JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 14.03.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which judgment of conviction dated 31.12.2017 and order of sentence dated 17.01.2008, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirmaur at Nahan (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant Drug Inspector filed a complaint against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under 18(c) and 18-A of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 ( hereinafter called the Act ) for possessing thirteen intact and six broken bottles of Corex syrup. The learned Trial Court held that the possession of the bottles was proved but it was not proved that possession was for sale. Hence, no case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 18(c) of the Act was made out, however, the accused failed to disclose the name of the person from whom the bottles were purchased. Hence, the accused were convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- each (total Rs.2000/-) and in default of payment of the fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month. 3. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by learned Trial Court, the present petitioner and co-accused filed an appeal, which was decided by learned Appellate Court, who held that only the present petitioner Pawan Kumar was apprehended on the spot. The identity of the co-accused was not established, therefore, the appeal was partly allowed. The conviction and sentence of the present petitioner were upheld and accused Sachin Kumar was acquitted of the charges framed against him. 4. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the petitioner has approached this Court asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in deciding the appeal in the absence of accused without appointing a counsel to represent him. The judgment is bad on this ground alone. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 5. The judgment is bad on this ground alone. Hence, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 5. I have heard Ms Seema K.Guleria, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 6. Ms Seema K. Guleira, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in convicting and sentencing accused-Pawan Kumar. The learned Trial Court had acquitted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 18(c) and convicted him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 18A of the Act. These findings are contradictory because if the petitioner did not have any drugs, he was not bound to disclose the name of the person from whom bottles were purchased. Learned Appellate Court erred in deciding the appeal without hearing the learned counsel for the accused, therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment of the learned Appellate Court be set aside. 7. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that the learned Trial Court had categorically held that possession of the petitioner was proved. He was acquitted because the possession for sale was not proved, therefore, there is no error in the judgments of the learned Courts below. The present petitioner was bound to disclose the name of the person from whom he had purchased the drugs. He had failed to do so and he was rightly convicted by the learned Trial Court. Learned Trial Court had not dismissed the appeal in default but had decided the appeal on merits after going through the record. Learned Appellate Court was not bound to adjourn the hearing of the case in the absence of the accused or his counsel. There is no infirmity in the procedure adopted by the learned Appellate Court, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. There is no infirmity in the procedure adopted by the learned Appellate Court, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 10. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 wherein it was observed: “13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex-facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 11. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 11. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. A perusal of the record of learned Appellate Court shows that the matter was listed for arguments on 07.03.2013 , none appeared on behalf of appellants and the Trial Court Court ordered that the matter be listed in the second session. None appeared during the second session and the learned Appellate Court noticed that the appellants were not present despite knowledge. The learned Appellate Court heard the arguments of the learned Public Prosecutor and listed the matter for final order on 14.03.2013. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam , (2011) 4 SCC 729 that if the counsel of the accused does not appear, the Court should not decide the case against him in the absence of the counsel because the accused should not suffer for the fault of the counsel. The Court should appoint an amicus curiae and should hear him. It was observed:- “5. We are of the opinion that even assuming that the counsel for the accused does not appear because of the counsel's negligence or deliberately, even then the court should not decide a criminal case against the accused in the absence of his counsel since an accused in a criminal case should not suffer for the fault of his counsel and in such a situation the court should appoint another counsel as amicus curiae to defend the accused. This is because the liberty of a person is the most important feature of our Constitution. Article 21 which guarantees protection of life and personal liberty is the most important fundamental right of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Article 21 can be said to be the “heart and soul” of fundamental rights. 6. In our opinion, a criminal case should not be decided against the accused in the absence of counsel. We are fortified in the view we are taking by a decision of the US Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama [77 L Ed 158: 287 US 45 (1932)] , in which it was observed: (L Ed pp. 170-71) “What, then, does a hearing include? We are fortified in the view we are taking by a decision of the US Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama [77 L Ed 158: 287 US 45 (1932)] , in which it was observed: (L Ed pp. 170-71) “What, then, does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by the counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defence, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. If in any case, civil or criminal, a State or Federal Court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.” The above decision of the US Supreme Court was cited with approval by this Court in A.S. Mohammed Rafi v. State of T.N. [ (2011) 1 SCC 688 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 509: AIR 2011 SC 308] vide para 24. 7. 7. A similar view which we are taking here was also taken by this Court in Man Singh v. State of M.P. [(2008) 9 SCC 542 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 828] and in Bapu Limbaji Kamble v. State of Maharashtra [ (2005) 11 SCC 413 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 778] 8. In this connection we may also refer to Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Articles 21 and Articles 22(1) are as under: “ 21. Protection of life and personal liberty .—No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. *** 22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases .—(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.” (emphasis supplied) 9. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [ (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SCC 597] , it has been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court that the procedure for depriving a person of his life or liberty should be fair, reasonable and just. We are of the opinion that it is not fair or just that a criminal case should be decided against an accused in the absence of a counsel. It is only a lawyer who is conversant with law who can properly defend an accused in a criminal case. Hence, in our opinion, if a criminal case (whether a trial or appeal/revision) is decided against an accused in the absence of a counsel, there will be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. 10. The right to appear through counsel has existed in England for over three centuries. In ancient Rome, there were great lawyers e.g. Cicero, Scaevola, Crassus, etc. who defended the accused. In fact the higher the human race has progressed in civilisation, the clearer and stronger has that right appeared, and the more firmly has it been held and asserted. Even in the Nuremberg trials the Nazi war criminals, responsible for killing millions of persons, were yet provided counsel. who defended the accused. In fact the higher the human race has progressed in civilisation, the clearer and stronger has that right appeared, and the more firmly has it been held and asserted. Even in the Nuremberg trials the Nazi war criminals, responsible for killing millions of persons, were yet provided counsel. Therefore when we say that the accused should be provided counsel we are not bringing into existence a new principle but simply recognising what already existed and which civilised people have long enjoyed. 11. Apart from the above, we agree with the eminent jurist Seervai who has said in his Constitutional Law of India, 3rd Edn., Vol. I, p. 857 “The right to be defended by the counsel does not appear to have been stressed and was clearly not considered in any detail, in Ajaib Singh case [State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, (1952) 2 SCC 421: AIR 1953 SC 10: 1953 Cri LJ 180: 1953 SCR 254 ] . But the right of a person accused of an offence, or against whom any proceedings were taken under the CrPC is a valuable right which was recognised by Section 340 CrPC. Article 22(1), on its language, makes that right a constitutional right, and unless there are compelling reasons, Article 22(1) ought not to be cut down by judicial construction. … It is submitted that Article 22(1) makes the statutory right under Section 340 CrPC a constitutional right in respect of criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings.” 12. We are fully in agreement with Mr Seervai regarding his above observations. The Founding Fathers of our Constitution were themselves freedom fighters who had seen the civil liberties of our people trampled under foreign rule, and who had themselves been incarcerated for a long period under the formula “Na vakeel, na daleel, na appeal” (No lawyer, no hearing, no appeal). Many of them were lawyers by profession and knew the importance of counsel, particularly in criminal cases. It was for this reason that they provided for assistance by counsel under Article 22(1), and that provision must be given the widest construction to effectuate the intention of the Founding Fathers. 13. In this connection, we may also refer to the ringing speech of Rt. It was for this reason that they provided for assistance by counsel under Article 22(1), and that provision must be given the widest construction to effectuate the intention of the Founding Fathers. 13. In this connection, we may also refer to the ringing speech of Rt. Hon'ble Srinivasa Sastri, speaking in the Imperial Legislative Council, at the introduction of the Rowlatt Bill, 7-2-1919 (the Rowlatt Act prohibited counsel to appear for the accused in cases under the Act): “When the Government undertakes a repressive policy, the innocent are not safe. Men like me would not be considered innocent. The innocent then is he who forswears politics, who takes no part in the public movements of the times, who retires into his house, mumbles his prayers, pays his taxes, and salaams all the government officials all around. The man who interferes in politics, the man who goes about collecting money for any public purpose, the man who addresses a public meeting, then becomes a suspect. I am always on the borderland and I, therefore, for personal reasons, if for nothing else, undertake to say that the possession, in the hands of the executive, of powers of this drastic nature will not hurt only the wicked. It will hurt the good as well as the bad, and there will be such a lowering of public spirit, there will be such a lowering of the political tone in the country, that all your talk of responsible Government will be mere mockery…. Much better that a few rascals should walk abroad than that the honest man should be obliged for fear of the law of the land to remain shut up in his house, to refrain from the activities which it is in his nature to indulge in, to abstain from all political and public work merely because there is a dreadful law in the land.” 14. In Gideon v. Wainwright [ 9 L Ed 2d 799: 372 US 335 (1962) ], Mr Hugo Black, J. of the US Supreme Court delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court observed: (L Ed p. 805) “… lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.” 15. In Gideon v. Wainwright [ 9 L Ed 2d 799: 372 US 335 (1962) ], Mr Hugo Black, J. of the US Supreme Court delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court observed: (L Ed p. 805) “… lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.” 15. In Brewer v. Williams [51 L Ed 2d 424: 430 US 387 (1976)] , Mr Stewart, J. delivering the opinion of the US Supreme Court observed: (L Ed p. 441) “The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great…. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all.” 13. A similar view was taken in L . Laxmikanta v. State (2015) 4 SCC 222 , wherein it was observed:- “19. Coming now to the last argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appeal should be remanded to the High Court for its rehearing afresh because no one appeared for the appellant in the High Court at the time of the hearing of the appeal which caused prejudice to the appellant. In our view, the High Court in such circumstances should have appointed any lawyer as amicus curiae on behalf of the appellant to argue the appellant's case instead of proceeding to decide the appeal ex parte on merits. Indeed, in our considered opinion, it was the appropriate course which the High Court should have followed for deciding the appeal finally on merits to meet such eventuality.” 14. This position was reiterated in Christopher Raj v. K. Vijayakumar , (2019) 7 SCC 398 , wherein it was observed:- “8. Admittedly, the appellant-accused did not appear in the criminal appeal before the High Court. When the accused has not entered an appearance in the High Court, in our view, the High Court should have issued a second notice to the appellant-accused or the High Court Legal Services Committee to appoint an advocate or the High Court could have taken the assistance of Amicus Curiae. When the accused was not represented, without appointing any counsel as Amicus Curiae to defend the accused, the High Court ought not to have decided the criminal appeal on merits; more so, when the appellant-accused had the benefit of acquittal. When the accused was not represented, without appointing any counsel as Amicus Curiae to defend the accused, the High Court ought not to have decided the criminal appeal on merits; more so, when the appellant-accused had the benefit of acquittal. The High Court erred in reversing the acquittal without affording any opportunity to the appellant-accused or by appointing an Amicus Curiae to argue the matter on his behalf.” 15. A similar view was taken in K. Muruganandam v. State of T.N. , (2021) 20 SCC 642 , wherein it was observed:- “6. It is well settled that if the accused does not appear through counsel appointed by him/her, the Court is obliged to proceed with the hearing of the case only after appointing an Amicus Curiae, but cannot dismiss the appeal merely because of non-representation or default of the advocate for the accused (see Kabira v. State of U.P. [Kabira v. State of U.P., 1981 Supp SCC 76: 1982 SCC (Cri) 144 ] and Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam [Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam, (2011) 4 SCC 729 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 481] ). 16. The Court undoubtedly has the power to go through the record and decide the appeal on merit, however, when the liberty of the person is involved and the person stood convicted, this course should not have been adopted especially when the legal aid counsel is available in every Court. Learned Appellate Court had only heard learned Public Prosecutor and had not the advantage of hearing anyone on behalf of the appellant, which put the appellant/accused at a serious disadvantage. 17. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court erred in hearing the appeal on merits in the absence of the learned counsel for the accused. 18. In view of the above, the present revision petition is allowed and judgment dated 14.03.2013, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirmour, District at Nahan H.P. is ordered to be set aside qua the petitioner alone and the matter is remanded back to the learned Appellate Court to hear petitioner Pawan Kumar and decide the matter afresh. It is made clear that in case there is no representation on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Appellate Court would be within its right to appoint a legal aid counsel to represent the petitioner. It is made clear that in case there is no representation on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Appellate Court would be within its right to appoint a legal aid counsel to represent the petitioner. Since, other accused Sachin Kumar has been acquitted and no appeal has been preferred on his behalf, therefore, order of remand will not affect the acquittal of Sachin Kumar recorded by the learned Appellate Court. 19. Petitioner-Pawan Kumar through his counsel is directed to appear before the learned Appellate Court on 21.04.2025. 20. The present revision is disposed of in aforesaid terms, so also pending application(s), if any. 21. A copy of this judgment along with the record of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith so that the same could reach well before the next date of hearing.