JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 09.06.2009 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Una, (learned Trial Court), vide which the appellants (accused before learned Trial Court) were convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 of Indian Penal Code ( IPC ). They were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three years, pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each and in default of payment of the fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for two months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC . They were sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of the fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC . (For convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC . It was asserted that the informant-Prem Chand (PW1) is the father of the victim-Trishla Devi. She was married to accused Daizy @ Vishal in the year 2006 as per Hindu Rites and Customs. Accused Daizy and his family members started harassing Trishla soon after her marriage for not bringing sufficient dowry and a vehicle. The informant had provided the dowry as per his capacity. The accused also gave beatings to Trishla in her matrimonial home. She was not provided the daily necessities of life. The informant made a complaint to Kamlesh Kumar, Panchayat Pardhan of his Gram Panchayat. Panchayat Pradhan accompanied the informant to the matrimonial home of Trishla Devi. Pardhan counselled the accused. The accused admitted their fault and undertook to maintain the deceased properly, however, Vishal Kumar, Sudesh Kumari and Baikunth Lal continued to harass the victim. The victim committed suicide due to the harassment of the accused. 3. The police were informed about the death of Trishla Devi. An entry (Ext. PW9/A) was recorded in the police station. SI/SHO Kapur Chand (PW13), HHC Amrik Singh, Constable Joginder Kumar and HHC Balbir Singh went to the spot for verification of the information. The victim committed suicide due to the harassment of the accused. 3. The police were informed about the death of Trishla Devi. An entry (Ext. PW9/A) was recorded in the police station. SI/SHO Kapur Chand (PW13), HHC Amrik Singh, Constable Joginder Kumar and HHC Balbir Singh went to the spot for verification of the information. SI Kapur Chand prepared the site plan (Ext. PW13/A). He conducted the inquest on the dead body and issued the reports (Ext. PW5/B and PW5/C). He filed an application (Ext. PW5/A) for conducting the post-mortem examination of Trishla Devi. Dr Shiv Pal Singh (PW5) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased and found that there was no external mark of injury on the body. He preserved the viscera and handed it over to the police official accompanying the dead body. He reserved his final report which was to be given after the receipt of the chemical examiner’s report. 4. The viscera were sent to FSL, Junga for analysis. The result of the analysis (Ext. PW5/D) was issued stating that phosphine gas was detected in the contents of the viscera. Final Report (Ext. PW5/E) was issued by Dr Shiv Pal Singh stating that the cause of death was phosphide poisoning leading to cardio-respiratory failure and death. 5. The statements of the remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class-II, who committed it to learned Sessions Judge, Una who assigned it to learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Una (learned Trial Court) for trial. 6. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 306 read with Section 34 of IPC to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 7. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Prem Chand (PW1) is the informant and father of the deceased. Kamlesh Kumari (PW2) is the Pardhan, who accompanied the informant to counsel the accused. Santosh Kumari (PW3) is the mother, Yudhvir Singh (PW4) is the brother and Usha Devi (PW8) is the aunt of the deceased. Dr. Shiv Pal Singh (PW5) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Ravinder Joshi (PW6) was the up-Pradhan and Madhu Bala (PW7) was the ward member of Gram Panchayat to whom the complaints of harassment were made. Santosh Kumari (PW3) is the mother, Yudhvir Singh (PW4) is the brother and Usha Devi (PW8) is the aunt of the deceased. Dr. Shiv Pal Singh (PW5) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Ravinder Joshi (PW6) was the up-Pradhan and Madhu Bala (PW7) was the ward member of Gram Panchayat to whom the complaints of harassment were made. HHC Ram Lal (PW9) proved the entry in the daily diary. C-Joginder Kumar (PW10) carried the viscera to FSL Junga. HC Ramesh Chand (PW11) was working as MHC with whom the viscera was deposited. ASI Bakhtawar Singh (PW13) signed the FIR. SI Kapur Chand (PW13) conducted the investigation. 8. The accused-Vishal Kumar in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. admitted the marriage between him and the deceased. He denied the rest of the prosecution case. He stated that a false FIR was lodged against him. He never demanded any dowry from the deceased or maltreated her. The deceased was short-tampered and hyper-sensitive. He was present in the shop since 8:00 pm and reached home after receiving the information regarding the closure of the room from inside. Accused Sudesh Kumari also admitted the relationship between Vishal and the deceased. She claimed that she had left the house at 6:30 am to do her duty in the school as a Peon. She returned at 4:00 pm on the date of the incident. Accused Baikunt Lal also admitted the relationship between accused Vishal and the deceased. He stated that he never demanded any dowry nor did he maltreat the deceased. The deceased was short-tampered and hyper-sensitive. The statements of Dr. Jagdishwar Kanwar (DW1) and Seema Rani (DW2) were recorded in defence. 9. The learned Trial Court held that the relationship between the deceased and the accused was not disputed. It was also not disputed that the victim had committed suicide within seven years of her marriage. There was sufficient evidence that the accused were harassing the deceased for dowry. A presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act arises in these circumstances. The defence of the accused was not probable; hence, the accused were convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 10. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused have preferred the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The defence of the accused was not probable; hence, the accused were convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. 10. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused have preferred the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The ingredients of the offence were not established on the record. The prosecution relied upon the statements of interested witnesses who wanted to get the accused punished. No independent person supported the prosecution case. Learned Trial Court relied upon assumptions and presumptions to record the conviction. Learned Trial Court had not granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused; hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 11. I have heard Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants/accused and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 12. Mr. Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants/accused submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There was no satisfactory evidence regarding the beating of the deceased. The deceased was not taken to the Medical Officer to get her treated and this conduct falsifies the version of the prosecution witnesses regarding the beatings. There were various discrepancies in the statements of prosecution witnesses. The conduct of the informant was unnatural because he had not made a report to the police and had gone to his home after seeing the dead body of the victim. No complaint of harassment was ever made to Pardhan by the deceased and the complaints were made by the relatives of the deceased. The statements of the relatives are hearsay and cannot be used to convict the accused. No complaint of harassment was ever made to Pardhan by the deceased and the complaints were made by the relatives of the deceased. The statements of the relatives are hearsay and cannot be used to convict the accused. He relied upon the judgments in State of H.P. v. Nikku Ram , (1995) 6 SCC 219 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1090, State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal , (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107 : 1993 SCC OnLine SC 273, State of Maharashtra v. Ashok Chotelal Shukla, (1997) 11 SCC 26 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1186, Rang Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 3 SCC 454 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 703 : 2000 SCC OnLine SC 521, Bodhraj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 201 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 814, Chanchal Kumari v. UT, Chandigarh, 1985 SCC OnLine SC 368 : AIR 1986 SC 752, Rajbabu v. State of M.P., (2008) 17 SCC 526 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 572 : 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1129, Atmaram v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 12 SCC 286 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 85 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 133, Bhola Ram v. State of Punjab, (2013) 16 SCC 421 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 290 : 2013 SCC OnLine SC 994, State of M.P. v. Shriram, (2019) 14 SCC 430 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 379 : 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1885, Gurjit Singh v. State of punjab, (2020) 14 SCC 264 : (2020) 4 SCC (cri) 758 : 2019 SCC online SC 1516, Suresh Kumar And Another vs. State of H.P. Cr. Appeal No. 471 of 2010 d ecided on 21- 08-2024 and State of H.P. vs. Hem Raj, 2024 STPL 7674 HP, 2024 STPL(Web) 222 HP = 2024 HHC 3024, in support of his submission. 13. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that it was duly proved that the accused used to beat the deceased and the deceased was left with no option but to commit suicide. Any act which endangers the safety of the victim or compels her to commit suicide would constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of IPC . He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aluri Venkata Ramana vs. Aluri Thirupathi Rao and Ors. (12.12.2024 - SC Order): MANU/SCOR/151680/2024 , in support of his submission. Any act which endangers the safety of the victim or compels her to commit suicide would constitute cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of IPC . He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aluri Venkata Ramana vs. Aluri Thirupathi Rao and Ors. (12.12.2024 - SC Order): MANU/SCOR/151680/2024 , in support of his submission. 14. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 15. The informant (PW1) stated that his daughter was married to accused Daizy Kumar @ Vishal on 07.05.2006. She resided normally in her matrimonial home for about four months after her marriage. Accused Daizy Kumar @ Vishal, Sudesh Devi and Baikunth Lal started harassing her thereafter for bringing insufficient dowry and not providing a vehicle. The deceased used to tell these facts to him on her visit to her parental home. The informant and his family members used to console her by saying that the situation would normalize with time. Trishla Devi told her brother Yudhvir six months before her death that she was beaten by accused Baikunth Lal and her arm was injured. Yudhvir went to the matrimonial home of Trishla Devi and brought her to her parental home. The informant and his family members approached Pradhan Kamlesh Kumari. Ravi Kumar (Up-Pardhan) was also present with Pradhan. The incident of maltreatment was narrated to them. Pradhan accompanied the informant and his wife to the house of the deceased. The accused could not provide any explanation for the injury sustained by the deceased. They tendered an apology and assured not to commit such acts in the future. The informant and his family members returned to Chandpur. The accused did not mend their behaviour and they continued to harass and maltreat the deceased. The deceased committed suicide subsequently due to the harassment. Her dead body was found on the floor beside the bed. The informant was told after half an hour that the dead body was brought to the police station Haroli. He, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan and other villagers went to the Police Station where his statement (Ext. PW1/A) was recorded. 16. It was submitted that the informant’s behaviour was unnatural. He saw the dead body of the deceased and returned to his home. He should have made a complaint to the police immediately after seeing the dead body of his daughter. He, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan and other villagers went to the Police Station where his statement (Ext. PW1/A) was recorded. 16. It was submitted that the informant’s behaviour was unnatural. He saw the dead body of the deceased and returned to his home. He should have made a complaint to the police immediately after seeing the dead body of his daughter. This behaviour is sufficient to discard his testimony. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Hardam Singh, (2003) 12 SCC 679 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 834: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1048 , that there is no rule of natural reaction and the reaction of a witness cannot be predicted. It was observed: - “4… .Before we advert further, we may at this stage point out that by now it is a well-settled principle of law that there is no set rule of natural reaction. Everyone reacts in his own special way and in what way the witness should react cannot be predicted. In Rana Partap v. State of Haryana [(1983) 3 SCC 327: 1983 SCC (Cri) 601 ] in paragraph 6 it was pointed out as under: (SCC p. 330) “6. Yet another reason given by the learned Sessions Judge to doubt the presence of the witnesses was that their conduct in not going to the rescue of the deceased when he was in the clutches of the assailants was unnatural. We must say that the comment is most unreal. Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Everyone reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way.” This Court in Bachittar Singh v. State of Punjab [(2002) 8 SCC 125: 2003 SCC (Cri) 233] on human behaviour, held as under: (SCC p. 135, para 12) “12. Human behaviour varies from man to man. Human behaviour varies from man to man. Different people behave and react differently in different situations. Human behaviour depends upon the facts and circumstances of each given case. How a man would behave in a particular situation, can never be predicted. In the given circumstances, the behaviour of Joginder Singh, PW 3 sleeping on the roof of the house of Sukhwant Singh, after seeing the accused armed with weapons and hearing the firing, jumping from the roof and running towards his Village Mastewala to inform his father and family members instead of loitering around in the Village Dholewala and informing somebody risking his life, is quite natural. One should not forget that the incident had happened at 1.00 a.m. and that at that odd time, nobody would be readily available to be informed without loss of time. In the process, the life of the witness would be at great risk.” 17. It was held in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1021 that different persons react differently to circumstances and uniform behaviour should not be expected. It was observed at page 150: “32. The Single Judge has termed a person who decided to commit suicide a “weakling” and has also made observations on how the behaviour of the deceased before he committed suicide was not that of a person who is depressed and suffering from mental health issues. Behavioural scientists have initiated the discourse on the heterogeneity of every individual and have challenged the traditional notion of “all humans behave alike”. Individual personality differences manifest as a variation in the behaviour of people. Therefore, how an individual copes up with a threat—both physical and emotional, expressing (or refraining to express) love, loss, sorrow and happiness, varies greatly in view of the multi-faceted nature of the human mind and emotions. Thus, the observations describing the manner in which a depressed person ought to have behaved deeply diminishes the gravity of mental health issues”. 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sk. Bilal v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1319 that testimony of a person cannot be discarded on the ground that he had failed to react in a particular manner. It was observed: “11. 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sk. Bilal v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1319 that testimony of a person cannot be discarded on the ground that he had failed to react in a particular manner. It was observed: “11. In Shivasharanappa v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 5 SCC 705 this Court relying on the following judgments observed as follows: “19. In Gopal Singh v. State of M.P. [ (2010) 6 SCC 407 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 150] this Court did not agree with the High Court which had accepted the statement of an alleged eyewitness as his conduct was unnatural and while so holding, it observed as follows: (SCC p. 413, para 25) “25. We also find that the High Court has accepted the statement of Feran Singh, PW 5 as the eyewitness of the incident ignoring the fact that his behaviour was unnatural as he claimed to have rushed to the village but had still not conveyed the information about the incident to his parents and others present there and had chosen to disappear for a couple of hours on the specious and unacceptable plea that he feared for his own safety.” 20. In Rana Partap v. State of Haryana [(1983) 3 SCC 327: 1983 SCC (Cri) 601], while dealing with the behaviour of the witnesses, this Court has opined thus: (SCC p. 330, para 6) “6. … Every person who witnesses a murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Everyone reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way.” 21. In State of H.P. v. Mast Ram [ (2004) 8 SCC 660 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1165] it has been stated that there is no set rule that one must react in a particular way, for the natural reaction of man is unpredictable. In State of H.P. v. Mast Ram [ (2004) 8 SCC 660 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1165] it has been stated that there is no set rule that one must react in a particular way, for the natural reaction of man is unpredictable. Everyone reacts in his own way and, hence, natural human behaviour is difficult to prove with credible evidence. It has to be appreciated in the context of given facts and circumstances of the case. A similar view has been reiterated in Lahu Kamlakar Patil v. State of Maharashtra [ (2013) 6 SCC 417 : (2012) 12 Scale 710] 22. Thus, the behaviour of the witnesses or their reactions would differ from situation to situation and individual to individual. The expectation of uniformity in the reaction of witnesses would be unrealistic but the court cannot be oblivious to the fact that even taking into account the unpredictability of human conduct and lack of uniformity in human reaction, whether, in the circumstances of the case, the behaviour is acceptably natural allowing the variations. If the behaviour is absolutely unnatural, the testimony of the witness may not deserve credence and acceptance.” 19. In the present case, the informant stated in his cross- examination that he went into shock after seeing the dead body of the deceased, which is highly probable; hence, his behaviour cannot be used to discard his testimony. 20. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness that the deceased was injured is not acceptable in the absence of the evidence of the Medical Officer. This submission is also not acceptable. The informant stated in his cross-examination that the deceased was got treated at a private hospital. He admitted that deceased had been treated by Jeet Kumar of village Jatpur, who is not a doctor but a quack. He also admitted that Jeet Ram is not running a shop. Therefore, the informant has stated that the deceased was not treated at a hospital but by a quack. The informant was working as a T-mate and if he had approached Quack instead of the hospital, he could not be faulted. Thus, the absence of a medical record regarding the injury sustained by the deceased is not sufficient to discard his testimony that the deceased has suffered an injury on her arm. 21. His version regarding the injury is supported by Kamlesh Kumari (PW2) Pradhan. Thus, the absence of a medical record regarding the injury sustained by the deceased is not sufficient to discard his testimony that the deceased has suffered an injury on her arm. 21. His version regarding the injury is supported by Kamlesh Kumari (PW2) Pradhan. She stated that six months before the death of Trishla Devi, her parents came to her house and told her that the accused had ill-treated Trishla Kumari and she had sustained injuries on her arm due to the beatings given to her. She visited the house of the accused to counsel them. She is Pradhan and an independent person and there is no reason to disbelieve her statement. She categorically stated that Trishla Kumari had sustained injuries on her arm which corroborates the informant’s version. 22. A similar statement was made by Ravinder Joshi (PW6) Up-Pradhan of Gram Panchayat. He stated that he was sitting in the office of Gram Panchayat with Smt. Kamlesh Kumari, Pradhan. The informant and his wife visited the panchayat and told them about the maltreatment of the deceased. They went to the house of Prem Chand to see Trishla Kumari and found that her arm was injured and tied. He is the Up-Pradhan of Gram Panchayat. It was suggested to him in his cross-examination that he had good relations with the family of Prem Chand and that is why he was deposing falsely. This suggestion was denied by him and a denied suggestion does not amount to any proof. Therefore, his testimony cannot be discarded due to denied suggestion. 23. He was contradicted with his previous statement marked by portions A to A and he denied the same. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness is not reliable because of contradiction. This submission cannot be accepted. 24. Proviso to Section 162 of Cr.P.C. permits the use of the statement recorded by the police to contradict a witness. 23. He was contradicted with his previous statement marked by portions A to A and he denied the same. It was submitted that the testimony of this witness is not reliable because of contradiction. This submission cannot be accepted. 24. Proviso to Section 162 of Cr.P.C. permits the use of the statement recorded by the police to contradict a witness. It reads: Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. 25. Thus, it is apparent that the defence can use the statement to contradict a witness if the statement is proved. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court about a century ago in Emperor vs. Vithu Balu Kharat (1924) 26 Bom. L.R. 965 that the previous statement has to be proved before it can be used. It was observed: “The words "if duly proved" in my opinion, clearly show that the record of the statement cannot be admitted in evidence straightaway but that the officer before whom the statement was made should ordinarily be examined as to any alleged statement or omitted statement that is relied upon by the accused for the purpose of contradicting the witness; and the provisions of Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act apply to this case, as well as to any other similar ease. Of course, I do not mean to say that, if the particular police officer who recorded the statement is not available, other means of proving the statement may not be availed of, e.g., evidence that the statement is in the handwriting of that particular officer.” 26. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu Naicker and Others, etc. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu Naicker and Others, etc. Versus State of T.N., (1978) 4 SCC 385 that if the witness affirms the previous statement, no proof is necessary, but if the witness denies or says that he did not remember the previous statement, the investigating officer should be asked about the same. It was observed: - “52. This is the most objectionable manner of using the police statement and we must record our emphatic disapproval of the same. The question should have been framed in a manner to point out that from amongst those accused mentioned in examination-in-chief there were some whose names were not mentioned in the police statement and if the witness affirms this no further proof is necessary and if the witness denies or says that she does not remember, the investigation officer should have been questioned about it.” 27. The Gauhati High Court held in Md. Badaruddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, 1989 SCC OnLine Gau 35: 1989 Cri LJ 1876 that if the witness denies having made the statement, the portion marked by the defence should be put to the investigating officer and his version should be elicited regarding the same. It was observed at page 1880: - “ 13. The learned defence counsel has drawn our attention to the above statement of the Investigating Officer and submits that P.W. 4 never made his above statement before the police and that the same being his improved version cannot be relied upon. With the utmost respect to the learned defence counsel, we are unable to accept his above contention. Because, unless the particular matter or point in the previous statement sought to be contradicted is placed before the witness for explanation, the previous statement cannot be used in evidence. In other words, drawing the attention of the witness to his previous statement sought to be contradicted and giving all opportunities to him for explanation are compulsory. If any authority is to be cited on this point, we may conveniently refer to the case of Pangi Jogi Naik v. State reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 205: (1965 (2) Cri LJ 661). If any authority is to be cited on this point, we may conveniently refer to the case of Pangi Jogi Naik v. State reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 205: (1965 (2) Cri LJ 661). Further in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012 : (1959 Cri LJ 1231) it was also held that the statement not reduced to writing cannot be contradicted and, therefore, in order to show that the statement sought to be contradicted: was recorded by the police, it should be marked and exhibited. However, in the case at hand, there is nothing on the record to show that the previous statement of the witness was placed before him and that the witness was given the chance for explanation. Again, his previous statement was not marked and exhibited. Therefore, his previous statement before the police cannot be used, Hence, his evidence that when he turned back, he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering, the gun from the chest is to be taken as his correct version. 14. The learned defence counsel has attempted to persuade us not to rely on the evidence of this witness on the ground that his evidence before the trial Court is contradicted by his previous statement made before the police. However, in view of the decisions made in the said cases we have been persuaded irresistibly to hold that the correct procedure to be followed which would be in conformity with S. 145 of the Evidence Act to contradict the evidence given by the prosecution witness at the trial with a statement made by him before the police during the investigation will be to draw the attention of the witness to that part of the contradictory statement which he made before the police, and questioned him whether he did, in fact, make that statement. If the witness admits having made the particular statement to the police, that admission will go into evidence and will be recorded as part of the evidence of the witness and can be relied on by the accused as establishing the contradiction. However, if, on the other hand, the witness denies to have made such a statement before the police, the particular portions of the statement recorded should be provisionally marked for identification as B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2 etc. However, if, on the other hand, the witness denies to have made such a statement before the police, the particular portions of the statement recorded should be provisionally marked for identification as B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2 etc. (any identification mark) and when the investigating officer who had actually recorded the statements in question comes into the witness box, he should be questioned as to whether these particular statements had been made to him during the investigation by the particular witness, and obviously after refreshing his memory from the case diary the investigating officer would make his answer in the affirmative. The answer of the Investigating Officer would prove the statements B-1 to B-1, B-2 to B-2 which are then exhibited as Ext. D. 1, Ext. D. 2 etc. (exhibition mark) in the case and will go into evidence, and may, thereafter, be relied on by the accused as contradictions. In the case in hand, as was discussed above, the above procedure was not followed while cross-examining the witness to his previous statements, and, therefore, we have no alternative but to accept the statement given by this witness before the trial Court that he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his chest to be his correct version.” 28. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Shaik Subhani v. State of A.P., 1999 SCC OnLine AP 413: (1999) 5 ALD 284 : 2000 Cri LJ 321: (1999) 2 ALT (Cri) 208 that putting a suggestion to the witness and the witness denying the same does not amount to putting the contradiction to the witness. The attention of the witness has to be drawn to the previous statement, and if he denies it, the statement is to be proved by the investigating officer. It was observed at page 290: - “ 24… As far as contradictions put by the defence are concerned, we would like to say that the defence Counsel did not put the contradictions in the manner in which it ought to have been put. By putting suggestions to the witness and the witness denying the same will not amount to putting contradiction to the witness. The contradiction has to be put to the witness as contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. By putting suggestions to the witness and the witness denying the same will not amount to putting contradiction to the witness. The contradiction has to be put to the witness as contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. If a contradiction is put to the witness and it is denied by him, then his attention has to be drawn to the statement made by such witness before the Police or any other previous statement and he must be given a reasonable opportunity to explain as to why such contradiction appears and he may give any answer if the statement made by him is shown to him and if he confronted with such a statement and thereafter the said contradiction must be proved through the Investigation Officer. Then only it amounts to putting the contradiction to the witness and getting it proved through the Investigation Officer.” 29. The Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Anjan Ganguly v. State of West Bengal, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22948: (2013) 2 Cal LJ 144: (2013) 3 Cal LT 193: (2013) 128 AIC 546: (2014) 2 RCR (Cri) 970: (2013) 3 DMC 760 and held at page 151: - “21. It was held in State of Karnataka v. Bhaskar Kushali Kothakar, reported as (2004) 7 SCC 487 that if any statement of the witness is contrary to the previous statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. or suffers from omission of certain material particulars, then the previous statement can be proved by examining the Investigating Officer who had recorded the same. Thus, there is no doubt that for proving the previous statement Investigating Officer ought to be examined, and the statement of the witness recorded by him, can only be proved by him and he has to depose to the extent that he had correctly recorded the statement, without adding or omitting, as to what was stated by the witness. 23. Proviso to Section 162(1), Cr.P.C. states in clear terms that the statement of the witness ought to be duly proved. The words if duly proved, cast a duty upon the accused who wants to highlight the contradictions by confronting the witness to prove the previous statement of a witness through the police officer who has recorded the same in the ordinary way. If the witness in the cross-examination admits contradictions, then there is no need to prove the statement. The words if duly proved, cast a duty upon the accused who wants to highlight the contradictions by confronting the witness to prove the previous statement of a witness through the police officer who has recorded the same in the ordinary way. If the witness in the cross-examination admits contradictions, then there is no need to prove the statement. But if the witness denies a contradiction and the police officer who had recorded the statement is called by the prosecution, the previous statement of the witness on this point may be proved by the police officer. In case the prosecution fails to call the police officer in a given situation Court can call this witness or the accused can call the police officer to give evidence in defence. There is no doubt that unless the statement as per proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 162, Cr.P.C. is duly proved, the contradiction in terms of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be taken into consideration by the Court. 24. To elaborate on this further, it will be necessary to reproduce Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. “S. 145. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” 25. Therefore, it is appropriate that before the previous statement or statement under Section, 161, Cr.P.C. is proved, the attention of the witness must be drawn to the portion in the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer to bring to light the contradiction, a process called confrontation. 26. Let us first understand what is proper procedure. A witness may have stated in the statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. that ‘X murdered Y’. In Court witness state ‘Z murdered Y’. This is a contradiction. Defence Counsel or Court and even prosecution if the witness is declared hostile having resiled from previous statement, is to be confronted to bring contradiction on record. The attention of the witness must be drawn to the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. where it was stated that ‘X murdered Y’. This is a contradiction. Defence Counsel or Court and even prosecution if the witness is declared hostile having resiled from previous statement, is to be confronted to bring contradiction on record. The attention of the witness must be drawn to the previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. where it was stated that ‘X murdered Y’. Since Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act uses the word being proved, therefore, in the course of examination of the witness, previous statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will not be exhibited but shall be assigned a mark, and the portion contradicted will be specified. The trial Court in the event of contradiction has to record as under. 27. The attention of the witness has been drawn to portions A to A of statement marked as 1, and confronted with the portion where it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this manner by way of confrontation contradiction is brought on record. Later, when the Investigating Officer is examined, the prosecution or defence may prove the statement, after the Investigating Officer testifies that the statement assigned mark was correctly recorded by him at that stage statement will be exhibited by the Court. Then contradiction will be proved by the Investigating Officer by stating that the witness had informed or told him that ‘X murdered Y’ and he had correctly recorded this fact. 28. Now a reference to the explanation to Section 162, Cr.P.C. which says that an omission to state a fact or circumstance may amount to contradiction. Say for instance if a witness omits to state in Court that ‘X murdered Y’, what he had stated in a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will be material? Contradiction, for the Public Prosecutor, as the witness has resiled from the previous statement, or if he has been sent for trial for the charge of murder, omission to state ‘X murdered Y’ will be a material omission, and amount to contradiction so far defence of ‘W is concerned. At that stage also attention of the witness will be drawn to a significant portion of the statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. which the witness had omitted to state and note shall be given that attention of the witness was drawn to the portion A to A wherein it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this way, the omission is brought on record. In this way, the omission is brought on record. The rest of the procedure stated earlier qua confrontation shall be followed to prove the statement of the witness and the fact stated by the witness. 29. Therefore, to prove the statement for the purpose of contradiction it is necessary that the contradiction or omission must be brought to the notice of the witness. His or her attention must be drawn to the portion of the previous statement (in the present case statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C.)” 30. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 760 wherein it was observed: “7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the Court which is inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162 CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross-examination. 8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus: “145. 8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162, the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads thus: “145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing .—A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.” The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing without such writing being shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross-examined by asking whether his prior statement exists. The second part is regarding contradicting a witness. While confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior statement. If there is a contradiction between the statement made by the witness before the Court and what is recorded in the statement recorded by the police, the witness's attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior statement, which are to be used to contradict him. Section 145 provides that the relevant part can be put to the witness without the writing being proved. However, the previous statement used to contradict witnesses must be proved subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of his previous statement is proved the contradictions can be said to be proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part shown to the witness of his prior statement produced on record. Marking is done differently in different States. In some States, practice is to mark the beginning of the portion shown to the witness with an alphabet and the end by marking with the same alphabet. While recording the cross-examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-examination. If the witness admits to having made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the cross-examination. If the witness admits to having made such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as proved. If the witness does not admit the portion of his prior statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the witness made a statement that was shown to the witness. Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with his prior statement reduced into writing, that particular part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if the witness admits to having made such a statement, or it can be proved in the cross- examination of the concerned police officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145 of the Evidence Act of confronting the witness by showing him the relevant part of his prior statement is to give the witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore, this is a rule of fairness. 9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which reads thus: “ 155. Impeaching credit of witness. — The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him— (1) ….…………………………………… (2) ……………………………………… (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.” It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission is not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve his/her testimony. A minor or trifle omission or contradiction brought on record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material contradiction or omission depending upon the facts of each case? A minor or trifle omission or contradiction brought on record is not sufficient to disbelieve the witness's version. Only when there is a material contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material contradiction or omission depending upon the facts of each case? Whether an omission is a contradiction also depends on the facts of each individual case. 10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P . 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875 Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus: “13. The learned counsel's first argument is based upon the words “in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all relevant questions to a witness before his attention is called to those parts of the writing with a view to contradict him. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514: 1952 SCR 812 ]. Bose, J. describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act thus at p. 819: Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if the witness denies that he made the former statement. In that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did, and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then Section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn to these parts which are to be used for contradiction. But that position does not arise when the witness admits the former statement. In such a case all that is necessary is to look to the former statement of which no further proof is necessary because of the admission that it was made.” It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a similar procedure is suggested for putting questions under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said decision of this Court and similar decisions were not considering the procedure in a case where the statement in writing was intended to be used for contradiction under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to a previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him; the second part deals with a situation where the cross-examination assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross-examination other than by way of contradiction, and the second with cross-examination by way of contradiction only. The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross- examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked “Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers “yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked “Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers “yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies: one is it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross-examination what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the illustration given by the learned counsel for the appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness box, for the witness has yet not made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually made before him. In such a case the question could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added) This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to guide our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned Trial Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' prior statements based on which they were sought to be contradicted in the cross-examination.” 31. The statement was never got proved from SI-Kapoor Chand (PW13) and the contradiction has not been proved. Hence, the testimony of this witness cannot be discarded because he was confronted with his previous statement. 32. The statement was never got proved from SI-Kapoor Chand (PW13) and the contradiction has not been proved. Hence, the testimony of this witness cannot be discarded because he was confronted with his previous statement. 32. Informant Prem Chand stated in his cross- examination that Trishla was 7 th pass and accused Daizy was 9 th pass. The accused runs a shop in village Samnal and Sandesh Kumari is working as a peon in Government School at Gondpur Jaichand. He admitted that no complaint was made to the police against the accused persons regarding the harassment or dowry demand. No complaint was made regarding the injuries inflicted on the arm of the deceased. They had also not approached Gram Panchayat, Haroli regarding the maltreatment given to the deceased. 33. It was submitted that the failure to report the maltreatment to the police or the Gram Panchayat, Haroli will make his testimony suspect. This submission cannot be accepted. The informant had made a complaint to the Pradhan of his Gram Panchayat who had visited the house of the accused and the accused had assured to treat the deceased properly. Therefore, the informant was justified in not reporting the matter to the police or Gram Panchayat, Haroli. 34. Madhu Bala (PW7) stated that the deceased and her mother had approached her regarding the maltreatment. She advised them to go to the Pradhan. Madhu Bala is the ward member of the Panchayat where the informant is residing. Her statement clearly shows that the deceased and her mother had made a complaint to the ward member, thus, the failure to report the matter to the police or the gram panchayat of the accused is not significant. 35. Usha Devi (PW8) stated that the informant used to meet her and tell her that she was being maltreated by the accused. She (Usha Devi) used to counsel the deceased by saying that the married daughter has to live in the house of her husband and everything settles down with time. Her statement shows that the deceased had made complaints to her but she had not taken any action rather she had asked the deceased to reside in her matrimonial home because a married daughter has to live in the house of her husband. In such circumstances, the deceased cannot be faulted for resigning to her fate. 36. Her statement shows that the deceased had made complaints to her but she had not taken any action rather she had asked the deceased to reside in her matrimonial home because a married daughter has to live in the house of her husband. In such circumstances, the deceased cannot be faulted for resigning to her fate. 36. The informant stated in his cross-examination that the deceased used to pay the visit to her parental home once in three or four months. She used to come in the morning and return in the evening. He admitted that the deceased remained with him for about 40 days at the time of her delivery. He denied that the accused had visited his house with the customary articles at the time of the birth of a child. He stated that the accused and other family members did not visit the house to see the newborn child. He denied that the accused accompanied him when the deceased was taken to the hospital. He admitted that accused Daizy along with deceased Trishla had attended the marriage of his sister’s daughter at Jhalera one year before the death of Trishla. He denied that accused Daizy had attended the marriage ceremony of the informant’s brother’s daughter which took place about one and a half years before the death of Trishala Devi. He and his wife visited the matrimonial home of the deceased about four times after the marriage of Trishala. He denied that he used to take the deceased to Peer Baba at Dussara for her treatment. He denied that the deceased was short- tampered. He stated that he had not mentioned the demand for a motorcycle in his statement made to the police. 37. It was submitted that the omission to state the demand for the motorcycle would adversely affect his testimony. This submission is not acceptable. The witness was asked about what he had told the police under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. In this regard, it is to be noticed that the statement recorded under Section 161 of Cr.PC is not a substantive piece of evidence, and the statement made to the police cannot be used for any purpose except to contradict the prosecution witness as per Section 162 of Cr. PC. PC. Therefore, it is not permissible to ask a witness as to what was told by him to the police and prove the statement recorded by the police. In Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875: AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Cri LJ 1231 (six-judges bench) learned counsel for the defence asked the following questions from the witness during his cross-examination: 1. “Did you state to the investigating officer that the gang rolled the dead bodies of Nathi, Saktu and Bharat Singh, and scrutinise them and did you tell him that the face of Asa Ram resembled that of the deceased Bharat Singh?” 2. “Did you state to the investigating officer about the presence of the gas lantern?” 38. Learned Sessions Judge disallowed the questions, after holding that omission does not amount to contradiction and cannot be put under section 161 of Cr.P.C. He held: “Therefore, if there is no contradiction between his evidence in court and his recorded statement in the diary, the latter cannot be used at all. If a witness deposes in court that a certain fact existed but had stated under Section 161 CrPC either that that fact had not existed or that the reverse and irreconcilable fact had existed, it is a case of conflict between the deposition in the court and the statement under Section 161 CrPC and the latter can be used to contradict the former. But if he had not stated under Section 161 anything about the fact, there is no conflict and the statement cannot be used to contradict him. In some cases, an omission in the statement under Section 161 may amount to contradiction of the deposition in court; they are the cases where what is actually stated is irreconcilable with what is omitted and impliedly negatives its existence.” 39. A question arose before the Hon’ble Supreme Court whether the questions were wrongly disallowed. It was held that the form of the questions was defective as they elicited from the witness what he had told the police and were properly disallowed. It was observed: “13.. …… The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. It was observed: “13.. …… The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the language of the proviso if the said statement be allowed to be used for the purpose of cross- examining a witness within the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real. The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to that part of the statement made before the police which contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be illustrated thus: If the witness is asked “Did you say before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he answers “Yes”, then the statement which does not contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This procedure involves two fallacies: one is it enables the accused to elicit by a process of cross-examination what the witness stated before the police officer. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. If a police officer did not make a record of a witness's statement, his entire statement could not be used for any purpose, whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral statement could be brought on record. This procedure, therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section 162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the illustration given by the learned counsel for the appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary statement made in the witness box, for the witness has yet not made on the stand any assertion at all which can serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section, should be between what a witness asserted in the witness box and what he stated before the police officer, and not between what he said he had stated before the police officer and what he actually made before him. In such a case the question could not be put at all: only questions to contradict can be put and the question here posed does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is contradicted by the police statement. This argument of the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. xxxxxxxxx 51. It must not be overlooked that the cross-examination must be directed to bringing out a contradiction between the statements and must not subserve any other purpose. If the cross-examination does anything else, it will be barred under Section 162 which permits the use of the earlier statement for contradicting a witness and nothing else. Taking the example given above, we do not see why cross-examination may not be like this: Q. I put it to you that when you arrived on the scene X was already running away and you did not actually see him stab D as you have deposed today? A. No. I saw both events. Q. If that is so, why is your statement to the police silent as to stabbing? A. 1 stated both the facts to the police. The witness can then be contradicted with his previous statement. A. No. I saw both events. Q. If that is so, why is your statement to the police silent as to stabbing? A. 1 stated both the facts to the police. The witness can then be contradicted with his previous statement. We need hardly point out that in the illustration given by us, the evidence of the witness in court is direct evidence as opposed to testimony to a fact suggesting guilt. The statement before the police can only be called circumstantial evidence of complicity and not direct evidence in the strict sense. Of course, if the questions framed were: Q. What did you state to the police? or Q. Did you state to the police that D stabbed X? They may be ruled out as infringing Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure because they do not set up a contradiction but attempt to get a fresh version from the witnesses with a view to contradicting him. How the cross-examination can be made must obviously vary from case to case, counsel to counsel and statement to statement. No single rule can be laid down and the propriety of the question in the light of the two sections can be found only when the facts and questions are before the court. But we are of the opinion that relevant and material omissions amount to vital contradictions, which can be established by cross- examination and confronting the witness with his previous statement. xxxxxxxx 59. This brings us to the consideration of the questions, which were asked and disallowed. These were put during the cross-examination of Bankey, PW 30. They are: Q. Did you state to the investigating officer that the gang rolled the dead bodies of Nathi, Saktu and Bharat Singh and scrutinized them, and did you tell him that the face of Asa Ram resembled that of the deceased Bharat Singh? Q. Did you state to the investigating officer about the presence of the gas lantern? These questions were defective, to start with. They did not set up a contradiction but attempted to obtain from the witness a version of what he stated to the police, which is then contradicted. What is needed is to take the statement of the police as it is, and establish a contradiction between that statement and the evidence in court. These questions were defective, to start with. They did not set up a contradiction but attempted to obtain from the witness a version of what he stated to the police, which is then contradicted. What is needed is to take the statement of the police as it is, and establish a contradiction between that statement and the evidence in court. To do otherwise is to transgress the bounds set by Section 162 which, by its absolute prohibition, limits even cross-examination to contradictions and no more. The cross-examination cannot even indirectly subserve any other purpose. In the questions with which we illustrated our meaning, the witness was not asked what he stated to the police but was told what he had stated to the police and asked to explain the omission. It is to be borne in mind that the statement made to the police is “duly proved” either earlier or even later to establish what the witness had then stated.” xxxxxxxxx 60. In our opinion, the two questions were defective for the reasons given here and were properly ruled out, even though all the reasons given by the court may not stand scrutiny. The matter was not followed up with proper questions, and it seems that similar questions on these and other points were not put to the witness out of deference (as it is now suggested) to the ruling of the court. The accused can only blame themselves if they did not.” (Emphasis supplied) 40. Thus, no advantage can be derived by the defence from the admission of the witness regarding what was told by him to the police. 41. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Matadin v. State of U.P., 1980 Supp SCC 157 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 627 that the statement under Section 161 Cr.PC is not detailed and is meant to be brief. It does not contain all the details. It was observed at page 158: “ 3. The learned Sessions Judge had rejected the evidence of the eyewitnesses on wrong, unconvincing and unsound reasons. The Sessions Judge appears to have been swayed by some insignificant omissions made by some of the witnesses in their statement before the police and on the basis of these omissions dubbed the witnesses as liars. The learned Sessions Judge had rejected the evidence of the eyewitnesses on wrong, unconvincing and unsound reasons. The Sessions Judge appears to have been swayed by some insignificant omissions made by some of the witnesses in their statement before the police and on the basis of these omissions dubbed the witnesses as liars. The Sessions Judge did not realise that the statements given by the witnesses before the police were meant to be brief statements and could not take the place of evidence in the Court. Where the omissions are vital, they merit consideration, but mere small omissions will not justify a finding by a court that the witnesses concerned are self- contained liars. We have carefully perused the judgment of the Sessions Judge and we are unable to agree that the reasons that he has given for disbelieving the witnesses are good or sound reasons. The High Court was, therefore, fully justified in reversing the judgment passed by the trial court. We are satisfied that this is a case where the judgment of the Sessions Judge was manifestly wrong and perverse and was rightly set aside by the High Court. It was urged by Mr Mehta that as other appellants except Matadin and Dulare do not appear to have assaulted the deceased, so they should be acquitted of the charge under Section 149. We, however, find that all the appellants were members of the unlawful assembly. Their names find a place in the FIR. For these reasons, we are unable to find any ground to distinguish the case of those appellants from that of Matadin and Dulare. The argument of the learned counsel is overruled. The result is that the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The appellants who are on bail, will now surrender to serve out the remaining portion of their sentence.” 42. Similar is the judgment in Esher Singh v. State of A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585 : 2004 SCC OnLine SC 320 wherein it was held at page 601: “23. So far as the appeal filed by accused Esher Singh is concerned, the basic question is that even if the confessional statement purported to have been made by A-5 is kept out of consideration, whether residuary material is sufficient to find him guilty. So far as the appeal filed by accused Esher Singh is concerned, the basic question is that even if the confessional statement purported to have been made by A-5 is kept out of consideration, whether residuary material is sufficient to find him guilty. Though it is true as contended by learned counsel for the accused-appellant Esher Singh that some statements were made for the first time in court and not during the investigation, it has to be seen as to what extent they diluted the testimony of Balbeer Singh and Dayal Singh (PWs 16 and 32) used to bring home the accusations. A mere elaboration cannot be termed as a discrepancy. When the basic features are stated, unless the elaboration is of such a nature that it creates a different contour or colour of the evidence, the same cannot be said to have totally changed the complexion of the case. It is to be noted that in addition to the evidence of PWs 16 and 32, the evidence of S. Narayan Singh (PW 21) provides the necessary links and strengthens the prosecution version. We also find substance in the plea taken by learned counsel for the State that evidence of Amar Singh Bungai (PW 24) was not tainted in any way, and should not have been discarded and disbelieved only on surmises. Balbir Singh (PW 3), the son of the deceased has also stated about the provocative statements in his evidence. Darshan Singh (PW 14) has spoken about the speeches of the accused Esher Singh highlighting the Khalistan movement. We find that the trial court had not given importance to the evidence of some of the witnesses on the ground that they were relatives of the deceased. The approach is wrong. The mere relationship does not discredit the testimony of a witness. What is required is careful scrutiny of the evidence. If after careful scrutiny the evidence is found to be credible and cogent, it can be acted upon. In the instant case, the trial court did not indicate any specific reason to cast doubt on the veracity of the evidence of the witnesses whom it had described to be the relatives of the deceased. PW 24 has categorically stated about the provocative speeches by A-1. No definite cross-examination on the provocative nature of speech regarding the Khalistan movement was made, so far as this witness is concerned.” 43. PW 24 has categorically stated about the provocative speeches by A-1. No definite cross-examination on the provocative nature of speech regarding the Khalistan movement was made, so far as this witness is concerned.” 43. This position was reiterated in Shamim v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 10 SCC 509 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 319: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1559 where it was held at page 513: “ 12. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole inspires confidence. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, a hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, and attaching importance to some technical error without going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. Minor omissions in the police statements are never considered to be fatal. The statements given by the witnesses before the police are meant to be brief statements and could not take the place of evidence in the court. Small/trivial omissions would not justify a finding by the court that the witnesses concerned are liars. The prosecution evidence may suffer from inconsistencies here and discrepancies there, but that is a shortcoming from which no criminal case is free. The main thing to be seen is whether those inconsistencies go to the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects thereof. In the former case, the defence may be justified in seeking advantage of incongruities obtained in the evidence. In the latter, however, no such benefit may be available to it.” 44. Similar is the judgment in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot v. State of Gujarat, (2021) 19 SCC 555 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347 wherein it was observed at page 564: “22. In the latter, however, no such benefit may be available to it.” 44. Similar is the judgment in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot v. State of Gujarat, (2021) 19 SCC 555 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347 wherein it was observed at page 564: “22. We also do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel that there are major contradictions in the deposition of PWs 18 and 19. The contradictions which are sought to be projected are minor contradictions which cannot be the basis for discarding their evidence. The judgment of this Court in Mohar [Mohar v. State of U.P., (2002) 7 SCC 606 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 121] relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent State supports the case of the prosecution. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that convincing evidence is required, to discredit an injured witness. Para 11 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC p. 611) “11. The testimony of an injured witness has its own efficacy and relevancy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries on his body would show that he was present at the place of occurrence and had seen the occurrence by himself. Convincing evidence would be required to discredit an injured witness. Similarly, every discrepancy in the statement of a witness cannot be treated as fatal. A discrepancy which does not affect the prosecution case materially cannot create any infirmity. In the instant case, the discrepancy in the name of PW 4 appearing in the FIR and the cross- examination of PW 1 has been amply clarified. In cross- examination, PW 1 clarified that his brother Ram Awadh had three sons: (1) Jagdish, PW 4, (2) Jagarnath, and (3) Suresh. This witness, however, stated that Jagarjit had only one name. PW 2 Vibhuti, however, stated that at the time of occurrence, the son of Ram Awadh, Jagjit alias Jagarjit was milking a cow and he was also called Jagdish. Balli (PW 3) mentioned his name as Jagjit and Jagdish. PW 4 also gave his name as Jagdish.” 23. The learned counsel for the respondent State has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216] . In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that the evidence of injured witnesses cannot be brushed aside without assigning cogent reasons. The learned counsel for the respondent State has also relied on the judgment of this Court in Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216] . In the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that the evidence of injured witnesses cannot be brushed aside without assigning cogent reasons. Paras 27 and 30 of the judgment which are relevant, read as under: (SCC pp. 333-34) “27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107 ], Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [Balraje v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262] ) *** 30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental dispositions such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence. ‘9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be one of the factors to test the credibility of the prosecution version when the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.’ [ Ed. : As observed in Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 186, p. 192, para 9: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1435 Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a witness cannot be dubbed as improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the testimony of the witness liable to be discredited. (Vide State v. Saravanan [State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 580], Arumugam v. State [Arumugam v. State, (2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. [Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 11 SCC 334 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1352] and Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375] 24. Further, in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546] , this Court has considered the effect of the minor contradictions in the depositions of witnesses while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial. In the aforesaid judgment, it is held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. In the aforesaid judgment, it is held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: (SCC p. 483) “42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness.” 45. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Achchar Singh vs State of H.P. AIR 2021 SC 3426 that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded due to exaggeration alone. It was observed: “24. It is vehemently contended that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is exaggerated and thus false. Cambridge Dictionary defines "exaggeration" as "the fact of making something larger, more important, better or worse than it is". Merriam-Webster defines the term "exaggerate" as to "enlarge beyond bounds or the truth". The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as "enlarged or altered beyond normal proportions". These expressions unambiguously suggest that the genesis of an 'exaggerated statement' lies in a fact, to which fictitious additions are made to make it more penetrative. Every exaggeration, therefore, has the ingredients of 'truth'. No exaggerated statement is possible without an element of truth. On the other hand, the Advance Law Lexicon defines "false" as "erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct, or true". Oxford Concise Dictionary states that "false" is "wrong; not correct or true". Similar is the explanation in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differential between an 'exaggerated version' and a 'false version'. On the other hand, the Advance Law Lexicon defines "false" as "erroneous, untrue; opposite of correct, or true". Oxford Concise Dictionary states that "false" is "wrong; not correct or true". Similar is the explanation in other dictionaries as well. There is, thus, a marked differential between an 'exaggerated version' and a 'false version'. An exaggerated statement contains both truth and falsity, whereas a false statement has no grain of truth in it (being the 'opposite' of 'true'). It is well said that to make a mountain out of a molehill, the molehill shall have to exist primarily. A Court of law, being mindful of such distinction is duty bound to disseminate 'truth' from 'falsehood' and sift the grain from the chaff in case of exaggerations. It is only in a case where the grain and the chaff are so inextricably intertwined that in their separation no real evidence survives, that the whole evidence can be discarded. [ Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, (2003) 7 SCC 643 , 18 .] 25. Learned State counsel has rightly relied on Gangadhar Behera (Supra) to contend that even in cases where a major portion of the evidence is found deficient if the residue is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused, a conviction can be based on it. This Court in Hari Chand v. State of Delhi, (1996) 9 SCC 112 held that: "24. ...So far as this contention is concerned it must be kept in view that while appreciating the evidence of witnesses in a criminal trial, especially in a case of eyewitnesses the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus cannot apply and the court has to make efforts to sift the grain from the chaff. It is of course true that when a witness is said to have exaggerated in his evidence at the stage of trial and has tried to involve many more accused and if that part of the evidence is not found acceptable the remaining part of the evidence has to be scrutinised with care and the court must try to see whether the acceptable part of the evidence gets corroborated from other evidence on record so that the acceptable part can be safely relied upon..." 26. There is no gainsaid that homicidal deaths cannot be left to judicium dei. There is no gainsaid that homicidal deaths cannot be left to judicium dei. The Court in their quest to reach the truth ought to make earnest efforts to extract gold out of the heap of black sand. The solemn duty is to dig out the authenticity. It is only when the Court, despite its best efforts, fails to reach a firm conclusion that the benefit of the doubt is extended. 27. An eye-witness is always preferred to others. The statements of P.W.1, P.W.11 and P.W.12 are, therefore, to be analysed accordingly, while being mindful of the difference between exaggeration and falsity. We find that the truth can be effortlessly extracted from their statements. The trial Court fell in grave error and overlooked the credible and consistent evidence while proceeding with a baseless premise that the exaggerated statements made by the eyewitnesses belie their version.” 46. In the present case, the informant had specifically stated about the demand of dowry and the failure to mention the motor vehicle will not discredit his testimony. 47. The informant stated that his statement was recorded at the police station at 6:30 – 7:00 pm. SI Kapoor Chand (PW13) on the other hand stated that he had recorded the statement of Prem Chand at about 9:00 pm. It was submitted that this is a major contradiction in the testimony of the informant. This is not acceptable. The principles of appreciation of ocular evidence were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 , as under at page 378: - Appreciation of oral evidence “25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. There is no fixed or straitjacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under: “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. II. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. III. When an eyewitness is examined at length, it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer, not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. VI. By and large, a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen. VII. Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details. VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another. IX. By and large, people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder. X. In regard to the exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals, which varies from person to person. XI. Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when interrogated later on. XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination by counsel and, out of nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding the sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him. XIII. A former statement, though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence, need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.” [See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujara t [ Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 728: AIR 1983 SC 753], Leela Ram v. State of Haryana [Leela Ramv. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 222: AIR 1999 SC 3717] and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., 1959 SCC OnLine SC 17: AIR 1959 SC 1012]] 48. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2022) 6 SCC 52 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 479: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 253 that the Court has to examine the evidence of the witnesses to find out whether it has a ring of truth or not. The Court should not give undue importance to omission, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter. It was observed at page 60: - “ 38. From the evidence of Mahender Singh, PW 4, it appears that no specific question was put to him as to whether the appellant was present at the place of occurrence or not. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. This Court in Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] held: (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 39. Referring to Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546] , Mr Tyagi argued that minor discrepancies caused by lapses in memory were acceptable, contradictions were not. In this case, there was no contradiction, only minor discrepancies. 40. In Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan [Kuriya v. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 202] , this Court held: (SCC pp. 447-48, paras 30-32) “30. This Court has repeatedly taken the view that the discrepancies or improvements which do not materially affect the case of the prosecution and are insignificant cannot be made the basis for doubting the case of the prosecution. The courts may not concentrate too much on such discrepancies or improvements. The purpose is to primarily and clearly sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Where it does not affect the core of the prosecution case, such discrepancy should not be attached undue significance. The normal course of human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident, there may occur minor discrepancies. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Such discrepancies may even, in law, render credentials to the depositions. The improvements or variations must essentially relate to the material particulars of the prosecution case. The alleged improvements and variations must be shown with respect to the material particulars of the case and the occurrence. Every such improvement, not directly related to the occurrence, is not a ground to doubt the testimony of a witness. The credibility of a definite circumstance of the prosecution case cannot be weakened with reference to such minor or insignificant improvements. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of this Court in Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat [Kathi Bharat Vajsur v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 5 SCC 724 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 740], Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan [Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 323] and Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana [Sukhchain Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 5 SCC 100: 2002 SCC (Cri) 961] 31. What is to be seen next is whether the version presented in the Court was substantially similar to what was said during the investigation. It is only when exaggeration fundamentally changes the nature of the case the Court has to consider whether the witness was stating the truth or not. [Ref. Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] ]. 32. These are variations which would not amount to any serious consequences. The Court has to accept the normal conduct of a person. The witness who is watching the murder of a person being brutally beaten by 15 persons can hardly be expected to state a minute- by-minute description of the event. Everybody, and more particularly a person who is known to or is related to the deceased, would give all his attention to take steps to prevent the assault on the victim and then to make every effort to provide him with medical aid and inform the police. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. The statements which are recorded immediately upon the incident would have to be given a little leeway with regard to the statements being made and recorded with utmost exactitude. It is a settled principle of law that every improvement or variation cannot be treated as an attempt to falsely implicate the accused by the witness. The approach of the court has to be reasonable and practicable. Reference in this regard can be made to Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 266] and Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh [Shivlal v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 9 SCC 561: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 777] .” 41. In Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B. [Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC 646 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 685] , this Court held : (SCC pp. 666-67, paras 46 & 49) “46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as these witnesses have given different timing as to when they had seen the scufÒing and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. … Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. *** 49. It is a settled principle of law that the court should examine the statement of a witness in its entirety and read the said statement along with the statement of other witnesses in order to arrive at a rational conclusion. No statement of a witness can be read in part and/or in isolation. We are unable to see any material or serious contradiction in the statement of these witnesses which may give any advantage to the accused.” 42. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] , this Court held : (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. In Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 434 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 238] , this Court held : (SCC p. 446, para 24) “24. … The court has to examine whether the evidence read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more, particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks, and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken, as to render it unworthy of belief. Thus, the court is not supposed to give undue importance to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness.” 49. Similar is the judgment in Anuj Singh v. State of Bihar, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 497: AIR 2022 SC 2817 , wherein it was observed:- “ [17] It is not disputed that there are minor contradictions with respect to the time of the occurrence or injuries attributed on hand or foot, but the constant narrative of the witnesses is that the appellants were present at the place of occurrence armed with guns and they caused the injury on informant PW-6. However, the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial cannot be discarded merely because of minor contradictions or omissions, as observed by this court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary &Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 8 SCC 457 . This Court, while considering the issue of contradictions in the testimony while appreciating the evidence in a criminal trial, held that only contradictions in material particulars and not minor contradictions can be ground to discredit the testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: "42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. The relevant portion of para 42 of the judgment reads as under: "42. Only such omissions which amount to a contradiction in material particulars can be used to discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in the police statement by itself would not necessarily render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When the version given by the witness in the court is different in material particulars from that disclosed in his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor contradictions are bound to appear in the statements of truthful witnesses as memory sometimes plays false, and the sense of observation differs from person to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW 2. Even if there is a contradiction of statement of a witness on any material point, that is no ground to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness." 50. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the statements of the witnesses cannot be discarded due to omissions, contradictions or discrepancies. The Court has to see whether the discrepancies affect the prosecution case adversely or not and whether they are related to the core of the prosecution case or the details. 51. In the present case, the incident had taken place in May 2008 whereas the statement of the informant was recorded in the year 2009 after a lapse of one year. Therefore, the contradictions were bound to come with time. The contradiction regarding the time is not significant because no person remembers the time by looking at the watch. Thus, the contradiction in the time is not sufficient to discard the testimony of the informant. 52. Santosh Kumari (PW3) stated that Trishla was married to accused Daizy Kumar @ Vishal in the year 2006. She was treated normally by the accused for three or four months and thereafter the accused started ill-treating her for not bringing sufficient dowry. The accused used to say that the father of the deceased was a government employee and that he should provide them with a vehicle. The accused used to beat the deceased. She used to narrate all these facts on her visit to her parental home. The accused used to say that the father of the deceased was a government employee and that he should provide them with a vehicle. The accused used to beat the deceased. She used to narrate all these facts on her visit to her parental home. Accused Daizy tried to prevent her from disclosing the incident and talking to her family members alone. She (Santosh) disclosed these facts to Madhu Bala who was a Ward member. Madhu Bala advised her to report the matter to Pradhan. The deceased called her six months before her death and told her that the accused had maltreated her. The deceased was brought to her parental home. Her arm was fractured. The matter was reported to Kamlesh Kumari-Pradhan in the presence of Up-Pradhan. Pradhan and Up-Pradhan visited the house and saw Trishala Devi. They also went to the matrimonial home of the deceased. Pradhan counselled the accused and the accused tendered an apology with the assurance not to repeat the act in future. Trishla Devi was sent to her matrimonial home after treatment. The accused continued to ill-treat her. The deceased made a telephonic call on 22.05.2008 and said that the accused were maltreating her and she would die. She advised the deceased not to do so. She also talked to Daizy Kumar and asked him about the matter. Accused Daizy said that nothing had happened and deceased was lying. She came to know on 23.05.2008 that Trishla had suffered an attack. She and her family members went to the house of the deceased where the naked body of the deceased was found near the bed. 53. Her testimony regarding the complaints made to Madhu Bala, Ward Member, Pradhan Kamlesh and Up Pradhan Ravi is corroborated by their statements as noticed above. Her statement is as per the statement of the informant and corroborates his testimony in material particulars. 54. It was submitted that her conduct is also not natural. The deceased had made a complaint to her on 22.05.2008 at about 8:00-8:30 pm but no action was taken by her or her family members to save the deceased. This submission cannot be accepted. She explained that she talked to Daizy Kumar who told her that the deceased was lying and nothing had happened. The deceased had made a complaint to her on 22.05.2008 at about 8:00-8:30 pm but no action was taken by her or her family members to save the deceased. This submission cannot be accepted. She explained that she talked to Daizy Kumar who told her that the deceased was lying and nothing had happened. This was sufficient to allay her apprehension, therefore, she cannot be faulted for not rushing to the matrimonial home of the deceased and trying to save her. 55. She stated in her cross-examination that she had told the police that the accused used to demand the vehicle. She was confronted with the statement Mark ‘X’ wherein this fact was not recorded. This omission will not help the accused because it is not significant and the investigating officer Kapur Chand (PW13) was never asked about it. Hence, her testimony that she had told the police that the accused used to demand the vehicle has gone unrebutted. 56. She further stated that accused Daizy Kumar and his mother visited Chandpur to pay a customary visit on the next day of the marriage. She denied that the deceased used to come to her parental home about four times a month. She stated that the deceased used to visit once or twice in three months. She admitted that there are many houses near the house of the accused. She had not made any complaint to the police against the accused regarding the injury to the arm. She explained that she did not do so because she wanted to settle the deceased in her matrimonial home. The deceased was treated at Jatpur for five to seven days. The birthday of the grandson was celebrated and a Jagran was organized, however, the accused did not attend the function even though they were invited. Her son had gone to the house of the accused to know about the well-being of Daizy who was operated at Hoshiarpur. She and her son had gone to the house of the accused to celebrate the birthday of the son of the deceased. She admitted that the deceased became seriously ill and was brought to Jagdishwar Hospital at Una. The accused had not accompanied her at that time. She denied that the accused had talked to the doctor regarding the ailment of the deceased. She admitted that the deceased became seriously ill and was brought to Jagdishwar Hospital at Una. The accused had not accompanied her at that time. She denied that the accused had talked to the doctor regarding the ailment of the deceased. She had visited Dussera once or twice with the deceased to get the son of the deceased treated for the bad spirit. She denied that she was making a false statement. 57. Her statement in the cross-examination regarding the treatment of the deceased at Jatpur corroborates the testimony of the informant regarding this fact. There is nothing in the cross-examination of this witness to show that she was making a false statement and learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon her statement. 58. It was submitted that this witness admitted in her cross-examination that the deceased used to visit Dussera and this corroborates the defence version that the deceased was suffering from bad spirit and was being treated at Dussera. Her statement does not lead to such an inference because the statement has to be read as a whole. She stated that she used to visit Dussera for the treatment of the son of the deceased and this part of her testimony cannot be ignored. 59. It was submitted that there are many houses in the vicinity of the house of the accused but the deceased had not made any complaint to any person. The accused also examined Seema Rani (DW1), a neighbour of the accused who stated that the deceased used to visit her house and she never complained about the demand for dowry or the maltreatment. The fact that the deceased had not told her neighbours about the maltreatment cannot be used to infer that she was not maltreated or harassed in her matrimonial home. She had made a complaint to Usha Devi (PW8) who had advised her to reside in her matrimonial home. She had also complained to Madhu Bala, Ward Member and Pradhan but she was again compelled to go to her matrimonial home, thereafter, in these circumstances, the deceased cannot be faulted for not making complaints to any other person. Moreover, it was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda vs State of Gujarat, 2025 (2) SCC 116 that merely because the victim did not complaint does not guarantee that there were no instance of cruelty or harassment. Moreover, it was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda vs State of Gujarat, 2025 (2) SCC 116 that merely because the victim did not complaint does not guarantee that there were no instance of cruelty or harassment. Therefore, nothing can be made out from the fact that no complaint of harassment was made by the deceased to her neighbours. 60. Yudhvir Singh (PW4), brother of the deceased, stated that Trishla was married to accused Daizy in the year 2006. The accused started maltreating her after three months of her marriage. The accused used to give beatings to the deceased for bringing insufficient dowry and for not bringing the vehicle in the dowry. The accused used to get irritated on the visit of the family members of the deceased to her matrimonial home. The deceased called her family members and told them that the accused had given beatings to her. He went to the matrimonial home of the deceased and found that the arm of the deceased was fractured. He brought her to Chandpur. The matter was reported to Pradhan. Pradhan went to the house of the accused and the accused acknowledged their fault. They assured Pradhan not to repeat such acts in the future. The deceased was sent to her matrimonial home. The deceased called on 22.05.2008 and said that the accused were maltreating her and that she would be killed. Daizy Kumar assured to pacify the deceased. The deceased committed suicide the next day. 61. His testimony also corroborates the testimony of his parents regarding the harassment, the fracture on the arm of the deceased and a call made by the deceased on 22.05.2008 complaining about the maltreatment. 62. He stated in his cross-examination that he brought the deceased to her parental home six months before her death. She remained in her parental home for about 45 days. He and his wife visited the house of the accused seven days before the death of Trishla and stayed in the house for one night. Daizy Kumar had visited the Jagran organized to celebrate the birth of Yudhvir’s son. He denied that Daizy accompanied the deceased to Jagdishwar Hospital. The deceased went to her matrimonial home after delivering a child in her parental home. He talked to the deceased and her husband for about 10-15 minutes on 22.05.2008. Daizy Kumar had visited the Jagran organized to celebrate the birth of Yudhvir’s son. He denied that Daizy accompanied the deceased to Jagdishwar Hospital. The deceased went to her matrimonial home after delivering a child in her parental home. He talked to the deceased and her husband for about 10-15 minutes on 22.05.2008. She had no mobile and he could not say from where she had made the call. He denied that she was making a false statement. 63. It was submitted that there is a major contradiction between his statement and his mother’s statement regarding the visit of the accused during the Jagran. This is an insignificant contradiction related to the details and is bound to come with time. It does not affect the core of the prosecution case and cannot be used to discard the prosecution version. 64. Thus, the relatives of the deceased have made consistent statements regarding the harassment of the deceased for bringing insufficient dowry and beating the deceased which caused a fracture to her arm six months before her death. 65. Jagdishwar (DW1) stated that he had examined Trishla Devi on 06.09.2006. He advised a blood test of Trishla and her husband Daizy. The tests were conducted in his hospital. Trishla remained in the hospital and he had issued the prescription slips. She delivered a child. She had also visited the hospital on 12.02.2007 with a history of excessive bleeding. 66. His statement does not help the defence as he has only deposed about the deceased delivering a child which is undisputed. He admitted in his cross-examination that no record of the attendant of the patient is maintained; hence his statement does not show that the accused had accompanied the deceased. His statement only shows that the accused and deceased had visited his hospital once when their blood tests were conducted. Therefore, his testimony does not falsify the prosecution’s version. 67. It is unnecessary to refer to all the judgments dealing with the scope of Section 498A cited at the bar because the matter is concluded by the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aluri (supra), where the scope of Section 498A is discussed as under:- “7. Firstly, the provision under Section 498-A IPC must be examined. The said provision reads as under: "498A. Firstly, the provision under Section 498-A IPC must be examined. The said provision reads as under: "498A. Husband or relative of the husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.- Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to a fine. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" means- (a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 8. Section 498A of the IPC was introduced in the year 1983 with the primary objective of protecting married women from cruelty at the hands of their husbands or their in- laws. The section provides a broad and inclusive definition of "cruelty," encompassing both physical and mental harm to the woman's body or health. In addition, it covers acts of harassment designed to coerce the woman or her family into fulfilling unlawful demands for property or valuable security, including demands related to dowry. Notably, the provision also recognizes acts that create circumstances leading a woman to the point of suicide as a form of cruelty. 9. The definition of "harassment" under the Explanation to Section 498A is specifically outlined in clause (b), independent to the "wilful conduct" described in clause (a), thus necessitating a separate reading of the two. It is significant to note that the inclusion of the word "or" at the end of clause (a) clearly indicates that "cruelty" for the purposes of Section 498A can either involve wilful conduct that causes mental or physical harm or harassment related to unlawful demands, such as dowry. Moreover, these forms of cruelty can co-exist, but the absence of a dowry- related demand does not preclude the application of the section in cases where there is mental or physical harassment unrelated to the dowry. Moreover, these forms of cruelty can co-exist, but the absence of a dowry- related demand does not preclude the application of the section in cases where there is mental or physical harassment unrelated to the dowry. In interpreting the provision, it is crucial to consider the broader objective behind its introduction to safeguarding women from all forms of cruelty, regardless of whether the nature of the harm inflicted includes a specific demand for dowry or not. 10. The statement of objects and reasons for the introduction of this provision in the Indian Penal Code by The Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No.45 of 1983) reads as under - "The increasing number of Dowry Deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the workings of the Dowry Prohibition Act, of 1961. Cases of cruelty by the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by, or murder of, the hapless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction of the cases involving such cruelty. It is therefore proposed to amend the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of Dowry Death but also cases of cruelty to married women by their in-laws." 11. It is relevant to note the last line which explains that the aim of the introduction of Section 498A in the IPC is not only to curb cruelty relating to dowry demand but also cases of cruelty to married woman by their in-laws. A reasonable interpretation of this would be that cruelty within this section goes beyond the definition of cruelty relating just to dowry demand. 12. In the judgment of U. Suvetha v. State (2009)6 SCC 757 this Court outlined the necessary ingredients required to establish an offence under Section 498A of the IPC , as follows: "7. Ingredients of Section 498-A of the Penal Code are: (a)The woman must be married; (b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and (c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by the husband of the woman or by the relative of her husband." 13. Ingredients of Section 498-A of the Penal Code are: (a)The woman must be married; (b) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and (c) Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by the husband of the woman or by the relative of her husband." 13. From the above ingredients reiterated by this Court, it is clear that an unlawful demand for dowry is not a pre- requisite element to constitute "cruelty" under Section 498A IPC . It suffices that the conduct falls within either of the two broad categories outlined in clauses (a) or (b) of the provision, namely, wilful conduct likely to cause grave injury or mental harm (clause a), or harassment intended to coerce the woman or her family to meet any unlawful demand (clause b). Therefore, either form of cruelty, independent of dowry demand, is sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 498A IPC and make the offence punishable under the law. 14. Further, in the judgment of Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar (2001) 6 SCC 407 , this Court observed that - "25. The word 'cruelty' in common English acceptation denotes a state of conduct which is painful and distressing to another. The legislative intent in Section 498-A is clear enough to indicate that in the event of there being a state of conduct by the husband to the wife or by any relative of the husband which can be attributed to be painful or distressing, the same would be within the meaning of the section". 15. The impugned judgment of the High Court carefully examined several legal precedents pertaining to the two distinct limbs of Section 498A IPC . The High Court correctly observed that the decisions cited by the counsel for the accused did not establish that the wilful conduct referred to in clause (a) of Section 498A would only be considered as cruelty if it is coupled with a dowry demand or any unlawful demand for property or valuable security, as specified in clause (b). The High Court rightly rejected this contention. However, following this observation, the High Court also noted that the Appellant did not specifically allege a demand for property or valuable security, and further concluded that the allegation of the accused physically assaulting the Appellant did not amount to "wilful conduct" as envisaged under clause (a) of Section 498A IPC . The High Court rightly rejected this contention. However, following this observation, the High Court also noted that the Appellant did not specifically allege a demand for property or valuable security, and further concluded that the allegation of the accused physically assaulting the Appellant did not amount to "wilful conduct" as envisaged under clause (a) of Section 498A IPC . The judgment of the High Court primarily focused on the issue of whether a dowry demand is a necessary element for the applicability of Section 498A IPC . The conclusion it arrived at was that the two clauses of the provision must be read disjunctively, thereby confirming that the absence of a dowry demand does not preclude the application of the section. Despite this, the High Court went on to quash the criminal proceedings against the accused under Section 498A IPC . Notably, the High Court failed to provide adequate reasoning as to why the allegations made by the Appellant, specifically that she had been physically beaten did not amount to "cruelty" under Section 498A IPC . The High Court's decision to quash the proceedings appears to have been primarily influenced by the lack of a dowry-related demand in the case, without addressing the broader implications of the allegations of physical abuse, which can fall within the scope of "cruelty" as contemplated by the provision.” 68. It is apparent from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the definition of Cruelty not only covers the acts of harassment designed to coerce the woman or her family into fulfilling unlawful demands of dowry but also recognizes the acts which involve mental or physical harm to the deceased. It is duly proved by the statement of the informant, his wife, his son, Pradhan, and Up-Pradhan that the deceased had sustained an injury on her arm, therefore, the act of the accused would be covered under Section 498A of IPC . 69. It was submitted that there is no evidence of any instigation. It is not necessary to provide such evidence. It was held by this Court in Suresh Kumar (supra) that if the accused creates such circumstance that the deceased is left with no option but to commit suicide, the case would be covered under Section 306 of IPC . It was observed: “13. Section 306 of the IPC provides for the abetment of suicide. It was held by this Court in Suresh Kumar (supra) that if the accused creates such circumstance that the deceased is left with no option but to commit suicide, the case would be covered under Section 306 of IPC . It was observed: “13. Section 306 of the IPC provides for the abetment of suicide. This section was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 216: [2024] 3 S.C.R. 329: 2024 INSC 156 as under: “64. Suicide is distinguishable from homicide since it amounts to the killing of self. This Court in M. Mohan v. State (2011) 3 SCC 626 went into the meaning of the word suicide and held as under: 37. The word “suicide” in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal Code, however, its meaning and import are well known and require no explanation. “Sui” means “self” and “cide” means “killing”, thus implying an act of self- killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his objective of killing himself. 65. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 , this Court delved into the meaning of the word ‘instigate’ or ‘instigation’ and held as under: 20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 66. Thus, this Court held that to ‘instigate’ means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or encourage to do ‘an act’. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 66. Thus, this Court held that to ‘instigate’ means to goad, urge, provoke, incite or encourage to do ‘an act’. To satisfy the requirement of ‘instigation’, it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or that the words or act should necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. But, a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct creates a situation in which the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 67. Again, in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (2009) 16 SCC 605 , this Court elaborated further and observed that to constitute ‘instigation’, a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by ‘goading’ or ‘urging forward’. This Court held as follows: 17. Thus, to constitute “instigation”, a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by “goading” or “urging forward”. The dictionary meaning of the word “goad” is “a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to action or reaction” (see Concise Oxford English Dictionary); “to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts” (see Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 7th Edn.). 18. Similarly, “urge” means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially by pushing or forcing such a person. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to “goad” or “urge forward” the latter with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. 68. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to “goad” or “urge forward” the latter with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. 68. Thus, this Court has held that in order to prove that the accused had abetted the commission of suicide by a person, the following has to be established: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, the presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation. 69. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this Court after referring to some of the previous decisions held that it has been the consistent view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC , the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. Thereafter, this Court held as under: 13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC . 70. Similar is the view expressed by this court in Ude Singh (supra). 71. In Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2020) 15 SCC 359 , this Court after referring to Sections 306 and 107 of the IPC held as follows: 9. Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC , there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC . 72. Reverting back to the decision in M. Mohan (supra), this Court observed that abetment would involve a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Delineating the intention of the legislature and having regard to the ratio of the cases decided by this Court, it was concluded that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. 73. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. 73. Sounding a note of caution, this Court in State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73 observed that the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 14. This position was reiterated in Rohini Sudarshan Gangurde v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 INSC 519:2024 SCC OnLine SC 1701 wherein it was observed: “8. Reading these sections together would indicate that there must be either an instigation or an engagement or intentional aid to the ‘doing of a thing’. When we apply these three criteria to Section 306, it means that the accused must have encouraged the person to commit suicide or engaged in a conspiracy with others to encourage the person to commit suicide or acted (or failed to act) intentionally to aid the person to commit suicide. 9. In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190 , this court explained the concept of abetment along with the necessary ingredient for an offence under Section 306 of IPC as under: “25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 10. In Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B. (2010) 1 SCC 707 , this court explained the parameters of Section 306 in the following words: “12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC , the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. 13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC .” 11. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC .” 11. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 , while explaining the meaning of ‘Instigation’, this court stated that: “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement of “instigation”, though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes “instigation” must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an “instigation” may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.” 12. These principles and necessary ingredients of Section 306 and 107 of the Penal Code, 1860 were reiterated and summarized by this court in the recent case of Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab (2020) 10 SCC 200 .” 15. A similar view was taken by this Court in Devender Singh (supra) wherein it was observed: 39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vipin Jaiswal Versus State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 3 SCC 684 , held that the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused. It was observed from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and in particular PW-1 and PW-4 therein that they had made general allegations of harassment by the accused towards the deceased and had not brought any evidence and specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the accused on the deceased. It was held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC . The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: - “7. It was held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC . The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: - “7. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of both the offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC , the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, and in particular PW 1 and PW 4, we find that they have made general allegations of harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and have not brought into evidence any specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the appellant on the deceased. 16. In our considered opinion, the evidence of DW 1 (the appellant) and Ext.D-19 cast a reasonable doubt on the prosecution story that the deceased was subjected to harassment or cruelty in connection with the demand for dowry. In our view, the onus was on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the ingredient of Section 498-A IPC and the essential ingredient of an offence under Section 498-A is that the accused, as the husband of the deceased, has subjected her to cruelty as defined in the Explanation to Section 498- A IPC . Similarly, for the Court to draw the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act that the appellant had caused dowry death as defined in Section 304-B IPC , the prosecution has to prove besides the demand of dowry, harassment or cruelty caused by the accused to the deceased soon before her death. Since the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt this ingredient of harassment or cruelty, neither of the offences under Sections 498- A and 304-B IPC has been made out by the prosecution.” 40. As per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vipin Jaiswal’s case (supra), in the absence of any specific allegation, like, the date, or time of the incident much credence to the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-3 cannot be given, as the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was treated with cruelty and harassment by the accused persons in connection with demand of dowry. Xxxx 56. Xxxx 56. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions reveals that to justify the framing of charges under Section 306 IPC , the following ingredients must be established: (i) death due to suicide ; (ii) accused abets the commission of suicide. 57. The word ‘suicide’ is not defined in IPC . However, the meaning and import thereof were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gangula Mohan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2010) 1 SCC 750 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the word ‘suicide’ is not defined in the Indian Penal Code. However, its meaning and import is well known. The word ‘sui’ means ‘self’ and ‘cide’ means ‘killing’. In other words, the act must have been so intended to push the deceased into a situation that the deceased is driven to commit suicide. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 17 held as under: “17. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this court is clear that in order to convict a person under section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.” 58. What is abetment, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and another (2010) 12 SCC 190 and elaborated the meaning of ‘abetment’ in paras 25 of the judgment as under: “25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. 26. In the instant case, the deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life. The human sensitivity of each individual differs from the other. Different people behave differently in the same situation”. 59. What is ‘instigation’, was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , and defined the meaning of instigation in para 20 of its report, which reads thus: “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 60. In Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC 371 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court gave interpretation to the words ‘abetment’ and ‘instigation’ in the following manner: “6. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.” 60. In Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of M.P. (2002) 5 SCC 371 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court gave interpretation to the words ‘abetment’ and ‘instigation’ in the following manner: “6. Section 107 I.P.C defines abetment to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing if he firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 9. In Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P., 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 731 , the appellant was charged for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C basically based upon the dying declaration of the deceased, which reads as under: (SCC p.731, para1) "My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in- law. Because of these reasons and being harassed, I want to die by burning.” 10. This Court, considering the definition of 'abetment' under Section 107 I.P.C., found that the charge and conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 306 is not sustainable merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased. This Court further held that neither of the ingredients of abetment is attracted on the statement of the deceased. 11. In Ramesh Kumar V. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618 , this Court while considering the charge framed and the conviction for an offence under Section 306 I.P.C. on the basis of dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, in which she had stated that previously there had been quarrel between the deceased and her husband and on the day of occurrence she had a quarrel with her husband who had said that she could go wherever she wanted to go and that thereafter she had poured kerosene on herself and had set fire. Acquitting the accused this Court said: (SCC p.620) "A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged for abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." 12. Reverting to the facts of the case, both the courts below have erroneously accepted the prosecution story that the suicide by the deceased is the direct result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25th July 1998 wherein it is alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and had reportedly told the deceased 'to go and die'. For this, the courts relied on a statement of Shashi Bhushan, brother of the deceased, made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. when reportedly the deceased, after coming back from the house of the appellant, told him that the appellant had humiliated him and abused him with filthy words. The statement of Shashi Bhushan, recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is annexed as annexure P3 to this appeal and going through the statement, we find that he has not stated that the deceased had told him that the appellant had asked him 'to go and die'. Even if we accept the prosecution story that the appellant did tell the deceased 'to go and die', that itself does not constitute the ingredient of 'instigation'. The word 'instigate' denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. The presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or a spur of the moment cannot be taken to be uttered with mens rea. It is in a fit of anger and emotion. Secondly, the alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the deceased were on 25 th July 1998 ensued by quarrel. The deceased was found hanging on 27 th July 1998. It is in a fit of anger and emotion. Secondly, the alleged abusive words, said to have been told to the deceased were on 25 th July 1998 ensued by quarrel. The deceased was found hanging on 27 th July 1998. Assuming that the deceased had taken the abusive language seriously, he had enough time in between to think over and reflect and, therefore, it cannot be said that the abusive language, which had been used by the appellant on 25 th July 1998 drove the deceased to commit suicide. Suicide by the deceased on 27 th July 1998 is not proximate to the abusive language uttered by the appellant on 25 th July 1998. The fact that the deceased committed suicide on 27 th July 1998 would itself point out that it is not the direct result of the quarrel taking place on 25 th July 1998 when it is alleged that the appellant had used abusive language and also told the deceased to go and die. This fact had escaped the notice of the courts below.” 61. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that there should be an intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self- respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances. It is apt to reproduce paras 16 and 17 of the judgment which read thus:- “16. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, in Ramesh Kumar case (2001) 9 SCC 618 , R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation. 17. Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone into action: provoke to action or reaction" (See: Concise Oxford English Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts" (See: Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary - 7th Edition).” 62. In Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal and another (2012) 9 SCC 734 , it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC . A reasonable certainty to incite the consequences must be capable of being spelt out. A continued course of conduct which creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide would satisfy the ingredients of instigation to commit suicide or abetment of suicide. It is apt to reproduce paras 16 to 18 of the judgment which read as under: - “16. This Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, while dealing with a similar situation observed that what constitutes ‘instigation’ must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequences. A reasonable certainty to incite the consequences must be capable of being spelt out. More so, a continued course of conduct is to create such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide. 17. A reasonable certainty to incite the consequences must be capable of being spelt out. More so, a continued course of conduct is to create such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option but to commit suicide. 17. The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC . However, the words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation. (Vide: State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh, AIR 1991 SC 1532; Surender v. State of Haryana, (2006) 12 SCC 375; Kishori Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 2007 SC 2457 ; and Sonti Rama Krishna v. Sonti Shanti Sree, (2009) 1 SCC 554 .) 18. In fact, from the above discussion it is apparent that instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of a particular case. No straight-jacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether in a particular case, there has been instigation which force the person to commit suicide. In a particular case, there may not be direct evidence in regard to instigation which may have direct nexus to suicide. Therefore, in such a case, an inference has to be drawn from the circumstances and it is to be determined whether circumstances had been such which in fact had created the situation that a person felt totally frustrated and committed suicide. More so, while dealing with an application for quashing of the proceedings, a court cannot form a firm opinion, rather a tentative view that would evoke the presumption referred to under Section 228 Cr.P.C.”. 63. Similar issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala and others vs. S. Unnikrishnan Nair and others AIR 2015 SC 3351 and it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 9, 11, 12, 13 and 17 as under: - “9. Mr. 63. Similar issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala and others vs. S. Unnikrishnan Nair and others AIR 2015 SC 3351 and it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 9, 11, 12, 13 and 17 as under: - “9. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2, per contra, would contend that the High Court has justifiably quashed the investigation, for Haridath, the deceased, was holding a superior rank and there is nothing to suggest that the respondents had instigated him or done any activity that had left the deceased with no option but to commit suicide. He has placed reliance upon Netai Dutta vs. State of West Bengal, (2005) 2 SCC 659 and M. Mohan vs. State, Represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, (2011) 3 SCC 626 11. The aforesaid provision was interpreted in Kishori Lal v. State of M.P [4] by a two-judge Bench and the discussion therein is to the following effect:- “Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in IPC . A person abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word “instigate” literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do anything. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. “Abetted” in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.” 12. In Analendu Pal Alis Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707 dealing with the expression of abetment the Court observed:- “The expression “abetment” has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. In Analendu Pal Alis Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707 dealing with the expression of abetment the Court observed:- “The expression “abetment” has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause Firstly or to do anything as stated in clauses Secondly or Thirdly of Section 107 IPC . Section 109 IPC provides that if the act abetted is committed pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. Learned counsel for the respondent State, however, clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause Thirdly of Section 107 IPC only would be attracted. According to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided for under Section 107 IPC .” 13. As we find from the narration of facts and the material brought on record in the case at hand, it is the suicide note which forms the fulcrum of the allegations and for proper appreciation of the same, we have reproduced it herein-before. On a plain reading of the same, it is difficult to hold that there has been any abetment by the respondents. The note, except saying that the respondents compelled him to do everything and cheated him and put him in deep trouble, contains nothing else. The respondents were inferior in rank and it is surprising that such a thing could happen. That apart, the allegation is really vague. It also bafÒes reason, for the department had made him the head of the investigating team and the High Court had reposed complete faith in him and granted him the liberty to move the court, in such a situation, there was no warrant to feel cheated and to be put in trouble by the officers belonging to the lower rank. That apart, he has also put the blame on the Chief Judicial Magistrate by stating that he had put pressure on him. He has also made the allegation against the Advocate. 17. That apart, he has also put the blame on the Chief Judicial Magistrate by stating that he had put pressure on him. He has also made the allegation against the Advocate. 17. We have quoted in extenso from the said judgment and we have no hesitation in stating that the suicide note therein was quite different, and the Court did think it appropriate to quash the proceedings because of the tenor and nature of the suicide note. Thus, the said decision is distinguishable regard being had to the factual score exposited therein.” 64. Thus, what can be taken to be settled is that the abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. 65. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu Versus State of West Bengal, AIR 2010 Supreme Court 512 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that harassment must be coupled with some positive action proximate to the time of occurrence. In the absence of proof of such proximate action on the part of the accused, he or she cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC . In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC , there must be a case of suicide and for the commission of such an offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of the offence of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of offence of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by a person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC . Paragraph 16 of the said report is reproduced as under: - “16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC .” 66. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC .” 66. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Randhir Singh and another Versus State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 129 has reiterated the legal position as regards Section 306 IPC in paragraphs 12 and 13, which read as thus: - “12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve the mental process of entering into a conspiracy for the doing of that thing. The more active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of an offence under Section 306 of IPC . 13. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR (1994) SC 141 8 this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given, society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 67. Therefore, what is required is that unless there is a positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused persons, which alone compels the person to commit suicide, conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. The legal position has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mariano Anto Bruno and another Versus Inspector of Police, AIR 2022 Supreme Court 4994 , wherein, vide paragraphs 25 and 26, it was observed as under:- “25. The ingredients of Section 306 IPC have been extensively laid out in M. Arjunan Vs. The legal position has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mariano Anto Bruno and another Versus Inspector of Police, AIR 2022 Supreme Court 4994 , wherein, vide paragraphs 25 and 26, it was observed as under:- “25. The ingredients of Section 306 IPC have been extensively laid out in M. Arjunan Vs. State, represented by its Inspector of Police 7 which are as under: - “The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. are (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such an act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/ abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 I.P.C.” 26. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC , the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining culpability. With regard to the same, a two-judge bench of this Court in Ude Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana observed as under: - “16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of the cause of suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/ reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted the commission of suicide by another; the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of the accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306 IPC . If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snapshot of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased.” 16. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide.” 70. Therefore, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide.” 70. In the present case, it has been proved on record that the accused harassed the deceased. She was beaten and her arm was fractured. She had complained to various persons but she was sent to her matrimonial home. Therefore, she had no option but to take her life to save herself from the continuance of the harassment. 71. The learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the deceased had committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and the presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act applied to the present case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Naresh Kumar versus the State of Haryana (2024) 3 SCC 573 that when the married woman commits suicide and it is shown that she was subjected to cruelty, the presumption under section 113A of Indian Evidence Act applies. It was observed:- “31. In this appeal, we are concerned with Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. The mere fact that the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage, and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act may be raised, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. 32. What is important to note is that the term “the court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide had been abetted by her husband” would indicate that the presumption is discretionary, unlike the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which is mandatory. Therefore, before the presumption under Section 113-A is raised, the prosecution must show evidence of cruelty or incessant harassment in that regard. 33. The court should be extremely careful in assessing evidence under Section 113-A for finding out if cruelty was meted out. Therefore, before the presumption under Section 113-A is raised, the prosecution must show evidence of cruelty or incessant harassment in that regard. 33. The court should be extremely careful in assessing evidence under Section 113-A for finding out if cruelty was meted out. If it transpires that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court would not be satisfied for holding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide was guilty. 34. Section 113-A has been interpreted by this Court in Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab [Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 173: 1994 SCC (Cri) 235], Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1998) 3 SCC 309 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 740] and Shanti v. State of Haryana [Shanti v. State of Haryana, (1991) 1 SCC 371 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 191] 35. This Court has held that from the mere fact of suicide within seven years of marriage, one should not jump to the conclusion of abetment unless cruelty was proved. The court has the discretion to raise or not to raise the presumption because of the words “may presume”. It must take into account all the circumstances of the case, which is an additional safeguard. 36. In the absence of any cogent evidence of harassment or cruelty, an accused cannot be held guilty of the offence under Section 306IPC by raising a presumption under Section 113-A.” 72 A similar view was taken in Nikku Ram (supra), Ori Lal Jaswal (supra), Raj Babu (supra) and Gurjit Singh (supra), cited on behalf of the accused. 73. In the present case also, since the harassment and cruelty have been proved, therefore, the provisions of Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act squarely applied to the present case. 74. It was submitted that there is no satisfactory evidence regarding the commission of the suicide. This cannot be accepted. Dr. Shiv Pal Singh (PW5) had preserved the viscera of the deceased which was sent to FSL and as per the report of FSL, the phosphine gas was detected in the viscera. 74. It was submitted that there is no satisfactory evidence regarding the commission of the suicide. This cannot be accepted. Dr. Shiv Pal Singh (PW5) had preserved the viscera of the deceased which was sent to FSL and as per the report of FSL, the phosphine gas was detected in the viscera. Much was made out of the fact that phosphine gas was not detected in the preservative. The preservative is used to preserve the viscera and does not contain anything except the chemicals used for preserving the viscera. Therefore, nothing can be made out of the absence of the phosphine gas in the preservative. 75. It was submitted that the post-mortem examination was conducted on 24.05.2008 and the viscera was received on 27.05.2008. There is a delay in sending the viscera to the FSL, however, this delay is not material because the report specifically mentions that the seals were intact and were tallied with the specimen seals. This rules out any tampering with the case property when it remained in the custody of the police. 76. It was submitted that the report was issued on 07.07.2008 and the delay in issuing the report would make the prosecution case suspect. This submission is not acceptable. Nothing was shown to this Court that the phosphine gas could not be detected after the delay. No application was filed for calling the chemical examiner to establish this fact. Thus, the delay will not be material when the chemical examiner has specifically noticed the presence of phosphine gas in the viscera. 77. Dr Shiv Pal Singh PW5) stated in his cross- examination that the cause of death was not ascertained at the time of the post-mortem. This will not help the defence because the Doctor could have only ascertained the poisoning after receiving the report from the chemical examiner. Therefore, this fact will not help the accused. 78. Dr. Shiv Pal Singh (PW5) stated that there may be vomit if one takes phosphide. He stated in his examination-in- chief that there was no froth coming from the mouth and nostril of the deceased. It was submitted that the statement in the cross- examination and the absence of froth will make the prosecution case regarding the poisoning highly suspect. This is not acceptable. He stated in his examination-in- chief that there was no froth coming from the mouth and nostril of the deceased. It was submitted that the statement in the cross- examination and the absence of froth will make the prosecution case regarding the poisoning highly suspect. This is not acceptable. The Medical Officer has only stated about the possibility of the vomit and has not stated that the vomit would be present in all the cases of phosphide poisoning. Therefore, the absence of any vomit or froth will not make the prosecution case suspect. 79. It was submitted that the prosecution case is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. A reference was made to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ori Lal Jaswal (supra), Rang Bahadur (supra) and Raj Babu (supra) to submit that the introduction of the presumption does not rule out the proof of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. There can be no dispute with this proposition of the law. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra , (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033: 1973 SCC OnLine SC 253 that every hunch, hesitancy, or degree of doubt is not a reasonable doubt. It was observed at page 799: “6. Even at this stage, we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffer from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of the doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand special emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise, any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise, any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light heartedly as a learned Author [ Glanville Williams in ‘Proof of Guilt’.] has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted “persons” and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that “a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent .…” In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis, reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant. In India, the law has been laid down on these lines long ago.” 80. The term reasonable doubt was explained in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 928: 1988 SCC OnLine SC 230 as under at page 313: “25. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to “proof” is an exercise particular to each case. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to “proof” is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to the interdependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another a learned Author says [ See: “The Mathematics of Proof-II”: Glanville Williams: Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)] : “The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A juror may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions, and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other.” Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. The law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over-emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused person arising from the evidence, or the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. 26. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be mathematically enumerated as to how many of such units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge. There is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof. Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained intuitions of the Judge. While the protection given by the criminal process to the accused persons is not to be eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of the administration of criminal justice.” 81. It was held in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh , (2003) 11 SCC 271: 2004 SCC (Cri) 135: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 855 that reasonable doubt is not imaginary, trivial or possible doubt but a fair doubt based on common sense. It was observed at page 279: “12. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to the law. (See Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh [ (1990) 1 SCC 445 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 151: AIR 1990 SC 209 ] .) The prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. (See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava [(1992) 2 SCC 86: 1992 SCC (Cri) 241: AIR 1992 SC 840 ] .) A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. [See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn. [ (1978) 4 SCC 161 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 564: AIR 1978 SC 1091] ).] Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation. “A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. [See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn. [ (1978) 4 SCC 161 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 564: AIR 1978 SC 1091] ).] Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation. “A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties.” (Per Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution [1944 AC 315: (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] quoted in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh [ 1988 Supp SCC 686 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 48: AIR 1988 SC 1998 ], SCC p. 692, para 17.) Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than the truth. (See: Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : (1974) 1 SCR 489], State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal [ (1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 928: AIR 1988 SC 2154 ] and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa [ (2002) 8 SCC 381 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 32 : (2002) 7 Supreme 276 ] .) 82. In the present case, it was duly proved that the deceased had died within seven years of her marriage by consuming poison. She was being harassed before her death. She had also suffered a fracture on her arm. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act provides for a presumption that the suicide was abetted by her husband or her relatives when the cruelty is established and the death is caused within seven years. This presumption will shift the burden upon the accused to show that they had not abetted the commission of such suicide and there is no satisfactory evidence to establish this fact. The statements of Jagdishwar (DW1) and Seema Rani (DW2) are not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Thus, it cannot be said that the case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The case was proved to a degree of certainty which a prudent person requires. 83. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 of IPC . 84. Thus, it cannot be said that the case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The case was proved to a degree of certainty which a prudent person requires. 83. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 of IPC . 84. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused. This submission is only stated to be rejected. A young life was lost due to the act of the accused. It was laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Vasant Shankar Mhasane , 1992 SCC OnLine Bom 99: (1993) 1 Mah LJ 36: (1994) 1 Bom CR 84: 1993 Cri LJ 1134: (1992) 1 DMC 424 that the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person convicted of the commission of offences punishable under section 498A and 306 of IPC . It was observed at page 50: “28. We have carefully taken note of these factors, but it is equally essential, to our mind, to balance the objectives behind the induction of section 498-A into the Penal Code, 1860 and apply those objectives in the light of the present record. The cruelty that is attributable to the present respondent-accused has taken place over a period of time. It was persistent and it was sufficiently grave as to virtually drive the deceased Sadhana to a point of desperation whereby she was left with no option except to contemplate suicide. We have also held that the cruelty was grave enough to have caused serious mental injury to the deceased Sadhana. The respondent-accused is an educated person and in the circumstances of this case, it would be improper, in our judgment, to impart any degree of undue leniency on the facts of the present record. The circumstances and the submissions advanced by Mr. Mirajkar have, undoubtedly, weighed with us and we have taken all of them into account. 29. Section 498-A has been engrafted onto the Penal Code, 1860 in a situation where the national conscience was disturbed by the intensity and volume of instances of wife beating, bride burning and cruelty of different degrees and variations directed against women that necessitated a law to punish such acts. 29. Section 498-A has been engrafted onto the Penal Code, 1860 in a situation where the national conscience was disturbed by the intensity and volume of instances of wife beating, bride burning and cruelty of different degrees and variations directed against women that necessitated a law to punish such acts. Whereas religion and custom prescribed marriage to be a bond founded on love and the concept of sharing, local experience indicated, in some strata of society particularly, that it had been transformed into a licence to ill-treat. Law as an instrument of fostering social order is also required to be used as a channel for doing good and conversely for curbing evil. The essence of prescribing punishment for matrimonial cruelty in a Penal Code will be frustrated if, in proven instances of cruelty, a Court were to bend to the multifarious pleas for leniency. In our view, a proper and meaningful application of the law will not permit misguided clemency. This does not mean that our indignation, howsoever righteous, precludes us from taking cognizance of factors which do require consideration, but we refuse to be unduly swayed by them.” 85. A similar view was taken in Abdul Khader v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6852 wherein it was observed: “34. Coming to the sentencing part, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that, the incident occurred in the year 2002, and 22 years passed since then. The 1st accused was a boy aged 19 at the time of the commission of offence and he fell in love with the deceased girl. The other accused persons are his parents and brother. The specific allegation against the 3rd accused father-in-law was that, he confined the deceased in a room, and the allegation against the 4th accused brother-in-law was that he slapped on her face. But, the allegations against Accused 1 and 2 are quite serious which ultimately drove that girl to commit suicide. An 18-year- old girl was driven to commit suicide because of the ill- treatment and harassment from the part of her husband and in-laws and that matter has to be viewed seriously, and so they are not entitled to get the benevolence under the Probation of Offenders Act also.” 86. An 18-year- old girl was driven to commit suicide because of the ill- treatment and harassment from the part of her husband and in-laws and that matter has to be viewed seriously, and so they are not entitled to get the benevolence under the Probation of Offenders Act also.” 86. Keeping in view the increase in the number of such cases, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act could not have been granted to the accused and no fault can be found with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. 87. No other point was urged. 88. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed.