ORDER : M. Nagaprasanna, J. The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order dated 24-03-2022 passed by the 2 nd respondent/Deputy Commissioner, Dharwad District cancelling the caste certificate issued in favour of the petitioner on 18-08-2021. 2. Heard Sri Arun L. Neelopant, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri Sharad V. Magadum, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondents 1 to 4, Sri G.I. Gachchinamath, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.5, Sri V.M. Sheelvant, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.6 and Sri V.M. Banakar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.7. 3. Facts, in brief, adumbrated are as follows: The petitioner claims to be belonging to ‘Veerkudi Vellam’ caste which is depicted in Other Backward Class-A Category. On the said claim, the petitioner files an application before the jurisdictional Tahsildar for grant of caste certificate depicting him as belonging to the said caste. The petitioner is said to have produced all the documents in support of his claim for issuance of caste certificate. It is the averment in the petition, that the Tahsildar after verifying all the documents and following the procedure under law issues a caste certificate depicting the petitioner to be belonging to OBC-A category. On the strength of the said caste certificate, the petitioner contests election to the Hubli-Dharwad Municipal Corporation in Ward No.51 and gets elected as a Corporator. After the election, the election to the post of Mayor was scheduled to be held on 28-05-2022. 4. When things stood thus, the 6 th respondent approaches the Assistant Commissioner/3 rd respondent questioning the caste certificate dated 18-08-2021 under Section 4B of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointment etc.) Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). The challenge is rejected in terms of the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 21-12-2021. The 6 th respondent then prefers a revision before the Deputy Commissioner/respondent No.2 under Section 4F of the Act. The petitioner files his objections before the Revisional Authority and again produces all the documents that led to issuance of caste certificate in his favour. The Revisional Authority, by the impugned order dated 24-03-2022, cancels the caste certificate of the petitioner. 5. The petitioner files his objections before the Revisional Authority and again produces all the documents that led to issuance of caste certificate in his favour. The Revisional Authority, by the impugned order dated 24-03-2022, cancels the caste certificate of the petitioner. 5. In the interregnum, it appears, that one of the candidates who had contested the elections had challenged the caste certificate issued to the petitioner before this Court in Writ Petition No.103386 of 2021 seeking a prayer of quo warranto against the petitioner. The said petition is said to be dismissed for want of maintainability. Against the said order, a writ appeal is preferred in Writ Appeal No.100025 of 2022 and the said appeal is said to be pending adjudication at the hands of the Division Bench of this Court. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of the 2 nd respondent/Deputy Commissioner in cancelling the caste certificate issued in his favour is at the doors of this Court in the subject petition. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the Deputy Commissioner had no authority to examine the caste certificate issued to the petitioner under the provisions of the Act, which Act is specific for entertaining the challenge to the caste certificate issued for the purpose of services under the State and admission to educational institutions. The further submission of the learned counsel is that the caste certificate issued by the 4 th respondent/Tahsildar is for the purpose of participation in the elections. So, the challenge before the Assistant Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner would not be maintainable. The only remedy available for challenging the caste certificate is by way of election petition and not approaching the Authorities. The learned counsel would contend that the petitioner in his application had clearly mentioned that his caste as shown in the school certificate is Veerkudi Vellam and no objections were filed by respondents 6 and 7 to the nomination of the petitioner, despite knowing full well that the petitioner is contesting elections under OBC-A category. The contention is that appeal remedy under Section 4B of the Act is available only to the person whose application is rejected for issuance of caste certificate and respondents 6 and 7 had no locus to prefer an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner under Section 4B of the Act. The contention is that appeal remedy under Section 4B of the Act is available only to the person whose application is rejected for issuance of caste certificate and respondents 6 and 7 had no locus to prefer an appeal before the Assistant Commissioner under Section 4B of the Act. The learned counsel would seek to place reliance on plethora of judgments to buttress his submissions, relevant of which would bear consideration in the course of the order. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel representing the State and respondents 6 and 7 in unison would contend that the Act permits challenge even to caste certificate issued for the purpose of election. They would contend that the petitioner has produced caste certificate which could not have been issued in his favour as Hindu Veerkudi Vellam comes under OBC in Tamilnadu and the sister of the petitioner has secured a caste certificate depicting herself as belonging to Hindu-Veer. Therefore, the petitioner has contested the elections on the strength of a false caste certificate and his election is to be annulled on the said score, as the caste certificate so issued cuts at the root of the matter. They would, in unison, seek dismissal of the petition. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 9. As stated earlier, the petitioner applies for issuance of a caste certificate before the 4 th respondent/Tahsildar, Hubli. The caste certificate claimed was that the petitioner belongs to Hindu- Veerakudi Vellam, which comes to be issued. On the strength of the said caste certificate, the petitioner contests election in Ward No.51 of the Hubli-Dharwad Municipal Corporation and gets elected by defeating respondents 6 and 7 the other contesting candidates by considerable margin. On the complaint of one Krishna Malleshappa Gandagalekar as to whether petitioner belong to Veerkodi Vellam caste or not, on 13-09-2021, the Tahsildar, Hubli is said to have issued a communication/reply that ‘Vir, Veer, Veermasti’ are mentioned in the OBC list and such caste comes under the OBC Category-A and Veerkodi Vellam is a caste that does not exist in the said notification. After the said communication and the reply, the said Krishna Malleshappa Gandagalekarm one of the candidates who had contested the elections against the petitioner, files a petition before this Court seeking a writ of quo warranto in Writ Petition No.103386 of 2021. The said writ petition is dismissed by the coordinate Bench in terms of its order dated 01-12-2021 by the following observation: “…. …. …. 9. The material on record indicates that it is an undisputed fact that prior to the subject elections, in which both petitioner and respondent No.5 filed their nominations claiming benefit of reservation under OBC 'A’ category, the respondent No.5 had submitted an application on 18.08.2021 for issuance of a caste certificate for the purpose of claiming reservation to contest the elections; pursuant thereto, the Tahsildar issued the impugned caste certificate dated 18.08.2021 certifying that the respondent No.5 belonged to “Veer” community which was one of the notified communities under the State Government Notification dated 13.01.1995. 10. The main ground on which the petitioner seeks to assail the impugned caste certificate is by pointing out that since the respondent No.5 himself claimed that he belonged to ‘Veerakudi Vellam’ community, the Tahsildar clearly erred in issuing the impugned caste certificate in favour of respondent No.5. In this context, it is relevant to note that the scheme of the said Act of 1990 read with the said Rules of 1992, will indicate that upon the respondent No.5 filing an application for issuance of caste certificate for the purpose of claiming reservation to contest for the post of a 'councillor' in the elections, under Rules 3-A(2) & (3) the Tahsildar had three options viz., firstly, accept the material, information and documents produced by respondent No.5 and issue a caste certificate in his favour; secondly, direct holding of an enquiry and issue the caste certificate; thirdly, direct holding of an enquiry and reject the application of respondent No.5. 11. The material on record discloses that the Tahsildar has exercised the first option referred to supra as provided in Rule-3-A(2) and has issued the caste certificate in favour of respondent No.5 by coming to the conclusion that the documents, information and the material produced by respondent No.5 was sufficient and satisfactory and issue the certificate and that there was no necessity to hold any enquiry under Rule 3-A(3) of the said Rules of 1992. As rightly contended by the learned senior counsel for respondent No.5, there is a presumption attached to the validity of the caste certificate by virtue of Rule 3-C of the said Rules of 1992 and consequently, the petitioner is entitled to challenge the same only by way of an appeal / revision before the appropriate authorities under the Act and not by way of the present petition, particularly when the petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of the Act and the Rules. 12. Under these circumstances, in view of the Tahsildar issuing the caste certificate in favour of respondent No.5 by following the procedure under the Act and the Rules, and in the light of the availability of equally efficacious and alternative remedy by way of appeal / revision to the petitioner, I am of the considered opinion that the present petition is not a matter for this Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, particularly when several contentious issues and disputed and complicated questions of law and fact with regard to the legality, validity, genuineness and correctness of the caste certificate arise for consideration in the present petition which are incapable of being adjudicated upon by this Court. 13. In Kurapathi Maria Das’s case (supra), the Apex Court held as under: "17. There is no dispute that Rule 1 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities (Decision on Election Disputes) Rules, 1967, specifically provides for challenging the election of Councillor or Chairman. It was tried to be feebly argued that this was a petition for quo warranto and not only for challenging the election of the appellant herein. This contention is clearly incorrect. When we see the writ petition filed before the High Court, it clearly suggests that what is challenged is the election. In fact the prayer clauses(b) and (c) are very clear to suggest that it is the election of the appellant which is in challenge. Even when we see the affidavit in support of the petition in paragraph 8, it specifically suggested that the Ward No. 8 was reserved for the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes from where the appellant contested the election representing himself to be a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Paragraph 9 speaks about the election of the appellant as the Chairperson. Paragraph 9 speaks about the election of the appellant as the Chairperson. Paragraph 30 also suggests that the complaint has been made against the appellant that he had usurped the public office by falsely claiming himself to be a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. In paragraph 33, it is contended that the first petitioner had no remedy to question the election of the 9th respondent by way of an election petition. Therefore, though apparently it is suggested in the writ petition was only for the writ of quo warranto, what is prayed for is the setting aside of the election of the appellant herein on the ground that he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste. It is further clear from the writ petition that the writ-petitioners were themselves aware of the situation that the writ of quo-warranto could have been prayed for only on invalidation or quashing of the election of the appellant, firstly as a Councillor and secondly, as a Chairman and that was possible only by an Election Petition. The two decisions quoted above, in our opinion, are sufficient to hold that a writ petition of the nature was not tenable though apparently the writ petition has been couched in a safe language and it has been represented as if it is for the purpose of a writ of quo warranto. 18. Learned counsel Shri Gupta, however, invited our attention to some other decisions of this Court reported as K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan & Anr. [ 1999 (4) SCC 526 ] where a writ of quo warranto was sought against the member of the Legislative Assembly on the ground that his name was not found in the voters' list of that particular constituency from where he was elected. Our attention was invited to paragraphs 27 and 28. In paragraph 27 after referring to the decision of the Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Rao [ AIR 1953 SC 210 ] and considering the Article 192, the Court observed that Article 226 is couched in widest possible language and unless there is a clear bar to the jurisdiction of the High Court, its powers under Article 226 can be exercised when there is any act which is against any provision of law or violative of constitutional provisions and when the recourse cannot be had to the provisions of the Act for appropriate relief. Then the Court observed: "In circumstances like the present one, bar Under Article 329(b) will not come into play when the case falls under Articles 191 and 193 and the whole process of election is over. Consider the case where a person elected is not a citizen of India. Would the court allow the foreign citizen to sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly and not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?" In paragraph 28, the Court went on to hold that the High Court had rightly exercised its jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226. This case has been very heavily relied on in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench. 19. Shri N. Nageshwar Rao further points out that the factual scenario in that case was different. That was a case where admittedly the name of the elected candidate was not in the voters' list and the elected candidate had tried to use similar name in the voters' list which was admittedly not that of the elected candidate. There was no necessity of any proof, as a voter list was an admitted document and it clearly displayed that the name of the Legislator was not included in the list. Therefore, the Court observed in that case in paragraph 27 which we have quoted above to the effect: "In circumstances like the present one, bar Under Article 329 (b) will not come into play when the case false under Articles 191 and 193 and the whole process of election is over." (emphasis supplied) 20. We are afraid, we are not in position to agree with the contention that the case of K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan & Anr. [ 1999 (4) SCC 526 ] is applicable to the present situation. Here the appellant had very specifically asserted in his counter affidavit that he did not belong to the Christian religion and that he further asserted that he was a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Therefore, the Caste status of the appellant was a disputed question of fact depending upon the evidence. Such was not the case in K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan & Anr. [ 1999 (4) SCC 526 ] . Every case is an authority for what is actually decided in that. Therefore, the Caste status of the appellant was a disputed question of fact depending upon the evidence. Such was not the case in K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan & Anr. [ 1999 (4) SCC 526 ] . Every case is an authority for what is actually decided in that. We do not find any general proposition that even where there is a specific remedy of filing an Election Petition and even when there is a disputed question of fact regarding the caste of a person who has been elected from the reserved constituency still remedy of writ petition under Article 226 would be available. 21. Again as we have stated earlier, there was no dispute and no challenge to the findings of the High Court that K. Venkatachalam, the petitioner in case of K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan & Anr. [ 1999 (4) SCC 526 ] was not a Legislator in electoral roll of the constituency for the general elections for December, 1984 and he blatantly and fraudulently represented himself to be a Legislator of the constituency using the similarity with the name of another person. The situation in the present case is, however, entirely different in the sense that here the petitioner very seriously asserted that firstly, he was not a Christian and, secondly, that he belongs to the Scheduled Caste. 22. Shri Gupta, however, further argued that in the present case what was prayed for was a writ of quo warranto and in fact the election of the appellant was not called in question. It was argued that since the writ petitioners came to know about the appellant not belonging to the Scheduled Caste and since the post of the Chairperson was reserved only for the Scheduled caste, therefore, the High Court was justified in entering into that question as to whether he really belongs to Scheduled Caste. In short, the learned counsel argued that independent of the election of the appellant as a Ward member or as a Chairperson, his caste itself was questioned in the writ petition only with the objective to see whether he could continue as the Chairperson. This argument is clearly incorrect as the continuance of the appellant as the Chairperson was not dependent upon something which was posterior to the appellant's election as Chairperson. This argument is clearly incorrect as the continuance of the appellant as the Chairperson was not dependent upon something which was posterior to the appellant's election as Chairperson. It is not as if some event had taken place after the election of the appellant which created a disqualification in appellant to continue as the Chairperson. The continuance of the appellant as the Chairperson depended directly on his election, firstly, as a Ward member and secondly as the Chairperson which election was available only to the person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. It is an admitted position that Ward No.8 was reserved for Scheduled Cast and so also the Post of Chairperson. Therefore, though indirectly worded, what was in challenge in reality was the validity of the election of the appellant. According to the writ petitioners, firstly the appellant could not have been elected as a Ward member nor could he be elected as the Chairperson as he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste. We can understand the eventuality where a person who is elected as a Scheduled Caste candidate, renounces his caste after the elections by conversion to some other religion. Then a valid writ petition for quo warranto could certainly lie because then it is not the election of such person which would be in challenge but his subsequently continuing in his capacity as a person belonging to a particular caste. The Counsel for the appellant rightly urged that the question of caste and the election are so inextricably connected that they cannot be separated. Therefore, when the writ petitioners challenged the continuation of the appellant on the ground of his not belonging to a particular caste what they in fact challenged is the validity of the election of the appellant, though apparently the petition is for the writ of quo warranto. 23. There is yet another distinguishing feature in case of K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan & Anr. [ 1999 (4) SCC 526 ] . In that case there is a clear finding that the elected person therein played a fraud with the Constitution inasmuch as that he knew that his name was not in Electoral Roll of that constituency and he impersonated for some other person taking the advantage of the similarity of names. The appellant herein asserts on the basis of his Caste Certificate that he still belongs to Scheduled Caste. The appellant herein asserts on the basis of his Caste Certificate that he still belongs to Scheduled Caste. We are, therefore, of the clear opinion that the case of K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan & Anr. [ 1999 (4) SCC 526 ] is not applicable to the present case and the High Court erred in relying upon that decision. 24. Once it is held that the aforementioned case was of no help to the respondents, the only other necessary inference which emerges is that the bar under Article 243 ZG would spring in action. 25. Shri Gupta, however, pointed out that it was specifically proved that the appellant was a Christian and as such he did not belong to the "Mala" caste which was a Scheduled Caste. Now there is no dispute that the appellant was given two caste certificates within the definition of Section 2(b) of the 1993 Act. There is also no dispute that these community certificates were obtained by the appellant and they were valid and genuine certificates. It is also an admitted position that the certificates were never cancelled under Section 5 of the 1993 Act. The said certificates could be cancelled only under Section 5 after a full-fledged enquiry by the authority named in that Section. Under such circumstances we do not think that the High Court could have decided that question of fact which was very seriously disputed by the appellant. It seems that in this case, the High Court has gone out of its way, firstly in relying on the Xerox copies of the service records of the appellants and then at the appellate stage, in calling the files of the Electricity Board where the appellant was working. This amounted to a roving enquiry into the caste of the appellant which was certainly not permissible in writ jurisdiction and also in the wake of Section 5 of 1993 Act. 26. Again merely because the appellant was described as being a Christian in the service records did not mean that the appellant was actually a person professing Christian religion. It was not after all known as to who had given those details and further as to whether the details, in reality, were truthful or not. 26. Again merely because the appellant was described as being a Christian in the service records did not mean that the appellant was actually a person professing Christian religion. It was not after all known as to who had given those details and further as to whether the details, in reality, were truthful or not. It would be unneccesary for us to go into the aspect whether the petitioner in reality is a Christian for the simple reason that this issue was never raised at the time of his election. Again the appellant still holds the valid caste certificates in his favour declaring him to be belonging to Scheduled Caste and further the appellant's status as the Scheduled Caste was never cancelled before the authority under the 1993 Act which alone had the jurisdiction to do the same. If it was not for High Court to enter into the disputed question of fact regarding the caste status of the appellant, the findings recorded by it on that question would lose all its relevance and importance. There is one more peculiar fact which we must note. It has come in the judgment of the learned Single Judge as also in the Division Bench that the appellant "converted" to Christianity. Now it was nobody's case that the petitioner ever was converted nor was it anybody's case as to when such conversion took place, if at all it took place. All the observations by the learned Single Judge regarding the conversion of the appellant to Christianity are, therefore, without any basis, more particularly, in view of the strong denial by the appellant that he never converted to Christianity. Again the question whether the petitioner loses his status as Scheduled Caste because of his conversion is also not free from doubt in view of a few pronouncements of this Court on this issue. However, we will not go into that question as it is not necessary for us to go into that question in the facts of this case. 27. Shri Gupta then contended that there was no opportunity for the writ petitioners to challenge the caste as the application filed by them for cancellation of the Caste before the authority under 1993 Act was never decided. It was pointed out that such application was filed on 18.04.2006 and various representations were also made to various authorities. 27. Shri Gupta then contended that there was no opportunity for the writ petitioners to challenge the caste as the application filed by them for cancellation of the Caste before the authority under 1993 Act was never decided. It was pointed out that such application was filed on 18.04.2006 and various representations were also made to various authorities. We are not concerned with the various representations made to any other authority. However, if an application under Section 5 of the 1993 Act was made to the proper authority it was bound to be enquired into. However, taking the advantage that it was not decided for four months, the writ petitioners could not have rushed with the writ petition. At the most, the writ petitioners could have asked for a direction to the said authority for deciding that application one way or the other. That was not done. If that application had been decided upon and the concerned authority had found that the appellant's caste certificate itself was false and fraudulent and he did not genuinely belong to the Scheduled Caste then that itself could have been enough for the appellant to lose the post that he was elected to. In our opinion, it is necessary to get examined the Caste certificates of all the elected persons from reserved constituencies within a time frame to avoid such controversies. 28. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the High Court clearly erred firstly, entertaining the writ petition, secondly in going into the disputed question of fact regarding the caste status, thirdly, in holding that the appellant did not belong to the Scheduled Caste and fourthly, in allowing the writ petition". 14. 28. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the High Court clearly erred firstly, entertaining the writ petition, secondly in going into the disputed question of fact regarding the caste status, thirdly, in holding that the appellant did not belong to the Scheduled Caste and fourthly, in allowing the writ petition". 14. As held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, since the issue / question with regard to the validity and legality of the impugned caste certificate is in serious dispute and controversy between the petitioner and the respondents in the instant case, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court in the present petition in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, particularly in view of the equally efficacious and alternative remedy available in favour of the petitioner to challenge the impugned caste certificate before the appropriate authorities under the said Act and Rules; so also, the grievance of the petitioner with regard to the election of the respondent No.5 to the post of a 'councillor' can also be ventilated by him by way of an election petition under Section 33 of the KMC Act and the said prayer of quo warranto cannot be granted in favour of the petitioner in the present petition, particularly when the said direction is consequential to the issues / question with regard to the validity of the caste certificate and consequently, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the present petition subject to however reserving liberty in his favour to take recourse to such remedies as available in law in respect of the grievances, contentions and prayers put forth by him in the present petition. 15. 15. As rightly contended by the learned senior counsel for the respondent No.5, the present petition involving adjudication of contentious issues and complicated and disputed questions of fact is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; the impugned caste certificate was issued by the Tahsildar after complying with the procedure prescribed in Section 4-A of the said Act of 1990 r/w Rules 3-A(1) and (2) of the said Rules of 1992; any person including the petitioner herein who is aggrieved by the caste certificate has to necessarily challenge the same under Section 4-B of the said Act of 1990 r/w Rule 3-B of the said Rules of 1992 which provides for an equally efficacious and alternative remedy in favour of the petitioner as well as an equally efficacious and alternative remedy by way of a Revision under Section 4-F before the Deputy Commissioner. Further, the caste certificate which has been issued by the Tahsildar after following the procedure as per the said Act of 1990 and said Rules of 1992 has to be necessarily challenged/assailed in terms of the mechanism/procedure prescribed under the same and not by way of the present petition before this Court. 16. Further, the caste certificate which has been issued by the Tahsildar after following the procedure as per the said Act of 1990 and said Rules of 1992 has to be necessarily challenged/assailed in terms of the mechanism/procedure prescribed under the same and not by way of the present petition before this Court. 16. Insofar as the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner that respondent No.5 having himself stated that he belongs to ‘Veerakudi Vellam’ community which is not notified in the Notification dated 13.01.1995, as well as the material on record which indicates that he belongs to ‘Veerakudi Vellam’ community and not one of the notified communities, the Tahsildar erred in issuing the caste certificate in favour of the respondent No.5 is concerned, even this contention qua the validity of the caste certificate has to be necessarily urged and put forth in an appeal / revision filed by the petitioner before the appropriate authority under the Act and Rules and not before this Court by way of the present petition, particularly in view of the rival contentions with regard to the caste certificate which is essentially disputed question of fact based on the documents and material relied upon by both sides; as stated supra, while the petitioner relies upon certain documents / material to contend that the caste certificate was illegal and invalid, respondent No.5 also relied upon certain other documents / material to contend that the certificate was valid and proper and consequently, this issue is incapable of being adjudicated upon in the present petition and as such, this contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 17. In the result, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) Petition is hereby dismissed. (ii) However, liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to take recourse to such remedies as available in law in relation to the grievances, contentions and prayers urged in this petition. (iii) All rival contentions urged by both sides are kept open and no opinion is expressed on the same. (iv) Registry is directed to return the original records back to the learned HCGP.” Against the said order, it appears, the said petitioner is before the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.100025 of 2022. The said writ appeal is pending consideration. 10. (iv) Registry is directed to return the original records back to the learned HCGP.” Against the said order, it appears, the said petitioner is before the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.100025 of 2022. The said writ appeal is pending consideration. 10. After the dismissal of the writ petition, as noted supra, the 6 th and 7 th respondents, other participants in the election, approaches the 3 rd respondent/Assistant Commissioner, Dharwad Sub-Division on 04-12-2021 challenging the caste certificate issued in favour of the petitioner under Section 4B of the Act. The said proceeding is terminated by the Assistant Commissioner on the score that it is barred by limitation. Section 4B of the Act reads as follows: “ 4B . Appeal against order under section 4A .- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Tahasildar under section 4A may, within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order prefer an appeal to Assistant Commissioner of the revenue sub-division. (2) The Assistant Commissioner of the revenue sub- division may after giving both parties an opportunity of being heard pass orders allowing or dismissing the appeal and in appropriate cases directing issue of a caste certificate or as the case may be, an income and caste certificate to the applicant.” Section 4B permits an aggrieved person to call in question the caste certificate so issued against any person coming under the Act to challenge it within 30 days of issuance of the said caste certificate. 11. In the case at hand, the caste certificate had been issued on 18-08-2021 and the challenge to the said caste certificate was on 04-12-2021. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner on the score of delay in raising a challenge, rejects the said challenge by issuance of endorsement on 21-12-2021. The said endorsement reads as follows: Against the said endorsement, the 6 th and 7 th respondents herein approaches the Deputy Commissioner by filing a revision petition. The Deputy Commissioner allows the revision petition setting aside the caste certificate by the following order: “…. …. …. 16. The principles held in the above decisions cannot be disputed. The said endorsement reads as follows: Against the said endorsement, the 6 th and 7 th respondents herein approaches the Deputy Commissioner by filing a revision petition. The Deputy Commissioner allows the revision petition setting aside the caste certificate by the following order: “…. …. …. 16. The principles held in the above decisions cannot be disputed. Merely on the principles held in those decisions without considering material fact of the instant case it cannot be concluded that Caste Certificate issued by the Respondent No.2 on 18-08-2001 is correct and other Caste Certificates signed by the Village Accountant, Revenue Inspector, Tahasildar preparation of mahajar are not correct. In such conflicting issue it cannot be concluded that Caste Certificate issued by the Respondent No.2 on 18.08.2001 is only correct and not other certificates belonging to Respondent No.1. 17. There is one letter by Krishna M.Gandagalekar addressed to the Regional Commissioner (Administrator) Hubballi-Dharwad Municipal Corporation, Hubballi dated 09.09.2021 wherein it is clearly stated that Sandilkumar S (R1) does not belong to category (A) and he has obtained false caste certificate from Hubaballi Tahsildar. Such complaint when was given the concerned authorities should have verified as to the real fact. Hubballi Tahsildar Grade-2 on 13-09-2021 has replied to Krishna S/o Malleshappa Gandagalekar wherein it is stated that the Central Government list of other Backward Classes/OBCs, Karnataka State as per Sl.No.181 Vir, Veer, Veeramasti is mentioned in the OBC list and further stated such caste comes under category “A” but not Veerakodi Vellam. The respondent No.2 who has given such reply to that Krishna Gandagalekar on 13-09-2021 about the caste of “Category-A” which does not include Veerakodi Vellam, then he issued caste certificate to respondent No.1 on 18.08.2001 stating Respondent No.1 belongs to Veer community is unexplainable and unbelievable. 18. In view of these reasons, genuineness of caste certificate of Respondent No.1 issued by Respondent No.2 on 18-08-2021 cannot be accepted. 19. In view of these reasons, the Petition filed by the Petitioner is liable to be allowed holding Caste Certificate issued by the Respondent No.2 in respect of Respondent No.1 on 18-08-2021 is not genuine. 20. Hence, proceeded to pass the following: ORDER Petition is allowed and Caste Certificate issued by the Respondent No.2 in respect of Respondent No.1 on 18.08.2021 is not accepted and rejected. No costs. Dictated, transcribed, corrected and then pronounced in Open Court on 24-03-2022. 20. Hence, proceeded to pass the following: ORDER Petition is allowed and Caste Certificate issued by the Respondent No.2 in respect of Respondent No.1 on 18.08.2021 is not accepted and rejected. No costs. Dictated, transcribed, corrected and then pronounced in Open Court on 24-03-2022. Sd/-(Nitesh K.Patil, IAS) Deputy Commissioner, Dharwad.” The petitioner is now before this Court calling in question the order of the Deputy Commissioner. 12. The preliminary contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the caste certificate so issued in his favour had to be challenged only by filing an election petition and not under the provisions of the Act. To answer the said contention, this Court need not delve deep into the matter, as the Apex Court in the case of A. RAJA v. D. KUMAR , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1033 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 45. Adopting and applying the afore-referred precedents, it is clear that ‘in any trial’ would refer only to a trial under the Act. The terms preceding and succeeding ‘in any trial’ also fortify our conclusion. Even the start and end of Section 10 are hemmed in by reference to the Kerala Act itself. The meaning of ‘any trial’ has to be ‘judged by the company it keeps.’ The Kerala Act in Section 24 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, but Section 21 establishes Special Courts to try offences thereunder. As such, arguendo, even if we brush aside the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis principles, on a harmonious reading of the Kerala Act as a whole, we are not able to countenance that the Legislature intended ‘any trial’ occurring in Section 10 to include an Election Petition. In the wake of the above discussions, we have no hesitation to hold that a Caste/Community Certificate cannot be assailed in an Election Petition. Exception to the above proposition can only be by way of legislative carve-out in the State concerned, which will be determinative. Exempli gratia, if the legislation permits challenge to Caste/Community Certificate in an Election Petition, then the Madhuri Patil (supra) guidelines cannot come in the way. In the absence of which, the Madhuri Patil (supra) guidelines, as modified per Dayaram (supra), will prevail, under which challenge to a Caste Certificate cannot be mounted in an Election Petition. Exempli gratia, if the legislation permits challenge to Caste/Community Certificate in an Election Petition, then the Madhuri Patil (supra) guidelines cannot come in the way. In the absence of which, the Madhuri Patil (supra) guidelines, as modified per Dayaram (supra), will prevail, under which challenge to a Caste Certificate cannot be mounted in an Election Petition. Obviously, the guidelines issued in Madhuri Patil (supra) were in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution. As elucidated by the 5-Judge Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 , ‘Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.’ It was further stated ‘… the power is used with restraint without pushing back the limits of the Constitution so as to function within the bounds of its own jurisdiction. To the extent this Court makes the statutory authorities and other organs of the State perform their duties in accordance with law, its role is unexceptionable but it is not permissible for the Court to “take over” the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the State and “perform” their functions.’ … … … 64. We deem it appropriate to clarify the position in the wake of the present Judgment. A duly issued Caste/Community Certificate would be amenable to challenge only under the provisions of the statute concerned, and not in an Election Petition. In case no statute governing the field in a State/Union Territory is operative, the Madhuri Patil (supra) guidelines, as modified in Dayaram (supra), shall be followed. 65. Insofar as the constitutional bar, or any analogous provision thereto, adverted to in Lillykutty (supra) is concerned, we feel no need to dwell thereupon inasmuch as the interplay between such bar(s) and the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or by this Court has been dealt with in a number of precedents, referred to in Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, 2023 INSC 804 , specifically at paragraph no. 36 thereof.” The Apex Court holds that a caste certificate so issued in favour of an applicant can be challenged only under the provisions of the statute and not by filing an election petition. In case no statute governing the field in the State is operative, the guidelines issued by the Apex Court in plethora of cases should be followed. In the light of the Apex Court steering clear the controversy of whether the caste certificate issued to a candidate for the purpose of elections can be challenged under the Statute, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the 6 th and 7 th respondents could not have preferred a petition/appeal before the Assistant Commissioner would hold no water. 13. Respondents 6 and 7 have preferred the appeal before the Assistant Commissioner invoking Section 4B of the Act. Section 4B of the Act is quoted supra which mandates the challenge to be raised within 30 days. Challenge is rejected by issuance of endorsement quoted supra. Respondents 6 and 7 file a revision before the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner cancels the caste certificate. The Deputy Commissioner, in his order, goes on to the merit of the matter, but does not decide on the issue of maintainability of the appeal. If the challenge before the Assistant Commissioner was rejected on account of limitation or delay in raising the challenge under the statute, the delay has cut at the root of the matter. The objections before the Deputy Commissioner filed by the petitioner was specific with regard to delay in raising a challenge. The averment in the objections is as follows: “…. …. …. 4. The appeal has been preferred with an inordinate and unexplained delay in challenging the Caste Certificate having been issued by Respondent No.2 to respondent No.1. Leaving apart the ‘sufficient cause’ for the delay, the appellant has not even preferred to file an application for the condonation of delay and hence even on this ground of limitation, the appeal is not maintainable.” The objection is categorical that the challenge is barred by limitation. The Deputy Commissioner does not answer the said contention of the petitioner, but goes on to cancel the caste certificate so issued in favour of the petitioner. The Deputy Commissioner does not answer the said contention of the petitioner, but goes on to cancel the caste certificate so issued in favour of the petitioner. If the proceeding before the original Authority is barred by limitation, the said defect that cuts at the root of the matter cannot be cured by the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority entertaining the appeal or revision, without at the outset answering the question with regard to limitation. If the Appellate/Revisional Authority would answer the question of limitation and hold in favour of the petitioner, no other contention need be considered and if it goes against the petitioner, then the Appellate/Revisional Authority could traverse on merit of the matter. 14. A perusal at the order quoted supra would not indicate that the Revisional Authority has considered the aspect of delay in approaching the Assistant Commissioner. If it were to be a suomotu proceeding by the Deputy Commissioner, it would have been a circumstance altogether different. Respondents 6 and 7 have preferred an application before the Deputy Commissioner being aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Commissioner. Therefore, the Revisional Authority ought to have, at the outset, considered the question of limitation. In the light of non-consideration of the said question, the matter requires to be remitted back to the hands of the Deputy Commissioner to consider the case afresh, bearing in mind the observations made in the course of the order. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) Writ Petition is allowed. (ii) The order of the 2 nd respondent/Deputy Commissioner dated 24-03-2022 stands obliterated. (iii) The matter is remitted back to the hands of the Deputy Commissioner to consider the application/revision afresh, in accordance with law, bearing in mind the observations made in the course of the order. Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2024 also stands disposed.