JUDGMENT AND ORDER : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. Heard Mr. S. Dutta, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S. Dutta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. S.Deka, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondents. 2. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been invoked challenging the order dated 30.04.2024 passed by the learned Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Lakhimpur, North Lakhimpur (hereinafter referred to as, “the learned Trial Court”) in petition No. 1195/2023 arising out of Title Suit No. 10/2022 whereby the said application was rejected. 3. It is seen from the records that the petitioner herein who is the defendant in the suit had filed an application under Order XXVI Rule 10A read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for scientific investigation relating to the question of paternity of the plaintiff No. 2 by means of DNA test (Deoxyribonucleic acid). The very basis on which the said application was filed is that the plaintiff No. 2 during his cross examination stated that he had no objection to the DNA test. 4. Be that as it may, the plaintiff No. 2 had filed the written objection wherein he had categorically stated that he was not agreeable to the DNA test. On the basis thereof, the learned Trial Court taking into account the right of privacy is a Constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and there being no exceptional circumstances present rejected the application vide the impugned order dated 30.04.2024. This Court finds it relevant to incorporate the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court in the impugned order. The relevant portion of the impugned order is reproduced herein under. “It is pertinent to emphasize here that the plaintiff no. 2 has objected to the said DNA test being conducted on him. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had in a catena of decisions held that when a party is unwilling to subject himself to the DNA test, forcing him to undergo one would impinge upon his personal liberty and his right to privacy thereby violating Article 21of the Constitution. It also has major societal repercussions for the said person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had in a catena of decisions held that when a party is unwilling to subject himself to the DNA test, forcing him to undergo one would impinge upon his personal liberty and his right to privacy thereby violating Article 21of the Constitution. It also has major societal repercussions for the said person. However, it can be allowed exceptional circumstances in circumstances where other evidence is available to prove or dispute the relationship it is fit and proper to refrain from ordering the said DNA Test which might have adverse societal repercussions on the life of the plaintiff no. 2 as well as it would also tantamount to infringing upon his right to privacy. Considering all the above, am of the opinion that there is no such exceptional circumstance in instant suit where DNA test would be left out as the last resort to prove or dispute the relationship of plaintiff no. 2 with Late Lila Kanta Ahom @ Gogoi, would not be just and proper and it would also tantamount to infringing upon Article 21 of the Constitution. Considering all the above, prayer of the defendant side is hereby rejected.” 5. This Court had heard the learned counsels for the parties and had given anxious consideration to the materials on record including the impugned order. The question arises as to whether this Court ought to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in respect to the impugned order. 6. This Court has duly perused the application filed by the petitioner before the learned Trial Court. From a perusal of the said application, it is seen that the ground for seeking DNA test upon the plaintiff No. 2 is that the petitioner as defendant had submitted the written statement cum counter claim wherein a declaration was sought for to the effect that the plaintiff No. 2 is not the son of Late Lila Kanta Gogoi and as such the plaintiff No. 2 should undergo DNA test. On the other hand, the plaintiff No. 2 has refused to undergo DNA testing by exercising his right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Further to that, the plaintiff No. 2/the respondent herein has also stated that there are sufficient evidence that he is the son of Late Lila Kanta Gogoi. On the other hand, the plaintiff No. 2 has refused to undergo DNA testing by exercising his right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Further to that, the plaintiff No. 2/the respondent herein has also stated that there are sufficient evidence that he is the son of Late Lila Kanta Gogoi. In that regard, reference was made to the legal heir certificate, NRC Form, Voter ID Card, PNA Card, Aadhar Card, Gaon Pradhan Certificate, HSLC Pass Certificate as well as the Pre Degree Certificate. The plaintiff No. 2/respondent herein further stated he is 56 years old, and would not like to undergo the test which would humiliate him and cause mental torture. 7. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of the stage of the suit wherein the evidence of the PW 1 is yet to be completed. The question of sufficiency of evidence being present or not could not have been considered at the stage when the evidence of the parties were not laid in entirety before the learned Trial Court. 8. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take note of a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ivan Rathinam Vs. Milan Joseph reported in (2025) SCC OnLine SC 175 wherein the Supreme Court dealt with the powers of the Court to order DNA Testing. Some of the paragraphs of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein below. “ 26. The advent of scientific testing has made it much easier to prove that a child is not a particular person's offspring. To this end, Indian courts have sanctioned the use of DNA testing, but sparingly. 27. Before delving into the analysis, it is pertinent to elucidate Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: “112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy. The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.” 28. The language of the provision makes it abundantly clear that there exists a strong presumption that the husband is the father of the child borne by his wife during the subsistence of their marriage. This section provides that conclusive proof of legitimacy Is equivalent to paternity. The object of this principle is to prevent any unwarranted enquiry into the parentage of a child. Since the presumption is in favour of legitimacy, the burden is cast upon the person who asserts ‘illegitimacy’ to prove it only through ‘non-access.’ 29. It is well-established that access and non-access under Section 112 do not require a party to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had or did not have sexual intercourse at the time the child could have been begotten. ‘Access’ merely refers to the possibility of an opportunity for marital relations. To put it more simply, in such a scenario, while parties may be on non-speaking terms, engaging in extra-marital affairs, or residing in different houses in the same village, it does not necessarily preclude the possibility of the spouses having an opportunity to engage in marital relations. Non-access means the impossibility, not merely inability, of the spouses to have marital relations with each other. For a person to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, they must first assert non-access which, in turn, must be substantiated by evidence. 30. It is only when such an assertion is made, that the court can consider the question of ordering a DNA test to establish paternity. In Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B. (supra), this Court laid down the following parameters to decide whether a court can order a DNA test for the purposes of Section 112: “(1) that courts in India cannot order blood test as a matter of course; (2) wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained. (3) There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. (4) The court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman. (5) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.” 31. (4) The court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman. (5) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.” 31. These parameters have been subsequently followed by this Court in Sharda v. Dharmpal (supra) and Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women (supra). In these cases, it was held that DNA tests may be ordered, only if a strong prima facie case of non-access is made out, with sufficient material placed before the court to arrive at a decision. 36. On one hand, courts must protect the parties' rights to privacy and dignity by evaluating whether the social stigma from one of them being declared ‘illegitimate’ would cause them disproportionate harm. On the other hand, courts must assess the child's legitimate interest in knowing his biological father and whether there is an eminent need for a DNA test. D.1.2.1 Right to privacy and right to dignity 37. Having recognized the diverging pathways in the present analysis, it is pertinent to first address the aspect of the right to privacy. At the outset, a cursory reference to the decision in K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, reveals that privacy is concomitant to the right of the individual to exercise control over his or her personality. Privacy includes, at its core, the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home, and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone, as a corollary to the safeguarding of individual autonomy and the ability of an individual to control vital aspects of his life. Elaborating further, this Court held that: “325. Like other rights which form part of the fundamental freedoms protected by Part III, including the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, privacy is not an absolute right. A law which encroaches upon privacy will have to withstand the touchstone of permissible restrictions on fundamental rights. In the context of Article 21 an invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable. The law must also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and personal liberty under Article 21. In the context of Article 21 an invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable. The law must also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and personal liberty under Article 21. An invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the threefold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them.” 38. In this context, while permitting an enquiry into a person's paternity vide a DNA test, we must be mindful of the collateral infringement of privacy. For this, the court must satisfy itself that the threshold for the abovementioned three conditions is satisfied. If even one of these conditions fails, it is considered an unwarranted invasion of privacy and consequently, of life and personal liberty as embodied in Article 21 of the Constitution. 39. Similarly, when dealing with the right to dignity, this Court, in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), held that the right to dignity encapsulates the right of every individual to be treated as a self-governing entity having intrinsic value. It means that every human being possesses dignity merely by being a human, and can make self-defining and self-determining choices. Further, this Court held that the right to dignity is intertwined with the right to privacy. This means that a person can exercise his right to privacy in order to protect his right to dignity and vice-versa. Together, these rights protect an individual's ability to make the most intimate decisions regarding his life, including sexual activity, whether inside or outside the confines of marriage. 40. Forcefully undergoing a DNA test would subject an individual's private life to scrutiny from the outside world. That scrutiny, particularly when concerning matters of infidelity, can be harsh and can eviscerate a person's reputation and standing in society. It can irreversibly affect a person's social and professional life, along with his mental health. On account of this, he has the right to undertake certain actions to protect his dignity and privacy, including refusing to undergo a DNA test. 41. Usually in cases concerning legitimacy, it is the child's dignity and privacy that have to be protected, as they primarily come under the line of fire. On account of this, he has the right to undertake certain actions to protect his dignity and privacy, including refusing to undergo a DNA test. 41. Usually in cases concerning legitimacy, it is the child's dignity and privacy that have to be protected, as they primarily come under the line of fire. Though in this instance, the child is a major and is voluntarily submitting himself to this test, he is not the only stakeholder bearing personal interest in the results, whatever they may be. The effects of social stigma surrounding an illegitimate child make their way into the parents' lives as there may be undue scrutiny owing to the alleged infidelity. It is in this backdrop that the Appellant's right to privacy and dignity have to be considered. 44. It must be noted that the law permits only a preliminary enquiry into a person's private life by allowing the parties to bring evidence on record to prove non-access to dislodge the presumption of legitimacy. When the law provides for a mode to attain a particular object, that mode must be satisfied. When the evidence submitted does not rebut this presumption, the court cannot subvert the law to attain a particular object, by permitting a roving enquiry into a person's private life, such as through a DNA test. 46. When dealing with the eminent need for a DNA test to prove paternity, this Court balances the interests of those involved and must consider whether it is possible to reach the truth without the use of such a test. 47. First and foremost, the courts must, therefore, consider the existing evidence to assess the presumption of legitimacy. If that evidence is insufficient to come to a finding, only then should the court consider ordering a DNA test. Once the insufficiency of evidence is established, the court must consider whether ordering a DNA test is in the best interests of the parties involved and must ensure that it does not cause undue harm to the parties. There are thus, two blockades to ordering a DNA test: ( i ) insufficiency of evidence; and ( ii ) a positive finding regarding the balance of interests. 51. In the case at hand, we cannot say that there is insufficient evidence to come to a conclusion regarding the presumption of legitimacy. There are thus, two blockades to ordering a DNA test: ( i ) insufficiency of evidence; and ( ii ) a positive finding regarding the balance of interests. 51. In the case at hand, we cannot say that there is insufficient evidence to come to a conclusion regarding the presumption of legitimacy. The Respondent and his mother placed on record certain letters, claimed to be written by the Appellant, where he allegedly admitted his paternity. They were deemed unreliable as they could not be proved to be written by the Appellant. Even the Register of Birth in Cochin clearly recorded Mr. Raju Kurian's name as the father of the Respondent. Documentary evidence aside, it is uncontested that the Respondent's mother and Mr. Raju Kurian were residing together, in a valid, subsisting marriage when the Respondent was conceived. Thus, in our considered opinion, there seems to be ample evidence to presume legitimacy and there is absolutely no confusion as to whether the presumption would apply. Further, as analyzed in detail above, the balance of interest does not support mandating a DNA test, as it is likely to have a disproportionately adverse impact on the Appellant and the Respondent's mother. As a result, there is no ‘eminent need’ for a DNA test. 9. The exposition of law above quoted and applied to the facts involved in the present case in the opinion of this Court, would show that the application so filed by the petitioner before the learned Trial Court was premature. The law declared above categorically mandates that directions for DNA Testing can only be permitted when the learned Court after perusal of the evidence finds that the evidence is not sufficient to conclude the legitimacy of paternity. In addition to that, the learned Court thereupon has to arrive at a finding, as to whether, the DNA test is in the best interest of the parties. In the instant case, the evidence of the parties is yet to be led in the entirety and under such circumstances the question of consideration of the said application could not have arisen. In addition to that, this Court further takes note of the provision of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India which mandates that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In addition to that, this Court further takes note of the provision of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India which mandates that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In this respect, this Court finds it relevant to observe that a direction upon the plaintiff No. 2/respondent herein to undergo DNA Testing to prove the case of the counter claimant/ petitioner herein would go against the very principles of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. 10. Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the present proceedings to exercise the supervisory jurisdiction. Accordingly, the instant petition stands dismissed. The interim order passed earlier by this Court stands vacated and the parties to the suit who are duly represented herein are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on 01.04.2025 for further proceedings of T.S. No.10/2022.