ORDER : Suraj Govindaraj, J. A Background A Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioner B Submissions on Behalf of Respondent Nos.1 and 2 C Submissions on Behalf of Respondent No. 3 D Points for Consideration E Whether the decision of the learned Trial Court dated 30.03.2013 is binding upon the Respondent No.3-Authority and subsequently the Disciplinary Committee? F Whether the Disciplinary Proceedings initiated by Respondent No.3-Authority can run parallelly to the criminal proceedings before the learned Trial Court? G Whether the recommendation letter dated 03.09.2014 issued by Respondent No.1- Upa-lokayukta and the subsequent entrustment of investigation to the Additional Registrar Enquiries, Karnataka Lokayukta can be held to be valid in law? H Whether the decision taken by the Respondent No.3-Board Committee dated 18.03.2015 dismissing the Petitioner from service, requires any interference at the hands of this Court? I Answer to Point No.5: What order? A. Background 1. The Petitioner is before this Court seeking for the following reliefs: (i) Call for the records relating to the Enquiry report dated: 30-08-2014 passed by the 2nd Respondent in No.Lok/ARE-3/ENQ-33/2010 Vide Annexure: A, the recommendation letter dated: 03/09/2014 issued by the Respondent No.1 in No.Lok/ARE-3/ENQ-33/2010 Vide Annexure: B and the decision taken by the 3rd Respondent Board committee meeting for dismissal of the Petitioner, in the Board Meeting which was held on 18-03-2015 in Subject No.92/21 vide. Annexure-C. (ii) Issue any appropriate order or direction or a Writ in the nature of Certiorari and to quash Enquiry report dated 30-08-2014 passed by the Respondent No.2 in No.Lok/ARE-3/ENQ-33/2010 Vide Annexure: A , the recommendation letter dated: 03/09/2014 issued by the Respondent No.1 in No.Lok/ARE-3/ENQ-33/2010 Vide Annexure: B and also the decision taken by the 3rd Respondent Board committee meeting for dismissal of the Petitioner, in the Board Meeting which was held on 18/03/2015 in subject No.92/21 vide Annexure-C (iii) G rant such other relief or relief’s as this Hon’ble Court deems fit to grant on the facts and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity. 2. The Petitioner joined the services of Respondent no.3 authority – Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited (KPTCL), in the year 2007 to the post of ‘Assistant Executive Engineer’ (in short: ‘AEE’ ) and came to be posted as the AEE to the O&M Sub-Division, BESCOM, Gudibande Taluk. 3. 2. The Petitioner joined the services of Respondent no.3 authority – Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited (KPTCL), in the year 2007 to the post of ‘Assistant Executive Engineer’ (in short: ‘AEE’ ) and came to be posted as the AEE to the O&M Sub-Division, BESCOM, Gudibande Taluk. 3. The Petitioner claims that he was a sincere and honest employee and discharged his duties with utmost integrity. 4. One Sri. Devaraj (hereinafter referred to as ‘ Complainant ’) is an Electrical Contractor and a resident of Varalakonda Village, Somenahalli Hobli, Gudibande Taluk, who conducts the business of installing electrical connections and wiring works for residential customers. 5. In the complaint dated 28.12.2007, it is stated that the complainant approached the Petitioner – AEE to grant approvals for three applications for electrical connections to the Secretary, Varlakonda Village Panchayath, Sri. Krishnappa s/o Narayanappa of Balenahalli and Sri. Shivanna s/o Nanjappa of Polampalli. In furtherance of the same, the Petitioner is claimed to have demanded a bribe of Rs. 500/- for each application, amounting to a total of Rs. 1500/- for the approval and issuance of electrical connections to the aforesaid applicants. 6. The complainant held back from conforming to this demand, and he reached out to the Karnataka Lokayukta Police, Chickaballapur District and filed a complaint against the alleged demands of the Petitioner, following which a ‘trap’ came to be set up by the Lokayukta Police wherein the Petitioner is alleged to have been caught red-handed accepting a bribe of Rs. 1500/- from the complainant, consisting of three Rs. 500 notes i.e. 500x3=1500/-. 7. Thereafter, an FIR came to be registered in Crime No. 2/2007 against the Petitioner under Sections 7 & 13 (i)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘ PC Act ’ for brevity) and subsequently a criminal case was instituted in the file of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Chikkaballapur numbered as PCACC01/2009. 8. The Petitioner pleaded ‘Not Guilty’ and contended that the said money received was in furtherance of securing monies that were lent as a loan to the complainant previously for personal reasons, and in that background, a trial was conducted and the Ld. The Trial Court acquitted the Accused/Petitioner vide order dated 30.03.2013, on the ground that the alleged act of the Accused/Petitioner was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, amongst other reasons. 9. The Trial Court acquitted the Accused/Petitioner vide order dated 30.03.2013, on the ground that the alleged act of the Accused/Petitioner was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, amongst other reasons. 9. Parallelly, during the pendency of the said case before the learned Trial Court, the Lokayukta Police vide communication dated 10.11.2009 to the Respondent No.3 authority – KPTCL urged for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner in accordance with Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as ‘KL Act’ for brevity) and subsequently entrusted the enquiry to the Lokayukta Police. 10. The KPTCL, by its order dated 04.02.2010, held the Petitioner to be a Delinquent Government Officer (DGO), initiated a departmental inquiry and handed over the inquiry to the Hon’ble Upa-lokayukta, who subsequently vide the order dated 11.08.2010 nominated Respondent No.2 - Additional Registrar of Enquires – 3 as the Inquiry Officer for the same. 11. The enquiry having been carried out, a report dated30.08.2014 was filed by Respondent No.2, holding the Petitioner to be guilty of the charged offence, and the Hon’ble Upa-lokayukta recommended Respondent No.3-authority vide letter dated 03.09.2014 to dismiss the Petitioner from service. Further, the KPTCL, on the recommendation of the said report, issued an order dated 07.05.2015 dismissing the Petitioner from service. 12. It is impugning the enquiry report of Respondent No.2 dated 30.08.2014, the letter of recommendation by Respondent No.1 dated 03.09.2014 and the order of dismissal by Respondent No.3 dated 18.03.2015, the Petitioner is before this Court. A. Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioner 13. Sri.S.Kalyan Basavaraj, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, would submit that: 13.1. Not only are the findings of Respondent No.2 -Authority perverse and ignorant of the relevant evidence on record, Respondent No.3 – KPTCL, without any application of mind, has mechanically dismissed the Petitioner from service based on the enquiry report and recommendation submitted by the Upalokayukta and as such has abdicated its legal duties as a ‘Disciplinary Authority’. 13.2. Both criminal proceedings before the Trial Court and the departmental proceedings before the concerned authority have been conducted based on the same set of common facts, circumstances and witnesses. 13.2. Both criminal proceedings before the Trial Court and the departmental proceedings before the concerned authority have been conducted based on the same set of common facts, circumstances and witnesses. The learned Trial Court, having come to the conclusion that the allegations against the Petitioner have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it was incumbent upon Respondent No.3 to have considered the same before passing such adverse orders, which indicates the ‘Double Standards’ employed by the enquiry authority. 13.3. Respondent No.3, though having relied upon the same set of documents that were considered by the Trial Court, has strangely rejected the judgement of the Trial Court by holding that the deposition of PW-1 in the criminal proceedings cannot be considered in departmental enquiry proceedings. 13.4. The criminal case, having concluded much before the disciplinary proceedings, it is legally binding on Respondent No.2 to consider and appreciate the evidence of the complainant in the said criminal case. 13.5. He further submits that the findings of the Trial Court are binding on the disciplinary proceedings, more so in the background of the Trial Court having delved in-depth to ascertain the facts of the matter and the acquittal of the Petitioner in that regard should have also followed suit in the disciplinary proceedings. 13.6. The enquiry authority has erred in not noticing the humanitarian ground upon which the Petitioner had lent the said monies to the complainant, on his request upon the death of his relative and the subsequent inability to travel back to his native place. 13.7. The Petitioner, having lent monies amounting to Rs.1,500/, was only receiving back his monies when the alleged payment of the bribe was made by the complainant. He states that the money given by the complainant was not a bribe but instead the returning of the money loaned to him by the kind gesture of the Petitioner. 13.8. The enquiring authority, having taken a stand that this claim of the Petitioner is contradictory to the statement of the complainant, stating to have been warned to pay bribes for the electrical instalments, is completely baseless and without application of mind. 13.9. 13.8. The enquiring authority, having taken a stand that this claim of the Petitioner is contradictory to the statement of the complainant, stating to have been warned to pay bribes for the electrical instalments, is completely baseless and without application of mind. 13.9. The Petitioner having no avenue but to repeatedly demand the repayment of the lent monies has led the complainant to develop a grouse against him coupled with the fact that the complainant’s inability to secure electrical installations due to non-fulfilment of required formalities (Ex-D1 & D2), the complainant has just utilised the situation of repayment as an opportunity to implicate the Petitioner in a false case and satisfy his revengeful intentions. 13.10. The Lokayukta police, no-where have succeeded in proving that the amount of Rs.1500/- paid by the complainant to the Petitioner on the day of the said trap was not in pursuance of the repayment of the loan by the complainant, both in the criminal case and in the disciplinary proceedings. 13.11. The Petitioner, both before the criminal Court and the disciplinary authority, has brought to its notice the incomplete applications filed by the complainant-electrical contractor for want of connections. Required material aspects in the application having been left blank, it was his duty not to oblige and approve the said applications and instead issued a notice to the complainant in this regard. (Annexures-R & P). 13.12. The enquiry authority not only wilfully disbelieves this statement but also fails to take note of the complainant himself admitting to the issuance of such a notice during the disciplinary proceedings. 13.13. On this aspect, the learned Judge of Trial Court at para 44 of the judgement has held as under: "...Coming to ExD-1, it was so got marked in the evidence of Pw9, who had placed a charge sheet. As per Ex.D1 it is clear that, the defects found in the application of Krishnappa, Shivanna and Secretary of Varlakunda panchayath were pointed out, and those persons were required to comply with the same. Since, compliance has not been proved by the Prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, it is difficult to hold that, those there applications were ready, so as to except, accused to do his part of work without expecting any gratification. Therefore, on this aspect also Prosecution should fail ". 13.14. Since, compliance has not been proved by the Prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, it is difficult to hold that, those there applications were ready, so as to except, accused to do his part of work without expecting any gratification. Therefore, on this aspect also Prosecution should fail ". 13.14. He further states that the complainant himself had admitted to the loan transaction and claimed repayment of the same, which had been made through a friend of his, prior to the date of the trap and was under the impression such repayment had been made. (Annexure-N) 13.15. The criminal Court has rightly appreciated that the complainant had accepted the said loan transaction, his subsequent attempt to escape from the liability of his statement by claiming the repayment via a friend and the co-relation to the statement of the Petitioner that he made repeated demands for repayment of the loaned monies. 13.16. In the deposition of the complainant before the criminal Court and as well as the disciplinary authority, he has stated to have given two currency notes, i.e. Rs.1,000/- and Rs.500/- denominations, respectively (Annexure-H). Whereas the Prosecution before both the forums has stated that the three currency notes were tendered as the alleged bribe i.e. Rs.500/-denomination each. 13.17. The enquiry authority at the very threshold ought to have disbelieved the case of the Lokayukta on the said ground alone. Further, in the examination-in-chief, the complainant states to have paid the bribe by way of two (2) currency notes and in the subsequent further examination-in-chief, he changes the version as payment of bribe made was in three (3) currency notes and once again in the cross- examination states to have paid the alleged bribe by way of two (2) currency notes. Thus, the mahazars in Annexures-L & M lose all credence and cannot be appreciated as evidence. 13.18. This serious contradiction wholly rejects the claims of bribery by the Respondents, and the enquiry authority has ignored this aspect of the judgement of the Trial Court, which goes to the very root of the veracity of this case and has totally been ignored by the Respondent No.2-Authority. 13.19. Further, the enquiry authority has failed to consider the fact that the shadow witness, Mr.Sreenivas (PW-2), has stated to have neither seen nor heard anything in relation to the alleged case of bribery, either demand or acceptance. 13.19. Further, the enquiry authority has failed to consider the fact that the shadow witness, Mr.Sreenivas (PW-2), has stated to have neither seen nor heard anything in relation to the alleged case of bribery, either demand or acceptance. The complainant himself states that the said witness was standing outside from the spot of the alleged transaction. 13.20. Lastly, he submits that inasmuch as the report of the Karnataka Lokayukta under section 12(3) of the Lokayukta Act, which was made to Respondent No.3-KPTCL wherein it was recommended to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner. Strangely, enquiry for the same was also sought to be entrusted to the prosecuting authority, thereby clearly vitiating the principles of a fair trial as the prosecuting authority itself is once again conducting the enquiry in disciplinary proceedings, clearly going on to show that the Upa-Lokayukta had already made up its mind to hold the Petitioner guilty of the said charge. 13.21. In the disciplinary proceedings, no independent enquiry and/or enquiry by persons not belonging to the prosecuting authority having been held, such an enquiry is wholly unjust, unfair and questionable. 13.22. In view of his submissions hereinabove, he prays for this Court to allow the instant petition and quash Annexures A, B & C. B. Submissions on Behalf of Respondent Nos.1 and 2 14. Sri. V. S. Arabatti, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 would submit that: 14.1. The communication dated 10.11.2009 to the Respondent No.3 authority, in furtherance of entrusting the disciplinary proceedings to the Lokayukta, was merely a communication and not a direction thereof. 14.2. As regards the contentions of the Petitioner that there has been a breach of due procedure, principles of natural justice not being followed, and that a proper opportunity was not provided to the Petitioner to make his case are all general allegations without any specific ground for the same, the proved misconduct is based on oral and documentary evidence and with the proper application of mind. 14.3. In relation to the contention of the Petitioner that the Respondent No.3 authority has abdicated its legal duties of that of a Disciplinary Authority stands disproved by the fact that all the documents marked and witnesses examined were for and by the Disciplinary Authority and not the Lokayukta. 14.4. 14.3. In relation to the contention of the Petitioner that the Respondent No.3 authority has abdicated its legal duties of that of a Disciplinary Authority stands disproved by the fact that all the documents marked and witnesses examined were for and by the Disciplinary Authority and not the Lokayukta. 14.4. The criminal proceedings against the Petitioner being initiated for the commission of offences under sections 7 & 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the departmental enquiry proceedings being initiated for the violation of Rule 3(1)(i) to (iii) of the Karnataka Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as ‘KCS Rules’ for brevity) are two distinct proceedings that are not based on the same set of facts, circumstances or outcomes and hence are independent of each other. 14.5. Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed.— Any public servant who,— (a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or (b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or (c) performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1.—For the purpose of this Section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Illustration.—A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. 'S' is guilty of an offence under this Section. Illustration.—A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. 'S' is guilty of an offence under this Section. Explanation 2.—For the purpose of this Section,— (i) the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or “attempts to obtain” shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or “accepts” or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means; (ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party. 14.6. By referring to Section 7 of the PC Act, he submits that for an offence under the said Section, there has to be both a demand and an acceptance of an undue advantage with an intention to perform or cause the performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such a duty. He, therefore, submits that without a demand and acceptance being established, there is no question of an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act having been committed. 14.7. Section 13 of the PC Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. He, therefore, submits that without a demand and acceptance being established, there is no question of an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act having been committed. 14.7. Section 13 of the PC Act is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—( 1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,— (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned; or (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or (d) if he,— (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.—For the purposes of this Section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than 1 [four years] but which may extend to 2 [ten years] and shall also be liable to fine.” 14.8. Rule 3(1) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1966 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 3. General : (1) Every Government Servant shall at all times; - (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; and (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government Servant. (2) (i) Every Government Servant holding a supervisory post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all Government Servants for the time being under his control and authority; (ii) No Government Servant shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgement except that when he is acting under the direction of his official superior and shall, where he is acting under such direction obtain the direction in writing, wherever practicable, and where it is not practicable to obtain the direction in writing, he shall obtain written confirmation of the direction as soon thereafter as possible. Explanation : Nothing in clause (ii) of sub-rule (2) shall be construed as empowering the Government Servant to evade his responsibilities by seeking instruction from or approval of a superior officer or authority when such instructions are not necessary under the scheme of distribution of powers and responsibilities. 14.9. By referring to Rule 3 of the KCS Rules, 1966, he submits that the demand made for money by promising to make available electric connections is an action on the part of the Petitioner, which is unbecoming of a government servant, and such acceptance establishes that the Petitioner has not acted with absolute integrity. 14.10. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police vs S. Samuthiram , [ AIR 2013 SC 14 ] , more particularly Para Nos. 14.10. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police vs S. Samuthiram , [ AIR 2013 SC 14 ] , more particularly Para Nos. 20 and 23 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 20 . We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non examination of two key witnesses before the criminal Court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the Prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning order P.Ws. 1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the Prosecution had not examined Head Constables 1368 Adiyodi and 1079 Peter of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with P.Ws. 1 and 2, husband and wife, to the Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the criminal Court has also opined that the signature of PW 1 (husband – complainant) is found in Ex.P1 – Complaint. Further, the Doctor P.W.8 has also clearly stated before the Enquiry Officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal Court, but only due to the fact that PW 1 and PW 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined. 23 . As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rule for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a Criminal Court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the Prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the Prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile etc. In the case on hand the Prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The Court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal Court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so. 14.11. By relying on S. Samuthiram’s case, his submission is that the acquittal of an employee by the criminal Court would not be binding on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the concerned Department. Even if acquitted, the employee derives no right for reinstatement to service as the ‘standard of proof’ that is warranted for holding a person guilty by the criminal courts, and that of disciplinary proceedings are wholly different. 14.12. He further submits that the statements and evidence produced before the Criminal Court cannot be held to be relevant to departmental enquiry proceedings as both proceedings are initiated under different laws with different purposes to be achieved. 14.13. The submission is that in criminal proceedings, the Prosecution is required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in departmental/disciplinary proceedings, the preponderance of probability is sufficient. In the present case, the fact that the money was made available by the complainant, which was recovered from the pocket of the Petitioner, is sufficient to establish that there is a demand made by the Petitioner, which was satisfied by the complainant. The acceptance is established by the amounts being found in the pocket of the Petitioner. In the present case, the fact that the money was made available by the complainant, which was recovered from the pocket of the Petitioner, is sufficient to establish that there is a demand made by the Petitioner, which was satisfied by the complainant. The acceptance is established by the amounts being found in the pocket of the Petitioner. 14.14. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court supra, the findings of the criminal Court are not binding on disciplinary proceedings. 14.15. If the claim of the Petitioner that he had helped the complainant by loaning him monies out of kindness were to be taken, then why would the complainant have reached out to the Lokayukta instead of settling the alleged matter with Petitioner himself would also have to be seen. 14.16. If the complainant merely had a grouse against the Petitioner in the background of a loan transaction, there is no reason for the complainant to have reached out to the Lokayukta unless demands for bribes have been made. 14.17. The Petitioner has set out to confuse and mislead this Court by comparing the judgement of the Trial Court with the findings of the Enquiry Authority, as both are independent of each other. 14.18. The contention that the Hon’ble Upalokayukta had already made up its mind upon the guilt of the Petitioner despite the decision of the Trial Court, by conducting another enquiry in disciplinary proceedings is wholly erroneous on account of the type of proof required to prove charges in the respective proceedings; one being a ‘Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ and the other being the ‘Preponderance of Probability’. 14.19. The charge of misconduct by the Petitioner having been proven by the adducing of oral and documentary evidence by the Disciplinary Authority, the finding having been proved by strong material, there being no merits in the claims of the instant petition, the petition is liable to be dismissed. C. Submissions on Behalf of Respondent No. 3 15. Sri. A. Chandrachud, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 3, would submit that: 15.1. The Petitioner was provided adequate opportunities to defend himself during the proceedings, and the enquiry officer has conducted the entire proceedings in the most fair and justifiable manner. 15.2. C. Submissions on Behalf of Respondent No. 3 15. Sri. A. Chandrachud, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No. 3, would submit that: 15.1. The Petitioner was provided adequate opportunities to defend himself during the proceedings, and the enquiry officer has conducted the entire proceedings in the most fair and justifiable manner. 15.2. Respondent No.3 has taken its decision upon examining the report of the enquiry officer, recommendations of the Uplalokayukta and also the reply furnished by the Petitioner to final show cause notice. Having found sufficient and sound evidence, it was held that the Petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him and thus terminated from service. 15.3. The orders passed in criminal proceedings do not have a bearing on Departmental Enquiry, and both cannot be considered to be overlapping each other. 15.4. The Departmental Enquiry against the Petitioner was on the charge of – Dereliction of duty, negligence, loss caused to the Board and non-performance of his official duties, etc. The criminal Prosecution, however, was to ascertain the criminality of the offences contemplated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, IPC and CrPC. 15.5. In this background, the Petitioner cannot seek to take shelter under the acquittal in criminal proceedings to ward off his liabilities in the Departmental Enquiry, which is based on Rules of Service and other internal regulations. 15.6. The proceedings against the Petitioner have been conducted in accordance with Regulation 12 (A)(1)(a)(i) of the KEB Employees Regulations, 1987 and further, the investigation of the Upalokayukta was entrusted in accordance with Section 12 of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984. 15.7. The Respondent No.3 authority, upon perusal of the nature and extent of the allegation, may either conduct its own enquiry via a Disciplinary Authority under Regulation 11 or may entrust the same to the Lokayukta / Upa-lokayukta. 15.8. The said Regulation 11 of the KEB Employees’Classification, Disciplinary Control and Appeal Regulations, 1987, (for short, ‘Regulations’) is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: Regulation 11 PROCEDURE FOR IMPOSING MAJOR PENALTIES 1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (viii) of Regulation 9 shall be made except after an enquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this Regulation and Regulation 11(A). 2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputations of misconduct or misbehaviours against a Board employee, it may itself enquire into, or appoint under this Regulation an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. Explanation:- Where the disciplinary authority itself holds the inquiry, any reference in sub- Regulation (7) to sub- regulation (20) and in sub-regulation (22) to the inquiry authority shall be construed as a reference to the disciplinary authority. 3) Where it is proposed to hold an Inquiry against a Board employee under this Regulation and Regulation 11 (A), the disciplinary authority shall draw up or caused to be drawn up. i) the substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour into difinite and distinct articles of charge. ii) a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misconduct in support of each article of charge, which shall contain, - a) a statement of all relevant facts including any admission or confession made by the Board employee; b) a list of documents by which, and list of witnesses by whom the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained. 4) The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Board employee a copy of the articles of charge, a statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and a list of documents and witnesses by which each articles of charges is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Board employee submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. 5) a) On receipt of the written statement of defence the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such of the articles of charge as are not admitted or if it considers it necessary so to do appoint, under sub- regulation (2) an inquiring authority for the purpose and where all the articles of charge have been admitted by the Board employee in his written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority shall record its findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall act in the manner laid down in Regulation 11 (A). b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the Board employee, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into the articles of charge or may, if it considers necessary to do so, appoint, under sub- regulation (2) an inquiry authority for the purpose. c) Where the disciplinary authority itself inquiries into any article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding an inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a Board employee or a legal practitioner to be known as the "Presenting Officer" to present on its behalf the case in support of the articles of charge. 6) The disciplinary authority shall, where it is not the inquiring authority, forward to the inquiring authority. i) a copy of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; ii) a copy of the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the Board employee; iii) a copy of the statements of witnesses if any, referred to in sub-regulation (3); iv) evidence proving the delivery of the documents referred to in sub-regulation (3)to the Board employee; and v) a copy of the order appointing the "Presenting Officer." Provided that where the Disciplinary Authority appoints under sub-regulation (2) an officer of the Loka Ayuktha as the inquiring authority such officer, may, if in his opinion it is considered necessary so to do, alter or modify the articles of charge, the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour, the list of documents, and list of witnesses and deliver or cause to be delivered to the Board employee a copy of these under intimation to the disciplinary authority and shall require the Board employee to submit within such time as may be specified a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. 7) The Board employee shall appear in person before the inquring authority on such day and at such time within ten working days from the date of receipt by him of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as the inquiring authority may, be a notice in writing, specify in this behalf, or within such further time, not exceeding ten days, as the inquring authority may allow. 8) The Board employee may take the assistance of any other Board employee to present the case on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or, the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. i) provided that if the retired Board employee is also a legal practitioner, the Board employee shall not engage such persons unless the presenting officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner and the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. ii) A co-employee shall represent as a defence counsel in one inquiry at a time. However, he shall not be permitted as a defence counsel in more than two enquiries in a calendar year. During the pendency of an inquiry he shall not be permitted to appear as defence counsel in any other inquiry. The defence counsel shall declare accordingly before seeking permission. 9) If the Board employee who has not admitted any of the articles of charge in his written statement of defence or has not submitted any written statements of defence, appears before the inquiring authority, such authority shall ask him whether he is guilty or has any defence to make and if he pleads guilty to any of the articles of charge, the inquring authority shall record the plea, sign the record and obtain the signature of the Board employee thereon. 10) The inquiring authority shall return a finding of guilt in respect of those articles of charge to which the Board employee pleads guilty. 10) The inquiring authority shall return a finding of guilt in respect of those articles of charge to which the Board employee pleads guilty. 11) The inquiring authority shall, if the Board employee fails to appear within the specified time or refuses or omits to plead, require the presenting officer to produce the evidence by which he proposes to prove the articles of charge, and shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding thirty days, after recording an order that the Beard employee may, for the purpose of preparing his defence; i) inspect within five days of the order or within such further time not exceeding five days as the inquiring authority may allow the documents specified in the list referred to in sub regulation (3); ii) submit a list of witnesses to be examined on his behalf; iii) apply orally or in writing to inspect and take extracts of the statements, if any of witnesses mentioned in the list referred to in sub-regulation (3) and the inquiring authority shall permit him to take such extracts as early as possible and in any case not later than three days before the commencement of the examination of the witnesses on behalf of the disciplinary authority. iv) give a notice within ten days of the order or within such further time not exceeding ten days as the inquiring authority may allow for the discovery or production of any documents which are in the possession of Board but not mentioned in the list referred to in sub- Regulation (3) :- Provided that the Board employee shall indicate the relevance of the documents required by him to be discovered or produced by the Board. 12) The inquring authority shall, on receipt of the notice for the discovery or production of documents, forward the same or copies thereof to the authority in whose custody or possession the documents are kept, with a requisition for the production of the document by such date as may be specified in such requisition : Provided that the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, refuse to requisition such of the documents as are, in its opinion, not relevant to the case. 13) On receipt of the requisition referred to in sub-regulation (12), every authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents shall produce the same before the inquiring authority; Provided that if the authority having the custody or possession of the requisitioned documents is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that the production of all or any of such documents would be against the public interest or security of the Board, it shall inform the inquiring authority accordingly and the inquiring authority shall, on being so informed, communicate information to the Board employee and withdraw the requisition made by it for the production or discovery of such documents. 14) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The witnesses shall be examined by or on behalf of the presenting officer and may be cross- examined by or on behalf of the Board employee. The presenting officer shall be entitled to re-examine the witnesses on any points on which they have been cross- examined, but not on any new matter, without the leave of the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit. 15) If it shall appear necessary before the close of the case on behalf of the disciplinary authority, the inquiring authority may, in its discretion, allow the presenting officer to produce evidence not included in the list given to the Board employee or may itself call for new evidence or recall and re- examine any witness and in such case the Board employee shall be entitled to have, if he demands it, a copy of the list of further evidence proposed to be produced and an adjournment of the inquiry for three clear days before the production of such new evidence, exclusive of the day of adjournment and the day to which the inquiry is adjourned. The inquiring authority shall give the Board employee an opportunity of inspecting such documents before they are taken on the record. The inquiring authority may also allow the Board employee to produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interest of justice. The inquiring authority shall give the Board employee an opportunity of inspecting such documents before they are taken on the record. The inquiring authority may also allow the Board employee to produce new evidence, if it is of the opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interest of justice. NOTE: New evidence shall not be permitted or called for or no witness shall be recalled to fill up any gap in the evidence. Such evidence may be called for only when there is an inherent lacuna or defect in the evidence which has been produced originally. 16) When the case for the disciplinary authority is closed the Board employee shall be required to state his defence, orally or in writing, as he may prefer. If the defence is made orally, it shall be recorded and the Board employee shall be required to sign the record. In either case a copy of the statement of defence shall be given to the presenting officer, if any, appointed. 17) The evidence on behalf of the Board employee shall then be produced. The Board employee may examine himself in his own behalf if he so prefers. The witnesses produced by the Board employee shall then be examined and shall be liable to cross examination, re-examination and examination by the inquiring authority according to the provision applicable to the witnesses for the disciplinary authority. 18) The inquiring authority may, after the Board employee closes his case, and shall, if the Board employee has not examined himself, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the Board employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. 19) The inquring authority may, after the completion of the production of evidence, hear the presenting officer, if any, appointed and the Board employee, or permit them to file written briefs of their respective case, if they so desire. 20) If the Board employee to whom a copy of the articles of charges has been delivered, does not submit the written statement of defence on or before the date specified for the purpose or does not appear in person before the inquiring authority or other wise fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this Regulation, at any stage of the enquiry the inquiring authority may hold the inquiry ex-parte. 21) a) Where a disciplinary authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in cluases (i) to (iv-a) of Regulation 9 but not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (viii) of Regulation 9 has itself inquired into or caused to be inquired into the articles of any charge and that authority having regard to its own findings or having regard to its own decision on any of the findings of any inquiring authority appointed by it, is of the opinion that the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (viii) of Regulation 9 should be imposed on the Board employee, that authority shall forward the records of the inquiry to such disciplinary authority as is competent to impose the last mentioned penalties. b) The disciplinary authority to which the records are so forwarded may act on the evidence on the record or may, if it is of the opinion that further examination of any of the witnesses is necessary in the interests of justice recall the witness and examine, cross-examine and re-examine the witnesses and may impose on the Board employee such penalty as it may deem fit in accordance with these Regulations. 22) Whenever any inquiring authority, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an enquiry ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein and is succeeded by another inquiring authority which has, and which exercises such jurisdiction, the inquiring authority so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by its predecessor or partly recorded by its predecessors and partly recorded by itself: Provided that if the succeeding inquiry authority is of the opinion that further examination of any witnesses whose evidence has already been recorded is necessary in the interest of justice, it may recall, examine, cross-examine and re- examine any such witnesses as here in before provided. 23) i) After the conclusion of the inquiry, a report shall be prepared and it shall contain - a) the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour; b) the defence of the Board employee in respect of each article of charge; c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each / article of charge; d) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefore. Explanation: If in the opinion of the inquiring authority the proceeding of the inquiry establish any articles of the charge different from the original articles of the charge, it may record its findings on such article of charge; Provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the Board employee has either admitted the facts on which such article of charge is based or has had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge. ii) The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the disciplinary authority shall forward to the disciplinary authority the record of inquiry which shall include – a) the report prepared by it under clause (i) b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the Board employee; c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry. d) written briefs, if any, filed by the presenting officer or the Board employee or both during the course of the inquiry; and e) the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry. 11. (A) ACTION ON THE INQUIRY REPORT. The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Regulation 11 as far as may be 2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. 3) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that one or more of the penalties specified in Regulation 9 should be imposed on the Board employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 12, make an order imposing such penalty. 15.9. By referring to Regulation 11, he submits that a detailed procedure which has been prescribed under Regulation 11 has been followed by the disciplinary authority as also by the enquiring authority. There is no fault found in reference thereto. 15.10. 15.9. By referring to Regulation 11, he submits that a detailed procedure which has been prescribed under Regulation 11 has been followed by the disciplinary authority as also by the enquiring authority. There is no fault found in reference thereto. 15.10. The said Regulation 14 (A)(1)(a) to (e) of the KEB Employees’ Classification, Disciplinary Control and Appeal Regulations, 1987 is reproduced hereunder for easy reference 14.(A) SPECIAL PROCEDURE IN CERTAIN CASES OF MISCONDUCT 1) The following provisions shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Regulations 10 to 11 (A) and 13 be applicable for purposes of proceeding against Board employees whose alleged misconduct has been investigated into by the Vigilance Commission / Lokayukta / UpaLokayukta either suo-moto or on a reference from the Board or from any other authority, viz. a) where on investigation into any allegation against - i) a member of the Board services Group A, B, C or D in respect of an allegation of a serious nature; the Vigilance Commissioner / Lokayukta / Upa Lokayukta or any Officer of the Vigilance Commission / Lokayukta / Upa Lokayukta authorised by him in writing under sub-rule 2 of Rule 5 of Karnataka State Vigilance Commission's Rules 1980 / Rule 12 of the Karnataka-Lokayukta / Upa Lokayukta Act 1984 is of the opinion that disciplinary proceedings shall be taken, he shall forward the record of investigation along with his recommendations to the Board, and the Board after examining such records, may either direct an inquiry into the case by the Vigilance Commission/ Lokayukta / Upa Lokayukta or direct the appropriate disciplinary authority to take action in accordance with-Regulation 11. b) Where the Vigilance Commission/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta is directed to hold an inquiry into a case under clause(a) the inquiry may be conducted either by the Vigilance Commissioner/ Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta or by an officer of the Vigilance Commission/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta authorised by the Vigilance Commissioner/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta to conduct the enquiry. b) Where the Vigilance Commission/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta is directed to hold an inquiry into a case under clause(a) the inquiry may be conducted either by the Vigilance Commissioner/ Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta or by an officer of the Vigilance Commission/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta authorised by the Vigilance Commissioner/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta to conduct the enquiry. Provided that the inquiry of a case relating to a Board employee shall not be conducted by an officer lower in rank than that of such Board employee; c) The Vigilance Commissioner/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta or the officer authorised to conduct the inquiry under clause(b) shall conduct the inquiry in accordance with the provisions of sub-regulation (2) to (20) and sub- regulation (23) of Regulation 11 and for the purposes of conducting such inquiry, shall have the power of the disciplinary authority referred to in the said Regulation. d) After the inquiry is completed, the records of the case with the findings of the inquiry officer and the recommendations of the Vigilance Commissioner/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta shall be sent to the Board. e) On receipt of the records under clause (d), the Board shall take action in accordance with the provisions of sub- regulation (21) and sub-regulation (23) of Regulation 11 and Regulation 11(A), and in all such cases the Board shall be competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Regulation 9. Explanation: In this Regulation, the expressions ‘Vigilance Commission/Lokyukta/Upa Lokayukta’ and ‘Vigilance Commissioner/Lokayukta/Upa Lokayukta’ shall respectively have the meanings assigned to them in the respective Rules/Act and further amendments made to the above from time to time. 15.11. By referring to Regulation 14A, he submits that there is a special procedure which has been prescribed in certain cases of misconduct, and if the investigation is done by the Vigilance Commission / Lokayukta / Upa-lokayukta, either suo-moto or on a reference from the Board or by any authority, the Upa-lokayukta, as in the present case being of the opinion that disciplinary proceedings shall be taken, has forwarded a record of investigation along with his recommendation to the Board. The Board, after examining such records, could either direct an inquiry by the Vigilance Commission /Lokayukta / Upa-lokayukta or direct the appropriate disciplinary authority to take action in accordance with Regulation 11. The Board, after examining such records, could either direct an inquiry by the Vigilance Commission /Lokayukta / Upa-lokayukta or direct the appropriate disciplinary authority to take action in accordance with Regulation 11. On such enquiry being completed, the records of the case with the finding of the enquiry officer and the recommendation of the Upa-lokayukta is required to be sent to the Board [in terms of 14(A)(1)(d)] and the Board shall take action in accordance with provisions of sub-regulation (21) and sub-regulation (23) of Regulation 11 and the Board would be competent to impose any of the penalties specified in Regulation 9. 15.12. He refers to Section 12 of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 12. Reports of Lokayukta, etc.- (1) If, after investigation of any action 1[ x x x ]1 involving a grievance has been made, the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta is satisfied that such action has resulted in injustice or undue hardship to the complainant or to any other person, the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta shall, by a report in writing 2[within three months or at any event not later than four months from the date of complaint,]2 recommend to the competent authority concerned that such injustice or hardship shall be remedied or redressed in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the report. (2) The competent authority to whom a report is sent under sub-section (1) shall, within one month of the expiry of the period specified in the report, intimate or cause to be intimated to the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta the action taken on the report. (3) If, after investigation of any action 1[XXX]1 involving an allegation has been made, the Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta is satisfied that such allegation 2[ is substantiated]2 either wholly or partly, he shall by a report in writing 3[within six months from the date of commencement of the investigation]3, communicate his findings and recommendations along with the relevant documents, materials and other evidence to the competent authority. 3 [Provided that, the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta may extend the said period by a further period of not exceeding six months for the reasons to be recorded in writing] (4) The Competent authority shall examine the report forwarded to it under sub-section (3) and within three months of the date of receipt of the report, intimate or cause to be intimated to the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta the action taken or proposed to be taken on the basis of the report. (5) If the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta is satisfied with the action taken or proposed to be taken on his recommendations or findings referred to in sub-sections (1) and (3), he shall close the case under information to the complainant, the public servant and the competent authority concerned; but where he is not so satisfied and if he considers that the case so deserves, he may make a special report upon the case to the Governor and also inform the competent authority concerned and the complainant. (6) The Lokayukta shall present on or before 31st October of every year, a consolidated report on the performance of his functions and that of the Upalokayukta under this Act to the Governor. (7) On receipt of the special report under sub- section (5), or the annual report under sub- section (6), the Governor shall cause a copy thereof together with an explanatory memorandum to be laid before each House of the State Legislature. (8) The Lokayukta or an Upalokayukta may at his discretion make available, from time to time, the substance of cases closed or otherwise disposed of by him which may appear to him to be of general, public, academic or professional interest in such manner and to such persons as he may deem appropriate. 15.13. By referring to Section 12 of K.L.Act, he submits that the said Section provides for the manner in which reports are to be submitted by the Lokayukta. The report being as envisaged in Regulation 14(A) detailed above. The Lokayakta or the Upa-lokayukta, if satisfied that the action on part of an officer has resulted in injustice or undue hardship to the complainant or to any other person, then a report to that effect shall be submitted in writing within three months to the competent authority within three months to the competent authority. The Lokayakta or the Upa-lokayukta, if satisfied that the action on part of an officer has resulted in injustice or undue hardship to the complainant or to any other person, then a report to that effect shall be submitted in writing within three months to the competent authority within three months to the competent authority. The competent authority shall consider the same and report to the Lokayukta or Upa-lokayukta the action taken on the report. 15.14. The enquiry officer, upon a proper enquiry of Ex. P.7 has submitted that there are inconsistencies in the claim made by the Petitioner as regards the transaction of a hand loan, subsequent demands for repayment, the complainant developing a grudge, and in that regard, filing a complaint before the Lokayukta and hence the same cannot be given any credence. 15.15. The enquiry officer has also considered the evidence of the shadow witness – PW 2, who has supported the mahazars recorded. 15.16. Having utterly failed to disprove all the above, the enquiry officer, on a fair consideration, has held that the Petitioner is guilty as regards the charges levelled against him. 15.17. The Petitioner, not having disclosed the real and true facts, not approaching this Court with clean hands, not holding any locus standi and merits in the instant petition, he persuades this Court to dismiss the petition with costs. 16. Heard Sri.S.Kalyan Basavaraj, learned counsel for the Petitioner, Sri.V.S.Arabatti, learned counsel for Respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri.A.Chandrachud, learned counsel for Respondent No.3. Perused papers. D. Points for Consideration 17. Upon hearing all the concerned parties and perusing the relevant material on record, the points that would arise for the consideration of this Court are: 1. Whether the decision of the learned Trial Court dated 30.03.2013 is binding upon the Respondent No.3-Authority and subsequently the Disciplinary Committee? 2. Whether the Disciplinary Proceedings initiated by Respondent No.3-Authority can run parallelly to the criminal proceedings before the learned Trial Court? 3. Whether the recommendation letter dated 03.09.2014 issued by Respondent No.1- Upa-lokayukta and the subsequent entrustment of investigation to the Additional Registrar Enquiries, Karnataka Lokayukta can be held to be valid in law? 4. Whether the decision taken by the Respondent No.3-Board Committee dated 18.03.2015 dismissing the Petitioner from service, requires any interference at the hands of this Court? 5. What order? 18. I answer the above points as under: 19. 4. Whether the decision taken by the Respondent No.3-Board Committee dated 18.03.2015 dismissing the Petitioner from service, requires any interference at the hands of this Court? 5. What order? 18. I answer the above points as under: 19. Answer to Point No. 1: Whether the decision of the learned Trial Court dated 30.03.2013 is binding upon the Respondent No.3-Authority and subsequently the Disciplinary Committee? 19.1. The Petitioner came to be acquitted by an order of the Trial Court dated 30.03.2013 and, in that regard, submits that the Trial Court has rightly applied the principles of ‘Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt’ insofar as having delved deep into the allegation and appreciating the diverse evidence on record. Further, it is contended that the findings of the Trial Court are binding upon the Disciplinary forum in light of a common set of facts, circumstances and witnesses dealt in both proceedings. 19.2. Per Contra, Respondent No.3-Authority has sought to contend that the Trial conducted was in furtherance of an FIR registered under provisions of the PC Act, 1988, whereas departmental inquiry proceedings were initiated to ascertain any violation in the rules of service and conduct, thus both are distinct proceedings not having a bearing on each other and are independent procedures. 19.3. Reference is to be drawn to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India vs Sardar Bahadur , [1971 INSC 298] , more particularly para no. 16 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 16 . A finding cannot be characterised as perverse or unsupported by any relevant materials if it is a reasonable inference from proved facts. Now what are the proved facts : Nand Kumar as representative of M/s. Ram Sarup Mam Chand and M/s. Mam Chand and Company of Calcutta filed five applications for licences to set up steel re-rolling mills on 14- 6-1956. On 25-6-56, a cheque drawn in favour of P. S. Sundaram was given to the respondent by Nand Kumar for Rs. 2,500/-; the cheque was endorsed and the amount credited in the account of the respondent. When the respondent borrowed the amount in question from Nand Kumar, he was not working in the Industries Act Section. On 25-6-56, a cheque drawn in favour of P. S. Sundaram was given to the respondent by Nand Kumar for Rs. 2,500/-; the cheque was endorsed and the amount credited in the account of the respondent. When the respondent borrowed the amount in question from Nand Kumar, he was not working in the Industries Act Section. Nand Kumar knew that the respondent was working in the Steel & Cement Section of the Ministry and the applications for the grant of licences for setting up the steel plant re-rolling mills would go to that Section. Even if the applications were to be dealt with at the initial stage by the Industries Act Section the respondent at least was expected to know that in due course the Section in which he was working had to deal with the same. This is borne out by the fact that in July 1958 copies of the applications were actually sent to the Steel & Cement Section where the respondent was working. If he, therefore, borrowed money from Nand Kumar a few days earlier it seems rather clear that he placed himself under pecuniary obligation to a person who was likely to have official dealings with him. The words "likely to have official dealings" take within their ambit the possibility of future dealings between the officer concerned and the person from whom he borrowed money. A disciplinary preceding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. No doubt there was no separate finding on the question whether Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent by the Inquiring Officer or the President. But we think that such a finding was implied when they said that charge No. 3 has been proved. The only question was whether the proved facts of the case would warrant such an inference. Tested in the light of the standard of proof necessary to enter a finding of this nature, we are satisfied that on the material facts proved the inference and the implied finding that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent were reasonable. 19.4. A perusal of the extracted portion of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sardar Bahadur's case would categorically establish the distinction between a criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings. The burden of proof in criminal proceedings being “beyond reasonable doubt” whereas the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings being “preponderance of probability”. 19.5. In a criminal proceeding, the accused could also be punished by way of imprisonment, thereby resulting in loss of liberty and in order to impose such a punishment, it is required to be established that the accused has committed the crime he is accused of beyond reasonable doubt. 19.6. Insofar as disciplinary proceedings are concerned, as indicated supra, the test and or proof being “preponderance of probability”, what would be required to be considered is whether it was probable for the delinquent officer to have committed such delinquency. 19.7. In disciplinary proceedings, it would not be required to establish beyond reasonable doubt of the delinquency. Thus, it is clear that the standard of proof in criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are entirely different. 19.8. Similar was the view in S. Samuthiram's case where it was held that it was for the Prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that such strict burden of proof is not required in disciplinary proceedings where a preponderance of probabilities would suffice. 19.9. 19.8. Similar was the view in S. Samuthiram's case where it was held that it was for the Prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that such strict burden of proof is not required in disciplinary proceedings where a preponderance of probabilities would suffice. 19.9. Applying the dicta laid down in both the above decisions to the present facts, it is clear that the standard of proof in criminal proceedings is much higher than that in the disciplinary proceedings and as such, if such standard of proof in a criminal proceeding is not discharged and the person is acquitted, the same would not necessarily entail the dismissal of the disciplinary proceedings against the very same person. Since even if the Prosecution had failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the disciplinary authority could establish the delinquency by a preponderance of probability. 19.10. Of course, the contra cannot be true inasmuch as if a delinquent officer has been discharged in a disciplinary inquiry, then the same would naturally result in the criminal proceedings being dismissed, since the burden of proof in criminal proceedings is much higher than that in disciplinary proceedings. 19.11. The standard of proof being different in both the proceedings, the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner that there would be double standards which are applicable is not correct since what is required to be decided is completely different in a different context and different perspective. The decision of the Trial Court being rendered in criminal proceedings where the burden of proof was beyond reasonable doubt cannot therefore, apply to the disciplinary proceedings by the disciplinary authority/committee where the burden of proof is “preponderance of probability”. 19.12. Hence, I answer Point No.1 by holding that the decision of the trial Court in the criminal proceedings is not binding on the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority can conduct its own proceedings and determine whether the concerned officer is guilty of the delinquency alleged against him. 20. Answer to Point No. 2: Whether the Disciplinary Proceedings initiated by Respondent No.3- Authority can run parallelly to the criminal proceedings before the learned Trial Court? 20.1. The disciplinary authority can conduct its own proceedings and determine whether the concerned officer is guilty of the delinquency alleged against him. 20. Answer to Point No. 2: Whether the Disciplinary Proceedings initiated by Respondent No.3- Authority can run parallelly to the criminal proceedings before the learned Trial Court? 20.1. One of the contentions taken up by the learned counsel for the Petitioner is that there would be parallel proceedings, one before the Trial Court and the other before the disciplinary authority, and therefore, both are not maintainable. As observed in my answer to Point No.1, the distinction between criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings have been clearly made out. Criminal proceedings are initiated for violation of any penal statute, whereas disciplinary proceedings are initiated by the disciplinary authority for any delinquency or violation of the terms of service. Both of them operate in two different fields. There is no embargo on both the proceedings being conducted simultaneously or parallelly. The criminal proceedings are initiated by the State to maintain law and order in the discharge of its sovereign powers. Disciplinary proceedings being initiated by the employer to maintain discipline of its employees. 20.2. Hence, I answer Point No.2 by holding that Disciplinary Proceedings initiated by Respondent No.3-Authority can run parallel to the criminal proceedings before the Trial Court, both operating in different spheres. 21. Answer to Point No. 3: Whether the recommendation letter dated 03.09.2014 issued by Respondent No.1- Upa-lokayukta and the subsequent entrustment of investigation to the Additional Registrar Enquiries, Karnataka Lokayukta can be held to be valid in law? 21.1. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that it is unfair and questionable that the prosecuting authority – Upa-lokayukta themselves, are conducting the enquiry in furtherance of its letter dated 03.09.2014 issued under section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 to the Respondent No.3- KPTCL recommending to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner. 21.2. The answer to this point is two-fold; (i) On the legality of the recommendation of the Upa-lokayukta dated 03.09.2014 vide Annexure - F. (ii) On the legality of entrustment of investigation to the Upa-lokayukta by Respondent No. 3 – KPTCL. 21.3. The Respondent-Upa-Lokayukta asserts that the power to recommend disciplinary action is drawn from Section 12 (3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (supra). 21.4. 21.3. The Respondent-Upa-Lokayukta asserts that the power to recommend disciplinary action is drawn from Section 12 (3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (supra). 21.4. Clause 3 of Section 12 of the KL Act, 1984 is reproduced herein-above says that upon carrying out an investigation against a grievance raised, if such an investigation goes on to reasonably satisfy either the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta that the allegations made against the complainee partly or wholly stands substantiated, then the Lokayukta or the Upa- lokayukta shall submit a report, in writing, communicating his findings and recommendations along with the relevant material, documents and evidence collected to the Competent Authority. 21.5. Further, it is pertinent to note that the design of the provision itself is such that it mandates the Lokayukta/Upa-Lokayukta to submit a report, even if partly satisfied, as regards the allegations against the complainee. A careful reading of the provision would bring to clarity that the word ‘shall’ is employed, and thus, it would be incumbent upon the Lokayukta/Upa- Lokayukta to submit the report dated 03.09.2014, thereby making the report valid in law. 21.6. The disciplinary proceedings within the Respondent No. 3-Authority are governed by the Karnataka Electricity Board Employees’ Classification, Disciplinary, Control and Appeal Regulations, 1987. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 submits that the entrustment of inquiry/investigation to the Additional Registrar Enquiries -3, Karnataka Lokayukta was made under Regulation 14(A)(1)(a)(i) of the KEB Regulations, 1987 (supra). 21.7. The said Regulation reproduced herein-above stipulates that when a report upon investigation of a serious allegation by the Vigilance Commission / Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta is submitted and is of the opinion to initiate disciplinary proceedings against such a complainee, then the Disciplinary Board may either direct an inquiry into the case by the Vigilance Commission / Lokayukta / Upa- Lokayukta or direct the appropriate disciplinary authority to take action in accordance with Regulation 11 of the KEB Regulations, 1987. 21.8. A bare and literal reading of the said provision would elucidate that the disciplinary committee has the power to direct an inquiry only to any of the 3 investigative bodies mentioned therein, namely, the Vigilance Commission, ‘Lokayukta’ and the ‘Upa-Lokayukta’, further it may even direct these bodies to take action against the complainee under Regulation 11 if need be. Thus, it is undoubtedly clear that the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta are statutorily enabled bodies to undertake inquiry/investigation. 21.9. Thus, it is undoubtedly clear that the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta are statutorily enabled bodies to undertake inquiry/investigation. 21.9. Both options of inquiry or action being available and open to Respondent No. 3-KPTCL, it has chosen to exercise its statutorily granted discretion to conduct an investigation/inquiry once again so as to ascertain the veracity of the allegations raised against the Petitioner and has directed Respondent No.3 to conduct such inquiry vide order dated 04.02.2010, and Respondent No. 3 vide order dated 11.08.2010 in turn has nominated Respondent No. 2 –‘Additional Registrar of Enquires – 3’ as its inquiry officer. 21.10. A conjoint reading of Section 12 of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 and Regulation 14 of the KEB Regulations, 1987 would amply justify the actions taken inasmuch as the report dated 03.09.2014 filed by the Upa-Lokayukta and the subsequent entrustment of inquiry vide order dated 04.02.2010 is concerned. 21.11. Hence, I answer Point No. 3 by holding that the report submitted by Respondent No. 3- Authority and subsequent entrustment of investigation to Respondent No. 2 and 3 is valid in law. 22. Answer to Point No. 4: Whether the decision taken by the Respondent No.3-Board Committee dated 18.03.2015 dismissing the Petitioner from service, requires any interference at the hands of this Court? 22.1. The scope and object of criminal and departmental proceedings remain distinct, with each of them being governed under two separate sets of laws and the rules of appreciation of evidence being different from the degree of proof necessary to establish the commission of a penal offence from that of delinquency, respectively. 22.2. A perusal of the enquiry report would indicate that the complainant was an electrical contractor and had given a complaint on 28-12- 2007 against the DGO stating that he had given an application to the DGO for supply of electricity to his clients and when he contacted the complainant as regards the action taken, the DGO demanded Rs.1,500/-. On the basis of said complaint, the Police Inspector, Karnataka Lokayukta, Chickballapur had registered a case in Crime No.2/2007 under Section 7, 13 (1)(d)read with Section 13 (2) of the P.C.Act 1988, where a charge sheet has been filed after investigation. 22.3. The Upa-Lokayukta had also sent an observation note to the DGO and sought his explanation as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated. 22.3. The Upa-Lokayukta had also sent an observation note to the DGO and sought his explanation as to why disciplinary action should not be initiated. Response of the DGO having been submitted on 30.4.2009, denying the allegation, the Upa-lokayukta was of the opinion that the proceedings cannot be dropped and submitted a report under subsection (3) of Section 12 of the K.L.Act to the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the DGO. There is no allegation or contention during the course of arguments as regards any violation of the procedure of enquiry. The DGO admitted that the complainant was known to him and stated that the complainant had sought for some money for a sum of Rs.1,500/- for his family necessity, which the DGO had advanced, and it is that amount which had been returned. There is no demand for bribe or acceptance as a bribe for the said amount of Rs.1,500/-. The payment of Rs.1,500/- being as a return of loan was properly accepted by the DGO. 22.4. A perusal of the documents on record would indicate and establish that the complainant was an electrical contractor. He had submitted three applications for electric connections to the DGO. The DGO had pointed out certain defects in the said application and on that ground, an electricity connection was not given. The contention of the complainant in this regard is that in order to overlook these deficiencies, the DGO had demanded a sum of Rs.1,500/- and it is at that stage that he had approached the Lokayukta police with a complaint and in that background, a trap was laid. The complainant was given three notes of 500 rupees each with phenolphthalein powder applied to it and it is these notes which were handed over by the complainant to the DGO, who took the said notes and put it in his pocket. Thereafter, the hands of DGO was washed in the chemical solution, which changed colour to rose colour. The contention of DGO is that since there were inadequacies or defects in the application filed, an electricity connection was not given. Hence, the question of a demand for a bribe being made would not arise. 22.5. I am unable to accept this submission. The contention of DGO is that since there were inadequacies or defects in the application filed, an electricity connection was not given. Hence, the question of a demand for a bribe being made would not arise. 22.5. I am unable to accept this submission. If the documents were in order and the applications submitted were proper, then it would have been the bounden duty on the part of the DGO to make available the electricity connection. The fact that there were certain defects in the application give credence to the contention of the complainant that in order to overlook the said defects, the DGO had demanded a bribe amount. 22.6. As regards the contention of the DGO that, he had earlier advanced the sum of Rs.1,500/- as a hand loan, which came to be repaid by the complainant. It is also not acceptable firstly for the reason that there are no details as to when the DGO had advanced a sum of Rs.1,500/- to the complainant, more so when the same has been denied. The fact remains that the DGO has accepted Rs.1,500/- and on a search, the said amount was found in the pocket of the DGO. The above actions have been witnessed by the panchas and the shadow witness who have signed the mahazhar. 22.7. What is required to be considered only is the explanation of the DGO as regards the receipt of the monies by contending that there was no demand for bribe made nor was there acceptance. Taking into account that the applications were defective, the allegation of the complainant that the DGO had demanded an amount of Rs.500/- per application would have to be believed, thus establishing the demand made. This being coupled with the fact that the amount was received by the DGO and found in his pocket. If at all it was a simple loan transaction, then the DGO should have received the money the first time the complainant went to give the money. At that time, the DGO asked the complainant to come back later since there were too many people. Thus, again establishing the fact that the DGO did not want to take the money in front of the other people. 22.8. These facts satisfy the requirement of preponderance of probability to establish that the DGO had demanded the money and had received the money. Thus, again establishing the fact that the DGO did not want to take the money in front of the other people. 22.8. These facts satisfy the requirement of preponderance of probability to establish that the DGO had demanded the money and had received the money. The money being found with him, the delinquency which had been established by the disciplinary authority, and the charges which had been framed in the disciplinary proceedings that the DGO had demanded and accepted illegal gratification of Rs.1,500/- from the complainant for doing certain official work has been established by a preponderance of probabilities. 22.9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GM Tank vs. State of Gujarat and another , more particularly Paras 31, 32 and 34 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder for easy reference: 31. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are not distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal Court on the examination came to the conclusion that the Prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal Court on the examination came to the conclusion that the Prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 32. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the Department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. 34. For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the judgment and order dated 28.1.2002 passed by the learned single Judge in Special Civil appln. No. 948 of 1983 as affirmed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 1085 of 2002 and allow this appeal. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 22.10. By relying on GM Tank's decision, learned counsel for the Petitioner has contended that when departmental proceedings and criminal cases are based on identical or similar sets of facts without any iota of difference, the honourable acquittal in criminal proceedings would have to be taken note of in disciplinary proceedings. These aspects have been dealt with by me hereinabove and I have come to a conclusion that by considering the facts of the matter and by applying the rules of preponderance of probability, the disciplinary authority has established the delinquency on part of the Petitioner. The fact situation in GM tank’s case and the present case are different and the same would not be applicable to the present case. 22.11. The fact situation in GM tank’s case and the present case are different and the same would not be applicable to the present case. 22.11. In that view of the matter, I answer Point No.4 by holding that the decision of the disciplinary committee is proper and valid and does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. 23. Answer to Point No.5: What order? 23.1. In view of my answer to Point Nos. 1 to 4, I pass the following: ORDER i) No grounds being made out, the Writ Petition stands dismissed.