JUDGMENT : Johnson John, J. The above appeals are filed by the 2nd respondent in O.P.(MV) Nos. 714 and 716 of 2014 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Pala challenging the direction in the common award of the Tribunal permitting the 3rd respondent insurance company to recover the award amount from the owner of the vehicle after payment to the claim petitioners, on the ground of violation of policy conditions. 2. The appellant is the owner of the offending vehicle and the contention of the respondent insurance company is that there is violation of permit conditions. It is contended that in violation of Exhibit B8 order prohibiting the plying of tipper lorries through State Highways between 8 a.m. and 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. to 5 p.m., the offending vehicle was driven through Pala-Ramapuram road at 4.05 p.m. on 15.01.2014. 3. Respondent insurance company also contended that there is violation of Rule 118 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, as it was found that the speed governor in the offending vehicle was not pre-set to the prescribed speed limit. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the alleged violation of Exhibit B8 executive order by itself will not amount to any violation of policy conditions and there is also no violation of Rule 118 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (Rules, 1989’ for short) as alleged. 5. The respondent insurance company is alleging violation of Rule 118 of the Rules, 1989 on the basis of the findings in Exhibit B2 report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector. In Exhibit B2, it is stated that the speed governor was found not set to the limit of 60 kms. per hour and the vehicle could achieve a speed of 70 kms. per hour and the same is a violation of permit condition. Column No.4 of Exhibit B4, goods carriage permit of the offending vehicle, shows that the permit is valid for all roads in Kerala State except those prohibited by any law in force. Exhibit B5, copy of the policy of insurance, provides that the policy covers use only under a permit within the meaning of motor vehicles Act, 1988. The respondent insurance company has no case that the offending vehicle was not having a valid permit. Rule 118 of Rules, 1989 provides thus: “[118. Exhibit B5, copy of the policy of insurance, provides that the policy covers use only under a permit within the meaning of motor vehicles Act, 1988. The respondent insurance company has no case that the offending vehicle was not having a valid permit. Rule 118 of Rules, 1989 provides thus: “[118. Speed governor.—(1) Every transport vehicle notified by the Central Government under sub-section (4) of section 41 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (58 of 1988), save as provided herein, and manufactured on or after the 1st October, 2015 shall be equipped or fitted by the vehicle manufacturer, either in the manufacturing stage or at the dealership stage, with a speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function) having maximum pre-set speed of 80 kilometre per hour conforming to the Standrad AIS 018/2001, as amended from time to time: Provided further that the transport vehicles that are – (i) Two wheelers; (ii) three wheelers; (iii) quadric cycles; [xxx] (v) fire tenders; (vi) ambulances; (vii) police vehicles; (viii)verified and certified by a testing agency specified in rule 126 to have maximum rated speed of not more than 80 kilometre per hour, shall not be required to be equipped or fitted with speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function): Provided further that the transport vehicles manufactured on or after 1st October, 2015 that are dumpers, tankers, school buses, those carrying hazardous goods or any other category of vehicles, as may be specified by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time, shall be equipped or fitted by the vehicle manufacturer, either in the manufacturing stage or at the dealership stage, with a speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function) having maximum speed of 60 kilometer per hour conforming to the Standards A1S 018/2001, as amended from time to time. Provided also that on and from 1st April 2017, articulated or truck-trailer or tractor-trailor vehicles engaged by automobile manufactures to carry motor vehicles from their factories to different sale outlets in the country, shall be equipped or fitted by the vehicle manufacturer, either in the manufacturing stage or at the dealership stage, with a speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function) having maximum speed of 60 kilometres per hour conforming to AIS 018/2001, as amended from time to time, till such time the corresponding Bureau of Indian Standards specifications are notified. The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify on or before 1st October, 2015, the categories of transport vehicles registered prior to the 1st October, 2015 which are not already fitted with a speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function), and are not covered under the first proviso to sub-rule (1) above, that such transport vehicles shall be equipped or fitted by the operators of those vehicles on or before 1st April 2016 with a speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function) having maximum pre-set speed of 80 kilometre per hour or such lower speed limit as specified by the State Government from time to time, conforming to the Standard AIS: 018/2001, as amended from time to time. Provided that the categories of transport vehicles carrying hazardous goods and those transport vehicles that are dumpers, tankers or school buses, registered prior to the 1st October, 2015 and not already fitted with a speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function) shall be equipped or fitted by the operator of such vehicle with a speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function) having maximum pre-set speed of 60 kilometre per hour or such other lower speed limit as may be specified by the State Government, conforming to the Standard AIS : 018/2001, as amended from time to time. An Airport Passenger Bus, referred to in rule 93-C, shall be equipped or fitted with a speed governor (speed limiting device or speed limiting function) having maximum pre-set speed of thirty kilometer per hour or such lower speed limit as specified by the State Government from time to time, conforming to the Standard AIS: 018/2001 as amended from time to time. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the occurrence was on 15.01.2014 and the vehicle was fitted with a speed governor and in the absence of any allegation that the vehicle could achieve a speed of more than 80 kms. per hour, it cannot be held that there is violation of Rule 118 of the Rules, 1989. There is no evidence in this case to show that the maximum pre-set speed of the speed governor fitted in the vehicle has contributed to the cause of the accident and therefore, the contention of the 2nd respondent insurance company in this regard is not legally sustainable. 7. There is no evidence in this case to show that the maximum pre-set speed of the speed governor fitted in the vehicle has contributed to the cause of the accident and therefore, the contention of the 2nd respondent insurance company in this regard is not legally sustainable. 7. Exhibit B8 notification is issued by invoking the power under Section 115 of the Act, 1988. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that permit is issued under Section 66 of the Act, 1988 and violation of an executive order issued by exercising the power under Section 115 of the Act, 1988 cannot be seen as violation of a permit issued under Section 66 of the Act, 1988. It is also pointed out that the said violation is punishable under Section 177 of the Act, 1988. 8. As noticed earlier, the respondent insurance company has no case that the offending vehicle was not having a valid permit and therefore, I find that a mere technical violation, even if it would attract penal consequences under the Act, by itself cannot be treated as a fundamental breach. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that the Tribunal has not recorded any finding that there is violation of any specific policy condition and that the owner of a vehicle is expected to take only reasonable care by giving necessary instruction to the driver not to use the vehicle in violation of law and it is not possible for the owner of the vehicle to accompany the driver to ensure that the vehicle is not driven during the prohibited hours. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that it is specifically contended in the written statement filed by the owner of the vehicle that he had given specific direction to the 1st respondent to drive the vehicle following all the traffic rules and regulations. The specific case of the appellant is that a violation of Exhibit B8 executive order by the 1st respondent, driver of the vehicle, without the knowledge of the owner of the vehicle will not amount to violation of any permit condition or policy condition. 10. Sub-Sections 1 and 2 of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1998 is extracted below for convenient reference: 147. Requirement of policies and limits of liability. 10. Sub-Sections 1 and 2 of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1998 is extracted below for convenient reference: 147. Requirement of policies and limits of liability. - (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which – (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer, and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) – (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the motor vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a transport vehicle, except gratuitous passengers of a goods vehicle, caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle in a public place. Provided that a policy shall not be required – (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Explanation. Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party shall be deemed to have been caused by or to have arisen out of, the use of a vehicle in a public place, notwithstanding that the person who is dead or injured or the property which is damaged was not in a public place at the time of the accident, if the act or omission which led to the accident occurred in a public place. (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in sub-section (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely: - (a) save as provided in clause (b), the amount of liability incurred; (b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand: Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier." 11. It is also worthwhile to consider sub-Section 1 of Section 149 of Motor vehicles Act, 1988 which reads as follows: "149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks. It is also worthwhile to consider sub-Section 1 of Section 149 of Motor vehicles Act, 1988 which reads as follows: "149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks. - (1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of S.147 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment or award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) [or under the provisions of S.163A] is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments.” 12. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sabeer Ali [ 1999 (3) KLT 700 ], a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows: “A mere reading of the provisions of clause (c) of S. 149(2)(a)(i) would show that there is no merit in the contention raised by the Insurance Company. The breach of the condition should be one relating to the use of the vehicle for a purpose not allowed by the permit. In the present case, there is no dispute that the offending vehicle was allowed by permit to carry passengers. It is also admitted case that when the accident happened the vehicle was being used as a taxi for carrying passengers. If that be so, there is no question of putting the vehicle to a purpose not allowed by the permit (emphasis supplied). If the vehicle was used for carrying goods then it would have come within clause (c). So also, if it was permitted to be used as a public goods carrier but at the same time it was used to carry passengers then also it would come under clause (c). If the vehicle was used for carrying goods then it would have come within clause (c). So also, if it was permitted to be used as a public goods carrier but at the same time it was used to carry passengers then also it would come under clause (c). Merely because more number of passengers than was allowed under the permit it cannot be said that the vehicle was used for a purpose not allowed by the permit. It may amount to a violation of the permit conditions regarding number of persons to be carried in the vehicle. But, that will not be a reason coming under clause (c). Therefore, according to us, the Insurance Company cannot be absolved from its liability for the reason that there is breach of a specified condition of the policy being one coming under S.149(2)(a)(i)(c).” 13. In B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Officer, Hassan [ (1996) 4 SCC 647 ], the Honourable Supreme Court observed in para 7 as follows: “7. It is plain from the terms of the Insurance Policy that the insured vehicle was entitled to carry 6 workmen, excluding the driver. If those 6 workmen when travelling in the vehicle, are assumed not to have increased any risk from the point of view of the Insurance Company on occurring of an accident, how could those added persons be said to have contributed to the causing of it is the poser, keeping apart the load it was carrying. Here, it is nobody's case that the driver of the insured vehicle was responsible for the accident. In fact, it was not disputed that the oncoming vehicle had collided head-on against the insured vehicle, which resulted in the damage. Merely by lifting a person or two, or even three, by the driver or the cleaner of the vehicle, without the knowledge of the owner, cannot be said to be such a fundamental breach that the owner should, in all events, be denied indemnification. The misuse of the vehicle was somewhat irregular though, but not so fundamental in nature so as to put an end to the contract, unless some factors existed which, by themselves, had gone to contribute to the causing of the accident. In the instant case, however, we find no such contributory factor. The misuse of the vehicle was somewhat irregular though, but not so fundamental in nature so as to put an end to the contract, unless some factors existed which, by themselves, had gone to contribute to the causing of the accident. In the instant case, however, we find no such contributory factor. In Skandia case [ (1987) 2 SCC 654 ] this Court paved the way towards reading down the contractual clause by observing as follows: (SCC pp. 665-66, para 14) “… When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependants on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of ‘reading down’ the exclusion clause in the light of the ‘main purpose’ of the provision so that the ‘exclusion clause’ does not cross swords with the ‘main purpose’ highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose. The theory which needs no support is supported by Carter's ‘Breach of Contract’ vide paragraph 251. To quote: “Notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the ‘main purpose rule’, which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promisor's contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn v. Margetson & Co. [1893 AC 351 : (1891-94) All ER Rep 693] (AC at p. 357), Lord Halsbury, L.C. stated: ‘It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. [1893 AC 351 : (1891-94) All ER Rep 693] (AC at p. 357), Lord Halsbury, L.C. stated: ‘It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument, and seeing what one must regard as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract.’ Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique Societe d' Armement Maritime SA v. NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [(1967) 1 AC 361 : (1966) 2 All ER 61 : (1966) 2 WLR 944 ] . Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract.” 14. Therefore, mere violation of an executive order issued by invoking the power under Section 115 of the Act, 1988 by the driver of the vehicle cannot be treated as a fundamental breach of the policy conditions, especially in the absence of any evidence to show that the driver committed the act with the knowledge of the appellant, who is the owner of the vehicle. In that circumstance, I am of the view that the breach alleged against the appellant, owner of the vehicle, is not sufficient to exonerate the insurance company from the liability to indemnify the insured. There is no evidence to show that the 1st respondent used the vehicle in violation of the time schedule fixed in Exhibit B8 with the knowledge of the owner of the vehicle and there is also no satisfactory material to show that the said violation has contributed to the cause of the accident. Therefore, I find that the direction in the impugned award permitting the 3rd respondent insurance company to reimburse the award amount from the appellant is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned award to the extent it permits the 3rd respondent insurance company to reimburse the award amount from the appellant is set aside. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned award to the extent it permits the 3rd respondent insurance company to reimburse the award amount from the appellant is set aside. Interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.