JUDGMENT : (K. Surender, J.) This Criminal Appeal is filed by the appellant/accused, aggrieved by the judgment and sentence dated 25.04.2019 in S.C.No.400 of 2017, on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Mahabubnagar, whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant/accused and Sri Arun Kumar Dodla, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent - State. 3. The case of the prosecution is that Smt. Jarpula Sunitha (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’) is the wife of the appellant. The appellant was convicted for pouring kerosene on his wife and setting her on fire. 4. After the deceased received burn injuries, she was taken to Osmania General Hospital, Hyderabad, where the Station House Officer, Afzalgunj Police Station, visited and gave a requisition to the concerned Magistrate to record the dying declaration of the deceased. No Police Officer from the Afzalgunj Police Station was examined. However, the prosecution relied on Ex.P10/requisition. In the said requisition, it is mentioned that a request was made to record the dying declaration of the deceased, who allegedly received accidental burns in her house on 10.10.2016. Based on the said requisition, PW.11 visited the hospital and recorded the dying declaration/Ex.P.11 of the deceased. To a question posed by the learned Magistrate as to how she received burning injuries, the deceased explained as follows: “It has been five years that I got married. From the time I got married he used to scold, beat and say filthy words. Today morning he brought mutton. He asked me to cook and I cooked. Asked to me make rotis and I made them. My mother-in- law brought gave him liquor (Sarai) to drink. He drank it. I asked him that why he brought mutton instead of chicken and from where do you get money. In response he said lanjamunda who are you to tell me and beat me as he wished. He beat me on waist. I still have pain in my waist. I scolded him back that you are beating and scolding me according to your wish. He does not send me to work. If I stay at home he suspects me asking who came? With whom have you been? And says filthy words. Even today he beat me and used filthy words as usual. Do not I get angry madam. I scolded him back that you are beating and scolding me according to your wish. He does not send me to work. If I stay at home he suspects me asking who came? With whom have you been? And says filthy words. Even today he beat me and used filthy words as usual. Do not I get angry madam. In anger I said few words. So, my husband said lanjamunda you oppose me and poured kerosene and lit fire. Fire was caught up. Fire was put off and I was brought to hospital. This much happened. As I was read I heard. It is correct. No one forced me to say this.” 5. The learned Magistrate recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at 09.30 P.M. The endorsement of the duty doctor was taken regarding the condition of the patient, and thereafter, the statement was recorded. Ex.P12 is the statement recorded by the Constable/PW.12, who went to the hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased at 11.00 P.M. In the statement given to PW.12, the deceased stated as follows: “I am resident of Suryanaik thanda. My mother belongs to Nuchukunta thanda, Amangal Mandal. Aprroximately five years back my parents gave me to Jarpula Ravi S/o Jarpula Ramulu who belongs to the Suryanaik thanda, for marriage. Presently I have two male children. They are kids. My husband drives auto at Hyderabad. So we are staying at sainagar colony, Hyderabad in a rented house. Approximately from five, six months my husband Ravi, having an illegal relation with other woman was roaming with her and when I strongly questioned about this he used to beat me. The day before yesterday on 08.10.2016 he beat me and took me with my children in auto to Suryanaik thanda from sainagar colony. On 10.10.2016 in the morning at 11.00 hrs, my husband Ravi came home fully drunk, beat me severely, took kerosene from house, poured it over me and lit fire. Because of that fire I screamed and people in the neighbourhood came to me and put off the fire and took me to Osmania and admitted for treatment. My husband Ravi beat me severely, poured kerosene over me and lit fire. This was the submission made by the deceased.” 6. The statement recorded by PW.12 formed the basis for registering an FIR by Talakondapally Police. 7. My husband Ravi beat me severely, poured kerosene over me and lit fire. This was the submission made by the deceased.” 6. The statement recorded by PW.12 formed the basis for registering an FIR by Talakondapally Police. 7. The deceased, while undergoing treatment in the hospital, died on account of burn injuries on 28.10.2016, i.e., 10 days after the incident. According to PW.14/Doctor, who conducted the autopsy, the cause of death of the deceased was “septicemia due to burns”. 8. The appellant was arrested by the police on 24.10.2016. His confession was recorded, and at his instance, M.O.1 was recovered. MO.1 is the kerosene tin which was found at the scene. 9. The learned Sessions Judge found favour with the statement made by the deceased to the Magistrate and accordingly, convicted the appellant, despite all the relatives of deceased/witnesses, who were examined to speak about the alleged harassment, turning hostile to the prosecution. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that placing reliance on the dying declaration would be incorrect since the initial information given to the Afzalgunj Police was suppressed. The learned Magistrate had not followed due procedure while recording the dying declaration. It was made on a printed proforma and the version given to the Magistrate is contrary to what was stated to the constable/PW.12, who recorded the statement of the deceased. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Banarsi Dass v. State of Haryana , [ (2014) 15 SCC 485 ] , wherein it was held as follows: “18. In the case before us, the incident occurred on 18.06.1998 whereas the death is on 04.08.1998. Exhibit-PM- dying declaration was recorded on 18.06.1998 itself. At the time of recording of the statement, the condition of the patient no doubt was very stable and she was in a very good state of mind as recorded by the doctor. The burn injury was only 40- 45% of the body and, according to doctor 40-45% burns is not fatal and such a patient can be saved if given proper treatment. It has also come out in evidence that the death is not caused by the burns but because of septicemia, an infection on account of improper management of the wounds. The burn injury was only 40- 45% of the body and, according to doctor 40-45% burns is not fatal and such a patient can be saved if given proper treatment. It has also come out in evidence that the death is not caused by the burns but because of septicemia, an infection on account of improper management of the wounds. It is fairly clear that the patient on 18.06.1998 was not apprehending death, not merely because she lived for more than seven weeks after the incident but because of the nature of the burn injuries which we have referred to above. No doubt, as laid down by this Court in Najjam Faraghi @ Nijjam Faruqui v. State of West Bengal[2], merely because a person died long after making the dying declaration, the statement does not become irrelevant. It was a case where the incident was on 29.06.1985 and death was on 31.07.1985 and in that case, there was a certificate by the doctor who conducted the postmortem that death was due to ante- mortem burns and the burns were extending over the whole body. To quote: "9. There is no merit in the contention that the appellant's wife died long after making the dying declarations and therefore those statements have no value. The contention overlooks the express provision in Section 32 of the Evidence Act. The second paragraph of sub-section (1) reads as follows: "Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question." No doubt it has been pointed out that when a person is expecting his death to take place shortly he would not be indulging in falsehood. But that does not mean that such a statement loses its value if the person lives for a longer time than expected. The question has to be considered in each case on the facts and circumstances established therein. If there is nothing on record to show that the statement could not have been true or if the other evidence on [pic]record corroborates the contents of the statements, the court can certainly accept the same and act upon it. The question has to be considered in each case on the facts and circumstances established therein. If there is nothing on record to show that the statement could not have been true or if the other evidence on [pic]record corroborates the contents of the statements, the court can certainly accept the same and act upon it. ..." (Emphasis supplied) In the instant case, however, Exhibit-PM-dying declaration does not either show the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in the death of the declarant-Chander Kalan. The burns were not fatal either.” 12. Relying on the said judgment, the learned counsel argued that the death was not a consequence of the burns received by the deceased on the date of the incident but rather due to subsequent developments while undergoing treatment, specifically septicemia. 13. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor argued that there is no reason why the wife of the appellant would speak against the appellant. The statement was recorded by the Magistrate only after the examination of the duty Doctor, who certified that the deceased was conscious, coherent and in a fit state of mind. Considering the certification, the Magistrate recorded the dying declaration. The Doctor endorsed regarding the mental capability and fitness both prior to and after recording the statement. The said dying declaration formed the sole basis for conviction of the appellant. 14. PWs.1 and 2 are the neighbors of the deceased. Both of them turned hostile to the prosecution and stated that the deceased committed suicide on account of the unbearable stomach pain. PW.3 is the husband of the deceased’s sister. According to him, the appellant informed him that during a quarrel with deceased, she herself poured kerosene and set fire to herself. PW.4 is another neighbor who turned hostile to the prosecution case. PW.5 was the neighbor where the deceased and appellant lived in Hyderabad. PW.6 is the mother of the deceased. According to her, the deceased committed suicide due to unbearable stomach pain. PWs.7 and 8 are the scene of offence panchas, and both of them were declared hostile to the prosecution case. The prosecution has no help from PWs.1 to 8. 15. The entire case rests on the two dying declarations made by the deceased. According to her, the deceased committed suicide due to unbearable stomach pain. PWs.7 and 8 are the scene of offence panchas, and both of them were declared hostile to the prosecution case. The prosecution has no help from PWs.1 to 8. 15. The entire case rests on the two dying declarations made by the deceased. Ex.P11/dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate at 09.30 P.M. In the said statement, deceased stated that on the morning of the date of the incident, the appellant brought mutton to the house and asked the deceased to cook it. The mother of the appellant brought liquor and asked him to drink. After drinking the liquor, there was a fight and the appellant abused and beat her. The deceased then scolded him back. For the reason of deceased questioning the appellant, the appellant became suspicious of her fidelity, accusing her of spending time with someone else, and beat her. The deceased, in fact, questioned the Magistrate, stating that if someone beats and abuses you, it is likely to provoke anger. Since she said few words in anger, the appellant poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. 16. In the statement given to the constable/PW12, which is Ex.P12, the deceased mentioned her two children and also that the appellant was driving an auto. She further stated that 5 or 6 months prior to the incident, the appellant was having an illegal relationship with another woman, and when she questioned about the said relationship, the appellant beat the deceased on 08.10.2016. Again, on the date of the incident, i.e., on 10.10.2016 around 11.00 A.M., the appellant came home in a fully drunken condition, beat her indiscriminately, and 1 0 poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The neighbors came there and took her to the Osmania General Hospital. As seen from both the statements, the statements are totally contradicting one another. 17. All the witnesses who were supposed to speak about the incident and the harassment by the appellant did not support the case of the prosecution. The only evidence remaining are the two statements made by the deceased, which contradict each other. There is neither any evidence to support the version given to the Magistrate, nor is there any corroborating evidence for the events narrated in the statement made to the Constable. The only evidence remaining are the two statements made by the deceased, which contradict each other. There is neither any evidence to support the version given to the Magistrate, nor is there any corroborating evidence for the events narrated in the statement made to the Constable. Exs.P11 and P12 were recorded with a difference of one hour between them. 18. In Dandu Lakshmi Reddy v. State of A.P., the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it would be unsafe to convict any person on the strength of fragile and rickety dying declaration. The said observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is applicable to the facts of the case. It was further held that a noticeable discrepancy made by the very same person was overlooked by the High Court and the High Court could not afford to sideline such material discrepancy. The following are the observations of the Supreme Court: 11. We would proceed on the assumption that Ext.P-11 and Ext.P-14 contained what Lakshmi Devi had told the scribes of those two documents. The pivotal question is whether the said version of Lakshmi Devi is credible and reliable, or is there room for entertaining any doubt about the truthfulness of her version. 12. In view of the impossibility of conducting the test on the said version with the touchstone of cross-examination we have to adopt other tests in order to satisfy our judicial conscience that those two dying declarations contain nothing but truth. 13. First among such tests is to scrutinise whether there are inherent improbabilities in that version. We are unable to detect any such improbability inherent therein. The next test is whether there is any inherent contradiction therein. In that scrutiny we came across one material contradiction as between the two dying declarations regarding the context in which deceased caught fire. Ext.P-14 shows that she was set fire to when she was lighting a stove for preparing the coffee. The relevant portion of Ext.P14 is extracted herein below: Today morning i.e. 09.10.94 when I was lighting the stove in the kitchen and preparing coffee at about 6.00 a.m. my mother- in-law and husband came from behind. After entering the kitchen, my husband caught hold of my hair and I was unable to move. My mother-in-law Narayanamma sprinkled kerosene on my body and clothes. After entering the kitchen, my husband caught hold of my hair and I was unable to move. My mother-in-law Narayanamma sprinkled kerosene on my body and clothes. She asked her son to set fire, my husband lit the match- stick and threw on my clothes. When my clothes caught fire I started shouting with fear. My mother-in-law Narayanaamma and my husband Laxmi Reddy ran away from there.” 14. In Ext.P-11 (which is a dying declaration given to the judicial Magistrate of 1st class) the context stated by the declarant was altogether different. The relevant portion is extracted below: “My mother-in-law's name is Narayanamma, my husband's name is Dandu Lakshm Reddy. In the morning at 6.00 a.m. when I was sweeping, my mother-in- law Narayanamma and my husband Laxmi Reddy both poured kerosene on me, lit the match-stick and set me to fire.” 15. The above material divergence between two dying declarations pertaining to the occasion for launching the murderous attack on the deceased did not create any impression in the minds of the learned judges of the High Court, as they have observed thus: “Though there is a difference in the version of the deceased as to what she was doing at the relevant point of time the fact remains that A-1 and A-2 poured kerosene and lit fire to her. These aspects are mentioned in Ex.P.11 P.14. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the accused appellants.” 16. Thus the High Court has sidelined such a noticeable discrepancy looming large as between the two different statements made by the same person. When the sphere of scrutiny of dying declaration is a restricted area, the court cannot afford to sideline such a material divergence relating to the very occasion of the crime. Either the context spoken to in one was wrong or that in the other was wrong. Both could be reconciled with each other only with much strain as it relates to the opportunity for the culprit to commit the offence. Adopting such a strain to the detriment of the accused in a criminal case is not a feasible course. 19. A dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction, however, such a statement should inspire confidence in the Court. Adopting such a strain to the detriment of the accused in a criminal case is not a feasible course. 19. A dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction, however, such a statement should inspire confidence in the Court. For any reason, if the statement made by the deceased is doubtful, the Court can rely on any corroborating or supporting evidence. However, in the present case, as already discussed, two contradictory dying declarations were made. Further, at the very first instance, the Afzulgunj police had gone to the Osmania General Hospital and gave a requisition to the Magistrate stating that the deceased had received the accidental burns. All these circumstantial evidences, when viewed together, makes the version of the prosecution doubtful. For the said reasons, the benefit of doubt is extended to the appellant. 20. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment dated 25.04.2019 in S.C.No.400 of 2017, on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Mahabubnagar. The appellant/accused is acquitted for the said offences, and he shall be set at liberty if he is not required in any other cases. The fine amount paid, if any, shall be returned. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.