JUDGMENT C.KUMARAPPAN, J. The instant Criminal Appeals arising against the order of conviction passed in SC.No.24 of 2017 vide order dated 06.03.2019, by and in which the accused were found guilty under Section 376(2) (g) and 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. 2. There are two accused in this case. The first accused Krishnamoorthy preferred Crl.A.No.445 of 2019 and the 2 nd accused Vadivel preferred Crl.A.No.12 of 2021. Since both the appeals are arise out of a judgment in S.C.No.24 of 2017, we deem it appropriate to dispose both the appeals jointly. 3. The necessary facts, which are relevant for the disposal of this case are narrated hereinbelow:- (a) According to the prosecution, this is a case of rape and murder of 70 years old woman by name “(XXXXX)” (hereinafter called as “victim”), which took place on the intervening night of 20/21.09.2016 at about 1.00 AM. There is no direct evidence to say how, when and by whom the offence was committed. On 21.09.2016 at about 8.00.AM the deceased was first seen alive by one Prema [PW4]. Thereafter, the other witnesses had also visited the scene of occurrence and interacted with victim, and she was alive, till she reached the hospital for treatment. After PW4 neighbour noticed the condition of the victim, with the assistance of other neighbors, the victim was shifted to Rasipuram hospital. In the meantime, Ravikumar [PW1], who was the Village Administrative Officer came to know about the occurrence and visited the scene of occurrence. After knowing about the arrangements for shifting the deceased and on coming to know about the death of the deceased, he went to the police station, and gave the complaint [Ex.P1] before the Inspector of Police, Vennandur, and on receipt of the said complaint, an FIR [Ex.P22] was registered at about 11.00.AM. (b) Immediately on receipt of the FIR, Mr.Sasikumar, the Investigating Officer [PW20] proceeded to the scene of occurrence at about 12.15 hours and prepared the Observation Mahazar [Ex.P2], and rough sketch [Ex.P23]. He also collected the blood stain samples from the scene of occurrence. During the investigation, he recorded the statements of Ravikumar [PW1], Vasanthi [PW2], Mani [PW3], Prema [PW4], Asokan [PW5] and Subramani @ Loganathan [PW6], and through them he fixed the involvement of these accused. Maheswari [PW7] had given statement before the Investigating Officer [PW20] about the last seen theory. He also collected the blood stain samples from the scene of occurrence. During the investigation, he recorded the statements of Ravikumar [PW1], Vasanthi [PW2], Mani [PW3], Prema [PW4], Asokan [PW5] and Subramani @ Loganathan [PW6], and through them he fixed the involvement of these accused. Maheswari [PW7] had given statement before the Investigating Officer [PW20] about the last seen theory. (c) While so, after some days, on 27.09.2016 at about 12.30 hours, the first accused voluntarily surrendered before the Keeranur Village Administrative Officer Mr.Jegadishkumar [PW10], and gave an extra judicial confession. After recording the said confession, he was produced before the Investigating Officer. On arrest, the first accused again voluntarily gave a confession statement before Mr.Jegadishkumar [PW10] and his assistant, and in furtherance of the confession statement, a blood stained shirt [MO.5] and Lungi [MO.6] were recovered. Thereafter, on 05.10.2016, the 2 nd accused was arrested, who also gave a confession statement in the presence of PW10 and his assistant and a discovery of fact was effected through recovery of his blood stained shirt [MO.7] and Lungi [MO.8]. (d) The Investigating Officer had also recorded the statement from Dr.Dhamayanthi [PW11] who attended the deceased at Rasipuram Hospital. He also recorded the statement of Dr.Natrayan [PW12], who declared the death of the victim. Thereafter, the Investigating Officer [PW20] has also recorded the statement of the postmortem Doctor Ms.Sangeetha [PW17]. The postmortem report was marked as Ex.P21. (e) According to the postmortem report, the following external and internal injuries were found in the body of the deceased:- “ INIURIES:- 1. DARK RED MULTIPLE SMALL IRREGULAR ABRASIONS OVER MEDIAL AND UPPER ASPECT OF LEFT THIGH M-0.5X0.5 CMS ONE BELOW THE OTHER. 2. SCRATCH ABRASION OVER LOWER ASPECT OF LEFT SIDE OF CHEST M-5X0.5 CMS, 0.5X0.5 CMS 3.1 CMS BELOW ANOTHER SCRATCH ABRASION M-4X0.5 CMS 4. DARK REDDISH MULTIPLE IRREGULAR ABRASIONS AROUND THE MOUTH M-1X0.5 CMS 5. UNDER SURFACE OF CHIN OVER THE LEFT SIDE M-1X0.5 CMS 6. LACERATION OVER INNER ASPECT OF RIGHT SIDE OF LABIA MINORA M-0.75 X0.5X0.5 CMS 7. JUST BELOW ANOTHER LACERATION M-0.5X0.5X0.5 CMS 8. LACERATION OVER FOUCHETTE ON THE LEFT SIDE M- 1X0.75X0.5 CMS O/D HEAD:- SCALP-CONTUSION OVER LEFT FRONTO PARIETO TEMPORAL REGION M-20X12X0.5 CMS WITH UNDERLYING LEFT TEMPORALIS MUSCLE CONTUSION. DURA MEMBRANE-INTACT. LACERATION OVER INNER ASPECT OF RIGHT SIDE OF LABIA MINORA M-0.75 X0.5X0.5 CMS 7. JUST BELOW ANOTHER LACERATION M-0.5X0.5X0.5 CMS 8. LACERATION OVER FOUCHETTE ON THE LEFT SIDE M- 1X0.75X0.5 CMS O/D HEAD:- SCALP-CONTUSION OVER LEFT FRONTO PARIETO TEMPORAL REGION M-20X12X0.5 CMS WITH UNDERLYING LEFT TEMPORALIS MUSCLE CONTUSION. DURA MEMBRANE-INTACT. CRANIAL VAULT-INTACT.BRAIN SUB ARACHNOID HEMORRHAGE ALL OVER THE BRAIN SURFACE BASE OF SKULL-INTACT O/D NECK: NECK STRUCTURES-NORMAL HYOID BONE-INTACT O/D THORAX- RIBS-FRACTURE LEFT SIDE RIBS 1-5 IN THE MID CLAVICULAR LINE WITH SURROUNDING SOFT TISSUE CONTUSION. HEART NORMAL IN SIZE, C/S CHAMBERS -MINIMAL FLUID BLOOD. VALVES AND CORONARIES-NORMAL LUNGS- CONTUSION OVER UPPER LOBE OF LEFT LUNG M-3X2X0.5 CMS. RIGHT LUNG-NORMAL IN SIZE C/S CONGESTED O/D ABDOMEN: STOMACH 100 ML OF DARK BROWN COLOUR FLUID NO SPECIFIC ODOUR C/S CONGESTED, LIVER, SPLEEN AND BOTH KIDNEYS NORMAL IN SIZE, C/S CONGESTED BLADDER - EMPTY. UTERUS-CONTUSION SEEN OVER THE ADNEXA SURROUNDING THE UTERUS M-7X6X0.5 CMS. PELVIS-CONTUSION SEEN OVER THE PUBIC REGION M-4X4X0.5 CMS SPINAL COLUMN- INTACT. VISCERA PRESERVED AND SENT FOR CHEMICAL ANALYSIS AND TWO VAGINAL SWABS AND TWO SMEARS PRESERVED FOR SEMEN AND SPERM ANALYSIS.” (f) The Doctor [PW13] opined under Ex.P20, that the deceased would have died due to the fracture and sexual assault, within 24 hours prior to the postmortem. Thus, after completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer [PW20] laid the charge sheet under Sections 376 (2) (g), 449, 302 r/w 34 and 302 IPC. 4. At Trial, the prosecution relied upon 30 documents marked as Exs.P1 to P30, 8 Material Objects as MO.1 to MO.8, and 20 witnesses as PW1 to PW20. On behalf of the accused, no witness was examined and no document was marked. 5. The Trial Court, after having considered the oral and documentary evidence, has found that all the charges framed against the accused were proved and sentenced them to undergo life imprisonment. Assailing the said judgment, both the accused had preferred these criminal appeals. 6. We have heard Mr.M.Subash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first accused, Mr.N.Ponraj, learned counsel for the 2 nd accused, and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 7. Assailing the said judgment, both the accused had preferred these criminal appeals. 6. We have heard Mr.M.Subash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first accused, Mr.N.Ponraj, learned counsel for the 2 nd accused, and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 7. According to Mr.M.Subash, learned counsel for the first accused, though the case rests upon circumstantial evidences, the material circumstance of last scene theory, has not been spoken by any of the witnesses, and that the confession statements were retracted by the accused during 313 Cr.P.C questioning and that the same are not voluntary, but as a result of a threat by the police, and that no conviction could be based upon the mere confession statement and that the confession statement could only be relied upon to lend assurance to the proved incriminating circumstances, whereas in the case in hand, no incriminating circumstance has surfaced, much less being proved. It is his further submission that the alleged recovery of blood stained dress materials from the first accused is an concocted story and hence, he would pray for an order of acquittal. 8. Mr.N.Ponraj, learned counsel for the 2 nd accused had reiterated the above submissions and in addition to that, he would contend that he never gave any extra judicial or judicial confession, and therefore, it is illegal to rely upon the judicial confession of the co-accused [A1]. The learned counsel would further contend that the Ex.P19, qua the judicial confession statement of the first accused, is exculpatory in nature, therefore, the same will not come within the contours of confession. The learned counsel would further contend that the recovery of the blood stained dress material is a concocted story, and that no witnesses has spoken about the last seen theory, much less the presence of the accused at least near the scene of occurrence, nor about the acquaintance and relationship of the accused with the deceased. In such a view of the matter, Mr.N.Ponraj, the learned counsel for the 2 nd accused prayed for an acquittal of the 2 nd accused. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments:- 1. Haricharan Kurmi Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1964 SC 1184 ; 2. Jaddan and others Vs. State reported in 1973 Crl.L.J. 490. 9. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following judgments:- 1. Haricharan Kurmi Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1964 SC 1184 ; 2. Jaddan and others Vs. State reported in 1973 Crl.L.J. 490. 9. Contending contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would vehemently contend that the occurrence was a gruesome incident, where the helpless old lady was mercilessly raped and murdered, and such factum had been established through the extra judicial confession, which was further vindicated through the judicial confession of the first accused. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would further contend that both the judicial confession, and extra judicial confession had been corroborated through the recovery of blood stained dress material, which tallies with the blood stains found in the deceased. It was further contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the first accused did not exculpate himself from the occurrence. Therefore, the confession of the first accused could also be used against the 2 nd accused, and the same could lend assurance from the recovery of the blood stained dress materials of the accused. It is in this background, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that there are no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court and that the charges against the accused had been proved beyond reasonable doubts and hence, prayed to dismiss the appeals. 10. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by either side. 11. Admittedly, there is no direct evidence to show how, when and by whom the offence was committed. At the same breadth, there is also no evidence to prove the motive and last seen theory against the accused. The entire prosecution case revolves around the following three circumstances. (i) Extra judicial confession given by the first accused before Mr.Jegadishkumar [PW10], (ii) Judicial confession of the first accused given before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Paramathi [PW16] under Section 164 Cr.P.C - and - (iii) the discovery of fact through recovery of dress materials at the instance of both the accused. Apart from the above circumstances, there are no other incriminating circumstances available against the accused. 12. Before we address ourselves to the above incriminating circumstances, and the question of law, we would like to briefly indicate the nature of other evidences, so as to appreciate the veracity and the proof of the above incriminating circumstances. Apart from the above circumstances, there are no other incriminating circumstances available against the accused. 12. Before we address ourselves to the above incriminating circumstances, and the question of law, we would like to briefly indicate the nature of other evidences, so as to appreciate the veracity and the proof of the above incriminating circumstances. According to the prosecution, the commission of grave offence was committed by both the accused. To put it differently, the assailants were two in number. While looking at the evidence of PW4 and PW8, who are the neighbours to the deceased, they had stated that they were informed by the deceased that she was sexually assaulted by two men. For ready reference, we would like to extract their actual statement made during their examination. PW4, neighbour during her chief examination had stated as follows:- However, during cross examination, she admits as follows:- She explained that the information provided by the deceased was elusive and could not be understood from her mumbling. However, she understood that as if the deceased was sexually assaulted by two boys. 13. Similarly, PW8, another neighbour during her chief examination has stated as follows:- From the evidences of the neighbour [PW4 and PW8], we may assume that there were two assailants involved in the commission of offence. Their statements are in the nature of oral dying declaration, as it is in respect of the cause of death of the deceased. 14. But in contrast to the above evidence, the Doctor Dhamayanthi [PW11] had recorded in the Accident Register [Ex.P11] that the deceased was sexually assaulted by one unknown male member . Even according to PW11 Doctor, initially the deceased was very weak to speak, however, after administering IV fluid, she had gained some strength and informed the Doctor about the assailant. This also is in the nature of an oral dying declaration. But, if we look at the evidences of neighbours PW4 and PW8 on the one hand, and the Doctor's [PW11] evidence on the other hand, there is a difference in respect of number of assailants. Further from the evidences of PW4, PW8 and PW11, there is no clue about the identity of the assailants.According to the Doctor [PW11], the assailant was an unknown person. 15. Further from the evidences of PW4, PW8 and PW11, there is no clue about the identity of the assailants.According to the Doctor [PW11], the assailant was an unknown person. 15. Keeping in mind with the above evidences, let us analyze the extra judicial confession [Ex.P4] given before Mr.Jegadishkumar [PW10] and the judicial confession [Ex.P9] recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate [PW16]. 16. Whenever we consider the confession statement, we must keep in mind as to what extent the said statement could be used against the maker himself, qua Krishnamurthi [A1], and against the co-accused Vadivel [A2]. According to Ex.P4 Extra Judicial confession, it is the first accused's statement that the deceased knew him well, by name. The extra judicial confession of the first accused reads as follows:- 17. According to the above extra judicial confession statement, the first accused implicated himself fully by referring about his overtact of catching hold of the deceased's hand, when the 2 nd accused was sexually assaulting the deceased. But, in the following judicial confession [Ex.P19], to some extent, the first accused exculpates himself as if he did not catch hold of the deceased's hand, though he admits of guarding the scene of occurrence. 18. Therefore, from the judicial confession [Ex.P19] as well as extra judicial confession [Ex.P4], it is the first accused's statement that the deceased knew the first accused. However, she had informed the Doctor that she was sexually assaulted by an unknown person. The neighbours viz., PW4 & PW8, did not state as to whether the assailants are known or unknown to the victim. 19. Before we proceed further, we deem it appropriate to discuss the legal position regarding the evidentiary value of a confession statement. In the judgment of Muthuswami Vs. State of Madras reported in (1951) SC 1020 , the full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless the main features of the story of the confession statement are shown to be true, it is unsafe to regard mere wealth of uncorroborated detail as a safeguard of truth. The relevant paragraph is paragraph 9, the same read as under:- “ 9. The only reason the High Court give for accepting the confession is because the learned Judges considered there was intrinsic material to indicate its genuineness. But the only feature the learned Judges specify is that it contains a wealth of detail which could not have been invented. The relevant paragraph is paragraph 9, the same read as under:- “ 9. The only reason the High Court give for accepting the confession is because the learned Judges considered there was intrinsic material to indicate its genuineness. But the only feature the learned Judges specify is that it contains a wealth of detail which could not have been invented. But the point overlooked is that none of this detail has been tested. The confession is a long and rambling one which could have been invented by an agile mind or pieced together after tutoring. What would have been difficult is to have set out a true set of facts in that manner. But unless the main features of the story are shown to be true, it is, in our opinion, unsafe to regard mere wealth of uncorroborated detail as a safeguard of truth .” (Emphasis supplied by this Court) 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Vaikunth Giri Avadhi Vs. State of Bombay reported (1954) 1 SCC 625 has dealt in respect of the reliance of the confession of the co-accused. In the above reported judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the confession of the co- accused is not a substantive evidence by itself, however, may be considered to lend assurance to the existing evidence. It was further held, before relying the confession statement, other incriminating circumstances such as purchase of weapon and the process of disposing the weapon and his presence near the scene of occurrence has to be proved. Only after the above safeguard, the confession statement of the co-accused may be used against the other accused, as the co-accused confession is lending assurance to the proved evidence in record, to the complicity of the offence. 21. In yet another important judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Haricharan Kurmi Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1964 SC 1184 , the Apex Court, after elaborately going into various aspects, had ultimately propounded the law regarding reliance of confession statement made by the co-accused. In paragraphs 12 and 15, it was held that the statement of the co-accused cannot be dealt as a substantive piece of evidence . It was further held that the mere discovery of blood stains by itself is insufficient to justify the charge against the accused. The relevant paragraphs read as under:- “ 12. In paragraphs 12 and 15, it was held that the statement of the co-accused cannot be dealt as a substantive piece of evidence . It was further held that the mere discovery of blood stains by itself is insufficient to justify the charge against the accused. The relevant paragraphs read as under:- “ 12. As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person . In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against other accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person , and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty [(1911) ILR 38 Cal 559 at p. 588] a confession can only be used to “lend assurance to other evidence against a co- accused”. In re Periyaswami Moopan [(1913) ILR 54 Mad 75 at p. 77] Reilly. J., observed that the provision of Section 30 goes not further than this:“where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence”. In Bhuboni Sahu v. King [(1949) 76 IA 147 at p. 155] the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that “a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of “evidence” contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence”. It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 1 SCC 275 : (1952) SCR 526 ] where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case [(1949) 76 IA 147 at p. 155] has been cited with approval. 13. ...... 14....... 15 . The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 1 SCC 275 : (1952) SCR 526 ] where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case [(1949) 76 IA 147 at p. 155] has been cited with approval. 13. ...... 14....... 15 . Considering the evidence from this point of view, we must first decide whether the evidence other than the confessional statements of the co-accused persons, particularly Ram Surat, on whose confession the High Court has substantially relied, is satisfactory and tends to prove the prosecution case. It is only if the said evidence is satisfactory and is treated as sufficient by us to hold the charge proved against the two appellants, that an occasion may arise to seek for an assurance for our conclusion from the said confession. Thus, considered, there can be no doubt that the evidence about the discovery of bloodstains on which the prosecution relies is entirely insufficient to justify the prosecution charge against both the appellants. In our opinion, it is impossible to accede to the argument urged before us by Mr Singh that the said evidence can be said to prove the prosecution case . In fact, the judgment of High Court shows that it made a finding against the appellants substantially because it thought that the confession of the co-accused persons could be first considered and the rest of the evidence could be treated as corroborating the said confessions. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not right in confirming the conviction of the two appellants under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code.” 22. In yet another judgment in Palvinder Kaur Vs. State of Punjab reported in ( 1952) 2 SCC 177, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the statement, which contains self exculpatory matter, does not come within the contours of confession, if the exculpatory statement is of the some fact, which if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. 23. In Parmananda Pegu Vs. State of Punjab reported in ( 1952) 2 SCC 177, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the statement, which contains self exculpatory matter, does not come within the contours of confession, if the exculpatory statement is of the some fact, which if true, would negative the offence alleged to be confessed. 23. In Parmananda Pegu Vs. State of Assam reported in (2004) 7 SCC 779, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the issue of reliance of the confession against the maker , wherein the Apext Court, after relying Subramania Goundan v. State of Madras reported in 1958 SCR 428 , has held that it would be sufficient, if the general trend of the confession is substantiated by some evidence. The relevant paragraphs are extracted hereunder:- “ 19. In order to be assured of the truth of confession, this Court, in a series of decisions, has evolved a rule of prudence that the court should look to corroboration from other evidence. However, there need not be corroboration in respect of each and every material particular. Broadly, there should be corroboration so that the confession taken as a whole fits into the facts proved by other evidence. In substance, the court should have assurance from all angles that the retracted confession was, in fact, voluntary and it must have been true . The law on the subject of retracted confession has been succinctly laid down by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Subramania Goundan v. State of Madras [ 1958 SCR 428 : 1958 Cri LJ 238] which lays down: (SCR pp. 440-41)” 24. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 21 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the evidence on recovery of certain articles of the deceased at the instance of the accused is by itself is too weaker piece of evidence to sustain the conviction against the accused. 25. From the above judgments, the following principles emerge:- (a). Before relying upon the confession, the Court must satisfy itself as to whether the statement is true, and was voluntarily made in due compliance of Section 164(2) to (4) Cr.P.C. (b). The minute details provided in the confession statement by itself will not give any credence, unless the main features of the story are shown to be true. (c). The confession of the co-accused cannot be the basis to lay conviction, against co-accused. The minute details provided in the confession statement by itself will not give any credence, unless the main features of the story are shown to be true. (c). The confession of the co-accused cannot be the basis to lay conviction, against co-accused. However, if such confession is proved, it can be used to lend assurance to the already proved fact. (d). The confession of the co-accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. (e). If the confession contains exculpatory statement, then the same will not amount to a confession. (f). In order to rely upon the confession against the maker, there is a duty cast upon the prosecution to substantiate the general trend of the confession through some evidence. (g). Before relying the retracted judicial confession, it is prudent to expect a general corroboration. Now let us proceed with the facts of the present case in the background of the above settled legal position. 26. While looking at the voluntariness of the confession statement, the learned Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the judicial confession had taken all safeguards to satisfy the voluntariness of such confession. Only after providing all the safeguards provided under Section 164(2) to (4) of Cr.P.C, he had recorded the confession statement. Accordingly, this Court does not have any doubt in respect of the voluntariness of the judicial confession [Ex.P19]. Further, the wholesome reading of the first accused's extra judicial confession [Ex.P4] and his judicial confession [Ex.P19] would unequivocally indicate his alleged abetment of guarding the scene of occurrence. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer that the first accused has retracted his confession during 313 Cr.P.C proceedings. 27. However, the learned counsel for the 2 nd accused would vehemently contend that in the judicial confession [Ex.P19] the first accused exculpated himself, as such, the same could not be considered as confession statement. Though such argument appears to be attractive, the confession contains the statement regarding the alleged abetment of the first accused by guarding of the scene of occurrence. Therefore, this Court has no iota of doubt as to the admissibility of Ex.P4 and Ex.P19 retracted confession statement. In such a view of the matter, now the issue narrows down as to whether the confession statements [Exs.P4 & P19] can be the sole basis to lay conviction against the maker of the statement qua A1, and the co-accused A2. 28. In such a view of the matter, now the issue narrows down as to whether the confession statements [Exs.P4 & P19] can be the sole basis to lay conviction against the maker of the statement qua A1, and the co-accused A2. 28. According to the precedents which we have already discussed hereinabove, as against the 2 nd accused, the confession statement of the co- accused, qua first accused, cannot be a substantive piece of evidence, and the same could be used only to lend assurance to the already proved factum, namely, the other incriminating circumstances. As seen hereinabove, apart from the two confession statements, as against the 2 nd accused, the recovery of his alleged blood stained dress materials is the only other incriminating circumstance. 29. Before we proceed with the factum of recovery of 2 nd accused's dress materials, let us consider as to the reliance and sufficiency of the confession statement to lay conviction against the maker, qua the first accused. Admittedly, except the confession statement and the recovery of blood stained dress materials, no other circumstances are established against both the accused. There is not even a proof regarding the presence of the accused near the deceased's place of stay. According to the first accused's confession statement, the deceased was running a brothel house. But, no one had spoken about such factum. Further, the first accused's confession statement proceeds that he used to visit the deceased very often. Here again, no one has spoken about his acquaintance with the deceased. More strangely, there are no evidence at least as to the presence of the accused in the village on the date of occurrence. Even there is no evidence as to the purchase and consumption of alcohol by both the accused. While looking at the rough sketch [Ex.P23], within 60 feet from the scene of occurrence there are residences. But, no one had heard the noise of the deceased. To put it differently, there are no materials to speak about the trends of proclavity projected in the confession statement, except the ultimate factum of sexual assault. 30. In Premananda's case [cited supra], after referring the judgment in Subramania Goundan Vs. State of Madras reported in 1958 SCR 428 reiterated that general trend of the confession should be substantiated and proved through some evidences, before believing the truthfulness of the contents of the confession statement. 30. In Premananda's case [cited supra], after referring the judgment in Subramania Goundan Vs. State of Madras reported in 1958 SCR 428 reiterated that general trend of the confession should be substantiated and proved through some evidences, before believing the truthfulness of the contents of the confession statement. In the case in hand, as stated supra, except the proof of sexual assault no other materials are available to lend assurance to the confession statement. 31. However, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor would invite the attention of discovery of fact at the instance of both the accused, which according to the prosecution is sufficient to lend assurance to the confession statement. No doubt, the confession statements, generally, have better footing than the evidence of an accomplice. In the case of an accomplice evidence, before relying his statement, we need corroboration on the material particulars. But, to act upon the retracted judicial confession, there is no need to have corroboration on material particulars, but, a general corroboration is sufficient. As such, it is incumbent upon this Court to analyze whether the recovery of blood stained dress materials at the instance of both the accused could be a corroboration to Ex.P19-retracted confession statement. If such recovery is proved beyond reasonable doubts, the same can be very well safely used against the maker of the confession statement. 32. According to the prosecution, after the arrest of both the accused, they made a discovery of fact by recovering the blood stained dress materials in the presence of PW10. Now, let us analyse as to whether the prosecution had proved the above discovery of fact, beyond reasonable doubts. According to PW10, the confession statement was recorded by the Investigating Officer [PW20] himself. He would state that it was the Inspector of Police [PW20], who typed the confession statement in the computer. The relevant admission of PW10 is as follows:- 33. However, when the Inspector of Police [PW20] was cross examined, he denied the same and stated that such a statement was typed by the writer of the police station. His admission is as follows:- 34. In view of the above material contradiction, the standard of evidentiary value of PW10 becomes “neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable”. In such a view of the matter, it is prudent to expect a corroboration. However, no independent witnesses were made available to corroborate the statement of PW10. His admission is as follows:- 34. In view of the above material contradiction, the standard of evidentiary value of PW10 becomes “neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable”. In such a view of the matter, it is prudent to expect a corroboration. However, no independent witnesses were made available to corroborate the statement of PW10. Therefore, we have our own doubt about the truthfulness of the discovery of blood stained dress materials at the instance of both the accused. Though the evidence of the serology report would indicate that the blood group found in the in-skirt of the deceased, and the blood group of the recovered dress material are one and the same, in view of the above reasonable doubt over the evidence of PW10, the serology report loses it's significance. If PW10 was really a witness to confession statement and recovery, he would not have mentioned that the Investigating Officer [PW20] himself typed the confession statement in the Computer. Here admittedly there are no corroboration to dislodge our doubt, which ultimately renders the reliance of the evidence of PW10 as unsafe. Hence, we may safely hold that there are no corroboration to the confession statement. 35. It is well settled principle of law that life and liberty of a person cannot be put in jeopardy on mere suspicion, howsoever strong, and this can, only be deprived on the basis of the definite proof. In the present case, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the discovery of blood stained dress materials beyond reasonable doubts, which resulted in lack of corroboration to the confession statement. 36. As we already stated, it is always prudent to have some corroboration to rely upon the retracted confession. In the case in hand, though this Court has held that there is no infirmity in recording the confession statement in line with Section 164(2) of Cr.P.C, to lend assurance to the retracted confession statement, would like to have some proof as to the trends of events projected in the confession statement. But, the prosecution has miserably failed to establish either the discovery of fact, or the trends of events projected in the confession statement. In such view of the matter, the confession statement cannot be used against the maker himself. If that being the case, the same cannot be used even against the co-accused qua A2. 37. But, the prosecution has miserably failed to establish either the discovery of fact, or the trends of events projected in the confession statement. In such view of the matter, the confession statement cannot be used against the maker himself. If that being the case, the same cannot be used even against the co-accused qua A2. 37. As such, we are of the firm view that there are reasonable doubts in the prosecution case, which touches upon the core issue of the matter. No doubt, from the available materials, there is high degree of suspicion against both the accused. But, as we already discussed, life and liberty of a person cannot be put in jeopardy on the high degree of suspicion without a proof beyond reasonable doubts. Accordingly, since we have a doubt in our faith, by giving benefit of such doubt to the accused, we intend to acquit both the accused from all charges. 38. In the result, both the Criminal Appeals stand allowed. The conviction and sentence passed in S.C.No.24 of 2017 by the learned Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Namakkal, dated 06.03.2019 is set aside. The appellants are acquitted from all the charges and the fine amount paid by them, if any shall be refunded. The bail bond, if any, executed by the accused shall stand cancelled.