JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. By way of instant petition, petitioners have prayed for following substantive relief(s): “That the respondents may be directed to regularize the services of the applicants on completion of three years of service with all consequential benefits.” 2. Petitioners were appointed as Computer Operators on contract basis in Sutlej Valley Watershed Development Society (for short “Society”) in the month of March 2004. The Society was closed vide notification dated 05.05.2012 and consequently the services of petitioners also came to end w.e.f. 30.06.2012. 3. Thereafter, petitioners were engaged by respondent No. 3 as computer operators on contract basis and were deputed with Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority (for short, “CAMPA”). Petitioners are continuing to work in the same capacity till now. 4. Petitioners are seeking regularization of their services on completion of three years of contract service with respondents under the regularization policy of the State Government dated 04.05.2017 (A-7). 5. The specific case of the petitioners is that after closure of project their services have been utilized by respondents through respondent No. 3 on contractual basis. The contract for such purpose was entered into between the petitioners and the 3rd respondent. 6. Respondents have contested the claim of the petitioners on the ground that the petitioners have been re-engaged under CAMPA on contract basis w.e.f. 05.02.2013 and as per Clause-6 of the contract signed by the petitioners, it was made clear that their appointment was non-governmental. Further by making reference to Caluse-9 of the contract, it has been asserted that the petitioners had entered into a contract by agreeing not to claim any right for regular employment. The facts with respect to initial engagement of petitioners as Computer Operators on contract basis in the society and the closure of the society have not been denied. 7. Respondents have further submitted that the CAMPA is a also society constituted for the implementation of Catchment Area Treatment Plans (CAT Plans) for various Hydro Electric Projects being executed in Sutlej Valley Basin. The services of petitioners are stated to be governed by the bye laws of CAMPA. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case carefully. 9. Noticeably, petitioners are not seeking any benefit of service rendered by them in the society. The services of petitioners are stated to be governed by the bye laws of CAMPA. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record of the case carefully. 9. Noticeably, petitioners are not seeking any benefit of service rendered by them in the society. They are placing reliance on the communication dated 04.05.2017 (A-7), addressed by Additional Chief Secretary (Personnel) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, whereby the decision of the government to regularize the services of those contractual appointees who had completed three years continuous services as on 31.03.2017, had been conveyed. Petitioners claimed that since, they had also completed three years continuous services on contract with respondents, they were also entitled to be regularized on completion of period of three years. 10. The only objection of respondents is that because the services of the petitioners have been engaged for the CAMPA, hence communication dated 04.05.2017, was not applicable to them. 11. In order to assess the true nature of the services of petitioners, it is necessary to have a glance at relevant material available on record as under: 11.1 On 17.05.2012, a communication was sent by DFO CAT Plan, Nichar at Rampur to Member Secretary of the Society-cum-Conservator of Forests, Rampur seeking guidance as to how the staff engaged in the project after its closure was to be treated. It was highlighted that the staff in the project was engaged due to shortage of departmental staff posted in CAMPA. The availability of funds to engage contractual staff under various ongoing CAT Plans was also mentioned. It was stated that the fund transferred to society had earned interest of about Rs. 1 Crore, which could be utilized to re-engage the staff of the society in CAMPA. As per said communication, it was further made clear that out of total capital outlay of Rs. 132 Crores for 8 CAT Plans being implemented in the jurisdiction of Rampur Circle, Rs. 69 Crores were still lying unutilized. Six more CAT Plans were also stated to be in the pipeline for implementation. The life span of CAT Plans was estimated for about next ten years. 132 Crores for 8 CAT Plans being implemented in the jurisdiction of Rampur Circle, Rs. 69 Crores were still lying unutilized. Six more CAT Plans were also stated to be in the pipeline for implementation. The life span of CAT Plans was estimated for about next ten years. 11.2 Noticeably, the duties performed by petitioners in the society were described as preparation of computerized forms; monthly, quarterly and annual progress report of CAT Plans; preparation of account and summary of funds utilized; preparation /compilation of APOs of CAT plans; reconciliation of progress of fund with POs of the society; preparation of balance sheets and documentation of work executed etc. besides other routine office work assigned to them by Project Officers. Thus, as per DFO CAT Plan, Nichar, at Rampur, since the Computer Operators i.e. the petitioners were looking after CAT Plan works in the society, therefore, in their absence the work of CAT plans would suffer badly. The importance of the experience gained by the petitioners while working in the society was also highlighted. 12. Thus, it is clearly evident that the necessity of engaging petitioners for successful operation of CAT Plan was there. Even the funds were available and the qualifications of the petitioners was also not in question. 13. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (HoFF) H.P. vide communication dated 25.05.2017 (A-5) recommended to the Additional Chief Secretary (Forests), the case of the petitioners for regularization against vacant posts of Clerk by giving justification for such recommendation. It was stated that the petitioners had been engaged on contract basis after proper interview. They were sponsored candidates of respective employment exchanges. The petitioners had rendered almost 14 years of continuous service under the project and CAMPA. It was also underlined that the petitioners were between the age of 35 to 45 years and they were the bread earner for their families. 14. The Special Secretary (Forests) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, vide communication dated 05.09.2017, rejected the recommendation of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (HoFF) in following terms:- “ I am directed to refer to your letter No. Ft. HB(15) 437 Vol. II (E-III) dated 25.05.2017, on the subject cited above and to say that the contractual employees (Computer Operators) engaged in CAT Plan/CAMPA under CCF Rampur belong to the Society/Projects. Hence, not eligible for regularization in the Government Department.” 15. HB(15) 437 Vol. II (E-III) dated 25.05.2017, on the subject cited above and to say that the contractual employees (Computer Operators) engaged in CAT Plan/CAMPA under CCF Rampur belong to the Society/Projects. Hence, not eligible for regularization in the Government Department.” 15. Though, the initial recruitment of petitioners was under the society and after closure of society they were engaged to serve CAMPA, can it be said that the respondents owe no legal duty to grant permanence to the jobs of petitioners after utilizing their services for about 22 years. The answer, in my considered view has to be against the respondents for the reasons detailed hereafter. 16. Admittedly, since long now the State Government has resorted to initial mode of recruitment through contract employment and it is thereafter that the contract employees are regularized after putting in certain years of continuous service as per the norms applicable from time to time. 17. The petitioners have been performing the same functions while being engaged for CAMPA as they were performing in the society. They are catering to the requirement of CAT Plans being executed by the respondents. The necessity of such plans had arisen on account of large number of Hydro Electric Projects executed in Sutlej Valley Basin. The functions being discharged through CAT Plans are purely governmental functions. The governmental functions being discharged through CAT Plans cannot be given any other parlance simply because such functions have been executed/performed through one or the other society. 18. In the given circumstances, it will be not be inappropriate to hold that the society or the CAMPA are nothing but extended wings of the government. Their substantial funding and management are by the government. 19. Significantly, the CAT Plans have been in operation since the formation of the society in the year 2002 and are still in operation, though now through CAMPA. It means that the engagement of petitioners has been to perform such functions which are permanent in nature. 20. The question, thus, arises whether the treatment of petitioners as a different class than the contractual employees engaged in different departments and other authorities of the State is legal and justified? The answer, in my considered view, has to be in negative. 21. Since, the petitioners for all intents and purposes have been engaged to discharge governmental functions, their status cannot be different than other contractual employees of the State Government. The answer, in my considered view, has to be in negative. 21. Since, the petitioners for all intents and purposes have been engaged to discharge governmental functions, their status cannot be different than other contractual employees of the State Government. The initial recruitment of petitioners on contract basis and the longevity of continuous service are the facts which admittedly have taken place. It is not the case of respondents that the benefit of the communication dated 04.05.2017 has not been extended to the contractual employees engaged in other departments of the State Government. 22. Viewed from another angle, it can clearly be inferred from the facts of the case that the respondents have provided petitioners with varied reasons to entertain legitimate expectations that the services of petitioners would be granted permanency at some stage. As noticed above, petitioners have now been working for about 21 years and discharging governmental functions. This could not have been possible except the implied concurrence of the State. In other words, the State Government allowed the petitioners to reach that stage of life where they cannot even turn around and have some other occupation for livelihood. They have their families to support. The state action in denying the petitioners the benefit of regularisation of services at par with other contractual employees employed by it clearly sounds antithetical to the concept of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 23. As expounded in State of Jharkhand and Ors. Vs. Brahmputra Mettalics Ltd. (2020) 13 SCALE 500 , the concept of legitimate expectation in the context of India is as under: - “40. Under Indian Law, there is often a conflation between the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. This has been described in Jain and Jain's well known treatise, Principles of Administrative Law: “At times, the expressions ‘legitimate expectation’ and ‘promissory estoppel’ are used interchangeably, but that is not a correct usage because ‘legitimate expectation’ is a concept much broader in scope than ‘promissory estoppel’. … A reading of the relevant Indian cases, however, exhibit some confusion of ideas. It seems that the judicial thinking has not as yet crystallised as regards the nature and scope of the doctrine. At times, it has been referred to as merely a procedural doctrine; at times, it has been treated interchangeably as promissory estoppel. However, both these ideas are incorrect. It seems that the judicial thinking has not as yet crystallised as regards the nature and scope of the doctrine. At times, it has been referred to as merely a procedural doctrine; at times, it has been treated interchangeably as promissory estoppel. However, both these ideas are incorrect. As stated above, legitimate expectation is a substantive doctrine as well and has much broader scope than promissory estoppel. … In Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India , the Supreme Court has observed in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation: “the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted as part of our law and that the decision maker can normally be compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the expectation based on previous practice or past conduct unless some overriding public interest comes in the way Reliance must have been placed on the said representation and the representee must have thereby suffered detriment.” It is suggested that this formulation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation is not correct as it makes “legitimate expectation” practically synonymous with promissory estoppel. Legitimate expectation may arise from conduct of the authority; a promise is not always necessary for the purpose.” 41. While this doctrinal confusion has the unfortunate consequence of making the law unclear, citizens have been the victims. Representations by public authorities need to be held to scrupulous standards, since citizens continue to live their lives based on the trust they repose in the State. In the commercial world also, certainty and consistency are essential to planning the affairs of business. When public authorities fail to adhere to their representations without providing an adequate reason to the citizens for this failure, it violates the trust reposed by citizens in the State. The generation of a business friendly climate for investment and trade is conditioned by the faith which can be reposed in government to fulfil the expectations which it generates. Professors Jain and Deshpande characterize the consequences of this doctrinal confusion in the following terms: “Thus, in India, the characterization of legitimate expectations is on a weaker footing, than in jurisdictions like UK where the courts are now willing to recognize the capacity of public law to absorb the moral values underlying the notion of estoppel in the light of the evolution of doctrines like LE [Legitimate Expectations] and abuse of power. If the Supreme Court of India has shown its creativity in transforming the notion of promissory estoppel from the limitations of private law, then it does not stand to reason as to why it should also not articulate and evolve the doctrine of LE for judicial review of resilement of administrative authorities from policies and longstanding practices. If such a notion of LE is adopted, then not only would the Court be able to do away with the artificial hierarchy between promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, but, it would also be able to hold the administrative authorities to account on the footing of public law outside the zone of promises on a stronger and principled anvil. Presently, in the absence of a like doctrine to that of promissory estoppel outside the 31 promissory zone, the administrative law adjudication of resilement of policies stands on a shaky public law foundation.” 42. We shall therefore attempt to provide a cogent basis for the doctrine of legitimate expectation, which is not merely grounded on analogy with the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The need for this doctrine to have an independent existence was articulated by Justice Frankfurter of the United State Supreme Court in Vitarelli v. Seton: “An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.” 43. However, before we do this, it is important to clarify the understanding of the doctrine of legitimate expectation in previous judgments of this Court. In National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan (“National Buildings Construction Corpn.”), a three Judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice S. Saghir Ahmad, held that: “18. The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of “legitimate expectation” was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. But claims based on “legitimate expectation” have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.” (emphasis supplied) 44. However, it is important to note that this observation was made by this Court while discussing the ambit of the doctrine of legitimate expectation under English Law, as it stood then. As we have discussed earlier, there was a substantial conflation or overlap between the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel even under English Law since the former was often invoked as being analogous to the latter. However, since then and since the judgment of this Court in National Buildings Construction Corporation (supra), the English Law in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation has evolved. More specifically, it has actively tried to separate the two doctrines and to situate the doctrine of legitimate expectations on a broader footing. In Regina (Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) v. East Sussex County Council3, the House of Lords has held thus “33 In any case, I think that it is unhelpful to introduce private law concepts of estoppel into planning law. As Lord Scarman pointed out in Newbury District Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] A.C. 578, 616, estoppels bind individuals on the ground that it would be unconscionable for them to deny what they have represented or agreed. But these concepts of private law should not be extended into “the public law of planning control, which binds everyone”. (See also Dyson J in R v. Leicester City Council, Ex p Powergen UK Ltd. [2000] JPL 629, 637.) 34. But these concepts of private law should not be extended into “the public law of planning control, which binds everyone”. (See also Dyson J in R v. Leicester City Council, Ex p Powergen UK Ltd. [2000] JPL 629, 637.) 34. There is of course an analogy between a private law estoppel and the public law concept of a legitimate expectation created by a public authority, the denial of which may amount to an abuse of power… But it is no more 33 than an analogy because remedies against public authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public which the authority exists to promote. Public law can also take into account the hierarchy of individual rights which exist under the Human Rights Act 1998, so that, for example, the individual's right to a home is accorded a high degree of protection (see Coughlan's case, at pp 254-255) while ordinary property rights are in general far more limited by considerations of public interest : see R ( Alconbury Developments Ltd) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389. 35 It is true that in early cases such as the Wells case [1967] 1 WLR 1000 and Lever Finance Ltd. v. Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 Q.B. 222, Lord Denning MR used the language of estoppel in relation to planning law. At that time the public law concepts of abuse of power and legitimate expectation were very undeveloped and no doubt the analogy of estoppel seemed useful…..It seems to me that in this area, public law has already absorbed whatever is useful from the moral values which underlie the private law concept of estoppel and the time has come for it to stand upon its own two feet.” (emphasis supplied) 45. In a concurring opinion in Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India (“Monnet Ispat”), Justice H.L. Gokhale highlighted the different considerations that underlie the doctrines of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. The learned judge held that for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, there has to be a promise, based on which the promisee has acted to its prejudice. In contrast, while applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the primary considerations are reasonableness and fairness of the State action. He observed thus: “Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations 289. The learned judge held that for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, there has to be a promise, based on which the promisee has acted to its prejudice. In contrast, while applying the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the primary considerations are reasonableness and fairness of the State action. He observed thus: “Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations 289. As we have seen earlier, for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel there has to be a promise, and on that basis the party concerned must have acted to its prejudice. In the instant case it was only a proposal, and it was very much made clear that it was to be approved by the Central Government, prior whereto it could not be construed as containing a promise. Besides, equity cannot be used against a statutory provision or notification. 290…..In any case, in the absence of any promise, the Appellants including Aadhunik cannot claim promissory estoppel in the teeth of the notifications issued under the relevant statutory powers. Alternatively, the Appellants are trying to make a case under the doctrine of legitimate expectations. The basis of this doctrine is in reasonableness and fairness. However, it can also not be invoked where the decision of the public authority is founded in a provision of law, and is in consonance with public interest.” (emphasis supplied) 46. In Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary, speaking through Chief Justice T.S. Thakur, the Court discussed the decision in Monnet Ispat (supra) and noted its reliance on the judgment in Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn. It then observed: “This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well- known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.” 47. Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 48. Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. 48. As regards the relationship between Article 14 and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, a three judge Bench in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries , speaking through Justice J.S. Verma, held thus: “7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law : A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is ‘fairplay in action’. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. 8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary 36 concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision- making process. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision- making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.” (emphasis supplied) 49. More recently, in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. v. NOIDA, a two-judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice B.S. Chauhan, elaborated on this relationship in the following terms: “39. State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of a “democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination”. The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. …. 41. Power vested by the State in a public authority should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. “Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them.” A decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, “in good faith” means “for legitimate reasons”. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, “in good faith” means “for legitimate reasons”. It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other...]” (emphasis supplied) 50. As such, we can see that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is one of the ways in which the guarantee of non-arbitrariness enshrined under Article 14 finds concrete expression.” 24. The above view in Brahmaputra Metallics has further been approved by a three judges bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.U. Tayyaba Vs. Union of India (2023) 5 SCC 688 . 25. The only reasons assigned by the respondents to deny regularization to the petitioners is their engagement for CAMPA, which cannot be validated being in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The act of respondents is clearly unfair and arbitrary and thus, discriminatory. 26. In result, the petition is allowed. Respondents are directed to regularize the services of the petitioners in terms of communication dated 04.05.2017 (A-7) on completion of three years from the date of their respective contractual engagements by respondent No. 3. Petitioners have approached the Court in the year 2017 itself, therefore, they will also be entitled to all consequential benefits flowing from the date of regularization of their respective services. 27. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.