JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. Both these appeals are filed against the common oral judgment dated 20.9.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.2408 of 2011. 2. Briefly stated before the learned Single Judge is that the disciplinary authority i.e. the District Development Officer, Sabarkantha District Panchayat had filed Special Civil Application No.2408 of 2011 challenging the judgment and order of the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal at Gandhinagar dated4.12.2010. 3. By the aforesaid judgment and order, the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal in an appeal filed by the appellant set aside the order of removal dated 14.2.2006 on the ground that the order was passed without assigning any reasons and considering a representation of the appellant. 4. The appellant was serving under the Panchayat and had during the course of his service, suffered departmental proceedings on account of three charge-sheets dated 08.07.1996, 6-8.12.1999 and 26.12.2000. After the Inquiry Officer submitted a report on these three charges holding some of the charges as proved and some partly proved, the disciplinary authority imposed an order of removal from service on 7.1.2002. That order was a subject matter of challenge by the appellant before the Civil Services Tribunal by filing Appeal No.423 of 2002. The tribunal, by judgment and order dated 15.6.2005 set aside the order of penalty and remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority. This, the tribunal did on the ground that no opportunity to make a representation against the penalty imposed was given by the disciplinary authority. That order was a subject matter of challenge by the respondent in Special Civil Application No.24389 of 2005. The petition was rejected on 27.12.2005. Apparently therefore, the remand order of the tribunal for reconsideration of the first order of penalty dated 7.1.2002 was sustained. The disciplinary authority on the 2 nd round, passed the order of removal dated 14.2.2006. The tribunal again when the removal order was challenged by the appellant held that the disciplinary authority had passed an order without reasons, inasmuch as, it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority while imposing a penalty to deal with the contents of the representation made by a delinquent and record reasons as to why the order of penalty was passed. The tribunal by the order impugned before the learned Single Judge again remanded the matter to the disciplinary authority for fresh consideration. 5. The tribunal by the order impugned before the learned Single Judge again remanded the matter to the disciplinary authority for fresh consideration. 5. Undettered by these repeated remands, the Panchayat again came forward and filed the petition which is decided by the judgment under challenge. The learned Single Judge, in its opinion rightly so rather than again passing an order of remanding the matter to the authorities which could be the 3 rd round on its own passed the order of quashing and setting aside the order of removal but modifying the order of full back wages to the extent of 50%. It is against both these orders both the Panchayat as well as the employee are in appeals. 6. In the appeal at the hands of the appellant of Letters Patent Appeal No.1516 of 2022 i.e. the delinquent employee, Mr. Hasurkar, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that obviously when the charges against the employee-appellant were minor, inasmuch as, some with regard to unauthorized absence and one with regard to unjustified accusation of misappropriation of small amount, and when the charges were only partly proved, the order of removal though being set aside the appellant – delinquent employee deserved full back wages. This was particularly so when it was a pure case of victimization at the hands of Panchayat. 7. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant would rely upon a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) reported in 2013(0) GLHEL-SC 54440 . Reliance was placed on clause (v), paragraph No.33 where it was suggested by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when there is victimization of an employee, the concerned Court or tribunal would be fully justified in directing payment of full back wages. 8. In Letters Patent Appeal No.153 of 2020 at the hands of the Panchayat, Mr. H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the tribunal was completely unjustified in remanding the matter on the ground that the order of dismissal was without reasons. He would submit that once the charges had been held to be proved and the matter had already been remanded once earlier, a subsequent remand was unjustified. H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the tribunal was completely unjustified in remanding the matter on the ground that the order of dismissal was without reasons. He would submit that once the charges had been held to be proved and the matter had already been remanded once earlier, a subsequent remand was unjustified. He would submit that the charge against the employee was of unauthorized absenteeism and financial irregularities and, therefore, the order of removal ought to have been confirmed by the tribunal and also the learned Single Judge was unjustified in setting aside the order of remanding and in addition thereto, grant 50% of backwages. 9. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel in the respective appeals, and having perused the order of learned Single Judge, we note that the inquiry was in connection with charge-sheets of the year 1996, 1999 and of the year 2000. For the charges in question, the inquiry officer’s report was submitted in the year 2000 and the order of removal was passed on 7.1.2002. The first remand pursuant to the order of tribunal was in the year 2005. 2 nd order of penalty of 14.2.2006 is a subject matter of an appeal which again entailed a remand by the tribunal in the year 2010. On both these occasions, the tribunal had set aside the orders of penalty on the ground that the orders of penalty were passed in non-compliance of principles of natural justice, at the1 st stage, when a representation on the second show cause notice was not considered and on the 2 nd stage when the order of penalty was without reasons having been recorded. We may note that at no stage did the tribunal positively hold that the charges against the delinquent-employee i.e. the appellant of Appeal No.1516 of 2022 were unjustified. We, therefore, cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel Mr. Hasurkar for the appellant that it was case of victimization. 10. We may note that at no stage did the tribunal positively hold that the charges against the delinquent-employee i.e. the appellant of Appeal No.1516 of 2022 were unjustified. We, therefore, cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel Mr. Hasurkar for the appellant that it was case of victimization. 10. Moreover, as far as the decision in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase (Supra) is to be considered, it was a case where though the decision was with regard to the quantum of back wages that can be allowed or denied and may be was in the context of the exercise of jurisdiction by a Labour Court, the judgment never did indicate that it is not within the jurisdiction of a Court to consider the issue of backwages considering the nature of misconduct etc. 11. Having perused the judgment of the learned Single Judge under challenge, we find that taking into consideration the case law set out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court which, the learned Single Judge has extensively considered especially in the case of Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari reported in 2017 (2) SCC 308 , it will be an exercise in futility if the request of the employee is accepted either for a fresh remand or for quashing and setting aside the direction of denial of 50% of backwages. 12. For the benefit of our judgment, we may quote paragraph Nos.16 to 25 of the decision dated 20.9.2019 passed in Special Civil Application No.2408 of 2011 of the learned Single Judge of this Court which read as under: “16. A perusal of the removal order dated14.02.2006 reveals that except recording of the facts, disciplinary authority has not considered any evidence and there is no discussion on the evidence recorded in the report of the inquiry officer as well as the contents of the representation dated 10.9.2005 filed by the respondent respondent are not referred to and dealt with. 17. The Supreme Court in the case G. Vallikumar Vs. Andra Education Society and Others, reported in 2010 (2) SCC 497 while examining an analogous provisions to Rule12(a)(b) of the Panchayat Rules has held thus:- “13. We shall now deal with the question whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in setting aside the direction given by the Tribunal for reinstatement of the appellant with consequential benefits. Andra Education Society and Others, reported in 2010 (2) SCC 497 while examining an analogous provisions to Rule12(a)(b) of the Panchayat Rules has held thus:- “13. We shall now deal with the question whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in setting aside the direction given by the Tribunal for reinstatement of the appellant with consequential benefits. Shri Y. S. Rao, who conducted inquiry against the appellant submitted report dated 4.7.1999 with the findings that all the charges except charge No.4 have been proved against the appellant. She was given a copy of the inquiry report along with show cause notice to which she filed reply dated 20.11.1995. In his order, the Chairman of the Managing Committee did refer to the allegations leveled against the appellant and representation submitted by her in the light of the findings recorded by the inquiry officer but without even adverting to the contents of her representation and giving a semblance of indication of application of mind in the context of Rule 120(1)(iv) of the Rules, he directed her removal from service. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the order of punishment was passed by the Chairman without complying with the mandate of the relevant statutory rule and the principles of natural justice. The requirement of recording reasons by every quasi judicial or even an administrative authority entrusted with the task of passing an order adversely affecting an individual and communication thereof to the affected person is one of the recognized facets of the rules of natural justice and violation thereof has the effect of vitiating the order passed by the concerned authority. 18. It is held by the Apex Court, while examining the provision of Rule 120(1)(iv) of The Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, which mandates that the disciplinary authority has to impose the penalty after considering the representation made by the delinquent meaning thereby that the contents of the representation are to be dealt with by recording reasons and if the same is not followed, it can be presumed that the rules of natural justice are violated. In the present case, though the representation dated 10.9.2005 of the respondent is referred to in the punishment order, its contents are not dealt with. In the present case, though the representation dated 10.9.2005 of the respondent is referred to in the punishment order, its contents are not dealt with. Thus, the expression “consider the representation” contained in Rules 8(12) (a) and (b) of the Gujarat Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1997, which is similar to the phraseology of Rule 120(1)(iv) of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1971 mandates that the representation made by the delinquent has to be considered by adverting to the contents raised therein and the same are to be dealt in the manner which disclose the application of mind of the disciplinary authority. 19. The Supreme Court in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation Vs. A Masilamani, 2013 (6) SCC 530 , has explained the word “consider”. The Apex Court has held thus:- The word “consider”, is of great significance. Its dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that, there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority, should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself, should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority, and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide: Director, Marketing, Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Santosh Kumar, (2006) 11 SCC 147 ; and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 1771 ) 20. Thus, the Apex Court while explaining the word “consider” has held that the same connotes active application of mind and postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. It is held that the formation of the opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. In the present case, the order of punishment passed against the respondent absolute fails the strictures laid down by the Apex Court. Hence, the same preciously set aside by the Tribunal. 21. At this stage it would be apposite to reproduced the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, 2017 (2) SCC 308 8. Hence, the same preciously set aside by the Tribunal. 21. At this stage it would be apposite to reproduced the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari, 2017 (2) SCC 308 8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the inquiry to be deficient either proceduraliy or otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Inquiry Officer for a proper inquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh inquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand 9. The next question is whether the respondent would be entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral benefits in full or part. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We say so because while the High Court has directed release of service/retiral benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for the period between the date of removal and the date of superannuation. Taking a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court’s direction for release of service benefits would include the release of his salaries also for the period mentioned above. We are, however, of the opinion that while proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh start from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of superannuation would not also be justified. 22. The Supreme Court while considering the fact that disciplinary authority does not appear to have properly appreciated the evidence and recorded reasons in support of his conclusion has set aside the order. Further the matter is not remanded back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration since long time has elapsed. 23. 22. The Supreme Court while considering the fact that disciplinary authority does not appear to have properly appreciated the evidence and recorded reasons in support of his conclusion has set aside the order. Further the matter is not remanded back to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration since long time has elapsed. 23. The Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank (supra) has held that instead of remand for a fresh start of the disciplinary proceedings, did not issue directions to grant full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and the same was ordered to be reduced to the effect of50%. 24. In the present case, despite the directions issued by the Tribunal twice to the petitioner for passing an order to consider the reply of the respondent to the show cause notice, the disciplinary authority has committed the same mistake. Hence, it will not be appropriate to again remand the matter to the disciplinary authority. 25. In this view of the matter, the direction apropos back-wages is required to be modified. Instead of grant of full back-wages to the respondent, the same is modified to the extent of 50%. The impugned order of the Tribunal is modified to the aforesaid extent. The petitioners shall reinstate the respondent within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the order. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.” 13. What we note from the chronology which we have set out hereinabove is a case where for a charge-sheet of 1996 and 1999 and first order of removal of 2002, having only interfered on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice, once the order was set aside, remanding the matter afresh would unnecessarily be a case where the litigants will have to undergo hardship especially an employee – the delinquent who, we are informed has now superannuated and is drawing only provisional pension. 14. In light of what we have stated hereinabove, both the appeals stand dismissed. Interim Relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith. No order as to costs.