JUDGMENT : Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J. Preface: 1. Three employees of this Hon’ble Court have instituted the present writ petition, praying for the issuance of an appropriate writ, more particularly in the nature of mandamus, directing the concerned respondents to determine their inter se seniority in the cadre of Superintendent Grade-II, with retrospective effect from 30.07.2018 (forenoon). Consequent thereto, they also pray for promotion to the next higher post, namely that of Assistant Court Officer (for short, ACO), being the last common cadre, on the strength of such revised seniority. The petitioners further beseech this Hon’ble Court to direct the re-fixation of their pay and the disbursement of consequential arrears of emoluments accruing from the such re-determination and promotional benefits. Petitioners’ case: 2. Before delving into the contours of the controversy hovering around the present writ petition, it would be appropriate to first advert to the essential facts, as set out in the writ petition, which led to its institution. Those essential facts are as follows: i) The petitioners commenced their service career as Lower Division Assistants (for short, LDA) in the Appellate Side Establishment of this Hon’ble Court on 10.12.2001 (forenoon). ii) In accordance with Rules 3(2) and 6(1) of the Calcutta High Court Service (Appellate Side) Categorisation of Posts, Channels of Promotion and Principles of Seniority Rules, 1986 (for short, the 1986 Rules), petitioner no. 1 is senior to the other two petitioners, and petitioner no. 2 is senior to petitioner no. 3. iii) Subsequently, in terms of Rules 4 and 5(1) of the 1986 Rules, the petitioners were promoted to the posts of Upper Division Assistant (in short, UDA) in September 2007, January 2008, and 2009, respectively. iv) On 10.05.2018, the Joint Registrar (General Administration), Appellate Side, issued a notice inviting applications from eligible and interested candidates for 2 (two) vacant posts of Superintendent in the Protocol Department and 1 (one) vacant post of Superintendent at the High Court Judges’ Guest House, Bijan Bhawan, Salt Lake, Kolkata, all in the category of Superintendent Grade-II. v) The notice dated 10.05.2018 stipulated that employees in the UDA category, irrespective of gender or place of residence, possessing a minimum of 10 years of service experience (inclusive of their tenure as LDA and UDA), were eligible to apply for the said posts. v) The notice dated 10.05.2018 stipulated that employees in the UDA category, irrespective of gender or place of residence, possessing a minimum of 10 years of service experience (inclusive of their tenure as LDA and UDA), were eligible to apply for the said posts. It further contained a stipulation that any applicant not residing in Kolkata or Howrah town would be required to furnish an undertaking to the effect that he would make suitable residential arrangements within Kolkata or Howrah town prior to assuming the post. The notice further instructed the applicants to acquaint themselves with the High Court’s Notifications bearing Nos. 2679A-G.S. dated 19.04.2000 and 3151-G.S. dated 09.05.2000. vi) The petitioners contend that the notice did not specify that applicants who might be selected would be barred from asserting their inter se seniority in the category of Superintendent Grade-II, nor did it indicate that the provisions of Rules 6(2)(a) and 6(2)(c) of the 1986 Rules would be inapplicable to them. On the contrary, the petitioners assert that Rule 7(iii) would primarily govern the determination of their inter se seniority in the said category. vii) A notice dated 05.07.2018, issued by the Deputy Registrar (Administration), indicated that the selection process would comprise a Written Test carrying 30 marks, a Viva Voce of 10 marks, and an Assessment of Service Records carrying 10 marks. viii) The petitioners’ case is that, upon being declared successful in the selection process, they were promoted to posts in the category of Superintendent Grade-II with effect from 30.07.2018 (forenoon), in terms of Rule 5(1) of the 1986 Rules. Such promotion, they contend, was effected in supersession of all other incumbents who were senior to them in the basic cadre as well as in the cadre of UDA, including those who were subsequently promoted to the Superintendent Grade-II category. ix) However, the petitioner contended, no category-wise Gradation List of the General Branch of Appellate Side Establishment has yet been published following the mandate of the Rule 8 of the 1986 Rules. x) In the year 2023, petitioner no. 1 was promoted to the post of Cashier/Accountant in the Superintendent Grade-I category. ix) However, the petitioner contended, no category-wise Gradation List of the General Branch of Appellate Side Establishment has yet been published following the mandate of the Rule 8 of the 1986 Rules. x) In the year 2023, petitioner no. 1 was promoted to the post of Cashier/Accountant in the Superintendent Grade-I category. Thereafter, following the prescribed promotional hierarchy, he was successively promoted to the post of Section Officer in the Section Officer category, then to Additional Court Keeper in the Court Keeper category, followed by Superintendent Grade-I (Selection Grade category), and ultimately to the post of Assistant Court Officer in the Selection Grade category with effect from 21.01.2024. Since then, petitioner no. 1 has been serving in the post of Assistant Court Officer. xi) Petitioner No. 2, holding an LL.B. degree, was promoted from Superintendent Grade-II to Special Assistant (Legal) in Superintendent Grade-I through a selection process conducted under Rules 5(3) and 9 of the 1986 Rules, with effect from 23.12.2022 (forenoon). Subsequently, he was further promoted to the post of Stamp Reporter/Addl. Stamp Reporter in the Selection Grade category, with effect from 07.08.2023 (forenoon). He is presently serving as the Stamp Reporter in the General Branch of the Appellate Side Establishment. xii) Petitioner No. 3 was promoted to the post of Cashier/Accountant in the Superintendent Grade-I category in December 2023, and subsequently to the post of Section Officer in the Section Officer category with effect from 06.12.2023. He is currently serving as a Section Officer in the General Branch of the Appellate Side Establishment. xiii) However, the petitioners contended that while granting promotions from Superintendent Grade-II, being the last common cadre, to posts in the Superintendent Grade-I category, their inter se seniority (Petitioners Nos. 1 to 3) was disregarded. Certain employees junior to the petitioners were granted regular promotion to the Superintendent Grade-I category in violation of Rules 6(2)(a) and 6(2)(c) of the 1986 Rules. xiv) The petitioners contend that the Protocol Wing or Department is neither a separate establishment nor a closed cadre. Officers such as Assistant Registrars or Deputy Registrars, when attached to this department, are not denied their inter se seniority. xv) The petitioners brought these anomalies to the attention of the concerned respondents; however, despite receiving the representation, no action was taken. As a result, the petitioners were compelled to file the present writ petition. xvi) After the arguments advanced by Mr. xv) The petitioners brought these anomalies to the attention of the concerned respondents; however, despite receiving the representation, no action was taken. As a result, the petitioners were compelled to file the present writ petition. xvi) After the arguments advanced by Mr. Saha Roy, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners and Mr. Kar, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents, the petitioners filed a supplementary affidavit placing on record a notification dated 13.08.2014 issued by the Judicial Department, Government of West Bengal, which shows that two posts of Superintendents in the Protocol Department of the High Court and one post in the Judges’ Guest House were created by the State. They also annexed certain appointment letters to demonstrate that even in cases of regular appointments, the terms ’officiating’ and ’temporary’ are often used. Mr. Kar initially raised a strong objection to the acceptance of the supplementary affidavit at the final stage of the hearing. However, he subsequently proceeded to advance his arguments, drawing my attention to the documents annexed thereto and their contents. Respondents’ Case 3. In the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by the Registrar General of this Court, the respondents have contended that the writ petition is not maintainable on the grounds of suppression of material facts, delay, and laches, and that the reliefs sought are barred by the principles of estoppel. It is averred that the petitioners had participated in the promotion process and accepted their respective promotions without objection for over six years. The respondents further argued that the writ petition suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties, as the incumbents who may be affected by any order passed in the matter have not been arrayed as parties in this writ petition. 4. It is emphasized therein that the placement in the posts of Superintendent Grade-II, particularly in the Protocol Department and the Judges’ Guest House, is ’officiating’ in nature and does not constitute regular promotion. These posts, especially those at the Judges’ Guest House, are standalone positions, not part of the regular establishment, and do not form part of the feeder category for promotion to Assistant Registrar or Deputy Registrar. The criteria for selection, including residency and communication skills, further indicate that these are not conventional promotions. 5. These posts, especially those at the Judges’ Guest House, are standalone positions, not part of the regular establishment, and do not form part of the feeder category for promotion to Assistant Registrar or Deputy Registrar. The criteria for selection, including residency and communication skills, further indicate that these are not conventional promotions. 5. The candidates selected pursuant to the notification dated 09.05.2000, read in conjunction with the notification dated 19.04.2000, cannot be equated with those who undergo regular promotion under Rule 5(1) read with Rule 5(3) of the 1986 Rules, as seniority or service record was never a criterion for selection to the aforesaid three posts. 6. The respondents deny that any incumbent junior to the petitioners has superseded them. They assert that there has been no violation of Rule 6(2)(a) or Rule 6(2)(c) of the 1986 Rules, and that the promotions to posts in the Superintendent Grade-I category were lawful and not irregular, as alleged. It is further stated that the placement orders issued in 2018 cannot be construed as ’out of turn’ promotions. The respondents contend that the petitioners had accepted their promotions without objection at the relevant time, and that the present attempt to seek retrospective recasting of the seniority list from 2018 onwards, particularly in the year 2024, amounts to an afterthought and would disturb a position that has long been settled in law. 7. It is contended by the respondents that the notifications of 2000 did not permit all candidates to apply for the post, and Rule 5(3) of the 1986-Rule, which pertains to consideration of service records and fitness, is applicable to promotion to Superintendent Grade-II. They dispute that the petitioners are entitled to claim inter se seniority in the Protocol Department with effect from 30.07.2018, as alleged by the petitioners. 8. The respondents assert that the "Senority cum Gradation List" of Superintendent Grade-II category, as sought by the petitioners, is under active consideration of the competent authority. They rely on the fact that promotions were made through a due process. It is explicitly stated that promotion to selection grade is based on merit in all instances. Submissions: 9. Inviting my attention to certain provisions of the 1986 Rules, Mr. They rely on the fact that promotions were made through a due process. It is explicitly stated that promotion to selection grade is based on merit in all instances. Submissions: 9. Inviting my attention to certain provisions of the 1986 Rules, Mr. Saha Roy contended that promotion to the posts in the category of UDA and Superintendent Grade-II is based on seniority; promotion to all other higher posts is governed by the principle of merit-cum-seniority; and promotion to Selection Grade or Super Selection Grade posts is based solely on merit. He further submitted that inter se seniority in the basic category is to be determined by the order of merit in which candidates are placed in the select list. 10. Citing the provisions of Rules 6(2)(a) and 6(2)(c) of the 1986 Rules, he contended that seniority of persons appointed on promotion to any post shall be determined from the date of joining the post and the persons appointed on the result of an earlier selection shall be senior to those appointed on the results of a subsequent selection. 11. Referring to the notification dated 09.05.2000 (Annexure P-4 to the writ petition), Mr. Saha Roy contended that the post of Protocol Officer ought to be classified as a Selection Grade post, as defined under Schedule-A of the 1986 Rules. He pointed out that Schedule-A categorizes posts such as Superintendent, Editor, Accountant, and Court Keeper under Superintendent Grade-II, while posts such as Stamp Reporter, Assistant Registrar, and Superintendent Grade-I fall under the Selection Grade category. The post of Deputy Registrar, he submitted, is placed in the Super Selection Grade category. 12. He argued that nowhere in the petitioners’ letters of appointment was it stated that, upon accepting the posts of Superintendent in the Protocol Department or in the Judges’ Guest House, they would forfeit their inter se seniority in the Superintendent Grade-II category or in the category of UDA. 13. Referring to Rule 8 of the 1986 Rules, Mr. Saha Roy contended that although the respondents were obligated under the said rule to prepare and publish a gradation list, for the last two years, no such list has been published. He further submitted that the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents contains no specific denial of the petitioners’ assertion that they have been deprived of their legitimate inter se seniority and promotional benefits. 14. He further submitted that the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents contains no specific denial of the petitioners’ assertion that they have been deprived of their legitimate inter se seniority and promotional benefits. 14. He asserted that the posts of Superintendent in the Protocol Department and at the Judges’ Guest House fall under the Superintendent Grade-II category, and that the petitioners’ seniority should have been reckoned from the date of their joining in that category. However, he argued that, in violation of the 1986 Rules and the notification dated 09.05.2000, the petitioners were not granted the benefit of inter se seniority. Instead, employees who were junior to the petitioners in both the basic category and the Superintendent Grade-II category were promoted to posts in the Superintendent Grade-I category. 15. In rebuttal, Mr. Kar argued that the writ petition is vitiated by non- joinder of necessary parties. He submitted that since the petitioners seek a retrospective recasting of the gradation list and alteration of inter se seniority, such relief would inevitably affect the seniority of other employees, who have not been impleaded as parties to the proceedings. 16. Mr. Kar contended that the alleged deprivation claimed by the petitioners dates back to 2018, yet they accepted their promotions thereafter without objection. He argued that the petitioners have not explained the delay in approaching the Court, having filed the present writ petition only in 2024 i.e. after a gap of six years. On these grounds alone, he submitted, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. According to him, a belated challenge to the gradation list or inter se seniority has the potential to unsettle settled positions. In matters such as this, where the rights of third parties may be affected, such delayed action ought not to be entertained. 17. Referring to paragraph 3 of the supplementary affidavit, Mr. Kar argued that the petitioners sought to contend that the posts of Superintendent in the Protocol Department and at the Judges’ Guest House are not standalone posts. He asserted, however, that these posts are staffed by employees from the Upper Division Assistant (UDA) category, and that selection to these posts does not constitute promotion to a higher promotional post. He further submitted that employees from the UDA category are appointed to officiate in these posts, and their suitability is assessed through a selection process. 18. To support his submissions, Mr. He further submitted that employees from the UDA category are appointed to officiate in these posts, and their suitability is assessed through a selection process. 18. To support his submissions, Mr. Kar relied on the decision reported in (2004) 2 SCC 76 (Ramrao & Ors. vs. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Association & Ors.), wherein it was held that a writ petition challenging a promotion order is not maintainable without impleading the promotee. On a similar issue, he referred to the decision in (1998) 4 SCC 251 (Prabodh Verma & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors.). He also cited (2018) 5 SCC 798 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Chaman Rana) to contend that in cases of denial of promotion, a delay of more than six months or at most a year would be considered unreasonable for approaching the Court. 19. He also referred to the decision reported in (1988) 4 SCC 534 (Bharat Singh & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors.) to contend that no argument can be advanced beyond the pleadings. Additionally, he relied on an unreported decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in WPO 311 of 2018 to submit that at the final stage of hearing, no subsequent pleading filed by any party to the proceeding can be taken into consideration. 20. In reply, Mr. Saha Roy argued that no gradation list has been published, and as such, the petitioners are unaware of which individuals, if any, would be adversely affected by an order passed in this writ petition. Therefore, according to him, the petition cannot be held to be defective on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. He further submitted that the writ petition does not seek to challenge the promotion order of any specific employee. 21. He contended that since no gradation list has been published and the petitioners are unable to ascertain their positions therein, the question of a belated approach cannot be raised in this writ petition. He further contended that there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing a writ petition. He asserted that there are instances where writ petitions have been entertained even 13 to 14 years after the cause of action arose. 22. He further contended that there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing a writ petition. He asserted that there are instances where writ petitions have been entertained even 13 to 14 years after the cause of action arose. 22. He further argued that the supplementary affidavit was filed by the petitioners solely to bring to the Court’s attention that an incorrect submission had been made—that the petitioners were appointed purely on a temporary basis to officiate in those posts. He asserted that the term ’officiate’ is routinely used in all letters of appointment issued by the High Court. He contended that the Court cannot be permitted to decide any issue based on a factual inaccuracy. In support of his submission, he relied on the decisions reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 (Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors.) and (2011) 9 SCC 65 (High Court of Judicature at Patna vs. Madan Mohan Prasad & Ors.). Discussion and Conclusion: 23. In the present case, the petitioners have prayed for a direction to the concerned respondents to revise their inter se seniority in the Superintendent Grade-II category with effect from 30.07.2018, to grant them higher promotional posts accordingly, to re-fix their pay, and to release all consequential benefits. The writ petition has been filed in the year 2024. 24. In Chaman Rana (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court quoted with approval the proposition laid down in the decision, reported at (1975) 1 SCC 152 ( P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of T.N. ), which is extracted below: “ .. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wife exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle the settled matters. The petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s petition as well as the appeal.” 25. Citing the decision in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. (supra), Mr. Saha Roy contended that if the petitioners’ claim is found to be legally sustainable, the delay in raising such a claim ought to be condoned. He submitted that when substantial justice and technical considerations are in conflict, the cause of substantial justice must prevail. 26. It is well settled that there is no prescribed time limit for filing a writ petition, nor can it be said that Courts are absolutely barred from exercising their writ jurisdiction merely due to the passage of time. There is no rigid or inflexible rule as to when a delayed writ petition may be entertained and when it may be declined. However, if there is an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and the delay remains unexplained or inadequately explained, the High Court may, in its discretion, refuse to intervene and grant relief. Where the demand of justice is compelling, the Court may still choose to interfere despite the delay. Whether a belated writ petition should be entertained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. If circumstances exist that justify the petitioner’s conduct, and the illegality complained of is patent and manifest, the writ petition ought not to be dismissed at the threshold on the ground of delay alone. Whether a belated writ petition should be entertained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. If circumstances exist that justify the petitioner’s conduct, and the illegality complained of is patent and manifest, the writ petition ought not to be dismissed at the threshold on the ground of delay alone. When the cause of substantial justice is pitted against technical objections, it is the former that must prevail. 27. In service matters, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that delayed claims should not be entertained, especially when they risk disturbing settled positions. The law is well-settled that belated challenges, particularly those filed after several years, are not maintainable as they can cause prejudice to third parties. A writ petition challenging seniority after a period of six years, if entertained, can unsettle the rights of others that have already matured over time and lead to disruption of settled service structure. Undoubtedly, due to such delay, third-party right has been created. Therefore, in light of this established legal position in service jurisprudence, the contention advanced by Mr. Saha Roy cannot be accepted. 28. Moreover, in the present case, it is an admitted position that the promotees, who are likely to be adversely affected in the event an order is passed for revision of inter se seniority in the category of Superintendent Grade-II, have not been impleaded as parties to the writ petition. In Ramrao & Ors. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that in matters concerning promotion, the promotees are necessary parties, and in their absence, the writ petition cannot be effectively adjudicated. Therefore, the non-joinder of such affected parties renders the petition procedurally defective and legally untenable. 29. Therefore, for the aforesaid two reasons, in my considered view, the writ petition can’nt be entertained. It has been held that the writ petition is not entertainable on the grounds of inordinate delay and non-joinder of necessary parties, entering into the merits of the case would serve no useful purpose and is thus unwarranted. 30. Consequently, the writ petition and IA No. GA 1 of 2024 are, thus, dismissed; however, there shall be no order as to the costs.