JUDGMENT : DHIRAJ SINGH THAKUR, C.J : The petitioners challenge the issuance of e-auction sale notice, dated 14.02.2025, for sale of the property admeasuring 194.667 Sq. Mtrs and a building constructed thereupon bearing H.No.15, in R.S. No.123/1 of Gunadala, Vijayawada, in NTR District, as being illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice. 2. It is stated that the petitioners jointly purchased the property in question in regard to which a sale deed was executed by respondent Nos.2 to 6 after receipt of the entire sale consideration by them. After conducting due diligence and after having verified from the office of the concerned Sub-Registrar that there was no encumbrance upon the said property, a sale deed was then executed and registered in favour of the petitioners. 3. It is stated that a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), dated 17.04.2023, came to be issued to respondent Nos.2 to 6 by the Bank asking them to repay an amount of Rs.6,12,05,988/- that had been taken from the Bank after mortgaging the properties, which included the one that had been purchased by the petitioners. This fact, it is stated, was not within the knowledge of the petitioners that the property sold to the petitioners was already mortgaged with the State Bank of India – respondent No.1 herein. 4. The immediate concern of the petitioners is that the e-auction sale notice, dated 14.02.2025, has been issued by the Bank with a view to sell the said property under the provisions of the Act, which is to be held on 17.03.2025. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that being bonafide purchasers of the property in question, they are not legally obliged to discharge any part of the loan obtained by respondent Nos.2 to 6 and that the Bank, if at all, ought to proceed against the other properties, which have not been sold by the said respondents and could easily be liquidated. 6. It is stated that the e-auction notice, which has been issued by the Bank, is not in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act, as no notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was ever issued to the petitioners or for that matter, additionally, no notice under Section 13(4)(d) was issued by the Bank. 6. It is stated that the e-auction notice, which has been issued by the Bank, is not in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act, as no notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was ever issued to the petitioners or for that matter, additionally, no notice under Section 13(4)(d) was issued by the Bank. It is stated that since the aforementioned provisions have not been complied with, the Bank could not have proceeded against the petitioners, which were a mandatory statutory requirements. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length. 8. Since a reference has been made to Section 13(4) of the Act, it would be appropriate to reproduce the same hereinbelow: “ 13. Enforcement of security interest. (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely:— (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; (b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset: Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt: Provided further that where the management of whole of the business or part of the business is severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security for the debt; (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt.? 9. 9. A reading of the said clauses of Section 13 of the Act would thus make it clear that the option which the secured creditor is given in terms of clause 13(4) are enumerated under sub-sections (a) to (d) of clause (4) of the said Section. The option which is available to a secured creditor under Section 13(4)(a) for sale of the secured asset is not dependent upon the service of notice under Section 13(4)(d) and is in fact independent thereof. In fact, the option with the secured creditor under Section 13(4)(d) of the Act can be invoked any time if a notice in writing is given to any person, who has acquired any of the assets from the borrower, who owes money to the secured creditor to pay so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured creditor. The said option can thus be exercised independently of the right of the secured creditor to take possession in terms of Section 13(4)(a) of the Act. In our opinion, the argument that it was mandatory for the Bank to serve upon the petitioners a notice inasmuch as it acquired the secured asset before any steps could be taken to sell the property is an argument, which is not legally sound and may not warrant our interference in the extraordinary writ jurisdiction on that ground. 10. On a perusal of the scheme of the Act, it can be seen that there is an alternate remedy provided by way of an appeal under Section 17 of the Act, before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, stated that the availability of an alternate remedy by itself does not prevent this Court from exercising its writ jurisdiction. 12. The issue with regard to the exercise of writ jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the light of the availability of an alternate remedy has been considered by the Apex Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh , [ (2021) 6 SCC 771 ] , PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank , [2024 SCC OnLine SC 528] 13. In Radha Krishan Industries (supra), the following principles have been crystallized: "27. In Radha Krishan Industries (supra), the following principles have been crystallized: "27. The principles of law which emerge are that : (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law; (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with." 14. In PHR Invent Educational Society (supra), the Apex Court held that availability of an alternate remedy was a rule of self-restraint and once a statutory forum was provided for redressal of grievances, writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. The exceptions in which a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability alternate remedy were crystallized as under: "29. The exceptions in which a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability alternate remedy were crystallized as under: "29. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of them are thus: (i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question; (ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; (iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and (iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice.? 15. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon , [ (2010) 8 SCC 110 ] , the Apex Court held: "45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. … 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.? 16. In Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd , (2024) 2 SCC 1 , the Apex Court held: "97. This Court has time and again, reminded the High Courts that they should not entertain petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person under the provisions of the Sarfaesi Act. **** 101. This Court has time and again, reminded the High Courts that they should not entertain petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person under the provisions of the Sarfaesi Act. **** 101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the Rdbfi Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon, it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the Rdbfi Act and the Sarfaesi Act." 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the present case would certainly fall within the exceptions which have been carved out for exercise of writ jurisdiction inasmuch as even when a notice under Section 13(4)(d) was required to be served upon the petitioners, the same was not complied with which would render the action of the Bank in proceeding to sell the property illegal. We are not convinced with the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that failure to serve notice under Section 13(4)(d) would vitiate the notice for sale of the property in question. 18. With a view to find out as to whether any such notice was at all issued to the petitioners, we asked the learned counsel for the Bank to take instructions in that regard. Post the lunch break, when the matter was taken up again, learned counsel for the Bank stated that according to his information, there was a notice published in the newspaper and that further instructions would have to be taken upon verification of the exact position from the records. 19. Be that as it may, we give liberty to the petitioners to avail the alternate remedy and take all possible grounds before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The observations made by us shall not in any manner influence the Debts Recovery Tribunal from taking an independent view on the matter. The Writ Petition is, accordingly, disposed of. No costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.