned, no cogent evidence is available on record to prove that the appellant has outraged the modesty of sister-in-law (Bhabhi) of Maqsood S/o Hanif Khan. In respect of other charges i.e. Charge No.1 and 3 with regard to leaving police lines without permissions and thereby committing an act of indiscipline in violation of para 64(5) of Police Regulation and hurling filthy abuses and assaulting Maqsood and his sister Halima are not of very grievous nature. 16. It is also be kept in view that the appellant at the time of alleged incident was engaged as newly recruited in the police service. This point should have kept in view before passing the major penalty of removal from service. Disciplinary Authority as well as Appellate Authority have not kept in view the aforesaid. 17. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Chief Executive Officer, Krishna District Cooperative Central Bank Limited and Another Vs. K. Hanumantha Rao and Another reported in (2017) 2 SCC 525 in para 7.3 has held as under: “7.3. The impugned order is also faulted for the reason that it is not the function of the High Court to impose a particular punishment even in those cases where it was found that penalty awarded by the employer is shockingly disproportionate. In such a case, the matter could, at the best, be remanded to the disciplinary authority for imposition of lesser punishment leaving it to such authority to consider as to which lesser penalty needs to be inflicted upon the delinquent employee. No doubt, the administrative authority has to exercise its powers reasonably. However, the doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority. The Court must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Anr. v. Rajendra Singh [ (2013) 12 SCC 372 ], this principle is formulated in the following manner: (SCC pp. 380-81, paras 13-14) “13. Indubitably, the well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to a delinquent employee keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee. 380-81, paras 13-14) “13. Indubitably, the well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to a delinquent employee keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee. Courts cannot assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra [ (1999) 1 SCC 759 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 405] this principle was explained in the following manner: (SCC p. 773, para 22) “22...The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. … The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone.” 14. Yet again, in State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak [ (2008) 7 SCC 580 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 431], this Court reiterated the law by stating: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 14 and 17) “14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope of interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. * 17. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this case, has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the appellate authority to impose any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background, the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted.” 18. In the considered view of this Court, removal of the appellant from service, for the charge mentioned hereinabove though found proved, is disproportionate. Learned Single Judge has lost sight of the aforesaid fact by dismissing the writ petition in observing that along with charge of absence from duty, appellant / petitioner has been found guilty of any unbecoming act with the ladies. 19. Resultantly, this writ appeal has substance, succeeds and is hereby allowed by setting aside the order dated 09/02/2007 passed by learned Single Judge along with the order of termination passed against the appellant dated 26/10/1998 (Annex.-A/2) and order passed in appeal dated 15/12/1998 (Annex.-A/1) by the Appellate Authority rejecting the appeal. 20. It is directed that the Disciplinary Authority after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant on the point of sentence shall pass a fresh order by inflicting lesser punishment than removing the appellant from service within a period of 90 days from the date of passing of this order. 21. Accordingly, writ appeal allowed and disposed off. 20. It is directed that the Disciplinary Authority after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant on the point of sentence shall pass a fresh order by inflicting lesser punishment than removing the appellant from service within a period of 90 days from the date of passing of this order. 21. Accordingly, writ appeal allowed and disposed off. Certified copy as per rules.