JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioners have filed the present petition against the order dated 15.02.2023 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge -II, Solan, District Solan vide which the revision filed by the petitioners (the applicants before the learned Trial Court) against the order dated 24.07.2018, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kasauli, District Solan (H.P.) (learned trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the applicants filed an application before the learned Trial Court under Section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) for seeking maintenance. It was asserted that the applicants are the daughters of the respondent. Applicant No.1 was aged 19 years and applicant No.2 was aged 14 years. They have no source of income to maintain themselves. The respondent being their father is legally and morally bound to maintain them. Applicant No.1 was a student of BA second year in Degree College at Kalka. She required about Rs.three thousand per month for transportation, books, clothes etc., Rs.four thousand for her food and daily needs and Rs.one thousand for her miscellaneous expenses. Applicant No.2 was a student of 10 th standard. She required a minimum amount of Rs.three thousand for her school fees, notebooks and other materials, Rs.four thousand for her food and Rs.one thousand for her miscellaneous expenses. The respondent was running a business of cosmetic. He was also working for Sahara India and his monthly income was more than Rs.forty thousand. He could easily pay Rs.Eleven thousand per month to the applicants as maintenance. Hence, the application. 3. The application was opposed by filing a reply taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability and the applicants having concealed the material facts from the Court. The contents of the application were denied on merits. However, the relationship between the parties was not disputed. It was asserted that the applicants’ mother was working as a Teacher at Parwanoo Public Senior Secondary School, Sector 5, Parwanoo. She was drawing a salary of Rs.ten thousand per month. She was also receiving the rent of the building known as Santosh Bhawan to the tune of Rs.twenty-five thousand per month. It was asserted that the applicants’ mother was working as a Teacher at Parwanoo Public Senior Secondary School, Sector 5, Parwanoo. She was drawing a salary of Rs.ten thousand per month. She was also receiving the rent of the building known as Santosh Bhawan to the tune of Rs.twenty-five thousand per month. The respondent was working as an agent with Sahara India which was in dispute with its investors and the respondent was not earning anything. It was specifically denied that he was earning Rs.forty thousand per month and was in a position to pay Rs.Eleven thousand per month as maintenance to the applicants. Hence, it was prayed that the present application be dismissed. 4. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and afÏrming those of the application was filed. 5. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence and the applicants examined their mother- Dev Lata (PW1). The respondent examined himself (RW1) and Neeraj Kumar (RW2). 6. Learned Trial Court held that a major child is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr. P.C. Therefore, no maintenance could be awarded to applicant No.1. The applicants’ mother was earning Rs.Seven thousand per month by working as a teacher. She was also receiving the rent from Santosh Bhawan. However, this will not absolve the respondent from maintaining the applicant No.2. Hence, she was held entitled to maintenance of Rs.Six thousand per month from the date of the order. 7. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the applicants filed a revision which was decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan, District Solan. The learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan held that applicant No.1 was not entitled to any maintenance because she had attained majority. An interim maintenance of Rs.Five thousand was awarded to applicant No.2 which was increased to Rs.Six thousand by the order of learned trial Court. There is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned trial Court. Hence, the revision was dismissed. 8. I have heard Mr. Parikshit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners/applicants and Mr. Pranshul Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. Mr. Parikshit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners/applicants prayed that the learned Courts below erred in holding that a major daughter is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. He relied upon the judgments of Virender Kumar Sharma Vs. Parikshit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners/applicants and Mr. Pranshul Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. Mr. Parikshit Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners/applicants prayed that the learned Courts below erred in holding that a major daughter is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. He relied upon the judgments of Virender Kumar Sharma Vs. Uma Sharma, LAWS(HPH) 2012 12 28, Jagdish Jugtawat Vs. Manu Lata & Ors., (2003) 2 Apex Court Journal 137, Virender Kumar Sharma Vs. Uma Sharma Cr.MMO No.28 of 2012-G & Cr.MMO No.67 of 2012 decided on 01.12.2012, Subhash Roy Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2004) AIIMR (Cri.)(JS) 34: (2004) CriLJ 573, Agnes Lilly Irudaya Vs. Irudaya Kani Arasan (2018) 3 RCR (Criminal) 94, Ravinder Maurya Vs. Mansha Devi (2018) 5 ADJ 17 and Dilip Sharma Vs. Swati Sharma & Ors. (2022) 2 DMC 557 in support of his submission. 10. Mr. Pranshul Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the revision filed by the applicants before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Solan, District Solan (H.P) was dismissed. They cannot file a Second Revision before this Court. This bar cannot be circumvented by filing a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the present petition is not maintainable. Learned Courts below had rightly held that a major daughter is not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. after attaining the age of majority. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Abhilasha v. Parkash, (2021) 13 SCC 99 in support of his submission. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. Section 397 (3) of CrPC creates a bar to file a second revision. It reads as under: “(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” 13. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that if a person files a revision, he is precluded from filing the second revision. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan Vs. Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241 that the bar under Section 397 (3) of CrPC cannot be circumvented by filing a petition under Section 482 of CrPC. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan Vs. Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241 that the bar under Section 397 (3) of CrPC cannot be circumvented by filing a petition under Section 482 of CrPC. However, the High Court can intervene under Section 482 of CrPC when there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed: “10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant — cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of a criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when trial is conducted expeditiously. 11. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when trial is conducted expeditiously. 11. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] a three-judge Bench was to consider the scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put to facilitate expedient disposal of the cases but in Section 482 it is provided that nothing in the Code, which would include Section 397(2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On a harmonious construction of the said two provisions on this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order, still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In that case, when allegations of defamatory statements were published in the newspapers against the Law Minister, the State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under Section 500 IPC. After obtaining the sanction, on a complaint made by the public prosecutor, cognizance of the commission of the offence by the appellant was taken to trial in the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed the charges under Section 406. The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. On a preliminary objection raised on maintainability, this Court held that the power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. 12. In V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: (1980) 2 SCR 380 ] (SCR at p. 393) a four-judge Bench per majority had held that sub-section (3) of Section 397, however, does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. 12. In V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: (1980) 2 SCR 380 ] (SCR at p. 393) a four-judge Bench per majority had held that sub-section (3) of Section 397, however, does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Court under Section 397(1) of the Code. In Rajan Kumar Machananda case [1990 Supp SCC 132: 1990 SCC (Cri) 537] the case related to the release of a truck from attachment, obviously on the filing of an interlocutory application. It was contended that there was a prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397(2) of the Code. In that context, it was held that it was not revisable under Section 482 in the exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by provisions contained in Section 397(3), the revision is not maintainable. In the Dharampal case [ (1993) 1 SCC 435 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 333] which related to the exercise of power to issue an order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code, it was held that the inherent power under Section 482 was prohibited. On the facts, in that case, it could be said that the learned Judges would be justified in holding that it was not revisable since it was a prohibitory interim order of attachment covered under Section 397(2) of the Code but the observations of the learned Judges that the High Court had no power under Section 482 of the Code were not correct in view of the ratio of this Court in Madhu Limaye case [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 as upheld in V.C. Shukla case [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : (1980) 2 SCR 380 ] and also in view of our observations stated earlier. The ratio in the Deepti case [ (1995) 5 SCC 751 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1020] is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case, an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of the Magistrate for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The ratio in the Deepti case [ (1995) 5 SCC 751 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1020] is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case, an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of the Magistrate for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed the petition. In the revision at the instance of the accused, on a wrong concession made by the counsel appearing for the State that the record did not contain allegations constituting the offence under Section 498-A, the High Court without applying its mind had discharged the accused. On appeal, this Court after going through the record noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498-A IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused leading to the miscarriage of justice. In that context, this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. In view of the fact that the order of the High Court had led to the miscarriage of justice, this Court had set aside the order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate. 13. The ratio of Simrikhia case [ (1990) 2 SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] has no application to the facts in this case. Therein, on a private complaint filed under Sections 452 and 323 IPC the Judicial Magistrate, First Class had taken cognizance of the offence. He transferred the case for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code to the Second-Class Magistrate who after examining the witnesses issued a process to the accused. The High Court exercising the power under Section 482 dismissed the revision. But subsequently, on an application filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court corrected it. The question was whether the High Court was right in reviewing its order. In that factual backdrop, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for the second time. The ratio therein, as stated above, has no application to the facts in this case. 14. The question was whether the High Court was right in reviewing its order. In that factual backdrop, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for the second time. The ratio therein, as stated above, has no application to the facts in this case. 14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for a decision on merits after consideration of the evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. Since the High Court has left the matter to be considered by the Magistrate, it would be inappropriate at this stage to go into that question. We have only considered the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of the revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 397(3) and the inherent powers. We do not find any justification warranting interference in the appeal.” 14. This position was reiterated in Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, (2001) 8 SCC 522 , wherein it was held: “…though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously, particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. It was further held, “Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code.” 15. A similar view was taken in Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation, (2005) 2 SCC 571 , and it was held: “5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan [ (1999) 6 SCC 326 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118 ] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is a serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of the law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court.” 16. This position was reiterated in Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto , (2009) 3 SCC 310 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 8: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 292 , wherein it was observed: - “24. This position was reiterated in Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto , (2009) 3 SCC 310 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 8: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 292 , wherein it was observed: - “24. It is well settled that the object of the introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 397 was to prevent a second revision to avoid frivolous litigation, but, at the same time, the doors to the High Court to a litigant who had lost before the Sessions Judge were not completely closed and in special cases, the bar under Section 397(3) could be lifted. In other words, the power of the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482, was not subject to the prohibition under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code and was capable of being invoked in appropriate cases. Mr Sanyal's contention that there was a complete bar under Section 397(3) of the Code debarring the High Court from entertaining an application under Section 482 thereof does not, therefore, commend itself to us. 25. On the factual aspect, the Magistrate came to a that the appellants were entitled to possession of the disputed plot. It is true that while making such declaration under Section 145(4) of the Code, the Magistrate could have also directed that the appellants be put in possession of the same. 26. The question which is now required to be considered is whether the High Court was right in quashing the order passed by the Magistrate, which was confirmed by the Sessions Judge, on the ground that the application made by the appellants under Section 145(6) of the Code was barred firstly by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and also by virtue of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 17. Delhi High Court also took a similar view in Surender Kumar Jain v. State, ILR (2012) 3 Del 99 and held: — “5. The issue regarding the filing of a petition before the High Court after having availed the first revision petition before the Court of Sessions has come up before the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar of the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 82 (sic) Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar of the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 82 (sic) Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. But, that power was to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, particularly, when the person approaching the High Court has already availed remedy of first revision in the Sessions Court. This was not that in every case the person aggrieved of the order of the first revision court would have the right to be heard by the High Court to assail the same order which was the subject matter of the revision before Sessions Court. It all depends not only on the facts and circumstances of each case but as on whether the impugned order brought about a situation that is an abuse of the process of the court, there was a serious miscarriage of justice or the mandatory provisions of law were not complied with. The power could also be exercised by this Court if there was an apparent mistake committed by the revisional court. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limave v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 , State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal, (1979) 2 SCC 305 : AIR 1979 SC 87 , Rai Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) 1980 Cri LJ 202, Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation (2005) 2 SCC 571 .” 18. Therefore, the Court cannot exercise a revisional power, however, if a serious miscarriage of justice had taken place or a mandatory provision of law was not complied with, the Court can rectify the same while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 19. Section 125 of Cr.P.C. deals with the grant of maintenance to the parents, wives and children. It reads as under: 125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. Section 125 of Cr.P.C. deals with the grant of maintenance to the parents, wives and children. It reads as under: 125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. (1) If any person having sufÏcient means neglects or refuses to maintain— (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate as such Magistrate thinks fit and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: 20. It is apparent from the Section that it provides for maintenance to a minor child. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Abhilasha (supra) that a Family Court may have jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as well as Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 to grant maintenance and it can award maintenance to a major daughter under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions & Maintenance Act, 1956. However, a Magistrate can only award maintenance to a minor daughter. It was observed at page 118:- “34. There may be a case where the Family Court has jurisdiction to decide a case under Section 125CrPC as well as the suit under Section 20 of the 1956 Act, in such eventuality, the Family Court can exercise jurisdiction under both the Acts and in an appropriate case can grant maintenance to unmarried daughter even though she has become major enforcing her right under Section 20 of the 1956 Act so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings as observed by this Court in Jagdish Jugtawat [Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manju Lata, (2002) 5 SCC 422 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1147] . However, the Magistrate in the exercise of powers under Section 125CrPC cannot pass such an order. 35. However, the Magistrate in the exercise of powers under Section 125CrPC cannot pass such an order. 35. In the case before us, the application was filed under Section 125CrPC before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rewari who passed the order dated 16-2-2011. The Magistrate while deciding proceedings under Section 125CrPC could not have exercised the jurisdiction under Section 20(3) of the 1956 Act and the submission of the appellant cannot be accepted that the court below should have allowed the application for maintenance even though she has become major. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class as well as the learned Additional Magistrate in not granting maintenance to the appellant who had become major.” (Emphasis supplied) 21. Therefore, in view of the binding precedent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, learned Courts below had rightly held that a Magistrate cannot award maintenance to a major married daughter under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Since the matter is authoritatively concluded by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, therefore, the judgments of other High Courts taking a contrary view cannot be followed. 22. It was submitted that the learned Magistrate erred in granting the maintenance to applicant No.2 from the date of the order and the maintenance should have been granted from the date of filing the application. This submission is not acceptable. Learned Revisional Court had rightly noticed that an order of interim maintenance was passed in favour of applicant No.2. Therefore, she was getting the maintenance during the pendency of the proceedings and the learned Magistrate cannot be faulted for passing the order of maintenance from the date of the order. 23. No other point was urged. 24. Hence, the orders passed by learned Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 25. Records of learned Courts below be transmitted forthwith.