JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua , J. Whether the expression ‘consequential benefits’ would also encompass grant of all such promotions to the employee (petitioner) at different stages, which have not been specifically ordered in the judgment by the Court and whether non-grant of same by the employer would entail an action in contempt jurisdiction, are the questions involved in this contempt petition. 2. Related facts. 2(i) Asha Chauhan Vs. Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Limited Shimla & Others , [CWPOA No. 222/2020 decided on 24.05.2023] was filed by the petitioner with the grievance that she had been wrongly ignored for promotion against the post of Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f. 06.07.2016 i.e. the date when her juniors were promoted against the said post. The Department took the stand that the merit of all candidates was assessed by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) on the basis of their respective Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). Selected candidates were found to be “outstanding” whereas the petitioner was denied promotion as she was assessed only as “very good”. During pendency of the petition, petitioner retired from service on 30.09.2022. 2(ii) The Court found that petitioner’s assessment as ‘very good’ was on the basis of entries in the un-communicated ACRs. All available ACRs’ of the petitioner with the respondent-department were those, which were never communicated to her. Denial of promotion to the petitioner to the post of Superintendent Grade-II, on this count was held unsustainable. 2(ii)(a) The Court concluded that:- In the interest of justice, a direction was required to be issued to the respondent-department to confer promotion to the petitioner against the post of Superintendent Grade-II from the date, persons junior to her were promoted against the said post. While conferring promotion to the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-II, promotion given to her juniors was not to be disturbed. If need so arises, the petitioner was to be accommodated by creating supernumerary post. 2(ii)(b) In view of aforesaid conclusion, following relief was granted to the petitioner by the Court:- (i) Respondent-department was directed to promote the petitioner against the post of Superintendent Grade- II w.e.f. 06.07.2016 i.e. the date her juniors were promoted as such. (ii) While promoting the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-II, the promotion conferred upon her juniors was not to be disturbed. (iii) Promotion conferred upon the petitioner was to be with all consequential benefits. (ii) While promoting the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-II, the promotion conferred upon her juniors was not to be disturbed. (iii) Promotion conferred upon the petitioner was to be with all consequential benefits. The Court further observed that the mandamus being issued by the Court to the respondents to offer appointment (promotion) to the petitioner against the post of Superintendent Grade-II was in the background of undisputed facts that the DPC, which had considered petitioner’s candidature for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II had not found her unsuitable for promotion, but had assessed her as ‘Very Good’ as against ‘outstanding’ assessment of her juniors. 2(ii)(c) The respondents set out to implement the above judgment. Accordingly an order was passed on 09.08.2023, whereunder:- (i) Petitioner, who had retired on 30.09.2022 was retrospectively promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade-II in applicable pay-scale w.e.f 06.07.2016 against a supernumerary post for the period 06.07.2016 to 31.07.2017 and against vacant post w.e.f. 01.08.2017; (ii) Petitioner was also assigned seniority as Superintendent Grade-II based on her seniority position alongwith other incumbents including private respondents in the writ petition; (iii) Based upon petitioner’s retrospective promotion as Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f. 06.07.2016, pay fixation order towards grant of ‘consequential benefits’ was also issued separately & resultant payments were made to the petitioner. 3. Present contempt petition. 3(i) Sh. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that consequent upon grant of retrospective promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f. 06.07.2016 and on completion of 3 years of service as such on 06.07.2019, the petitioner (who had retired on 30.09.2022) became eligible for further promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I on & w.e.f. 06.07.2019. Post of Superintendent Grade-I was also lying vacant. Petitioner’s promotion as Superintendent Grade-I would fall within the ambit of ‘consequential benefits’ granted by the Court in Asha Chauhan’s 2 case. Post of Superintendent Grade-I was also lying vacant. Petitioner’s promotion as Superintendent Grade-I would fall within the ambit of ‘consequential benefits’ granted by the Court in Asha Chauhan’s 2 case. Respondents were liable to promote the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-I, but they did not promote her to the post of Superintendent Grade-I. About 15 months after petitioner’s retirement and about seven months after the pronouncement of the judgment, respondents on 29.12.2023 made promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I. By this time, petitioner had retired, therefore, she was not considered for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I. Her junior as Superintendent Grade-II was considered and promoted as Superintendent Grade-I. Thus, according to learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the judgment in Asha Chauhan’s2 case has been implemented by the respondents only in part. Petitioner was eligible and entitled for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I on 06.07.2019 on completion of three years of service as Superintendent Grade-II. The respondents have denied this consequential promotion to the petitioner thereby committing contempt of the Court. 3(ii) Mr. Shivank Singh Panta, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the judgment has been implemented by the respondents in letter and spirit. Promotion claimed by the petitioner in her writ petition and allowed by the Court in the judgment has been granted to her retrospectively in accordance with directions issued by the Court. Pay fixation order has also been issued as a ‘consequential benefit’ on account of petitioner’s retrospective promotion as Superintendent Grade-II. Relying upon certain precedents, learned counsel contended that no contempt has been made out by the respondents. 4. Consideration 4(i) Some decisions, where the expression ‘consequential benefits’ came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court:- 4(i)(a) In Union of India & Others Vs. Colonel Ran Singh Dudee , [ (2018) 8 SCC 53 decided on 03.07.2018] Hon’ble Apex Court elaborating the expression ‘consequential benefits’ in relation to claim of promotion in defence personnel, held that ‘consequential benefits’ would be those, which are easily quantifiable namely in the nature of loss of salary, emoluments and other benefits. ‘Consequential benefits’ cannot be construed to include promotions, which are strictly on the basis of comparative merit-cum-selection. Though while holding so, it was also observed that considerations, which apply to other Government servant in the matter of promotion cannot as a matter of course be applied to defence personnel. ‘Consequential benefits’ cannot be construed to include promotions, which are strictly on the basis of comparative merit-cum-selection. Though while holding so, it was also observed that considerations, which apply to other Government servant in the matter of promotion cannot as a matter of course be applied to defence personnel. Relevant paras are as under:- “24. The first question that arises is regarding the significance of the expression “consequential benefits” as used in the order dated 20.11.2013. The matter which was directly in issue and under consideration was the correctness and validity of General Court Martial proceedings. While annulling the findings and effect of such General Court Martial proceedings, the idea was to confer those benefits which the officer stood denied directly as a result of pendency of such proceedings. Such benefits would therefore be those which are easily quantifiable namely those in the nature of loss of salary, emoluments and other benefits. But the expression cannot be construed to mean that even promotions which are strictly on the basis of comparative merit and selection must also stand conferred upon the officer. It is true that as a result of pendency of the General Court Martial proceedings the respondent was kept out of service for nearly nine years and as such his profile would show inadequacy to a certain extent. On the other hand the Department was also denied of proper assessment of the profile of the respondent for those years. The correct approach in the matter is the one which was considered by this Court in Lt. Col. K.D. Gupta V. Union of India & Others , [1989 Supp (1) SCC 416] as under:- “8. The respondents have maintained that the petitioner has not served in the appropriate grades for the requisite period and has not possessed the necessary experience and training and consequential assessment of ability which are a precondition for promotion. The defence services have their own peculiarities and special requirements. The considerations which apply to other government servants in the matter of promotion cannot as a matter of course be applied to defence personnel of the petitioner’s category and rank. Requisite experience, consequent exposure and appropriate review are indispensable for according promotion and the petitioner, therefore, cannot be given promotions as claimed by him on the basis that his batchmates have earned such promotions. Requisite experience, consequent exposure and appropriate review are indispensable for according promotion and the petitioner, therefore, cannot be given promotions as claimed by him on the basis that his batchmates have earned such promotions. Individual capacity and special qualities on the basis of assessment have to be found but in the case of the petitioner these are not available. We find force in the stand of the respondents and do not accept the petitioner’s contention that he can be granted promotion to the higher ranks as claimed by him by adopting the promotions obtained by his batchmates as the measure.” 25. The opinion of the learned Solicitor General dated 01.11.2013 and the consequential order dated 20.11.2013 must be confined to the question of validity and correctness of the General Court Martial proceedings and the benefits which respondent stood denied purely as a result thereof. The concept that he must be granted those promotions which his batchmates or juniors received and the idea that he must also be considered for promotions which are strictly based on “selection” basis have not been accepted by this 1989 Suppl (1) SCC 416 Court in K.D. Gupta (supra). The Tribunal therefore completely erred in passing the directions in its order dated 17.01.2017. Since the opinion of the Law Officer dated 30.12.2015 was not consistent with the provisions of the relevant rules and the law declared by this Court in K.D. Gupta (supra), the Department was justified in expressing serious reservations and in generating note dated 03.02.2016. The Tribunal, in our considered view, attached undue importance to the opinion of the Law Officer dated 30.12.2015.” 4(i)(b) In K. Ananda Rao & Others Vs. S.S. Rawat IAS & Others , [ (2019) 13 SCC 24 ] the petitioners had filed contempt petition submitting inter alia that in terms of an order dated 09.08.2017 all ‘consequential benefits’ arising out of enhanced age of superannuation had to be extended to those, who had superannuated on attaining the age of 58 years on or after 02.06.2014. According to the petitioners, the ‘consequential benefits’ would and must include all back-wages even for the period the petitioners had not actually worked for. The Court held that issues raised in the contempt petition had not been canvassed before the Court on 09.08.2017. Mere use of expression ‘consequential benefits’ would not entitle concerned employees anything greater than what was contemplated. According to the petitioners, the ‘consequential benefits’ would and must include all back-wages even for the period the petitioners had not actually worked for. The Court held that issues raised in the contempt petition had not been canvassed before the Court on 09.08.2017. Mere use of expression ‘consequential benefits’ would not entitle concerned employees anything greater than what was contemplated. Paras of the judgment relevant to this context are as under:- “15. Since all these issues were not canvased before this Court and were not gone into by this Court on 09.08.2017, the question that arises is whether the expression “consequential benefits” occurring in the order dated 09.08.2017 must be given the interpretation that the employees were entitled to all salaries and emoluments for the period that they had not even worked in their respective organisations? The order dated 09.08.2017 does not indicate that any such aspect of the matter was in contemplation of this Court or the matter was addressed from this stand point. In the absence of any discussion, it is very difficult to say that this Court had thought of granting something which was in excess of what was contemplated in various policy documents culminating in the G.O. dated 08.08.2017. Those policy documents were not overridden or in way found to be inoperative. As a matter of fact, they were not even referred to. 16. In this background we need to consider the expression “consequential benefits” in said order dated 09.8.2017. The contempt petitioners submit that going by the law laid down by this Court in B. Prabhakar Rao Vs. State of A.P. , [6 1985 Supp SCC 432 ] and particularly direction No.2 therein the financial benefits in the nature of salary and other emoluments must be given to the employees even for the period that the employees had not worked. But the situation in B. Prabhakar Rao was completely different. There, the issue was only regarding raising of age of retirement from 55 years to 58 years. In the present case the decision of raising the age of superannuation was more or less contemporaneous with bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh. The division of assets and liabilities was still to be undertaken. The issue of allocation of employees in various institutions in the erstwhile State was also to be finalized. In the present case the decision of raising the age of superannuation was more or less contemporaneous with bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh. The division of assets and liabilities was still to be undertaken. The issue of allocation of employees in various institutions in the erstwhile State was also to be finalized. And lastly, there was a clear direction issued by this Court invoking powers under 142 of the Constitution of India. No such power was invoked or exercised while passing the order dated on 09.08.2017. 18. Thus, purely on the principle of parity the employees of the institution or entities in Schedule IX and X of 2014 Act could not demand the benefit of enhancement of the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. That benefit came to be conferred under policy documents and finally by the GO dated 08.08.2017. Thus, the source was in those policy documents and naturally the extent of benefits was also spelt out in those instruments issued by the Government. The Circular dated 28.06.2016 which was more or less adopted in proceedings dated 11.06.2018 must be taken to be the governing criteria in respect of such employees. Unless and until that governing criteria was departed from specifically, mere expression “consequential benefits” would not entitle the concerned employees anything greater than what was contemplated in the policy documents issued by the State Government. 19. We, therefore, do not find any violation of the orders passed by this Court and dismiss these contempt petitions. It goes without saying that every employee, who is similarly situated would be entitled to the benefits conferred by policy documents referred to above but not for salary and other emoluments for the period they had not actually worked.” 4(i)(c) Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon K. Samba Moorthy Vs. Sanjiv Chadha & Ors., Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10245/2024 decided on 27.01.2025. In the above case, in view of pendency of disciplinary proceedings, appellant’s result of promotion declared on 28.07.2001 was kept in abeyance by the respondent-employer. The disciplinary proceedings concluded and a penalty was imposed upon the appellant. Appeal & Review filed by the appellant were dismissed. In view of this development, appellant’s promotion from Grade-II to Grade-III that was earlier ordered to be kept in abeyance, stood cancelled. Appellant challenged disciplinary proceedings and the punishment order before the Hon’ble High Court. The disciplinary proceedings concluded and a penalty was imposed upon the appellant. Appeal & Review filed by the appellant were dismissed. In view of this development, appellant’s promotion from Grade-II to Grade-III that was earlier ordered to be kept in abeyance, stood cancelled. Appellant challenged disciplinary proceedings and the punishment order before the Hon’ble High Court. Hon’ble Single Judge allowed the petition and held the proceedings to be vitiated. The petitioner was held entitled to all ‘consequential benefits’. The employer assailed the judgment before the Hon’ble Division Bench. During pendency of the appeal, the appellant- employee superannuated. In view of this, at the request of the employer, the Division Bench disposed of the appeal leaving questions of law open. The appellant in the meanwhile had been promoted from Grade-II to Grade-III. The respondent-employer did not promote the appellant retrospectively from Grade-II to Grade-III w.e.f. 28.07.2001. Contempt petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court. Before the Hon’ble Apex Court, respondents took the plea that only ‘consequential benefits’ to which the appellant became entitled, on setting aside of the minor penalty imposed on him, was the payment of the arrears of salary occasioned by the said penalty and nothing more. That having been paid, no contempt was made out. ‘Consequential benefits’ would not include promotion w.e.f. 28.07.2001 as the same stood cancelled on 30.08.2002 and this was not challenged by the appellant. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that penalty was imposed in disciplinary proceedings, which was quashed by the Court and the appellant was held entitled to all ‘consequential benefits’. In this scenario, the appellant was entitled to the benefit of promotion from Grade-II to Grade-III w.e.f. 28.07.2001, which order was kept in abeyance and later cancelled only because of the result of the enquiry. This promotion and relief will be encompassed in the phrase ‘consequential benefit’. Grant of this relief would not tantamount to travelling beyond the main order. The relevant portion from the decision read as under:- “23. In this background, the only question that arises in these proceedings is: Ought not the respondents have granted the benefit of promotion from MMG/Scale-II to MMG/Scale-III with effect from 28.07.2001 with all monetary benefits to the appellant. 24……... 25. The relevant portion from the decision read as under:- “23. In this background, the only question that arises in these proceedings is: Ought not the respondents have granted the benefit of promotion from MMG/Scale-II to MMG/Scale-III with effect from 28.07.2001 with all monetary benefits to the appellant. 24……... 25. In this scenario, are we to deny the appellant the benefit of promotion from 28.07.2001 when he was ordered to be promoted but which order was kept in abeyance and which was cancelled only because of the result of the enquiry? 26. We think not. That will be very unfair and we are not prepared to put our imprimatur on such an interpretation. We are also not impressed with the submissions of Ms. Praveena Gautam, learned counsel that there were no pleadings about the illegality of the cancellation order and no prayer for setting aside the order of cancellation was made. On the facts of this case, we find that such relief will be encompassed in the phrase “consequential benefits” which the learned Single Judge clearly granted. In any event, ends of justice cannot be sacrificed on the altar of technicalities. 27-29 ………... 30. Insofar as promotion with effect from 28.07.2001 for the post of Manager Grade-III is concerned, we order that the appellant should be granted the same with all monetary benefits since the fundamental defect in the enquiry was due to no fault of the appellant. The defect was also accepted by the Bank when they did not press the appeal. The benefit of promotion to Manager Grade- III from 28.07.2001 is covered in the expression “consequential benefits” as ordered in the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20.07.2017 in Writ Petition No. 7616 of 2008. We say so on the facts of the present case.” However, significantly, Hon’ble Apex Court further observed in the decision that denial of further promotions upwards Grade-II would give a cause of action to the appellants to avail remedies as may be available to them in-law. Such denial would not partake the character of contempt. Question of further promotion cannot be ventured into while adjudicating the contempt petition. Relevant observations in this regard are as under:- “31. There is one more additional aspect. Such denial would not partake the character of contempt. Question of further promotion cannot be ventured into while adjudicating the contempt petition. Relevant observations in this regard are as under:- “31. There is one more additional aspect. It is not clear from the record as to on what ground the appellant was denied promotion in 2016, 2017 and 2018 exercises, for scales upward of Manage r Scale-III. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is dated 20.07.2017. We also find that by an order of 13.09.2017, the Division Bench suspended the order of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench disposed of the matter on 30.03.2022. We cannot venture into that arena while adjudicating the present Contempt Petition hence. We reserve liberty to the appellant to resort to such remedies as may be available to him in law insofar as his claim of denial for further promotions from upwards of Management Grade-III is concerned. We order that, in the event of any proceedings being initiated, all questions may be permitted to be raised by the parties which will be decided on their own merits. We also direct that such proceedings should not be rejected on the grounds of limitation or laches. 32. We are, for the present, not inclined to proceed against the respondents for action in contempt. We grant an opportunity to them to pass orders within four weeks from today remedy the situation by granting promotion to the appellant from Manager Scale-II to Scale-III from 28.07.2001 and grant him all monetary benefits with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, from the respective dates the monetary benefits fell due.” 4(ii) Thus, ‘consequential benefits’ would ordinarily encompass quantifiable financial benefits like salary, arrears etc. payable to as employee-petitioner as a result of direct relief granted to him by the Court. Upon retrospective seniority granted to a petitioner-employee in service, it would also include right of consideration for further promotion based upon fresh seniority position by holding review DPC etc. What would be the ‘consequential benefits’ would ultimately depend upon the nature of relief granted by the Court in the given factual position. 4(iii) In the present case, the petitioner had felt aggrieved against denial of promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II. She accordingly filed petition specifically seeking this relief. During pendency of the petition, petitioner retired on 30.09.2022. The judgment was pronounced on 24.05.2023. 4(iii) In the present case, the petitioner had felt aggrieved against denial of promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II. She accordingly filed petition specifically seeking this relief. During pendency of the petition, petitioner retired on 30.09.2022. The judgment was pronounced on 24.05.2023. The Court specifically held the petitioner entitled to promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II. The Court directed the respondents to promote the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-II, if necessary by creating a supernumerary post. The date from which the petitioner was to be promoted as Superintendent Grade-II, was also mentioned in the judgment i.e. w.e.f. 06.07.2016. Since the Court had directly conferred this promotion upon the petitioner, which otherwise was to be considered by the DPC, the Court also elaborated the reasons as to why the Court itself was issuing a specific mandamus to the respondents in the given facts for promoting the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f. a particular date. The Court had further held that promotion of the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-II would be with all consequential benefits. Relevant paras from Asha Chauhan Vs. Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Limited Shimla & Others (supra) alleged to be flouted by the respondents read as under :- “ 12. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that Interest of justice will be served in case a direction is issued to the respondent-Department to confer promotion to the petitioner against the post of Superintendent Grade-II from the date when persons junior to her were promoted against the said post without disturbing the promoted candidates. Seniority be granted to the petitioner in terms of her seniority in the feeder category and if need so arises. the petitioner be accommodated in terms of the order passed in her favour today by the Court by creating a supernumerary post. 13. The petition is accordingly, disposed of with the direction that as denial of promotion to the petitioner in terms of Annexures A-3 and A-5 by assessing her suitability on the basis of un- communicated ACRs is bad in law, therefore, the respondents are directed to promote the petitioner against the post of Superintendent Grade-II. i.e. the date when persons junior to her were promoted as such w.e.f. 06.07.2016. She shall be assigned suitable seniority in terms of her seniority position in the feeder cadre, but the promotion conferred to the private respondents shall not be disturbed. i.e. the date when persons junior to her were promoted as such w.e.f. 06.07.2016. She shall be assigned suitable seniority in terms of her seniority position in the feeder cadre, but the promotion conferred to the private respondents shall not be disturbed. The promotion will be with all consequential benefits. The mandamus which has been issued by this Court to the respondents to offer appointment to the petitioner against the post of Superintendent Grade-II is in the background of the undisputed facts that the Departmental Promotion Committee which considered the candidature of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II, had not found her to be unsuitable for promotion, but had assessed her as 'Very Good'. In the given factual situation, ‘consequential benefits’would only include financial benefits consequent upon petitioner’s retrospective promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II and nothing beyond that. In case, the petitioner, who had retired before the pronouncement of the judgment desired further promotion, it was for her to make submissions on this point before the Court, which she apparently did not do. There is no discussion in the judgment about further promotion of the petitioner to the post of Superintendent Grade-I. There is no direction to the respondents to consider the petitioner for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I. It is not the case of the petitioner that any junior to her was promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade-I before her retirement on 30.09.2022. It is not her case that any meeting of Departmental Promotion Committee was convened prior to her retirement for making promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I. A relief, which has not been directly granted to her, cannot be read in the judgment and on that basis, respondents cannot be held guilty of contempt. 4(iv) At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to Sudhir Vasudeva Chairman and Managing Director Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and Others Vs. M. George Ravishekaran and Others. , [8 (2014) 3 SCC 373 ] This was an appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court against directions issued by the High Court in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction to create supernumerary post. Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the Courts must not travel beyond the four corners of the order alleged to be flouted or enter into question that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment. Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that the Courts must not travel beyond the four corners of the order alleged to be flouted or enter into question that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment. Only such directions, which are explicit in the judgment or are plainly self evident are to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising the contempt jurisdiction. The argument that such a direction is implicit in the judgment is self defeating. Such course of action is not even open to balance the equities. The issue in such case would be of jurisdiction and not of justification. Relevant paras from the decision are as under:- “15. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb the liberty of the individual charged with commission of contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect of which disobedience is alleged. Courts must not, therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are plainly self evident ought to be taken into account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has been any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. Decided issues cannot be reopened; nor the plea of equities can be considered. Courts must also ensure that while considering a contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the precedents cited at the bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly and Others , [(2002) 5 SCC 610] , V.M.Manohar Prasad vs. N. Ratnam Raju and Another , [10 (2004) 13 SCC 610 ] , Bihar Finance Service House Construction Cooperative Society Ltd. vs. Gautam Goswami and Others , [11 (2008) 5 SCC 339 ] and Union of India and Others vs. Subedar Devassy PV . , [12 (2006) 1 SCC 613 ] 16. Applying the above settled principles to the case before us, it is clear that the direction of the High Court for creation of supernumerary posts of Marine Assistant Radio Operator cannot be countenanced. Not only the Courts must act with utmost restraint before compelling the executive to create additional posts, the impugned direction virtually amounts to supplementing the directions contained in the order of the High Court dated 02.8.2006. The alterative direction i.e. to grant parity of pay could very well have been occasioned by the stand taken by the Corporation with regard to the necessity of keeping in existence the cadre itself in view of the operational needs of the Corporation. If despite the specific stand taken by the Corporation in this regard the High Court was of the view that the respondents should be absorbed as Marine Assistant Radio Operator nothing prevented the High Court from issuing a specific direction to create supernumerary posts of Marine Assistant Radio Operator. The same was not done. If that be so, the direction to create supernumerary posts at the stage of exercise of the contempt jurisdiction has to be understood to be an addition to the initial order passed in the Writ Petition. The argument that such a direction is implicit in the order dated 02.08.2006 is self defeating. The same was not done. If that be so, the direction to create supernumerary posts at the stage of exercise of the contempt jurisdiction has to be understood to be an addition to the initial order passed in the Writ Petition. The argument that such a direction is implicit in the order dated 02.08.2006 is self defeating. Neither, is such a course of action open to balance the equities, i.e. not to foreclose the promotional avenues of the petitioners, as vehemently urged by Shri Rao. The issue is one of jurisdiction and not of justification. Whether the direction issued would be justified by way of review or in exercise of any other jurisdiction is an aspect that does not concern us in the present case. Of relevance is the fact that an alternative direction had been issued by the High Court by its order dated 02.08.2006 and the appellants, as officers of the Corporation, have complied with the same. They cannot be, therefore, understood to have acted in willful disobedience of the said order of the Court. All that was required in terms of the second direction having been complied with by the appellants, we are of the view that the order dated 02.08.2006 passed in W.P. No. 21518 of 2000 stands duly implemented. Consequently, we set aside the Order dated 19.01.2012 passed in Contempt Petition No. 161 of 2010, as well as the impugned order dated 11.07.2012 passed in Contempt Appeal No.2 of 2012 and allow the present appeal.” 5. To sum up , the respondents had been directed by the Court under the judgment dated 24.05.2023 to grant promotion to the petitioner to the post of Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f. 06.07.2016 with ‘consequential benefits’. This would obviously mean that the petitioner was to be promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f. 06.07.2016 alongwith financial benefits. Admittedly the respondents have promoted the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-II w.e.f. 06.07.2016 and have also granted her consequential monetary benefits. Petitioner’s allegation that the respondents have flouted the judgment by not considering her for further promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I to which she became entitled to on 06.07.2019 on completion of three years of service, cannot be sustained. The respondents have not flouted any directions issued to them. Petitioner stood retired on 30.09.2022. No junior to the petitioner had been promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade-I till her retirement. The respondents have not flouted any directions issued to them. Petitioner stood retired on 30.09.2022. No junior to the petitioner had been promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade-I till her retirement. Respondents made promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I on 29.12.2023 i.e. after petitioner’s retirement. Petitioner’s present claim for promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I on 06.07.2019 based upon her retrospective promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II, is an all together different issue, which had not been deliberated in Asha Chauhan’s 2 There was no specific direction to the respondents in Asha Chauhan’s 2 for petitioner’s further promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-I. Petitioner’s further promotion to different posts at different stages based upon her retrospective promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II in the given facts and circumstances more particularly taking note of specific mandamus issued to the respondents cannot be said to be covered within the meaning of ‘consequential benefits’. Respondents cannot be said to be guilty of Contempt of Court. Hence, contempt petition is dismissed. Notices discharged. However, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to seek appropriate remedy for the redressal of her claim for further promotion, in accordance with law. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.