ORDER : VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA, J. 1. The writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the action of the respondents in terminating the RO Dealership Agreement through proceedings in Ref.No.VZGDO/RO/Seetharama FS dated 18.15.2023 as highly illegal, arbitrary, unjust, and violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India, set-aside the same, consequently direct the respondents to restore RO Dealership Agreement in favour of the petitioners. 2. The facts of the case are that. Petitioner No.1 was awarded the retail outlet dealership situated at Innispeta, Rajamahendravaram for retail sale and supply of petroleum products. Petitioner No.1 firm was reconstituted with Petitioner No.2 - Sri N. Koti Reddy and Petitioner No.3 - Smt. Dwarampudi Rajya Lakshmi. After death of Sri N. Koti Reddy, the Dealership was reconstituted with Petitioner Nos.2 & 3 i.e. N.V.V. Jagan Mohan Reddy and Smt. N. Sakuntala. During operation of the dealership license, the Corporation received complaint that Petitioner No.2 was working as Full Time Professor at VJ College of Pharmacy, Diwancheruvu, Rajahmundry. One of the pre conditions and terms of operation of the retail outlet is that the Dealer should not take any employment or engage in any other business and/or profession apart from the operation of the Dealership. Based upon the complaint, the Corporation issued a Show Cause Notice dated 18.05.2021 calling upon the petitioners to show cause as to why the dealership should not be terminated. Dissatisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioners, the Corporation terminated the dealership on 18.05.2023 holding that Petitioner No.2 had been working as a Professor in VJ College of Pharmacy during subsistence of the dealership in violation of Clause 21 and 28(b) of the Dealership license Agreement. 3. Immediately, on 13.6.2023, the petitioners filed Arbitration Original Petitions in AOP No.8/2023 and AOP No.9/2023 before the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam, to direct the respondents to resume supply of petroleum products and to grant ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents from removing the installed machinery from the business premises of the petitioners. The Corporation also filed AOP No. 11/2023 seeking mandatory injunction to handover the retail outlet premises to run the business on ad-hoc basis. The Corporation also filed AOP No. 11/2023 seeking mandatory injunction to handover the retail outlet premises to run the business on ad-hoc basis. All the three AOPs were dismissed by the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam on 12.12.2023, granting liberty to the petitioners to agitate their respective contentions before the Arbitrator as per the terms of agreement, but the common order was not challenged by the petitioners. In the meantime, the petitioners invoked the arbitration process in terms of Clause 6 of the Dealership Agreement. Since the parties could not finalize the Arbitrator, the petitioners filed ah Arb. Appin No.47 of 2023 under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking for appointment of an Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the parties on the file of this Hon’ble Court. On 01.12.2023, this Hon’ble Court was pleased to allow ^ the Arbitration Application by appointing Justice D.V.S.S. Somayajulu, Former Judge of High Court of Andhra Pradesh as sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties. However since the learned Judge expressed his inability to enter reference, by order dated 23.02.2024 in I.A.No.1 of 2024, this Hon’ble Court modified the order and again appointed Justice Smt. K. Vijaya Lakshmi, Former Judge of High Court of Andhra Pradesh as the Arbitrator. Vide letter dated 26.04.2024, the Arbitrator entered reference and the same was communicated to all the parties. While so, the petitioners addressed a letter to the new arbitrator with a request to terminate the arbitration proceedings. At this juncture, the petitioners filed the present writ petition invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India claiming the relief as prayed for. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that, the respondents terminated the Dealership Agreement through proceedings dated 18.05.2023 under which the petitioners’ dealership was terminated is contrary to the principle of fair and reasonableness. Pursuant to the show cause notice dated 18.05.2021 issued by the respondents, even though the petitioners submitted detailed explanation on 02.06.2021 and 22.02.2023, without considering the same and without observing the principle of fair and reasonableness and without any reasons, the dealership of the petitioners was terminated with immediate effect. 5. He further submits that, as per Observation No.7 of the Impugned Order dated 18.05.2023, in case of conviction dealership is not terminated but is allowed to be operated through other partner(s) by reconstituting the dealership. 5. He further submits that, as per Observation No.7 of the Impugned Order dated 18.05.2023, in case of conviction dealership is not terminated but is allowed to be operated through other partner(s) by reconstituting the dealership. Allowing the operation with remaining partners in case of conviction of one of the partners is provided in the re-constitution policy. Therefore, the said benefit should be given to the other partners who submitted explanation on 22.02.2023 requesting for reconstitution of partnership and for continuation of the operation of the dealership. He further submits that, even though the petitioners submitted their detailed explanation for the Show Cause Notice, the Corporation did not consider the explanations in true spirit and terminated the dealership without any reasons, as such, the respondent corporation has not observed the principle of fair and reasonableness. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the action of the respondent Corporation is contrary to the principles of fair and reasonableness and also contrary to the terms of Observation No.7 of the termination proceedings. Even though the petitioners pleaded in their explanations for providing an opportunity for reconstitution of the partnership firm or allow the second partner, who is none other than the wife of the second petitioner, who is also a graduate to run the retail outlet, the respondent corporation terminated the dealership of the petitioners erroneously. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the corporation that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of alternative remedy by invocation of arbitration proceedings is not valid, in view of the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Court in catena of judgments. Even though an effective statutory remedy is available, but, the respondents exercised their power without jurisdiction or without observing principles of natural justice or without observing principle of fair and reasonableness/ personal hearing. Hence, the writ petition under extraordinary jurisdiction is maintainable. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents have utterly failed in observing principle of fair ahd reasonableness and therefore the petitioner can invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the writ petition under extraordinary jurisdiction is maintainable. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents have utterly failed in observing principle of fair ahd reasonableness and therefore the petitioner can invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, 'learned counsel for the petitioner relied on judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Yashoda vs. Sukhvwinder Singh , AIR 2022 SC 4623 , Kothari Filaments vs. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Kolkata, (2009) 2 SCC 192 , T. Takano vs. Securities and Exchange Board of lndia , (2022) 8 SCC 162 , Durga Pujari Suri Babu vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Hyderabad , 2014 (6) ALD 166 and K. Harinath vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Mumbai , 2013 (4) ALD 518 (DB). 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that once the petitioner invoked alternative remedy by filing Arb.AppIn No.47 of 2023 in which this Court f appointed an Arbitrator on 01.12.2023, having invited an Arbitrator without akin to the arbitration proceedings and filing the present writ petition is nothing but invoking parallel proceedings before two forums and such action is an abuse of process of law and such contention is not valid, for the reason that even though this Court appointed an Arbitrator on 01.12.2023, but further proceedings by the Arbitrator were not yet commenced and till receipt of notice by the petitioners from the Arbitrator, it cannot be said that the arbitration proceedings are invoked or exhausted, as such, invocation of jurisdiction of this Court cannot be termed that the petitioner preferred parallel proceedings. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners further explained that, the petitioners filed the present writ petition on 22.04.2024, but so far, the petitioners have not received any notice/proceedings from the Arbitrator, muchless, the petitioners are not aware of the orders of this Court dated 23.02.2024 regarding change of Arbitrator and therefore, the petitioners cannot be faulted. He also submits that, the Arb. Appln.No.47 of 2023 is not listed in the causelist dated 23.02.2024 and therefore, for commencement of the arbitration proceedings does not arise and filing this writ petition by the petitioners cannot be found fault with. 11. He also submits that, the Arb. Appln.No.47 of 2023 is not listed in the causelist dated 23.02.2024 and therefore, for commencement of the arbitration proceedings does not arise and filing this writ petition by the petitioners cannot be found fault with. 11. He submits that, this Court after hearing W.P.No. 10000 of 2024, this Court was pleased to pass an interim order on 29.04.2024 by observing that, since the arbitration proceedings are not in existence, rightly ordered “status quo” to be maintained by both the parties. After the interim orders passed by this Court, the petitioners received notice from the second Arbitrator only on 26.04.2024 and replied on 08.05.2024 requesting to terminate the arbitration proceedings, in view of filing of the writ petition, as such, there is no fault on the part of the petitioners and requested to grant the relief as prayed in the writ petition. 12. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable on two grounds. Firstly, the petitioners are available with an alternative remedy in view of the arbitration clause was envisaged under dealership agreement entered between the petitioners and the Corporation. Further, the petitioners already invoked AOP Nos.8 & 9 of 2023 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam on 13.06.2023 and the Corporation preferred AOP No. 11 of 2023 seeking certain reliefs and the learned Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam dismissed all the three AOPs on 12.12.2023 granting liberty to the petitioners to agitate their respective claims before the learned Arbitrator. 13. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that, during pendency of AOPs before the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam, the petitioner issued notice dated 10.07.2023 suggesting Justice S. Govindarajulu, Judge (Retd), High Court of A.P. as Arbitrator to resolve the issue of termination of dealership order dated 18.05.2023. The respondents through their registered reply order dated 19.07.2023 expressed their disinterest for nomination. However, they proposed to nominate Hyderabad Arbitration Center at Hyderabad as a Forum for adjudication of the issue. Thereafter, the petitioners filed Arb. Appin No.47 of 2023 before this Hon’ble Court and vide order dated 01.12.2023, this Court allowed the application and nominated Hon’ble Sri Justice D.V.S.S.S Somayajulu, Former Judge of this Hon’ble Court as Sole Arbitrator. However, the learned Judge expressed his inability to enter upon the reference and accordingly addressed a letter informing the same to this Hon’ble Court. Appin No.47 of 2023 before this Hon’ble Court and vide order dated 01.12.2023, this Court allowed the application and nominated Hon’ble Sri Justice D.V.S.S.S Somayajulu, Former Judge of this Hon’ble Court as Sole Arbitrator. However, the learned Judge expressed his inability to enter upon the reference and accordingly addressed a letter informing the same to this Hon’ble Court. Then the subject letter addressed by the learned Judge, expressing inability, the Registry had numbered the same as I.A.No.1 of 2024. He submits that, there was no representation on behalf of the petitioner on the said date of hearing and an order was passed on 22.04.2024 appointing Hon’ble Justice K. Vijaya Lakshmi, Former Judge of this Hon’ble Court as Sole Arbitrator. The same was dispatched by the Current Section of this Registry on 23.04.2024. 14. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that, having knowledge about the appointment of Arbitrator, without waiting till commencement of arbitration proceedings, for one reason or the other, the petitioner surprisingly t invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by way of writ petition on 22.04.2024 and invited an interim order on 29.06.2024, on the ground of non commencement of arbitration proceedings, pursuant to the letter addressed by the Arbitrator on 22.02.2024. Therefore, the petitioner is played fraud on this Court by suppressing the facts and invited an exparte interim order dated 29.04.2024. 15. He further submits that, order dated 22.04.2024 under which Hon’ble Justice K. Vijaya Lakshmi was appointed as Arbitrator was marked by the Registry on 23.04.2024 to the learned counsel for the, petitioner; dispatched to the respondents and learned Arbitrator on 23.04.2024. After receipt of the order, the learned Arbitrator issued Notice dated 26.04.2024 to the petitioners and the respondents. By suppressing receipt of order of change of Arbitrator and Arbitration reference notice from the learned Arbitrator, the petitioners invited an interim order from this Court on 29.04.2024 on the ground that no arbitration proceedings have not yet commenced, which amounts to mischief and fraud played by the petitioners on the part of the Court, and further amounts to abuse of process of law. 16. 16. Learned Standing Counsel submits that the petitioners are not fair while invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by suppressing the material facts at multiple times i.e. pendency of AOP Nos.8 & 9 of 2023 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam; invoking the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act before this Court in Arb.Appln.47 of 2023. He submits that, when the AOPs were disposed of by the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam on 12.12.2023, the petitioners again suppressed the existence/commencement of arbitration proceedings before this Court, filed the present writ petition and invited interim orders from this Court. Therefore the writ petition is not maintainable, in view of the suppression of material fact, mischief and fraud played by the petitioner. In support of his contentions, learned Standing Counsel relied upon the judgments laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhaven Construction vs. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Limited , (2022) 1 SCC 75 , CDC Financial Services (Mauritius) Ltd vs. BpI. Communications Ltd., (2003) 12 SCC 140 and Prestige Lights Ltd vs. State Bank of India , (2007) 8 SCC 449 . On the ratio laid down in the above judgments, learned counsel requested this Court dismissed the writ petition with exemplary costs. 17. Heard Sri V.V.N. Narayana Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sai Sanjay Suraneni, learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation and perused the material available on record. 18. Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record the points that arise for consideration are as follows: (i) Whether the writ petition is maintainable or not, in view of the effective and efficacious alternative remedy envisaged under the Terms of Dealership Agreement dated 07.11.2012? (ii) Whether the petitioners filed the present writ petition by suppressing the material facts i.e. Appointment of Second Arbitrator? (iii) Whether the petitioners had knowledge about the order dated 22.02.2024 i.e. appointment of learned Second Arbitrator and also the Notice dated 26.04.2024 issued by the learned Second Arbitrator? (iv) Whether the petitioners are entitled to the relief as claimed in the writ petition? POINT Nos.1 to 4: 19. (iii) Whether the petitioners had knowledge about the order dated 22.02.2024 i.e. appointment of learned Second Arbitrator and also the Notice dated 26.04.2024 issued by the learned Second Arbitrator? (iv) Whether the petitioners are entitled to the relief as claimed in the writ petition? POINT Nos.1 to 4: 19. Clause 62(a) of the Dealership Agreement states that, any dispute or difference of any nature whatsoever, any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim or set-off or regarding any right, liability, act, omission pf account of any of the parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director (Marketing) of the Corporation who may either himself act as the Arbitrator or nominate some other officer of the Corporation to act as the Arbitrator. The Dealer will not be entitled to raise any objection to any such Arbitrator on the ground that the Arbitrator is an officer of the Corporation. 20. Pursuant to the above said clause, the petitioner has availed efficacious alternative remedy under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In fact, after receipt of the order of termination dated 18.05.2023, the petitioners had invoked the arbitration clauses and filed Arbitration Original Petitions i.e. AOP No.8/2023 and AOP No.9/2023 before the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam, to direct the respondents to resume supply of petroleum products and to grant ad-interim injunction restraining the respondents from removing the installed machinery from the business premises of the petitioners. The Corporation also filed AOP No. 11/2023 seeking mandatory injunction to handover the retail outlet premises to run the business on ad-hoc basis. All the three AOPs were dismissed by the Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam on 12.12.2023, granting liberty to the petitioners to agitate their respective contentions before the Arbitrator, but for the reasons known to the petitioners, this common order was not challenged by the petitioners. 21. Pending AOPs, the petitioners got issued Legal Notice dated 10.07.2023 for appointment of Sole Arbitrator. Pursuant to the rejection of the claim of the petitioners, the petitioners invoked jurisdiction of this Court by filing Arb. Appln.No.47 of 2023 wherein, this Hon’ble Court appointed an Arbitrator (DVSS.J) on 01.12.2023. After appointment of Arbitrator, the learned Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam dismissed AOPs granting liberty to raise disputes before the Arbitrator. Pursuant to the rejection of the claim of the petitioners, the petitioners invoked jurisdiction of this Court by filing Arb. Appln.No.47 of 2023 wherein, this Hon’ble Court appointed an Arbitrator (DVSS.J) on 01.12.2023. After appointment of Arbitrator, the learned Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam dismissed AOPs granting liberty to raise disputes before the Arbitrator. The way the petitioners filed Arbitration Application before this Court appears to be suppression of material fact of filing AOPs before the learned Principal District Judge, Visakhapatnam. 22. Having invited an appointment of Arbitrator vide order dated 01.12.2023, without waiting till the time concluding the proceedings before the Arbitrator, the petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is certainly misconceived on the ground that, since the Arbitrator expressed his inability to proceed further. 23. Curiously, the petitioners filed the present writ petition on 22.04.2024 and it appears to have re-submitted on 25.04.2024 which was posted before the Court for hearing on 29.06.2024 and invited the interim orders of this Court on the ground that no arbitration proceedings have commenced. But the fact remains that, the order of change of Arbitrator passed by this Court on 22.02.2024 were dispatched by the Current Section of this Court on 23.04.2024. After receipt of the same, the learned Arbitrator (KVL,J) also issued notice on 26.04.2024 to the petitioners. When the order was issued by the learned Arbitrator on 26.04.2024, the petitioners being well aware of the fact about change of Arbitrator, did not mention about the same before the Court and invited the interim order on the ground that arbitration proceedings have not yet commenced. Therefore, the petitioners herein intentionally and wantonly suppressed the material facts before this Court and having invited about appointment of Arbitrator by filing Arb. Appl. No.47 of 2023 without waiting till conclusion of proceedings or without seeking remedy, after the recusal of First Arbitrator for either closure of the Arbitration proceedings or for appointment of another arbitrator and invoking extraordinary jurisdiction' by this Court, is nothing but playing mischief or fraud with the Court and it also amounts to suppression of material facts, as such, the writ petition is not maintainable on these grounds and liable to be dismissed. 24. 24. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, he filed I.A.No.1 of 2024 by way of additional affidavit and tried to bring to the notice of this Hon’ble Court that, on 22.02.2024, the order of this Court dated 22.02.2024 is not within the knowledge of the petitioners, as such, the same not brought to the notice of the Court on 29.06.2024 is incorrect and was unacceptable, contrary to the facts on hand. The fact remains that the petitioners themselves filed Arbitration Application seeking appointment of arbitrator. Accordingly, learned Arbitrator was appointed on 01.12.2023. The petitioner admitted the fact about recusal of first Arbitrator to act as Arbitrator vide letter dated 02.01.2024. But, intentionally, suppressed the order of this Court dated 22.02.2024 which was dispatched on 23.04.2024 and not brought to the notice of this Court even on the date of hearing of the writ petition on 29.04.2024. It is a clear case that the petitioners had knowledge about the appointment of Second Arbitrator. Though the petitioners may not be aware on the date of filing of writ petition, but, certainly they were aware of that at the time of hearing of writ petition. This indicates that the petitioners were aware of the change in the Arbitrator by the time of the hearing, contending their claim of ignorance at the time of filing the writ petition is untenable. 25. Further, the petitioners carrying on commercial business since decades, benefitted out of the dealership by the respondent Corporation, having invited an appointment of Arbitrator, without waiting for reasonable period for appointment and commencement of arbitration proceedings, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, stating that the Arbitration Proceedings have not commenced speaks volumes about the conduct of the petitioners. The petitioners filed for the appointment of an Arbitrator without waiting for the arbitration process to properly unfold. This premature action, coupled with their claims that arbitration had not commenced, reveals the petitioners' questionable conduct. 26. The other contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners addressed a letter dated 08.05.2024 after receipt of notice by the Arbitrator (KVL,J) dated 26.04.2024 seeking termination of arbitration proceedings, is nothing but a tactful conduct/intelligent and strategic move on the part of the petitioner after having invited the interim orders of this Court dated 29.04.2024 by suppressing the material facts and misleading the Hon’ble Court as narrated above. 27. Undoubtedly, writ of mandamus is purely discretion in nature and such writ of mandamus can be issued only when,the petitioner is able to prove her subsisting right or interest in the property and in the absence of any infringement or invasion or threatened action to infringe or invade the legal rights of the petitioner; writ of mandamus is not maintainable. In view of the specific plea, it is appropriate to examine the scope of writ of mandamus. 28. Writ of mandamus is purely discretionary in nature and such power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised only in certain circumstances. At best, this Court cannot decide the legality of the order. Yet, issuance of Writ of Mandamus is purely discretionary and the same cannot be issued as a matter of course. 29. In " State of Kerala v. A.Lakshmi Kutty , 1986 (4) SCC 632 " the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a Writ of Mandamus is not a writ of course or a writ of right but is, as a rule, discretionary. There must be a judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which a mandamus will lie. The legal right to enforce the performance of a duty must be in the applicant himself. In general, therefore, the Court will only enforce the performance of statutory duties by public bodies on application of a person who can show that he has himself a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of a right is the foundation of the jurisdiction of a Court to issue a writ of Mandamus. 30. In “ Raisa Begum v. State of U.P. , 1995 All.L.J. 534" the Allahabad High Court has held that certain conditions have to be satisfied before a writ of mandamus is issued. The petitioner for a writ of mandamus must show that he has a legal right to compel the respondent to do or abstain from doing something. There must be in the petitioner a right to compel the performance of some duty cast on the respondents. The duty sought to be enforced must have three qualities. It must be a duty of public nature created by the provisions of the Constitution or of a statute or some rule of common law. 31. Writ of mandamus cannot be issued merely because, a person is praying for. The duty sought to be enforced must have three qualities. It must be a duty of public nature created by the provisions of the Constitution or of a statute or some rule of common law. 31. Writ of mandamus cannot be issued merely because, a person is praying for. One must establish the right first and then he must seek for the prayer to enforce the said right. If there is failure of duty by the authorities or inaction, one can approach the Court for a mandamus. The said position is well settled in a series of decisions. 32. In “ State of U.P. and Ors. v. Harish Chandra and Ors. (1996) 9 SCC 309 " the Supreme Court held as follows; “ Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and the said right was subsisting on the date of the petition.” (Emphasis supplied) 33. In “ Union of India v. S.B. Vohra , (2004) 2 SCC 150 " the Supreme Court considered the said issue and held that 'for issuing a writ of mandamus in favour of a person, the person claiming, must establish his legal right in himself. Then only a writ of mandamus could be issued against a person, who has a legal duty to perform, but has failed and/or neglected to do so. 34. In “ Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lai Jain , (2008) 2 SCC 280 " the Supreme Court held thus; “The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr: Note 187.-Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the. sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed. Note 192.-Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure ofjustice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty. Note 196.-Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the court, subject always to the well settled principles which have been established by the courts. An , action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned-an interest which private litigants are apt to overlook when striving for private ends. The court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. The court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances. ” ' (Emphasis supplied) When a Writ of Mandamus can be issued, has been summarised in Corpus Juris Secundum, as follows: “Mandamus may issue to compel the person or official in whom a discretionary duty is lodged to proceed to exercise such discretion, but unless there is peremptory statutory direction that the, duty shall be performed mandamus will not lie to control or review the exercise of the discretion of any board, tribunal or officer, when the act complained of is either judicial or quasi-judicial unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion on the part of such Court, board, tribunal or officer, and in accordance with this rule mandamus may not be invoked to compel the matter of discretion to be exercised in any particular way. This principle applies with full force and effect, however, clearly it may be made to appear what the decision ought to be, or even though its conclusion be disputable or, however, erroneous the conclusion reached may be, and although there may be no other method of review or correction provided by law. The discretion must be exercised according to the established rule where the action complained has been arbitrary or capricious, or based on personal, selfish or fraudulent motives, or on false information, or on total lack of authority to act, or where it amounts to an evasion of positive duty, or there has been a refusal to consider pertinent evidence, hear the parties where so required, or to entertain any proper question concerning the exercise of the discretion, or where the exercise of the discretion is in a manner entirely futile and known by the officer to be so and there are other methods which it adopted, would be effective." (emphasis supplied) 35. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments referred supra, unless the legal right of the petitioner is infringed or invaded or threatened to infringe or invade, a writ of mandamus cannot be granted. 36. The factum of said suppression is a matter of serious concern. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments referred supra, unless the legal right of the petitioner is infringed or invaded or threatened to infringe or invade, a writ of mandamus cannot be granted. 36. The factum of said suppression is a matter of serious concern. An application under Article 226 would be refuted without a hearing on the merits or a rule nisi discharged, if it appears that the applicant has made a deliberate concealment of material facts, with a view to mislead the Court. 37. A prerogative remedy is not available as a matter of course, In exercising extraordinary power, a writ court will bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking the jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or in otherwise misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of the court by deceiving it. The very basis of writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If, material facts are not correctly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of writ court would become impossible. It is a fundamental principle of law that a person invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226, must come with clean hands and must make a full and complete disclosure of facts to the court. Parties are not entitled to choose their own facts to put forwards before court. A person invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of the court cannot be allowed to approach it with a pair of dirty hands. But even if the dirt is removed, and the hands become Clean, still the court will have to consider whether he should be granted the relief. 38. Prerogative writs are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts and the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts and the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extra ordinary power, a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes ^a false statement or suppresses a material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone. 39. A claimant is under a duty to disclose all material facts. These include all material facts known to the applicant and those that he would have known had he made the proper and necessary inquiries before applying for leave. Non-disclosure is sufficient ground for refusing the remedy sought or for setting aside the grant of permission or refusing permission and the claimant may be penalised in courts. Even in an advertent misstatement of fact will be a ground for refusal of relief. 40. In Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P. , AIR 1983 SC 1015 an interim order was obtained from court alleging the price fixed by government for foodstuffs was too low and uneconomical. But the real fact was that the price was fixed on agreement, which was suppressed. The Court dismissed the writ petition as also vacated the interim orders. In Union of India v. Muneesh Suneja , AIR 2001 SC 854 the petitioners filed successive writ petition before different High Courts without disclosing the filing of earlier petition. 41 In All India State Bank ‘Officer’s Federation v. Union of India , 1990 (Supp)SCC 336 , the court strongly disapproved the conduct of the petitioners infilling writ petition in a different High Court after filing a false declaration that no writ petition was t filed earlier. 42. By applying the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments referred supra, it is clear that, when the petitioners approached the Court claiming writ of mandamus, suppressing material fact or giving a misstatement of fact in the affidavit filed along with the writ petition, they are debarred to claim relief of writ of mandamus, which is purely discretionary in nature under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 43. 43. Thus, in view of the above discussion, the petitioners were fully having clear knowledge about continuation of arbitration proceedings and change of Arbitrator, as such the petitioners are not entitled for any relief as claimed in the writ petition and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 44. In the result, writ petition is dismissed with costs at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousands Only), payable to the Member Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Legal Services Authority, Amaravati. 45. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.