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2025 DIGILAW 390 (KER)

Venugopalan H S/o. k. Haridas v. District Educational Officer, Palakkad

2025-02-27

HARISANKAR V.MENON

body2025
JUDGMENT : These writ petitions pertain to the appointment of Head- teachers in the Upper Primary/Lower Primary Schools with specific reference to Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011. 2. The conditions of service of aided school teachers were prescribed under Chapter XIVA of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘KER’). Rule 45B provided for the obligatory qualifications for teachers seeking promotion as Headmasters of LP/UP Schools. Sub-rule (1) thereto provided that an Account Test (Lower) conducted by the Kerala Public Service Commission shall be an obligatory qualification. Sub-rule (2) provided exemption from the requirement for the qualification under sub-rule (1) as against those who were holding the post of Headmaster in the LP/UP Schools as on the date of introduction of Rule 45B and sub-rule (3) extended a temporary exemption to those teachers awaiting promotion as Headmasters from the requirement of sub-rule (1) till 31.03.1988. At the same time, sub-rule (4) extended a complete exemption from the rigor of sub-rule (1) for those teachers who have attained the age of 50 years. 3. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, (hereinafter referred to as the ’Central Act’) was introduced by the parliament to provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of 6-14 years. The Central Government framed the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Central Rules’) in exercise of the rule-making power under Section 38 of Central Act. The State Government, too, came out with the Kerala Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Kerala Rules’) under Section 38 of the Act. Rule 18 of the Kerala Rules originally provided as under:- “ 18. The State Government, too, came out with the Kerala Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Kerala Rules’) under Section 38 of the Act. Rule 18 of the Kerala Rules originally provided as under:- “ 18. Duties to be performed by Head-teacher and Teachers.- (1) The Head-teacher shall be a person having a minimum of twelve years of teaching experience and possessing pass in such departmental tests and test on Kerala Education Act and Rules as may be specified in that regard: Provided that teachers in service shall be given time up to three years to pass the above tests.” Thus, under the provisions of Rule 18, the Head-teacher was to be a person with a minimum of 12 years of teaching experience and a pass in such departmental tests and test on the Kerala Education Act and Rules, as specified. The proviso to Rule 18(1) extended a period of three years to those teachers who were in service, to pass the above test. 4. A Division Bench of this Court in Thomas v. Joint Secretary, General Education Department [2020 (1) KLT 840] was called upon to consider the question as to whether the test qualifications under Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules are mandatory as regards the teachers who have attained the age of 50 years. It was contended before this Court by the teachers who had obtained the qualifications, that there can be no appointment as Head-teachers without the qualifications as specified. Teachers who have already attained the age of 50 years and who are disabled on account of the non-acquisition of the test qualification, relied on the proviso to Rule 18(1) to contend that they have a window of three years for acquiring the qualification. The Division Bench of this Court found that the proviso cannot be found as having exempted such qualifications for a period of three years or permitted appointment of unqualified teachers as Head-teachers, subject to qualification being obtained within three years. The Division Bench of this Court found that the proviso cannot be found as having exempted such qualifications for a period of three years or permitted appointment of unqualified teachers as Head-teachers, subject to qualification being obtained within three years. The Division Bench of this Court considering the afore situation, held that since the proviso extends three years for acquisition of required qualification for those who have attained 50 years of age, the same has to be given due effect, that there can be no appointment/promotions of persons who are not qualified in accordance with Rules, that the unqualified senior teacher would be entitled to appear for the test and acquire the qualification within three years, in which event the senior will be entitled to seek promotion and the junior has to be reverted and senior to be promoted as the Head-teacher. It was clarified by this Court categorically, that the proviso does not enable the State to make appointments in violation of Rules. It was also made clear that the proviso would have application only for three years from 06.03.2018. 5. The afore judgment of the Division Bench of this Court was challenged before the Apex Court and by an order dated 17.06.2020, the Apex Court ordered that “the concerned parties shall maintain status -quo as on today.” 6. It is in the afore background that the Government came out with G.O.(P)No.19/2020/G.Edn. dated 23/12/2020 published as S.R.O.No.898/2020 produced as Ext.P10 in W.P(C)No.10721 of 2021, by substituting the existing proviso to Rule 18(1) referred to above, as under; “Provided that teachers who are otherwise eligible for being promoted as Head teachers shall be exempted from passing such departmental test on Kerala Education Act and Rules on or after attaining the age of 50 years.” Thus, the Government extended an exemption to teachers on attaining the age of 50 years from passing the departmental test, etc., prescribed under sub-rule (1). The afore amendment/substitution is also given retrospective effect from 30.04.2011- the date of introduction of the Kerala Rules. The afore S.R.O.No.898/2020 stood superseded by the G.O.(P)No.1/2021/G.Edn. dated 05/01/2021 published as S.R.O.No.18/2021 produced as Ext.P11 in W.P(C)No.10721 of 2021, noticing that in the substituted proviso referred to above, the words “test and” were omitted to be included on account of which intention of the Government was not fully made out. The afore S.R.O.No.898/2020 stood superseded by the G.O.(P)No.1/2021/G.Edn. dated 05/01/2021 published as S.R.O.No.18/2021 produced as Ext.P11 in W.P(C)No.10721 of 2021, noticing that in the substituted proviso referred to above, the words “test and” were omitted to be included on account of which intention of the Government was not fully made out. Therefore, after the supersession as above, the proviso read as under:- “Provided that teachers who are otherwise eligible for being promoted as Head teachers shall be exempted from passing such departmental tests and test on Kerala Education Act and Rules on or after attaining the age of 50 years." By virtue of the afore, the Government extended exemption to those teachers who have attained the age of 50 years from passing the department tests/test prescribed under Rule 18(1) of Kerala Rules. 7. It is in the backdrop of all the above that the controversy raised in this batch of writ petitions has arisen. For instance, the petitioner in W.P(C)No.10721 of 2021, claims that she was ranked No.8 in the overall seniority list of teachers working in the school managed by the 4 th respondent therein, in comparison to the 5 th respondent who was ranked No.9. It is pointed out that the teacher at rank No.7 was below 50 years of age and was not entitled to the benefit of exemption. The petitioner points out that when the incumbent Headmistress went on preparatory leave prior to retirement on 11.11.2019, the 5 th respondent was appointed in the vacancy violating the seniority as above. True, the petitioner admits that she had not obtained the test qualifications at that point of time. However, the petitioner obtained the required qualifications on 01.03.2021 as evidenced by Ext.P4 test results, and since that was within the period of three years from 06.03.2018 as laid down by this Court in Thomas (supra), the petitioner was to be appointed as the Headmistress. However, by virtue of the exemption provided under the proviso to Rule 18(1) referred to above, the petitioner contends that her claim is not being considered. However, by virtue of the exemption provided under the proviso to Rule 18(1) referred to above, the petitioner contends that her claim is not being considered. In W.P(C)No.1895/2019, the petitioner contends that she was denied the post of Headmistress, and 4 th respondent, who was claiming the exemption, was appointed in the said post.Similarly, in W.P(C)No.111/2021, the petitioner contends that she had already been appointed as Headmistress and the said appointment was not being approved on account of the rival claim raised by the 6 th respondent claiming the exemption extended as above. 8. In the light of the above, the prayers raised in these writ petitions, broadly are as under: - i. To declare S.R.O.No.898/2020 and S.R.O.No.18/2021 as ultra vires to the Constitution of India and the Central Act. ii. In the alternative, to declare the retrospective operation of S.R.O.No.18/2021 as illegal and unenforceable. iii. To declare the prescription of the qualifications under Rule 18 of the Kerala Rules as Ultra vires the Central Act. 9. I have heard Smt. M.A.Vaheeda Babu, Sri. K.T.Shyam Kumar, Dr. George Abraham, Sri. K.R.Ganesh, Sri. Fayas, Sri. K.A.Mohamed Haris, Sri. Joseph Thekkekuruvinal and Sri. P.M.Pareeth for the respective parties. I have also heard Sri. Antony Mukkath, the learned Senior Government Pleader for the State. 10. Sri. P.M.Pareeth, the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P(C) No.24328 of 2023, took a different line and contended that the very provisions of Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules are ultra vires to Section 23(1) of the Central Act. He has contended with reference to the facts and circumstance pointed out in the writ petition that the petitioner therein was the senior most teacher entitled for appointment as Headmistress with effect from 01.04.2020 and though such a request was made on retirement on the incumbent, the manager appointed the 7 th respondent who was junior to the petitioner. The petitioner seeks to challenge Ext.P8 by which the petitioner is denied the benefit by the Manager relying on Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules since the petitioner did not have the qualification required. 11. Sri. Pareeth, would contend that Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules is ultra vires to Section 23 of the Central Act read with Section 38 thereunder. 11. Sri. Pareeth, would contend that Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules is ultra vires to Section 23 of the Central Act read with Section 38 thereunder. It is his contention that Section 23 prescribes the qualifications required for appointment as teacher and under Section 38(2)(l), the Government has the power to make rules with respect to the salary/allowance payable to the teachers alone. 12. Insofar as the afore contention, if accepted, would make the consideration of the other two issues, purely academic, I proceed to consider the said issue as the preliminary issue arising for consideration. 13. The Apex Court in the State of T.N. and Another V. P. Krishnamurthy and Others [ (2006) 4 SCC 517 ], laid down the following broad principles while considering a challenge to a subordinate legislation:- “15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds: (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules).” The challenge raised in these writ petitions as above is to be evaluated on the touchstone of the afore principles laid down by the Apex Court. 14. True, Section 23 of the Central Act provides for the prescription of the minimum qualifications by the Authority to be authorized by the Central Government for appointment as a “teacher”. Section 38 provides for the rule-making power of the “appropriate Government”. The term appropriate Government includes the State Government under Section 2(a)(ii)(A). Section 38 to the extent relevant herein reads as under:- “ 38. Power of appropriate Government to make rules.- (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification, make rules, for carrying out the provisions of this Act. Section 38 provides for the rule-making power of the “appropriate Government”. The term appropriate Government includes the State Government under Section 2(a)(ii)(A). Section 38 to the extent relevant herein reads as under:- “ 38. Power of appropriate Government to make rules.- (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification, make rules, for carrying out the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- .......... (l) the salary and allowances payable to, and the terms and conditions of service of, teacher, under sub-section (3) of Section 23;” Sri. Pareeth relies on Section 38(2)(l) to contend that the State Government can only prescribe salary/allowances to teachers under the Central Act. 15. However, it is to be noticed that 38(1) and (2) of the Central Act lie independent of each other. Section 38(1) entitles the State Government to make rules for “carrying out the provisions of this Act.” Section 38(2) is in no way curtailing the rule-making power of the Government under 38(1). Section 38(2) can only be considered as illustrative, not limiting the power under 38(1) in any manner. This is made clear using the words “without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers”. Thus, even on the face of Section 38(2), the statute reserves the rights of the “appropriate Government” to make rules “for carrying out the provisions of this Act”. 16. In this connection, I notice the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Kerala v. Appukutty [ AIR 1963 SC 796 ] wherein the Apex Court considered an identical provision under Section 19(1) and 19(2)(f) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939. It was contended that the Rules made under the rule- making power by the State under which the impugned notices were issued were ultra vires to the substantive provisions of Section 19(2)(f). The Apex Court noticed that Section 19(1) permitted the State Government to make Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act whereas sub-section (2) used the same expression “without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power” before laying down illustrative matters, for the Rules to be made. Considering the afore situation, Apex Court held as under:- “4. The Apex Court noticed that Section 19(1) permitted the State Government to make Rules to carry out the purposes of the Act whereas sub-section (2) used the same expression “without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power” before laying down illustrative matters, for the Rules to be made. Considering the afore situation, Apex Court held as under:- “4. .......It is true that the substantive provisions of the Act do not expressly deal with the power and procedure for assessment of escaped turnover, the legislature has left it to be dealt with by statutory rules to be framed under s. 19, and r. 17 has been framed thereunder. Rule 17(1) and (3A) ex facie properly fall under s. 19(2)(f). In any event as was said by the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji (1945) L.R. 72 IndAp 241, the rule making power is conferred by sub- s. (1) of that section and the function of sub s. (2) is merely illustrative and the rules which are referred to in sub-s. 2 are authorised by and made under sub-s. 1. The provisions of sub-s. 2 are not restrictive of sub-s. (1) as expressly stated in the words "without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power" with which sub-s. (2) begins and which words are similar to the words of sub-s. (2) of s. 2 of the Defence of India Act which the Privy Council was considering. Now sub-s. 1 of s. 19 of the Act provides that "the State Government may make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act" and the long title of the Act is an Act to provide for the levy of general tax on the sale of goods in the State of Madras. Therefore in our opinion r. 17 and the various clauses thereof made under s. 19 are not beyond the rule making power of the State Government as contained in s. 19.” The afore observations of the Apex Court are applicable to the case at hand also. 17. Academy of Nutrition Improvement and Others v. Union of India [ (2011) 8 SCC 274 ], again considered a similar issue with reference to the rule-making power of the subordinate legislation holding as under:- “66. Statutes delegating the power to make rules follow a standard pattern. 17. Academy of Nutrition Improvement and Others v. Union of India [ (2011) 8 SCC 274 ], again considered a similar issue with reference to the rule-making power of the subordinate legislation holding as under:- “66. Statutes delegating the power to make rules follow a standard pattern. The relevant section would first contain a provision granting the power to make rules to the delegate in general terms, by using the words "to carry out the provisions of this Act" or "to carry out the purposes of this Act". This is usually followed by another sub-section enumerating the matters/areas in regard to which specific power is delegated by using the words "in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters". Interpreting such provisions, this Court in a number of decisions has held that where power is conferred to make subordinate legislation in general terms, the subsequent particularisation of the matters/topics has to be construed as merely illustrative and not limiting the scope of the general power. .....” To the same effect is the judgment of the Apex Court in the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Lakhwinder Kumar and Others [ (2013) 6 SCC 333 ] 18. In the light of the afore, I notice that Section 38(1) of the Central Act empowers the Government’s rule-making powers in general terms, and Section 38(2) has only enumerated some of the areas in which the rule-making power can be exercised. In that view of the matter, reliance placed on Section 38(2)(l) to contend that Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules is ultra vires to the rule-making power cannot be accepted. 19. Section 38(1) of the Central Act, on the other hand, empowers the State Government also to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Central Act. The Kerala Rules have been framed in exercise of the powers under Section 38(1) as above. Therefore, the challenge raised to the provisions of Rule 18 as ultra vires to the Central Act is only to be repelled. 20. The next issue arising for consideration is as to whether S.R.O.No.898/2020 and S.R.O.No.18/2020 are ultra vires to the Constitution of India and the Central Act. Therefore, the challenge raised to the provisions of Rule 18 as ultra vires to the Central Act is only to be repelled. 20. The next issue arising for consideration is as to whether S.R.O.No.898/2020 and S.R.O.No.18/2020 are ultra vires to the Constitution of India and the Central Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner would rely on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v. Anand Kumar Yadav and Another [2018 (13 SCC 560] in support of the afore contention. 21. In State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v. Anand Kumar Yadav and Another (supra), the Apex Court considered a situation where the State Government introduced certain provisions to the Uttar Pradesh Rules framed under the Central Act authorizing the State Government to relax the minimum education qualifications of the persons who were appointed as assistant teachers. On the basis of the afore, notifications were issued as per which “Shiksha Mitras” was added as a source for recruitment of teachers. The Apex Court noticed the notification issued under Section 23(1) of the Central Act by the National Council for Teachers’ Education (NCTE) prescribing the minimum qualification required for appointment as teachers. It is in the afore context that the Apex Court upheld the findings of the Allahabad High Court that the State Government had no power to relax the qualification prescribed under Section 23(1) of the Central Act by the NCTE and hence, Rule 16A authorizing such relaxation is ultra vires to the rule-making power of the State Government. 22. In the backdrop of the afore judgment, it is to be noticed that the prescription of qualifications under Section 23(1) by NCTE was for appointment as “teachers”. The present dispute in these cases is with reference to the qualification required for those seeking appointment as “Head-teacher”. The NCTE has only prescribed the qualifications for appointment to the post of “teacher”. It is only under the Kerala Rules that the word “Head- teacher” is defined. When that be so, it cannot be said that the prescription under Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules is beyond the power of the State Government as laid down under Section 38 of the Central Act. I am of the opinion that the judgment of the Apex Court would not apply for the afore reason. 23. When that be so, it cannot be said that the prescription under Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules is beyond the power of the State Government as laid down under Section 38 of the Central Act. I am of the opinion that the judgment of the Apex Court would not apply for the afore reason. 23. Insofar as the NCTE has only prescribed the qualifications required for appointment as a “teacher”, I am of the opinion that the contention raised by the petitioners that it is only the said authority which is capable of prescribing qualification for appointment as “Head-teacher” is only to be recorded and rejected. 24. At the same time, the question arises as to whether the notifications, insofar as they introduced an exemption from the obligatory qualification under Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules in the form of a “proviso” can be sustained, as contended by some of the counsel. 25. As already noticed, the Division Bench of this Court in Thomas (supra) categorically found that Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules is to be followed mandatorily and even on the face of the proviso as it exists up to 23.12.2020 on which date S.R.O.No.898/2020 was issued, no one could be appointed as Head-teacher without the required qualifications. 26. It is the afore prescription that is sought to be upset by the proviso as introduced by S.R.O.No.898/2020 and replaced by S.R.O.No.18/2021. By virtue of the proviso, teachers who have attained the age of 50 years are exempted from passing the departmental test prescribed under Rule 18(1). The Apex Court in S.Sundaram Pillai and Others v. V.R. Pattabhiraman and Others [ (1985) 1 SCC 591 ] has laid down the following as the functions of a proviso: - “43. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. To sum up. The Apex Court in S.Sundaram Pillai and Others v. V.R. Pattabhiraman and Others [ (1985) 1 SCC 591 ] has laid down the following as the functions of a proviso: - “43. We need not multiply authorities after authorities on this point because the legal position seems to be clearly and manifestly well established. To sum up. a proviso may serve four different purposes: (1) qualifying or excepting certain provisions from the main enactment: (2) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable: (3) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself; and (4) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision.” It is in the light of the afore principles, the scope and purport of the impugned proviso is to be considered. 27. As already noticed, the qualifications for the post of Headmaster in UP Schools were prescribed in Rule 45B of KER. Sub-rule (1) thereto provided for the obligatory qualifications. Sub-rule (4) at the same time extended a complete exemption from the requirement under sub-rule (1) for those teachers who have attained the age of 50 years. As already noticed, NCTE has prescribed qualifications for appointment as a teacher alone. In other words, no qualifications are prescribed for appointment to the post of “Head-teacher”. The qualifications required for appointment as Head-teacher are prescribed under Rule 18(1). The prescription under Rule 18(1) of the Kerala Rules is almost similar to the prescription contained under Rule 45B (1) of Chapter XIVA of the KER. The Government has only extended the exemption to the teachers who have attained the age of 50 years under Rule 45B(4) in the impugned proviso introduced by S.R.O.No.898/2020 and S.R.O.No.18/2021. This Court also notices that under Rule 13B of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958, every Government employee who attained the age of 50 years is entitled to exemption from passing the obligatory test for seeking promotion. I find no valid reason to accept the challenge against the introduction of the proviso as above. This Court also notices that under Rule 13B of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958, every Government employee who attained the age of 50 years is entitled to exemption from passing the obligatory test for seeking promotion. I find no valid reason to accept the challenge against the introduction of the proviso as above. The contention raised by some of the petitioners that the Proviso runs against the spirit of Rule 18(1) and hence is contradictory is also not to be accepted in the light of the above finding. In my opinion, the proviso is having an independent existence which is permissible going by the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Sundaram Pillai (supra). 28. Dr. George Abraham, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P(C) No.39881 of 2022, also relied on the order dated 17.06.2020 of the Apex Court in the Special Leave Petition filed against the judgment in Thomas (supra) to contend that the Apex Court while issuing notice, ordered the concerned parties to maintain status quo and hence, S.R.O.No.898/2020 and S.R.O.No.18/2021 ought not to have been issued. True, the Apex Court directed the parties to maintain status quo. However, that was only with reference to the claim between the competing teachers which was the subject matter of consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in Thomas (supra). That does not mean that the rule-making power of the State under Section 38 of the Central Act is curtailed. 29. The last issue arising for consideration is whether the retrospectivity provided to the substitution of the proviso by S.R.O.No.18/2021, is valid. The petitioners contend that S.R.O.No.18/2021 was issued on 05.01.2021 with retrospective effect from 30.04.2011. They contend that there cannot be any retrospective operation insofar as the teachers had a legitimate expectation for getting appointed on the basis of Rule 18(1) and proviso therein as they stood originally. The petitioners contend that on account of the substituted proviso, as noticed earlier, a new set of teachers also seek a claim for appointment to the post of Head-teacher to their detriment. In such circumstances, the petitioner contends that retrospectivity, is to be declared arbitrary. 30. I have considered the afore submissions. The petitioners contend that on account of the substituted proviso, as noticed earlier, a new set of teachers also seek a claim for appointment to the post of Head-teacher to their detriment. In such circumstances, the petitioner contends that retrospectivity, is to be declared arbitrary. 30. I have considered the afore submissions. In The Punjab State Cooperative Agricultural Development Bank Ltd. v. The Registrar, Cooperative Societies and Others [ (2022) 4 SCC 363 ] , the Apex Court noticed the earlier law on the point and summarised the legal position as under:- “49. The exposition of the legal principles culled out is that an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away the benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule indeed would divest the employee from his vested or accrued rights and that being so, it would be held to be violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.” I am of the opinion that the principles laid down in the afore judgment would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case at hand also. On account of the law, as it stood prior to S.R.O.No.18/2021, teachers had a vested right to seek appointment to the post of Head-teacher. When that be so, the subsequent substitution to the proviso, extending an exemption to another set of teachers, in my opinion, takes away the valid right available to the teachers seeking appointment to the post of Head-teacher. Therefore, their vested rights are affected. Hence, the notification S.R.O.No.18/2021 and for that matter, S.R.O.No.898/2020 cannot have retrospective operation. 31. In this connection, Sri.Antony, the learned Senior Government Pleader, relied on the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Narayanan v. Vijayalakshmi [2024 (3) KLT 116] , rendered following dictum laid down by the Apex Court in State of Haryana and Others v. Mahabir Vegetable Oils Private Limited [ (2011) 3 SCC 778 ] , wherein the retrospectivity provided to the 3 rd proviso to Rule 44A (1) of Chapter XIVA of the KER was upheld by this Court. But, the Full Bench was considering the provisions of the 3 rd proviso to Rule 44A (1) of Chapter XIVA of the KER by which benefits extended to teachers who have attained the age of 50 years were curtailed to some extent. But, the Full Bench was considering the provisions of the 3 rd proviso to Rule 44A (1) of Chapter XIVA of the KER by which benefits extended to teachers who have attained the age of 50 years were curtailed to some extent. The Full Bench found that the benefit under the 2 nd proviso was a concession and there is no prohibition in depriving the said concession retrospectively. The Full Bench also referred to the findings rendered by the Apex Court in State of Haryana and Others (supra), which held that the beneficiary of such a concession has no legally enforceable right and it can be taken away at any point of time. Thus, it is only on the basis of the nature of the benefit which was taken away, that Full Bench upheld the retrospectivity. 32. As against the afore, in the case at hand, certain teachers were entitled to promotion on the basis of the provisions of Rule 18(1) as it originally stood, on account of which a vested right had accrued, which could not be divested retrospectively. Hence, I declare that S.R.O.No.18/2021 can only have prospective operation. On the whole, these writ petitions would stand disposed of by holding that the amendment brought through S.R.O.No.898/2020 and S.R.O.No.18/2021 would only have prospective operation. The official respondents in these writ petitions to pass appropriate orders with respect to the respective parties in these writ petitions in the light of the afore declaration within a period of four weeks from today.