JUDGMENT : T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO, J. 1. The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘C.P.C.’) is file d by the Appellant/Plaintiff challenging the decree and Judgment dated 16.07.2015 in O.S. No. 208 of 2010 passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Guntur, (for short, ‘trial Court’). 2. The Appellant is the Plaintiff, who filed the suit in O.S. No. 208 of 2010 against the Defendants seeking partition of the plaint schedule properties into 32 equal shares and for allotment of nine such shares to Plaintiff. 3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit is reasonable to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case. 4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows: Takkellapati Venkata Reddy, the father of Defendants 1 to 3, 5 to 7, and Takkellapati Sambi Reddy, passed away in 1991, leaving his entire estate to his legal heirs, including the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The fourth Defendant is Venkata Reddy’s wife. The plaint schedule properties are ancestral properties of the Plaintiff’s father, Takkellapati Sambi Reddy, who died in a road accident about 25 years ago, leaving the Plaintiff as his sole legal heir. Raised by the fourth Defendant, the Plaintiff married in 2001, while Defendants 3, 5, 6, and 7 were married before 1985. For convenience and to access government benefits, the properties were shown as individually owned by family members, though they remain undivided. The Plaintiff has demanded a partition and separate possession of these properties but has received no cooperation from the Defendants, prompting the filing of this suit. 5. The first Defendant filed a written statement, which the 5th Defendant adopted. In the written statement statement, the 1st Defendant acknowledged the relationship between the parties and the death of the Plaintiff’s father in 1981. He stated that before the Plaintiff’s father’s death, Defendants 1 and 2, the Plaintiff’s father, and their father, Venkata Reddy, partitioned the joint family properties. The joint family-owned item no. 1 of the property, along with additional Ac. 0.75 cents and another tract of 1.25 acres, is not listed in the plaint schedule. In the partition, Defendants 1 and 2 received Ac. 0.75 cents each from item no. 1, and the remaining Ac. The joint family-owned item no. 1 of the property, along with additional Ac. 0.75 cents and another tract of 1.25 acres, is not listed in the plaint schedule. In the partition, Defendants 1 and 2 received Ac. 0.75 cents each from item no. 1, and the remaining Ac. 0.75 cents, not shown in the schedule, was allotted to the Plaintiff’s father. The Plaintiff’s father and Venkata Reddy shared Ac. 1.25 cents, with Venkata Reddy receiving Ac. 0.75 cents and the Plaintiff’s father getting Ac. 0.50 cents. Items 2, 3, and 4 of the plaint schedule were allocated to Defendants 1 and 2, who have since enjoyed their respective shares. Consequently, the first Defendant holds Ac. 0.75 cents in item no. 1, Ac. 0.58 cents in item no. 2, half of Ac. 0.26 cents, and half of item no. 4. Pattadar passbooks and title deeds were issued to the Plaintiff and Defendants for their respective shares. After Plaintiff’s father’s death, Defendant No. 1 sold Ac. 1.25 cents, and Plaintiff utilized the proceeds. Therefore, the Ac. 0.75 cents allocated to the Plaintiff’s father is now in the Plaintiff’s possession. Since the joint family properties were partitioned before 1981, Defendants 3 to 7 have no rights over them. Item no. 3 of the plaint schedule is being used by Defendants 1 and 2 as a cattle shed. Item no. 4 is a residential house allotted to Defendants 1 and 2. Since the partition, they have been residing in their respective shares. The first Defendant constructed an RCC building in the open space, assessed by the Gram Panchayat, Undavalli. The tiled portion was assessed with Assessment No. 332, and the RCC building with Assessment No. 333. The door number for the tiled house is 1-374, and for the RCC building, it is 1-374/1. Therefore, the tiled portion and the RCC building in item no. 4 are in the exclusive possession of the first Defendant. There are ongoing disputes between Defendants 1 and 2, and the second Defendant instigated Plaintiff to file the suit. The Plaintiff’s marriage was performed with the assistance of the first Defendant, and as such, the suit is not maintainable. 6. Defendants 2 to 4, 6 and 7 remained ex-parte. 7. Based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for partition of the plaint schedule properties as prayed for? The Plaintiff’s marriage was performed with the assistance of the first Defendant, and as such, the suit is not maintainable. 6. Defendants 2 to 4, 6 and 7 remained ex-parte. 7. Based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for partition of the plaint schedule properties as prayed for? (2) Whether the titled portion, which was allotted to 1st Defendant and the RCC building which was constructed by 1st Defendant in item No. 4 are in exclusive possession of 1st Defendant? (3) To what relief? 8. During the trial, on behalf of Plaintiff, PWs. 1 and 2 were examined and marked Exs.A.1 and A.2. On behalf of Defendants, DWs. 1 and 2 were examined, and Exs.B.1 to B.10 documents were marked. 9. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court dismissed the suit without costs. 10. Pursuant to the orders dated 07.07.2023 in I.A. No. 3 of 2023, Respondents 8 to 10 are impleaded as legal representatives of the deceased 1st Respondent. 11. Sri S Syamsunder Rao, learned senior counsel for the Appellant/Plaintiff, contends that the suit schedule properties are ancestral and should be partitioned into joint family properties. The Plaintiff, being the daughter of the late Sambi Reddy, one of the coparceners along with Defendants 1 and 2, is entitled to a share with the other coparceners. The learned Judge erred in concluding there was a prior partition without any supporting material evidence. Even if a prior partition is accepted, the property purchased by the father of Defendants 1 and 2 after the alleged partition is subject to partition after his death in 1991. Therefore, the dismissal of the suit is incorrect and unsustainable. The trial Court also overlooked the admissions made by DWs. 1 and 2 regarding the property purchased by the late Takkellapudi Venkata Reddy, which is liable to be partitioned. Furthermore, the trial court failed to recognize that all the sons, daughters, and wives of Takkellapudi Venkata Reddy were entitled to a share in his individual property upon his death. As such, the dismissal of the suit is legally flawed. 12. Per contra, Sri S.V.S.S.Siva Ram learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent/2nd Defendant and Sri V. Sreenivasa Rao, learned counsel for the Respondents 8 to 10, contend that the trial Court correctly appreciated the case facts and reached a correct conclusion. As such, the dismissal of the suit is legally flawed. 12. Per contra, Sri S.V.S.S.Siva Ram learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent/2nd Defendant and Sri V. Sreenivasa Rao, learned counsel for the Respondents 8 to 10, contend that the trial Court correctly appreciated the case facts and reached a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not require any interference. 13. Concerning the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: (1) Is the trial Court justified in holding that the Plaintiff is not entitled for partition of the schedule properties as prayed for? (2) Does the Judgment passed by the trial Court need any interference? POINT NOS. 1 and 2: 14. The First Appellate Court, being the final Court of fact, has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the trial Court’s findings. Considering the nature and scope of the First Appellate Court in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, MANU/SC/0946/2014 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 15. Again, in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, MANU/SC/0768/2010 this Court, taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court, reiterated the principle as mentioned above with these words: 3. How the regular first Appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate Court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 Code of Civil Procedure deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the Judgment of the appellate Court shall state: (a) the points for determination. (b) the decision thereon. (c) the reasons for the decision. (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the Appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the trial Court’s findings. The first Appeal is a valuable right of the parties, and unless restricted by Law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and Law. The Judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for the decision of the appellate Court. The Judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for the decision of the appellate Court. Sitting as a Court of First Appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first Appeal is a valuable right, and the parties have a right to be heard on questions of Law and facts. The Judgment in the first Appeal must address all the issues of Law and fact and decide on them by giving reasons supporting the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By L.Rs. MANU/SC/0091/2001 and Madhukar and Ors. v. Sangram and Ors. MANU/SC/0302/2001) The Court of First Appeal has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. When the Court of First Appeal takes a different view, the Judgment of the first appellate Court must show the conscious application of mind and record its findings based on the evidence adduced by the parties. The Judgment must record the reasons why the first appellate Court differs from the Judgment of the Trial Court. 15. Normally, appreciation of the evidence by the trial Court is only interfered with by the Appellate Court if such appreciation of evidence appears to be absurd or there has been a serious challenge to such exercise. This proposition of Law has been so firmly settled that it does not require any reiteration by citing any authority. 16. It is pertinent to note that the Appellant filed I.A. No. 1 of 2024 seeking to receive certified copies of (1) Adangal/Pahani dated 06.03.2024, (2) Adangal/Pahani dated 06.03.2024 and (3) Form-1-B Register (ROR) dated 06.03.2024 as additional evidence. Respondents 8 to 10 filed I.A. No. 2 of 2024 seeking to receive the certified copy of the registered gift deed dated 29.09.2014, executed by the Plaintiff, as additional evidence. This Court dismissed both applications through separate orders. 17. Before addressing the rival contentions of both sides, I will first outline the undisputed facts derived from the record as follows: (a) The relationship of the parties is not in dispute. It is also admitted that no partition deed or list of partitions existed. This Court dismissed both applications through separate orders. 17. Before addressing the rival contentions of both sides, I will first outline the undisputed facts derived from the record as follows: (a) The relationship of the parties is not in dispute. It is also admitted that no partition deed or list of partitions existed. Therefore, the whole dispute had to be dealt with mostly in the light of oral evidence. The documentary evidence placed by the parties is by and large peripheral in nature, in that by themselves, the document did not prove or disprove the fact of partition. (b) Takkellapati Venkata Reddy was the father of Defendants 1 to 3, 5 to 7, and of Takkellapati Sambi Reddy, the Plaintiff’s father. The 4th Defendant is the wife of the late Venkata Reddy. Venkata Reddy passed away in 1991. The Plaintiff’s father, the late Takkellapati Sambi Reddy, passed away in 1981 when the Plaintiff was only about 4 months old. The 4th Defendant, the Plaintiff’s grandmother, was responsible for raising the Plaintiff from childhood. The Plaintiff’s marriage took place in 2001. During the pendency of the Appeal, the 1st Respondent passed away, and as a result, Respondents 8 to 10 were substituted as the legal heirs of the 1st Respondent. 18. It is settled Law that the general principle undoubtedly is that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. The burden is certainly on Defendants 1 and 2, who set up the partition to establish the fact. However, when the evidence has been adduced on both sides, the burden of proof ceases to have practical purposes. [In this regard, a reference can be made to the decision in Addagada Raghavamma and Ors. vs. Addagada Chenchamma and Ors. MANU/SC/0250/1963] 19. It is also settled Law that the presumption that members of a Hindu family are joint is stronger in the case of a father and his sons. In Kesharbai v. Tarabai Prabhakarrao Nalawade, (2014) 4 SCC 707 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: 21. ………. It is a settled principle of Law that once a partition in the sense of division of right, title or status is proved or admitted, the presumption is that all joint property was partitioned or divided. The joint and undivided family is the normal condition of a Hindu family. ………. It is a settled principle of Law that once a partition in the sense of division of right, title or status is proved or admitted, the presumption is that all joint property was partitioned or divided. The joint and undivided family is the normal condition of a Hindu family. Still, until the contrary is proved, it is usually presumed that every Hindu family is joint and undivided, and all its property is joint. This presumption, however, cannot be made once a partition (of status or property), whether general or partial, is shown to have taken place in a family. ……………. 20. The Plaintiff testified as PW-1, while the 1st Defendant testified as DW-1. Both parties reiterated their respective pleadings during their chief examinations. The Plaintiff also examined Guntaka Bosi Reddy as PW-2, who is no other than the 3rd Defendant’s husband. In contrast, the Defendants examined V. Purna Reddy as DW-2. The 1st Defendant’s case is that the schedule properties were partitioned during the lifetimes of their father, Venkata Reddy, and the Plaintiff’s father, Sambi Reddy. According to the Defendants, the partition occurred three years before the death of the Plaintiff’s father. DW-1 further testified that in the partition, each brother was allocated Ac. 0.75 cents of wetland, and in addition, Ac. 0.50 cents of land was allocated to the Plaintiff’s father, Sambi Reddy, and another Ac. 0.75 cents to their father, Venkata Reddy. Item No. 2 of the property fell to the share of Defendants 1 and 2. In cross-examination, PW-1 testified that she had not filed the pattadar passbooks standing in her name. She further admitted that, apart from the Ac. 1.50 cents of land in D.No. 112/A, an additional Ac. 0.50 cents of land stands in her name, which she inherited from her grandmother, who had been her guardian when she was a minor. PW-1 also admitted that Item No. 3 of the property is in the possession and enjoyment of the Defendants. 21. According to the 1st Defendant, his father sold Ac. 0.75 cents of land that had fallen to his share and Ac. 0.50 cents of land that was recorded in the Plaintiff’s name in the passbook. The Plaintiff, PW-1, did not dispute this version. In her testimony, PW-1 stated that she was unaware of the sale of Ac. 1.25 cents of land after her father’s death. 0.75 cents of land that had fallen to his share and Ac. 0.50 cents of land that was recorded in the Plaintiff’s name in the passbook. The Plaintiff, PW-1, did not dispute this version. In her testimony, PW-1 stated that she was unaware of the sale of Ac. 1.25 cents of land after her father’s death. PW-2, in cross-examination, testified that the Plaintiff’s grandfather had sold Ac. 1.25 cents of land following the death of PW-1’s father. DW-2, V. Purna Reddy, also admitted during cross-examination that, following the Plaintiff’s father’s death, the Plaintiff’s grandfather sold Ac. 0.50 cents from the share of the Plaintiff’s father and Ac. 0.75 cents from the share of the Plaintiff’s grandfather. It is pertinent to note that said answer was elicited during the cross-examination of DW-2. Consequently, the trial Court was justified in observing that Plaintiff did not dispute the fact that her grandfather sold the entire extent of Ac. 1.25 cents, i.e., Ac. 0.50 cents from the share of the Plaintiff’s father and Ac. 0.75 cents from the share of the Plaintiff’s grandfather. Additionally, the sale deed dated 05.03.1982, marked as Ex.A.1, and another sale deed dated 28.04.1988, marked as Ex.A.2, were confronted with DW-2 during the cross-examination, further substantiating the facts presented by the Defendants. 22. After considering the facts mentioned above, the trial Court rightly observed that Plaintiff had not challenged the alienation made by her grandfather, even though Plaintiff had attained a majority ten years before filing the suit. 23. The 1st Defendant is required to prove the partition of the properties as he claims, backing it up with certain documents. A close look at Ex.B.1, the copy of the Adangal, reveals that in Sy. No. 112/A of Undavalli Grama Panchayat, the 1st Defendant is shown as possessing Ac. 0.75 cents, the 2nd Defendant has another Ac. 0.75 cents, and the Plaintiff is shown with an Ac. 0.75 cents land, with a reference that, the Plaintiff being a minor represented by her grandmother, Nagarathnamma, the 4th Defendant in this case. Although the Plaintiff has filed the suit for partition, the plaint itself asserts that the properties in question are shown independently in the name of joint family members, and the government-issued pattadar passbooks and title deeds reflecting this, as well as the Grama Panchayat records show the names of the individual family members. Although the Plaintiff has filed the suit for partition, the plaint itself asserts that the properties in question are shown independently in the name of joint family members, and the government-issued pattadar passbooks and title deeds reflecting this, as well as the Grama Panchayat records show the names of the individual family members. The trial Court, relying on Exs.B.1 to B.9, has found that DW-1 is in possession of the tiled house and RCC building, shown as Item No. 4 in the schedule, and is paying taxes regularly. The admission made by PW-1, combined with Ex.B.1 Adangal, clearly shows that she has been in possession of Ac. 0.75 cents in D.No. 112/A. 24. The Plaintiff filed the suit only for Ac. 1.50 cents in D.No. 112/A, despite Sy’s total extent of land. No. 112/A being Ac. 2.25 cents, of which the Plaintiff holds Ac. 0.75 cents. The Plaintiff intentionally left out the Ac. 0.75 cents of joint family land in her possession and chose to file the suit only for Ac. 1.50 cents. If Plaintiff indeed claims that the joint family properties have not been partitioned, she should have included the Ac. 0.75 cents from Sy. No. 112/A in the suit schedule. She didn’t offer any explanation for leaving out this portion of land. In the absence of any reasonable explanation, this Court has no choice but to conclude that the Plaintiff intentionally excluded the property from the plaint schedule. 25. A thorough review of the record shows that Plaintiff has not contested the existence of residential houses on Item No. 4 of the schedule property, nor has she disputed that Defendants 1 and 2 have those houses. Furthermore, Item No. 3 of the schedule property is being used for tethering cattle. The trial Court observed that it is plausible the 2nd Defendant was allotted Item No. 2 of the schedule property and is enjoying half share in the said property. However, this observation made by the trial Court regarding Item No. 2 appears to be incorrect for the reasons outlined below. 26. Another crucial point highlighted by the trial Court in its Judgment is that the Plaintiff sought to partition the plaint schedule properties into thirty-two equal shares and allot nine shares to her. However, this observation made by the trial Court regarding Item No. 2 appears to be incorrect for the reasons outlined below. 26. Another crucial point highlighted by the trial Court in its Judgment is that the Plaintiff sought to partition the plaint schedule properties into thirty-two equal shares and allot nine shares to her. If the partition had not already been carried out regarding the schedule properties, then the sons and daughters of the late Venkata Reddy would be entitled to claim equal shares in the entire schedule property, as per the amendment made to the Hindu Succession Act. The trial Court’s observation on this aspect is unequivocally correct. 27. The evidence on record clearly shows that, as claimed by the 1st Defendant, a family arrangement took place three years before the death of the Plaintiff’s father, and by accepting this arrangement, each family member took possession of their respective shares and enjoyed them. Furthermore, their names were duly recorded in the revenue records. The record also reveals that no objections were raised when the mutation entries were confirmed, and the respective shareholders were provided with pattadar passbooks and title deeds, reflecting their enjoyment of the properties. The material on record also demonstrates that the Plaintiff’s grandfather sold Ac. 0.75 cents of land that had fallen to his share. He had sold Ac. 0.50 cents of land that had fallen to the Plaintiff’s father’s share while acting as the Plaintiff’s guardian. 28. It is a well-settled rule of the Hindu Law, as followed by the Mitakshara School, that the partition of the joint estate consists of defining the shares of the coparceners in the joint property and that it is not necessary that there should be an actual division of the property by metes and bounds. The definition of shares may be proved, inter alia, by an entry in the Record of Rights showing the shares of each family member. Such an entry will be evidence of the severance of the joint status. 29. The material on record indicates that the partition took place three years before the Plaintiff’s father’s death. The Court cannot ignore facts that have been firmly established, especially when they span an extended period. In the context of this case, it is the Plaintiff’s responsibility to prove that the family continued to live jointly up to the date of the suit. The Court cannot ignore facts that have been firmly established, especially when they span an extended period. In the context of this case, it is the Plaintiff’s responsibility to prove that the family continued to live jointly up to the date of the suit. She cannot shift the burden onto the Defendants to prove that the partition didn’t occur, especially when it is established that the joint family properties were being separately and exclusively enjoyed by the respective sharers for over forty years. These facts unequivocally demonstrate that a partition had indeed taken place among the family members. As noted in the plaint, it is explicitly stated that the Defendants were acting independently in their names, and the evidence on record shows that the Plaintiff’s grandfather sold the property that fell to his share, as well as the share belonging to the Plaintiff, potentially as her guardian. 30. Based on the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, it is clear that the agricultural properties were allotted to the three brothers, and the partition was thereby completed. The Plaintiff failed to present any convincing or acceptable evidence to prove that the partition was limited to the joint family’s agricultural properties and did not extend to the house properties. This is not even the Plaintiff’s case in the plaint. Clear evidence indicates that both parties have been enjoying their respective shares of the agricultural properties. Defendants 1 and 2, brothers, have been separately enjoying the house properties. 31. In Lachapeta Ramalaxmi vs. Lachapeta Balanarsaiah and Ors. MANU/AP/0995/2006, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: 11. Another equally important principle is that if the partition of certain items of property is admitted, a presumption would follow that the partition is full and complete in all respects, and if any party asserts that any items of property are kept outside the partition, the burden is always upon him. 32. Another equally important principle is that if the partition of certain items of property is admitted, a presumption would follow that the partition is full and complete in all respects, and if any party asserts that any items of property are kept outside the partition, the burden is always upon him. 32. In Mullas’ Hindu Law, 15th Edition by S.T. Desai in Paragraph No. 328 in item No. 92), it treated the question of dispute between the parties partial partition as to property thus: “(2) Partial as to property:- It is open to the members of a joint family to make a division and severance of interest in respect of a party of the joint estate, while retaining their status as a joint family and holding the rest as the properties of a joint and undivided family. But where there is evidence to show that the parties intended to sever, then the joint family status is put an end to, and with regard to any portion of the property which remained undivided the presumption would be that the members of the family would hold it as tenants-in-common unless and until a special agreement to hold as joint tenants is proved. When a partition is admitted or proved, the presumption is that all the property was divided and a person alleging that family property, in the exclusive possession of one of the members after the partition is joint and is liable to be partitioned, has to prove his case.” 33. In Vemavarapur Mallikarjuna Rao vs. Chaturvedula Siva Sankara Prasad and Ors. MANU/AP/0070/1981, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that: 4. ……... It is now well settled that normally, a suit instituted for partition should be one for partition of the entire joint family properties, and all the interested co-sharers should be impleaded. The suit for partial partition of specified items can only be an exception. The Supreme Court in Hateshar Kuer v. Sakaldee Singh, (1969) 2 SCWR 414 held: “The rule requiring inclusion of the entire joint estate in a suit for partition is not a rigid and inelastic rule which can admit of no exception. This rule aims at preventing multiplicity of legal proceedings which must result if separate suits were to be instituted in respect of fragments of joint estates. This rule aims at preventing multiplicity of legal proceedings which must result if separate suits were to be instituted in respect of fragments of joint estates. Normally speaking it is more convenient to institute one suit for partition of all the joint properties and implead all the interested co-sharers so that all questions relating to the share of the various co-owners and the equitable distribution and adjustment of accounts can be finally determined. But this being a rule dictated by consideration of practical convenience and equity may justifiably be ignored when, in a given case there are cogent grounds for departing from it.” 34. Thus, this Court is of the view that when it is admitted or proved that a partition has taken place, the presumption is that it is a complete partition, though it is a rebuttable presumption. In this case, there is no plausible explanation in support of the partial partition theory. 35. As reflected in the record, the Trial Court overlooked an established fact. It’s possible this fact was not brought to the attention of the Trial Court. As previously noted, the father of Defendants 1 and 2 sold Ac. 1.25 cents of land to Indus Hospitals and received the sale consideration. The Plaintiff contends that with the proceeds from this sale, the father of Defendants 1 and 2 later purchased Ac. 1.20 ½ cents of land, which constitutes item No. 2 of the schedule property, as shown in Ex.A.2, dated 28.04.1988. During the chief examination, the 1st Defendant (DW-1) testified that the Plaintiff’s father died in a motor vehicle accident in 1981. Therefore, the acquisition occurred after the Plaintiff’s father’s death. 36. According to the 1st Defendant’s case, three years before the death of the Plaintiff’s father, Defendants 1 and 2, along with the Plaintiff’s father and their father Venkata Reddy, partitioned the joint family properties. However, the evidence on record establishes that item No. 2 of the schedule properties was purchased after the Plaintiff’s father’s death in the name of the father of Defendants 1 and 2. This makes it highly difficult to accept the 1st Defendant’s claim that item No. 2 of the schedule property was partitioned during the Plaintiff’s father’s lifetime. The record clearly shows that after the partition of the joint family properties, the 1st Defendant’s father purchased the property as per Ex.A.2. This makes it highly difficult to accept the 1st Defendant’s claim that item No. 2 of the schedule property was partitioned during the Plaintiff’s father’s lifetime. The record clearly shows that after the partition of the joint family properties, the 1st Defendant’s father purchased the property as per Ex.A.2. As such, this Court views that item No. 2 of the schedule property was acquired after the partition of the properties by Venkata Reddy, the father of Defendants 1 and 2, and Plaintiff’s father, and therefore, it cannot be regarded as joint family property. It is not the 1st Defendant’s case that item No. 2 of the schedule property was subsequently partitioned. Consequently, this Court is not inclined to accept the 1st Defendant’s assertion that item No. 2 of the schedule property was partitioned during the lifetime of the Plaintiff’s father. 37. Additionally, the 1st Defendant has asserted that he and the 2nd Defendant purchased the property in their father’s name, but the 2nd Defendant has chosen not to contest the matter. The material on record clearly shows that after the partition, the father of Defendants 1 and 2 purchased item No. 2 of the schedule property. The 1st Defendant has not taken a plea that item No. 2 of the schedule property was acquired in the name of their father by himself and the 2nd Defendant. No evidence has been presented to support such a claim. 38. In civil cases, the preponderance of probability constitutes a sufficient ground for decision if the facts and circumstances are such that no reasonable man would draw a particular inference from them or if the degree of probability in the case is such that as to include any hypothesis besides the one to be proved then the party who relies on a particular theory cannot be said to have discharged the onus of proof of establishing that theory. But, if the evidence strongly preponders in favour of any of the two theories set up, the Court is entitled to act on it. Trite, the proposition of Law is that witnesses might lie, but the circumstances would not do so. 39. In R.Puthunainar Alhithan Vs. But, if the evidence strongly preponders in favour of any of the two theories set up, the Court is entitled to act on it. Trite, the proposition of Law is that witnesses might lie, but the circumstances would not do so. 39. In R.Puthunainar Alhithan Vs. P.H.Pandian, (1996) 3 SCC 624 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an inference from the proved facts must be so probable that if the Court believes, from the proved facts, that the facts do exist, it must be held that the fact has been proved. The inference of proof of that fact could be drawn from the given objective, direct or circumstantial. 40. It’s clear that, following the death of the Plaintiff’s father, the Plaintiff was brought up by her grandparents, and their properties were recorded in the pattadar passbook and title deeds of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s grandfather, Venkata Reddy, sold his properties and Ac. 0.50 cents of property of his son, i.e., Plaintiff’s father. During this time, the Plaintiff was brought up by her grandparents. Even before the death of the Plaintiff’s father, the Plaintiff’s grandfather and his sons partitioned the joint family properties and began leading independent lives. Given these facts, if Item No. 2 of the schedule property, as claimed by the 1st Defendant, were indeed allocated to both the 1st and 2nd Defendants, it would have been reasonable for the 1st Defendant to provide a clear and specific description of the share he and the 2nd Defendant received in the alleged partition. The lack of such details cast serious doubt on the credibility of the claim, making it highly likely that Item No. 2 was never partitioned. It seems the 1st Defendant advanced this claim solely for the suit. Had a particular portion of the share been allocated to the second Defendant in item No. 2 of the schedule property, he would have contested the matter in the same manner as the first Defendant. The silence of the 2nd Defendant could very well point to the falseness of the 1st Defendant’s claim, suggesting that the alleged partition was invented to give the appearance of a legitimate division of item No. 2 of the schedule property. 41. In contrast, men may indeed lie, but the circumstances do not. The vague and unspecific nature of the 1st Defendant’s claim strongly supports the conclusion that the plea was introduced solely for this litigation. 41. In contrast, men may indeed lie, but the circumstances do not. The vague and unspecific nature of the 1st Defendant’s claim strongly supports the conclusion that the plea was introduced solely for this litigation. The 1st Defendant’s attempt to present a false narrative, suggesting that Item No. 2 of the schedule property had been divided among the family members, is nothing more than an attempt to obscure the truth: in all likelihood, Item No. 2 was never actually partitioned. Considering the facts and probabilities, this Court firmly believes that item No. 2 of the schedule property shall be regarded as the self-acquired property of Plaintiff’s grandfather. He died intestate; therefore, his legal heirs, three sons, four daughters, and his wife, are each entitled to an equal share of that property. 42. The Courts can grant relief to the extent of a plaintiff’s legitimate claim, ensuring substantial justice is served. In doing so, the Plaintiffs should be awarded their rightful share of the disputed property, even if their claim has been overstated. Justice should, however, be administered per the actual merits of each case. The Court’s primary endeavour is to remedy any injustice brought to its attention rather than deny relief to an aggrieved party on the basis of purely technical or narrow procedural grounds. The Court must consider all available reliefs and focus on the substance of the matter. It is empowered to grant a Plaintiff such general or specific relief as it deems just, to the same extent as if it had been explicitly requested, provided that it does not cause undue prejudice to the opposing party and is consistent with the specific claim raised in the pleadings of the case. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may, guided by sound and reasonable judicial principles, grant such relief as it deems appropriate. 43. The trial Court failed to properly assess the evidence on record concerning item No. 2 of the schedule property. The trial Court wrongly accepted the notion that all properties, including item No. 2, had been partitioned long before the Plaintiff’s father passed away. The trial Court made a serious mistake in concluding that the property, which was acquired after the death of the Plaintiff’s father, had been partitioned before his death and had already been allotted to the share of Defendants 1 and 2. The trial Court made a serious mistake in concluding that the property, which was acquired after the death of the Plaintiff’s father, had been partitioned before his death and had already been allotted to the share of Defendants 1 and 2. This misjudgment undermines the core of the case, showing a fundamental flaw in the Court’s reasoning. 44. As established from the record and in light of the observations made above, this Court concludes that all the schedule properties, except for item No. 2, were partitioned. Therefore, the suit for partition is not maintainable concerning those properties. 45. The Defendants have contended that item No. 2 of the schedule property, which was shown to be acquired after the death of the Plaintiff’s father, was partitioned even during the lifetime of the Plaintiff’s father. The evidence on record demonstrates that all joint family properties were partitioned before the Plaintiff’s father’s death. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s failure to include the joint family property that fell to her share is not detrimental to her case in the specific facts of the case, as this Court is ultimately going to dismiss the suit concerning all the joint family properties. The material on record reveals that the father of Defendants 1 and 2 alienated the properties which fell to his share and purchased item No. 2 of the schedule property. Decreeing the suit for partition of item No. 2 of the schedule property will not cause prejudice to any of the parties, despite the non-inclusion of joint family property falling to the share of the Plaintiff as the suit for partition regarding the joint family properties is going to be dismissed. Given the particular facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is inclined to decree the suit for the partition of item No. 2 of the schedule property. 46. After careful consideration, this Court views that the trial Court correctly evaluated the evidence in all aspects except for item No. 2 of the scheduled property. There is no reason for this Court to reach a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the trial Court concerning all items except for item No. 2. The trial Court’s findings regarding these items are accurate, and the appellant/Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient grounds to justify a different conclusion. Therefore, I align with the trial Court’s conclusion. 47. The trial Court’s findings regarding these items are accurate, and the appellant/Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient grounds to justify a different conclusion. Therefore, I align with the trial Court’s conclusion. 47. Based on the reasoning provided above and the facts of this case, this Court holds that the material on record establishes the partition of all joint family properties except item No. 2 of the schedule property. However, regarding item No. 2, the trial Court’s findings and conclusions were not based on a proper analysis of the evidence on record. The Judgment concerning item No. 2 is flawed and cannot be upheld; it is hereby set aside. Accordingly, the points are resolved as stated. 48. As a result, the Appeal Suit is partly allowed, without costs, by setting aside the Judgment and Decree passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Guntur, in O.S. No. 208 of 2010, dt.16.07.2015. The suit in O.S. No. 208 of 2010 is preliminarily decreed concerning item No. 2 of the schedule property. Item No. 2 of the schedule property shall be divided into eight equal shares, with Plaintiff entitled to one share (i.e., 1/8th share) of Item No. 2 of the schedule property. The rest of the suit claim is hereby dismissed. Both parties are directed to bear their own costs in the suit. 49. Miscellaneous Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.