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2025 DIGILAW 390 (HP)

State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ranjit Singh

2025-03-18

SUSHIL KUKREJA, TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT : Sushil Kukreja, J. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant- State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) against the judgment of acquittal dated 22.03.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (Circuit Court at Indora), in Sessions Case (RBT) No. 28/I/13/10, whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted of the charge for commission of the offences punishable under Sections 307, 324, 341, 323 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’). 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case, giving rise to instant appeal, as per the prosecution story, are that on 01.01.2009, at about 11:00 p.m., at place Dhakka Colony, Ranjit Singh-accused (respondent herein) wrongfully restrained Shri Ram Dutt (complainant/injured) from proceeding further on his way to his house and inflicted injuries on him with intention and knowledge under such circumstances that his act(s) would have caused death of the complainant. The accused also threatened the complainant to his life to cause his death or to cause grievous hurt. The statement of the complainant under Section 154 Cr.P.C. was recorded, whereupon an FIR under the apt sections of IPC was registered against the accused. The complainant was medically examined and as per the opinion of the Medical Officer, the complainant suffered injuries dangerous to life. During the course of the investigation, Investigating Officer took into possession blood stained banyan (vests) and shirt. During further course of the investigation, accused made a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, and in sequel thereto got recovered a knife, which was taken into possession and sealed in a parcel. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and rest of the codal formalities were completed by the police. After completion of the investigation, police presented the challan in the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 23.02..2012 framed charges against the accused under Sections 341, 307 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 506 IPC to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined 15 witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313, Cr.PC was recorded, wherein he denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against him, besides pleaded to be innocent and being falsely implicated. However, the accused did not examine any witness in his defence. 5. 4. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined 15 witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313, Cr.PC was recorded, wherein he denied all set of incriminating evidence led by the prosecution against him, besides pleaded to be innocent and being falsely implicated. However, the accused did not examine any witness in his defence. 5. Vide impugned judgment dated 22.03.2014, the learned trial Court, acquitted the accused for commission of the offence punishable under Sections 307, 324, 341, 323 and 506 IPC, hence, the instant appeal preferred by the appellant-State. 6. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General contended that the trial Court has appreciated the evidence on record in a slip- shod and perfunctory manner and discarded the well reasoned and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He further contended that the learned trial Court has gravely erred in disbelieving the versions of the prosecution witnesses on minor discrepancies and contradictions not affecting the core of the prosecution case, as such, the impugned judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside. 7. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent/ accused contended that the impugned judgment has been passed by the learned Trial Court after proper appreciation of both facts and law. He further contended that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in its true perspective and the impugned judgment does not require any interference by this Court. Therefore, he submitted that the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State as well as learned counsel for the respondent and also carefully examined the entire records. 9. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 10. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730 , which reads as under :- "10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup [1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years. 11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed: "7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.” 12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following: (i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court, (ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal, (iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and (iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 11. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471 , observed as under:- “31.The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows: 31.1.Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352 ] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2.However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows: 31.2.1.Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse; (a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489 ] (b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980) (c)Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393 ] (d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297 ] (e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99 ] (f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ] (g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445 ] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice; (a)Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502 ] (b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610 ].” 12. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:- “8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows: 8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible. 9.Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re- appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.” 13. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. 14. The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence. In fact, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused. 15. In the instant case, the accused has been tried for commission of the offence under Sections 341, 307 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 506 IPC on the allegation that on 01.01.2009 at about 11:00 p.m. at place Dhakka Colony, Tehsil and Police Station Indora, he restrained the complainant/Injured Ram Dutt from proceeding further on his way to his house, intentionally inflicted injuries on the person of the complainant with intention and knowledge that this act would have caused his death and threatened him to his life to cause his death or to cause grievous hurt. 16. 16. To substantiate the charge framed against the respondent- accused and to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses. However, the case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-1 Shri Suresh Kumar, PW-3 Dr. Rakesh Purohit, PW-5 Shri Ram Dutt (complainant/injured), PW-6 Smt. Kanta Devi (wife of the complainant), PW-7 Shri Rakesh Kumar, PW-8 Shri Tilak Raj and PW-9 Shri Neeraj Sharma. 17. Shri Ram Dutt (complainant/injured) appeared in the witness-box as PW-5 and deposed that he used to run a chicken, fish and meat shop and his shop was in the street near his house. On 31.12.2008, around 11 a.m., he was in his shop and doing his work and some customers, who were standing in front of his shop, were quarreling. Accused-Ranjeet Singh came there and objected for their noise and he asked him as to why the customers were abusing. He further deposed that accused gave beatings to him initially with fist blows, thereafter he (complainant/injured) ran towards his house. In the interregnum, the accused gave a knife blow in his stomach, resultantly he fell down on the spot. He further deposed that after hearing his hue and cry, his family members alongwith other came on the spot and took him to CH, Indora. Thereafter, he was referred to Pathankot for treatment and he was admitted at Tilak Hospital, Pathankot. He also deposed that he submitted a compliant before the police, whereupon FIR was registered. 18. Shri Suresh Kumar appeared in the witness-box as PW-1 and deposed that he was working in the sweet shop at Udhampur and on 31.12.2008 he was present in his house at New Harijan basti at Dhangu Peer. He further deposed that around 11:00 p.m. he heard noise in the street and went to the spot where he saw Ram Dutt (complainant/injured) lying in an injured state. He also deposed that on his inquiry the complainant told him that accused attacked him with ‘churi’ (knife). 19. PW-6, Smt. Kanta Devi, wife of the complainant/injured, deposed that her husband was running a shop of chicken, fish and meat and on 31.12.2008, around 11:00 p.m., she was waiting for him in the house. She has further deposed that in the interregnum she heard the cries of her husband in the street and she went there and saw him (complainant/injured) seriously injured. She has further deposed that in the interregnum she heard the cries of her husband in the street and she went there and saw him (complainant/injured) seriously injured. She also deposed that the accused went to his house after beating her husband. She further deposed that her husband told her that accused gave him a knife blow in his stomach. 20. Shri Rakesh Kumar (PW-7) deposed that during the year 2008 he was salesman at wine shop at Dhaka-Colony. On 31.12.2008 the accused quarreled with the complainant around 7/8 p.m.. He further deposed that around 11 p.m. he received a telephonic call from a person, who informed that complainant received the injuries. Thereafter, he visited the spot and saw the injured in serious condition. PW-8, Shri Tilak Raj, deposed that he was vegetable seller in the market and his house was situated at a distance of 20/25 meters from the house of the complainant/injured. He further deposed that on 31.12.2008, around 11 p.m., he heard noise of the injured and he went to the spot. He also deposed that the injured was lying in a serious condition in the street and the accused gave him blow of knife in his stomach and the blood started oozing from his injuries. 21. PW-9 Shri Neeraj Sharma deposed that he used to do business and on 31.12.2008 he was in his home. He has further deposed that his father heard noise in the street, thereafter he went to the street and saw people gathered. He saw Ram Dutt (complainant) lying injured in the lap of Tilak Raj. As per this witness, blood was oozing out from the stomach of the complainant. He has deposed that he asked the complainant about his injury and he told that the accused gave him a knife blow in his stomach. 22. We have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record and from the close scrutiny of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. 23. 22. We have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record and from the close scrutiny of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. 23. Complainant/injured Shri Ram Dutt, who appeared in the witness-box as PW-5 categorically deposed that at the relevant day some customers were standing in front of his shop and were quarreling, then accused Ranjit Singh came there and asked him as to why the customers were abusing and thereafter the accused had beaten him with fist blows. In the meantime, he (accused) gave him a blow of knife in his stomach, as a result of which he fell down on the spot and after hearing his noise, his family members alongwith others visited the spot and brought him to Civil Hospital, Indora. In cross-examination he admitted that on 31.12.2008, at about 10:30 p.m., 7/8 persons were eating and drinking on the occasion of celebration of new year and they were quarreling with each other. He further admitted that 7/8 persons, who were quarreling, were expelled by him from his shop and in that process he received injuries. Therefore, on careful analysis of his deposition, it has become clear that when he was assaulted by the accused in his shop, 7/8 persons were standing there. However, neither he had spelt out there names nor the Investigating Officer had associated anyone of them. 24. No credibility can be attached to the statements of the other witnesses, i.e., PW-6 Kanta Devi, PW-7 Rakesh Kumar, PW-8 Tilak Raj and PW-9 Neeraj Sharma, as their evidence is only hearsay and they have not witnessed the incident in question. 25. From the perusal of the statement of PW-6 Kanta Devi,it has become clear that she was not an eye witness to the incident in question and she had not seen the accused giving a knife blow in the stomach of her husband, i.e., the complainant/injured. 26. The perusal of the statement of PW-7 Rakesh Kumar also reveals that he had not seen the accused giving a knife blow in the stomach of the complainant/injured. Similarly, PW-1 and PW-9 had also not witnessed the incident & they reached the spot on hearing the noise. 27. 26. The perusal of the statement of PW-7 Rakesh Kumar also reveals that he had not seen the accused giving a knife blow in the stomach of the complainant/injured. Similarly, PW-1 and PW-9 had also not witnessed the incident & they reached the spot on hearing the noise. 27. Thus, in these circumstances, the version of PW-5 Ram Dutt (complainant) cannot be accepted in the absence of any corroboration from the eye-witnesses, who were admittedly present at the spot. The prosecution has failed to explain as to why Investigating Officer has not associated the independent witnesses, who were present at the spot at the time of the incident. 28. Now, coming to the statement of PW-3 Dr. Rakesh Purohit, who had medically examined the injured-Ram Dutt. In his deposition he had mentioned that the injuries No. 1 to 6 were found on the person of the injured. He further deposed that after giving emergency treatment, the patient was referred to Dr. RPGMC, Tanda. As per his opinion injuries No. 1 to 5 were simple and the opinion regarding injury No. 6 was withheld till the receipt of the expert opinion. He further deposed that on 28.01.2009 he had given his final opinion regarding injury No. 6 on the basis of the treatment summary of injured Ram Dutt given by Dr. Tilak Raj, Tilak Hospital, Pathankot, and according to the same patient was having a stab wound injury on his stomach and the exploration revealed that the injury could be dangerous to life. However, in his cross-examination he admitted that he had not been shown the X-ray and ultrasound report and he had given his opinion on 28.01.2009 without looking into report of Radiologist and ultrasound report. 29. Therefore, after closely scrutinizing the evidence of the Medical Officers, i.e. PW-2 and PW-3, the learned Trial Court had rightly come to the conclusion that the opinion given by PW-3 Dr. Rakesh Purohit that injury No. 6 was dangerous to life, is not based upon any scientific evidence and further the treatment summary given by Tilak Hospital, Pathankot, could not have been made the basis to opine that injury No. 6 was dangerous to the life without looking into the report of Radiologist and ultrasound report. Thus the statement of the complainant could not be corroborated by medical/expert evidence. 30. Now, adverting to the alleged recovery of knife, Ex. Thus the statement of the complainant could not be corroborated by medical/expert evidence. 30. Now, adverting to the alleged recovery of knife, Ex. P-4, at the behest of the accused pursuant to his statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. PW-8 Tilak Raj, who is an attesting witness to the disclosure statement, Ex. PW-7/A in his deposition maintained that the accused gave statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act to the police regarding the concealment of the knife in his house and the knife, Ex. P-4, was recovered at the instance of the accused from his house, on the identification of the accused. However, he has failed to depose as to where the knife was concealed by the accused and from which part of the house, the knife was recovered in his presence. 31. Another attesting witness to the disclosure statement, Ex.PW-7/A, Rakesh Kumar (PW-7), did not support the story of the prosecution with respect to the recovery of the knife concerned and he had turned hostile. He deposed that knife, Ex. P-4, was not recovered in his presence and volunteered that it was already recovered and sealed by the police. He further deposed that no disclosure statement was made by the accused in his presence. He was cross-examined at length by the learned Public Prosecutor, however, nothing favourable could be extracted from his cross-examination. He categorically denied the suggestion that the knife was recovered from the house of the accused at his instance. He also denied that the knife was sealed in his presence with seal having impression ‘T’. Even PW-2 Dr. Tilak Raj, Tilak Hospital, Pathankot, specifically stated in his cross-examination that there was no mark of blood stains on the knife shown to him in the Court. As per the report of the FSL, Ex. PW-16/C, no blood was detected on knife, Ex. P-4. PW-5 Ram Dutt (complainant) admitted that knife (Ex. P-4), which was shown to him in the Court was a new one and he had seen that knife for the first time in the Court. 32. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged recovery of knife from the house of the accused pursuant to the disclosure statement made by him under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 33. 32. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged recovery of knife from the house of the accused pursuant to the disclosure statement made by him under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 33. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that howsoever strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 5 SCC 722 on this aspect of the matter held as under: “21. Suspicion, howsoever grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof, and there is a large difference between something that 'may be proved and 'will be proved. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason, that the mental distance between 'may be and 'must be is quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large distance between 'may be true and 'must be true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in mind the distance between 'may be true and 'must be true, the court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record. The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon reason and common sense.” 34. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The view taken by the trial Court while acquitting the accused is a reasonable view based on the evidence on the record and the same cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record. Hence, no interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 22.03.2014, rendered by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. (Circuit Court at Indora), in Sessions Case (RBT) No. 28/I/13/10, is required as the same is the result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.