Narmada Khand Udyog Sahakari Mandali Limited v. Sumac International Limited
2025-06-11
D.N.RAY, SUNITA AGARWAL
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : (PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.RAY) 1. The Appellant, feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment dated 01.03.2024 rendered by the Learned Additional District Judge, Narmada at Rajpipla in Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos.10, 11, and 12 of 2021 (collectively referred to as the "impugned judgment"), whereby Civil Misc. Application No.11 of 2021, filed to challenge the arbitral award dated 17.12.2020, came to be dismissed, hereby prefers the present Appeal. The arbitral award in question, passed by the Learned Sole Arbitrator, had disallowed the counter claims advanced by the Appellant. 2. For the sake of convenience, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 11 of 2021 is taken up as a lead application and thus the brief facts of the same are as follows: 2.1 The Applicant is a Cooperative Society engaged in the establishment of a sugar manufacturing unit at Dharikheda. The Opponent, M/s. Sumac International Ltd., is a company involved in the manufacturing and supply of machinery for sugar factories. In pursuance of setting up its first sugar plant, the Applicant issued a tender on 16.10.1990 for the supply and commissioning of the requisite machinery. The Opponent responded to the tender on 13.11.1990, and its offer was accepted by the Applicant. A formal contract titled the Supplier Agreement was executed on 29.12.1990, valuing the transaction at Rs. 16.60 crore. The Opponent undertook to supply, install, and commission the machinery within 18 months from the date of execution, i.e., by 28.06.1992. Time was expressly stipulated as being of the essence of the contract. 2.2 The Applicant disbursed an advance of Rs. 3.46 crore in four installments, against which the Opponent furnished four Bank Guarantees. As per Clause 15.1.3 of the Supplier Agreement, the advance was to be strictly utilized for procurement of equipment and fulfilment of contractual obligations. However, the Opponent failed to adhere to key terms of the Agreement, including timely delivery, erection, submission of progress reports, commissioning of diesel generators, and performance trials. 2.3 Due to the Opponent’s non-performance, the Applicant invoked the Bank Guarantees on 30.12.1991. The Opponent challenged this invocation before a civil court at Lucknow, but later withdrew the suit on 31.01.1992. Following this, the parties convened a meeting on 12.05.1992 and entered into a Supplementary Agreement on 15.10.1992, executed by a duly authorized representative of the Opponent and ratified by its Board.
The Opponent challenged this invocation before a civil court at Lucknow, but later withdrew the suit on 31.01.1992. Following this, the parties convened a meeting on 12.05.1992 and entered into a Supplementary Agreement on 15.10.1992, executed by a duly authorized representative of the Opponent and ratified by its Board. Despite agreeing to new terms, the Opponent failed to provide fresh Bank Guarantees and did not comply with revised obligations. Subsequently, on 29.03.1993, the Opponent informed the Applicant that failure to depute an authorized signatory by 31.03.1993 would result in automatic cancellation of the agreement. No representative appeared, and on the same day, the Applicant issued a notice of cancellation in accordance with Clause 7 of the Supplementary Agreement. 2.4 Thereafter, the Opponent initiated arbitration proceedings by filing an application under Section 20 of the ARBITRATION ACT , 1940, and also sought an injunction under Section 41 to restrain the encashment of Bank Guarantees. The application for interim relief was rejected by the Civil Court at Bharuch and the rejection was upheld successively by this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Consequently, the Applicant recovered Rs. 4.23 crore through encashment of the Bank Guarantees. The said arbitration matter was later transferred and renumbered, ultimately leading to the appointment of Justice (Retd.) C.K. Thakker as Sole Arbitrator by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Parallelly, the Applicant filed a suit seeking damages for breach of contract. That suit, too, went through various transfers and was finally referred to the same Arbitral Tribunal by this Court under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 2.5 The Opponent filed its Statement of Claim, which was denied by the Applicant in its Written Statement dated 09.12.2018. The Applicant also submitted a Counter Claim on the same date. Both parties led oral and documentary evidence before the Arbitral Tribunal. By the impugned Award, the Arbitral Tribunal allowed partial claims of the Opponent:- Rs. 50 lakhs for Milling Plant, Rs. 20 lakhs as mobilisation advance, and Rs. 30 lakhs towards design charges. The Counter Claim of the Applicant was allowed only to the extent of Rs. 92,000 in respect of diesel generator interest.
By the impugned Award, the Arbitral Tribunal allowed partial claims of the Opponent:- Rs. 50 lakhs for Milling Plant, Rs. 20 lakhs as mobilisation advance, and Rs. 30 lakhs towards design charges. The Counter Claim of the Applicant was allowed only to the extent of Rs. 92,000 in respect of diesel generator interest. 2.6 Being dissatisfied with the Award on grounds of patent illegality, lack of evidentiary basis, and inconsistency with the terms of the Agreements, the appellant herein filed the Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 11 of 2021 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking to set aside the Award. 3. The Appellant, feeling dissatisfied with the impugned judgment dated 01.03.2024 rendered by the Learned Additional District Judge, Narmada at Rajpipla [in Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 10, 11, and 12 of 2021 (collectively referred to as the "impugned judgment"), whereby, Civil Misc. Application No. 11 of 2021, filed to challenge the arbitral award dated 17.12.2020, came to be dismissed], preferred the present Appeal with the following prayers:- a) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to admit and allow the present appeal; b) YOUR LORDSHIPS be pleased to set aside the Judgment and Order dated 1.03.2024 passed by the Ld. Additional District Judge, Narmada at Rajpipla (CMA-DC) Civil Misc. Application no. 10, 11 and 12 of 2021 and award dated 17.12.2020 of the L.d. Arbitral Tribunal to the extent of allowing claims of the Respondent for milling plant, mobilisation advance to the vendors, drawings and designs; c) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to award costs to the Appellant. 4. By the order dated 09.05.2024, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court while hearing the ex-parte Appeal filed by the Claimant-Respondent herein under Section 37 of the Act, challenging the dismissal of its application under Section 34 of the Act, vide order dated 01.03.2024, had dismissed such challenge instituted by the Respondents, wherein, the following findings have been recorded:- “(11) The cause of action or part thereof which led to the arbitral proceeding arose within the local limit of jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court since the contract provide for jurisdiction of Courts at Rajpipla. Hence, as per the provision of the Act this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate this application.
Hence, as per the provision of the Act this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate this application. In the aforesaid basis the applicant prays in CMA DC 10/2021 that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the impugned award dated 17th December, 2020 passed by arbitral Tribunal comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.K. Thakkar (retd.) in the Arbitral proceedings held between the applicant and opponent to the extent that it has allowed the claim of the opponent and awarded Rs. 50 Lacs towards milling plant, mobilization of advance Rs. 20 Lacs and drawings and designs charges of Rs. 30 lacs to the opponent. (12) In the aforesaid basis the applicant prays in CMA DC 11/2021 that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the impugned award dated 17th December, 2020 passed by arbitral Tribunal comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice C.K Thakkar, (retd.) in the Arbitral proceedings held between the applicant and the opponent to the extent that it has rejected the counter claim of the applicant of Rs. 2,50,00,000/- towards abandonment/termination of the contract by the opponent of Rs. 83,00,000/- towards liquidated damage of Rs. 32,13,90,000/- towards loss of profit, of Rs. 1,40,66,151/- towards loss of interest on bank guarantee and of Rs.24,74,14,412/- towards loss of goodwill. Case of opponent as per reply (CMA DC No. 10/2021 & 11/2021):- (13) The opponent has filed reply to the application wherein made the following averments: That the assertions made in the para 1 of the application u/s 34 with respect of allowing the claim of the claimant on the basis of no evidence are not correct at all and as a matter of fact on the basis of evidence placed by the claimant, the claimant ought to have been awarded full amount of its claim and not partly of Rs. 99,08,000/-. As a matter of fact, even the claimant/opponent has challenged the same award u/s 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 because in spite of sufficient evidence was on record, learned Tribunal has not awarded full amount of claim. That the averment made in the para 3.3 of the application are not correct, in fact, there were considerable delay in making payment of mobilization advances installments. Even then the claimant got the machinery manufacture.
That the averment made in the para 3.3 of the application are not correct, in fact, there were considerable delay in making payment of mobilization advances installments. Even then the claimant got the machinery manufacture. Due to delay in payment of installments of advance the project was delayed considerably and which part from other factor led to failure of project. The fact is that bank guarantee was invoked illegally by the applicant That the contention of applicant in para 3.6 of the application that the issue raised by applicant to modify the draft supplementary agreement were resolved, is totally incorrect because the claimant due to illegal invocation of bank guarantee under coercion and economic duress accepted unreasonable condition of the applicant, only to get the bank guarantee invocation withdrawn after signing of supplementary agreement but that was never done. (14) Applicant fails to get loan from IFCI till 31 March, 1993 the claimant will have to sign 2nd supplementary agreement on the same terms and conditions. So, as per the supplementary agreement no obligation was casted upon the claimant to sign 2nd supplementary agreement. Hence, the applicant is trying to mislead the learned Court. That in para 3.8 of the application the applicant has again made a misleading statement. The claimant while seeking appointment of arbitrator u/s 20 of ARBITRATION ACT has also sought injunction to stay the encashment of bank guarantee. But due to prevailing legal inpediment that the encashment of bank guarantee cannot be stopped due to without demur clause in the bank guarantee agreement, without any cause of fraud or irretrievable injustice. Therefore, mere refusal by Hon'ble Supreme Court to interfere in the encashment of the Bank guarantee cannot be treated as to hold that bank guarantee invocation and encashment was valid and legal. That the para 3.14 of the application u/s 34, the applicant is misleading the Court by placing incorrect facts as per the statement made by Mr. Awadhesh Verma in para 94 of his affidavit filed in support of claimant's claim. He has not made any statement that the milling plant which was manufactured for the applicant project was sold in 1999 in DRT proceedings. It is clearly stated that the milling plant was sold in 1994 to Khalilabad Sugar Mill Ltd. in lieu of 24% share of the said sugar mill.
He has not made any statement that the milling plant which was manufactured for the applicant project was sold in 1999 in DRT proceedings. It is clearly stated that the milling plant was sold in 1994 to Khalilabad Sugar Mill Ltd. in lieu of 24% share of the said sugar mill. While on 13th October, 1999 DRT in claimant's proceedings arising of illegal bank guarantee invocation passed an order due to which the Bank support to the claimant dwindled and the claimants was compelled its share in Khalilabad Sugar Mill Ltd. That in para 3.16 of the application u/s 34 as regard the learned Arbitral Tribunal allowing the claim of applicant/respondent to the extent of Rs. 92,000/- towards claim of interest on diesel generating set. It is totally unjustified without any basis, hence liable to set aside. So, the award passed by learned Arbitral Tribunal is patently illegal based on no evidence without any reason and perverse. (15) The contention of applicant that the opponent had not led any evidence in support of valuation of milling plant is totally baseless and false. Letter dated 17th/19th August, 1991 annexure 7 filed with SOC proved that respondent refused to give clearance for dispatch of 9 mill roller duly inspected by national federation. Further, proved that milling plant was lying ready but only because the applicant did not have money to take the delivery if could not be delivered. That with respect to contention made by the applicant that opponent has not submitted receipt, payment and voucher in support of the claim, is false. True fact is that opponent has submitted receipt and payment voucher of Rs 20 Lacs. Further, the applicant visit to work of claimant's under supervision of director of sugar, Gujarat and the visit report prepared by them confirm that most of the major critical machineries has been manufactured by the machinery supplier but only because the applicant refused to give dispatch clearance due to fund not available with them, the supply could not be made. (16) It may be submitted that as regards claim against drawing and design, the respondent themselves had filed a document, which proves that all the drawings and designs as per the agreement had been received by them, therefore, the claimant became entitled for full value of drawings and designs supplied.
(16) It may be submitted that as regards claim against drawing and design, the respondent themselves had filed a document, which proves that all the drawings and designs as per the agreement had been received by them, therefore, the claimant became entitled for full value of drawings and designs supplied. Respondent like to submit that learned Arbitrator has given a perverse and wrong finding that the supplementary agreement is valid and legal. The categorical case of respondent is that the supplementary agreement was unenforceable and void because it was unilateral and it contain unreasonable conditions and it was got signed under undue influence and coercion and decide that no approval of taken of the supplementary agreement by the applicant from the Director of sugar as per condition 11 of the supplementary agreement. That the applicant is not entitled for any relief and their application u/s 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act for setting aside the award is liable to be dismissed with special costs. Case of applicant in CMA DC No. 12/2021: (17) It is the case of the applicant that the present application u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeks to challenge the award dated 17th December, 2020 (Impugned award) passed by learned Arbitral Tribunal comprising of Sole Arbitrator Hon'ble Justice C.K. Thakkar (here-in-after referred to as “the ld. Arbitral Tribunal”). The learned Arbitral award contains decision beyonds the scope of submission and there is patent illegalities appearing on the face of record and if against the basic notion of morality of justice whereby the learned Arbitral Tribunal has failed to consider the contention of the applicant and had without application of mind passed the Arbitral award partly allowing the claims of the applicant and also the counter claims of the respondent without considering the reciprocal obligation on part of both the parties. Therefore, the applicant by the present petition prayed for setting aside the Arbitrary and illegal arbitral award dated 17th December, 2020 passed by learned Arbitral Tribunal to the extent it reject the claim of applicant and further applicant prayed for setting aside the counter claim awarded to respondent. That the applicant company is engaged with the manufacture work of machinaries required for setting up of sugar factory.
That the applicant company is engaged with the manufacture work of machinaries required for setting up of sugar factory. That the respondent clearly desire to establish a sugar plant at Dharikheda previously in district Bharuch, now Court district Narmada and for that purpose respondent had invited tender from several parties for supply of sugar plant machinery according to specification required. The applicant made an offer by tender to respondent for supply of machinaries and commissioning of sugar plant. That after certain negotiation and modification in the meeting of machinery selection committee of respondent Narmada chaired by State Government Officer and with the member drawns from all India Financial System, national Cooperative Development Cooperation, the offer of applicant was accepted and agreement was executed on 29th December, 1990 between the applicant and respondent to design, procure, manufacture, supply, commission and conduct supervision of the plant and machineries for total price of Rs. 16.60 Crores. (18) The applicant requested respondent to give clearance for dispatch of nine mill rollers which were duly inspected by the national federation. That despite the Respondent having no requisite funds the Applicant proceeded with the contract as per Agreement and sent copies of orders for certain major equipment such as Rollers Sugar Grades and Pan etc. The Applicant on 05.12. 1991 asked Respondent for firm commitment regarding its financial status and on 06.12.1991 appraised them regarding pending orders for purchase and also requested for opening of letter of credit as per the Agreement to facilitate the delivery of equipment. That Respondent while having the option of opening the letter of credit illegally invoked the Bank Guarantees on 30. 12.1991 breaching the terms of contract vide CI 17.6 vide R 17 page 93-100 dated 30.12.91 and pressed to cash them immediately on 16.01.1992 filed it with the Bank admitted vide letter R28 dated 15.9.92 written to obtain fresh BG It is further submitted that on 02.05.1992 Respondent sent a telegram to Applicant's bankers, Bank of India to make the payment of money as per their letter dated 30/12/1991. That under this duress & coercion and threat of invocation and cashment of Bank Guarantee, several meetings and events took place between the parties from 30.
That under this duress & coercion and threat of invocation and cashment of Bank Guarantee, several meetings and events took place between the parties from 30. 12.90 to 31.03.93 in the year 1992 and ultimately under duress and undue influence exertec by the Respondent upon the Applicant to cash all the Bank guarantees given against the advances, a supplementary Agreement was made to sign on 15.10.1992 Hence they put undue influence and pressure upon the Applicant to sign the aforementioned supplementary Agreement in which they specifically stipulated that term loan was not sanctioned to the Respondent on or before 31.03.1993, the advance would be recovered by invoking the Bank guarantees. (19) That until 31.03.1993 the Respondent were not sanctioned and disbursed loan IFCI so on 31.03.1993 the Respondent pressed upon the Applicant to supplementary Agreement to which the Applicant did not agree and, therefore Respondent unilaterally terminated the Agreement dated 29.12.1990 and invoked the Bank guarantees. That the Applicant ultimately on 16/4/1993 filed an application/Suit under Section 20 of the ARBITRATION ACT , 1940 for referring the dispute for arbitration. It is further submitted that the Applicant inter alia prayed for an order that Agreement dated 29.12.1990 between the parties be filed in the Court and the learned Court be pleased to direct the parties hereto to appoint their own arbitrators in terms of the said Agreement and an order of reference be made to them. (20) That in conformity with the said remedy available to the applicant vide aforesaid clause in the Supplies Agreement, an application under Section 20 of the ARBITRATION ACT , 1940 was filed in Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Bharuch, where it was registered as Arbitration Suit No. 19 of 1993. Thereafter on 07.03.2006 it was transferred to the court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Narmada at Rajpipla and where it was registered as Arbitration suit no. 4 of 2006. Therefore, the Application under Section 20 of 1940 Act being Arbitration Suit No. 19 of 1993 stood transferred to Rajpipla and the same was renumbered as Arbitration Suit No.4 of 2006. (21) That in the civil court at Bharuch the case of the Applicant had remained pending from April 1993 to March 2006.
4 of 2006. Therefore, the Application under Section 20 of 1940 Act being Arbitration Suit No. 19 of 1993 stood transferred to Rajpipla and the same was renumbered as Arbitration Suit No.4 of 2006. (21) That in the civil court at Bharuch the case of the Applicant had remained pending from April 1993 to March 2006. However in the meantime the suit filed under Section 41/1993 was decided and the Bank Guarantee was allowed to be paid by the orders of the courts under the terms of bank Guarantee with a direction on R19 on p-255 to 256 by the High Court at Ahmedabad that the invocation of Bank Guarantees will be decided on merits under the Arbitration proceedings as mentioned in date and events from 30.12.91 to 12.5.92 R21 on p-261-264 and court documents R19 from p-149-258 and the legality of invocation would obviously be examined before the arbitrator. That the Respondent got the case prolonged in one way or the other and did not allow the Court to appoint an arbitrator. It is further submitted that not only they took innumerable and unnecessary adjournments but also filed frivolous applications to delay the appointment of the arbitrator. It is further submitted that though there was an undisputed Agreement between the parties having an arbitration clause, even then an application was filed by Respondent on 28.02.2014 whereby respondent prayed for staying of the arbitration suit which was rejected. So much so that Respondent no. 1 filed Special Civil Application No. 17002 of 2017 In the High Court of Gujarat At Ahmedabad which too was dismissed on 25/09/2017. That ultimately the aforementioned application under Section 20 of the ARBITRATION ACT , 1940 was allowed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narmada at Rajpipla on 13.11.2017 and in compliance of the above order by means of the order dated 14.02 2018 the learned Court of Senior Civil Judge Narmada at Rajpipla appointed Sole Arbitrator. That the order dated 13th November, 2017 and 14th February, 2018 were challenged while respondent before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad by means of SCA No. 746 of 2018 and 4352 of 2018 respectively and both were dismissed by the High Court of Gujarat upholding the orders passed by Court of Senior Civil Judge, Narmada at Rajpipla.
That the order dated 13th November, 2017 and 14th February, 2018 were challenged while respondent before the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad by means of SCA No. 746 of 2018 and 4352 of 2018 respectively and both were dismissed by the High Court of Gujarat upholding the orders passed by Court of Senior Civil Judge, Narmada at Rajpipla. (22) That apart from above the Respondent had also filed a civil suit for damages against the Applicant in the Civil Court of Bharuch, which too was transferred to the Civil Court at Rajpipla and ultimately to the Commercial Court at Vadodara. In the said suit the applicant filed objection under Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, to refer the dispute to arbitration, because of the arbitration clause in the agreement, but the same was rejected by the Commercial Court vide order dated 14.03.2018 which was challenged by the Applicant by means of SCA no 10373 of 2018 in the High Court of Gujarat. The aforesaid dispute was also referred by tre Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat vide order dated 26.09.2018. to Mr. Justice CK Thakker. (23) That before the Learned Arbitrator, the Applicant submitted their Statement of Claim in November 2018 for an amount of Rs 3,467,89 lacs with interest as follows:- A. Compensation for Breaches Committed by Respondent i. Cost of maintaining Bank Guarantees -Rs. 13.95 lacs ii. Cost of Milling Plant Rs. 230 lacs iii. Mobilization Advance paid to Vendors - Rs. 112.96 lacs iv. Claim for Idle Overheads - Rs. 84 lacs v. Claim for Design and Drawings - Rs. 80 lacs vi. Claim for Loss of Profit - Rs. 170.85 lacs Total: Rs. 691.76 lacs. B. Loss of Goodwill Rs. 79.25 lacs (Rupees Seventy-nine lacs and twenty-five thousand only) C. Restitution Claim for causing Irreparable Loss of Business Rs 384 lacs (Rupees three hundred and eighty-four lakhs only) D. Interest (i) On Compensation (A+B=Rs 770.96 lacs) Rupees seven hundred and seventy lakhs and ninety-six thousand@ 18% from 31.3.93 till paid. (ii) Interest on Bank Guarantee cashed amount of Rs 346 lacs (Three hundred and forty-six lacs @ 17% compound at quarterly rest from 09.08.95 i.e., the date Bank guarantee was paid to the respondent till it paid back to the Applicant. E. Punitive Damages Rs 2312.88 lacs (Two thousand three hundred and twelve lakhs and eight thousand only). (24).
(ii) Interest on Bank Guarantee cashed amount of Rs 346 lacs (Three hundred and forty-six lacs @ 17% compound at quarterly rest from 09.08.95 i.e., the date Bank guarantee was paid to the respondent till it paid back to the Applicant. E. Punitive Damages Rs 2312.88 lacs (Two thousand three hundred and twelve lakhs and eight thousand only). (24). That after exchange of pleadings and documentary evidence by the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal:- ISSUES 1) Whether the Applicant proves that it was always ready and willing to perform its part of the Contract? 2) Whether the Applicant proves that the Project could not be completed on account of delays and defaults on the part of the Respondent? 3) Whether the Applicant proves that it was entitled to extension of time as also for escalation in price? 4) Whether the Applicant proves that Supplementary Agreement dated 15-10-1992 was executed under duress coercion, or undue influence? 5) Whether the Applicant proves that it was the Respondent who abandoned the Contract? 6) Whether the Applicant proves that the action of the Respondent in encashing Bank Guarantee was illegal and unlawful? 7) Whether it is proved that the Respondent had made the site available at the time of signing the agreement and if not when did it become available? 8) Whether it is proved that the advances which were paid progressively by the Respondent were paid only because the Respondent was satisfied by the compliances made by the applicant? 9) Whether it is proved that not approving of the schedule of inspection and payment as per the agreement amounts to lack of readiness and willingness on the part of the Respondent? 10) Whether the Applicant proves that the Applicant is entitled to claim an amount of Rs.691.76 lakhs or any other amount towards Claim No 17? 11)Whether the Applicant proves that the Applicant is entitled to claim an amount of Rs.79.25 lakhs or any other amount towards Claim No 27? 12) Whether the Applicant proves that the Applicant is entitled to claim an amount of Rs 384 lakhs or any other amount towards Claim No.37? 13) Whether the Applicant proves that the Applicant is entitled to claim an amount of Rs 346 lakhs or any other amount towards Interest of Bank Guarantee?
12) Whether the Applicant proves that the Applicant is entitled to claim an amount of Rs 384 lakhs or any other amount towards Claim No.37? 13) Whether the Applicant proves that the Applicant is entitled to claim an amount of Rs 346 lakhs or any other amount towards Interest of Bank Guarantee? 14) Whether the Applicant proves that the Applicant is entitled to claim an amount of Rs 2312.88 lakhs or any other amount towards Punitive Damages? 15) Whether the Respondent proves that the Arbitral Dispute raised by the Applicant is not maintainable? 16) Whether the Respondent proves that the Applicant has waived his right in view of settlement and execution of Supplementary Agreement dated 15-10-1992? 17) Whether the respondent proves that the applicant has waived it was always ready and willing to perform its part of obligations? 18). Whether the respondent proves that the project could not be completed on account of delays and defaults on the part of applicant ? 19) Whether the respondent has proved that the applicant has committed breach of supplementary agreement dated 15th October, 1992? 20) Whether the respondent proves that the applicant has abandoned the project? 21) Whether respondent proves that the action of invocation of bank guarantee was legal and in accordance with law?. 22) Whether the Applicant proves that the Counter-claim lodged by theRespondent is not maintainable? 23) Whether the Respondent proves that the Respondent is entitled to an amount of Rs.250 lakhs or any other amount for abandonment /termination of the Contract? 24) Whether the Respondent proves that the Respondent is entitled to Rs 83 lakhs or any other amount towards Liquidated Damages? 25) Whether the Respondent proves that the Respondent is entitled to Rs. 3213.9 lakhs or any other amount towards Loss of Profit? 26) Whether the Respondent proves that the Respondent is entitled to Rs. 1,40,66,151/- or any other amount towards loss of interest on BankGuarantee? 27 Whether the Respondent proves that the Respondent is entitled to Rs 24,74 14,412/- or any other amount towards Loss of Goodwill? 28) Whether the Respondent proves that the Respondent is entitled to Rs. 91,576/- or any other amount towards interest of Diesel Generating Set? 29) Whether the Respondent is entitled to claim an amount of Rs. 61,62,62,139/-or any other amount from the Applicant as prayed in the Counterclaim? 30) Who is entitled and from whom? 31) What order as to interest?
28) Whether the Respondent proves that the Respondent is entitled to Rs. 91,576/- or any other amount towards interest of Diesel Generating Set? 29) Whether the Respondent is entitled to claim an amount of Rs. 61,62,62,139/-or any other amount from the Applicant as prayed in the Counterclaim? 30) Who is entitled and from whom? 31) What order as to interest? 32) What order as to costs? 33) What should be the Final Award?” 5. In the present appeal, it is the respondent before the Arbitrator, who challenged the award of a sum of Rs.1.00 Crore under the three heads, as noted in Paragraph No.23 of the order dated 09.05.2024 (Supra). 6. Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant has submitted that as noted in the order dated 09.05.2024 of this Court and as will be seen from the bare perusal of the award, the entire findings of the award are in favour of the appellant and against the Claimant-respondent. However, due to some inexplicable logic, the Tribunal has awarded certain random sums under three different heads to the Claimant. There is no connection, howsoever tenuous, that can be established from reading the award by which it is comprehensible as to why any sum has been awarded to the Claimant in spite of no findings in favour of the Claimant. By way of an example, the attention of this Court has been drawn to the findings under the head of “Drawings and Designs” at Page No.162 of the paper book, where the Tribunal has held as under :- “Having considered rival versions and documentary evidence in the form of letters, Minutes of Meetings, etc. it appears to the Tribunal that there was delay on the part of both the sides. It appears that certain drawings were incomplete or defective. But it is also clear from the record that for a sufficient long time, no action was taken either by the Respondent or by National Federation. Drawings received by the Respondent were forwarded for approval by Narmada to National Sugar Federation. But National Sugar Federation did not clear them immediately either by approving them or by suggesting changes, alterations or modifications for quite some time. For such delay, the Claimant cannot be held responsible.
Drawings received by the Respondent were forwarded for approval by Narmada to National Sugar Federation. But National Sugar Federation did not clear them immediately either by approving them or by suggesting changes, alterations or modifications for quite some time. For such delay, the Claimant cannot be held responsible. Thus, though delay in clearance of drawings and designs was on the part of both the sides, much more delay was on the part of the Respondent” 6.1 Mr. Joshi submitted that it defies logic as to how on the face of the aforesaid findings a sum of Rs.30.00 Lakhs could be awarded to the Claimant. In respect of the claim of Rs.2,30,00,000/- towards the cost of manufactured milling plant, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.50,00,000/- in spite of not an iota of findings in favour of the Claimant, by concluding abruptly as under :- “Having considered rival contentions, in my opinion, on the facts of the case, the Claimant must be held entitled to Rs.50 lakh towards Milling Plant. I, therefore, award Rs.50 lakh to the Claimant.” 6.2 Similarly, in respect of documents, in spite of noting that the Drawings and Designs prepared by the Claimant were duly forwarded by the Respondent to the National Sugar Federation, for which the Respondent could not have been faulted, a sum of Rs.20,00,000/- has been awarded to the Claimant with the following reasons :- “In my opinion, on the basis of documents on record and keeping in view In that the Claimant was also having other projects with him and it was also partly responsible for delay, it would be appropriate if the Claimant is held entitled to recover an amount of Rs.20 lakh. 7. When Mr.R.K.Sinha, learned advocate for the Claimant (Respondent in the present Appeal) was asked a pointed query as to what could be the logic behind the Tribunal’s award of these random sums of money under the aforesaid three heads, Mr. Sinha initially contended that the order dated 09.04.2025 of this Court has concluded that the award is correct and therefore, the present Appellant cannot be permitted to contend that the award of Rs.1.00 crores has to be struck down. Subsequently, Mr. Sinha contended that even according to him, the award was utterly unintelligible and confusing and therefore, this Court may quash and set aside the award and remand the parties to a fresh round of arbitration. 8.
Subsequently, Mr. Sinha contended that even according to him, the award was utterly unintelligible and confusing and therefore, this Court may quash and set aside the award and remand the parties to a fresh round of arbitration. 8. In view of the rival submissions of the parties, it is seen that both the sides have categorically submitted that the award is unintelligible and confusing and therefore, should be set aside fully. Whereas, the Claimant-respondent has submitted that they should be relegated a fresh round of arbitration, the appellant has submitted that this Court may only quash and set aside the award and that is how the matter must rest. 9. We are of the opinion that this is not a case where there are small gaps in the award which can be filled up if the matter is remanded to the learned Arbitrator and the arbitration can commence for the purpose of filling the gaps. It appears that the entire logic and reasoning of the award is that both the claimant-respondent and the appellant herein have to share equal responsibility for their actions and therefore, there are no disputes/claims that would survive, given that the Tribunal has categorically held that both the parties are equally to blame. We are also of the opinion that there is no connection whatsoever between the findings on one hand and the eventual awarded sum on the other. In Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “42 . In the 1996 Act, this principle is substituted by the "patent illegality" principle which, in turn, contains three subheads: 42.1. (a) A contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death knell of an arbitral award. This must be understood in the sense that such illegality must go to the root of the matter and cannot be of a trivial nature. This again is really a contravention of Section 28(1)(a) of the Act, which reads as under: " 28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute .-(1) Where the place of arbitration is situated in India- (a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India;" 42.2 .
Rules applicable to substance of dispute .-(1) Where the place of arbitration is situated in India- (a) in an arbitration other than an international commercial arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law for the time being in force in India;" 42.2 . (b) A contravention of the ARBITRATION ACT itself would be regarded as a patent illegality for example if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award in contravention of Section 31(3) of the Act, such award will be liable to be set aside. 42.3. (c) Equally, the third subhead of patent illegality is really a contravention of Section 28(3) of the ARBITRATION ACT , which reads as under: " 28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute .-(1)- (2) * (3) In all cases, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction." This last contravention must be understood with a caveat. An Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if an arbitrator construes a term of the contract in a reasonable manner, it will not mean that the award can be set aside on this ground. Construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide unless the arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair-minded or reasonable person could do.” 9.1. In Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Crompton Greves reported in (2019) 20 SCC Pg.1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “35 When we consider the requirement of a reasoned order, three characteristics of a reasoned order can be fathomed. They are: proper, intelligible and adequate. If the reasonings in the order are improper, they reveal a flaw in the decision- making process. If the challenge to an award is based on impropriety or perversity in the reasoning, then it can be challenged strictly on the grounds provided under Section 34 of the ARBITRATION ACT . If the challenge to an award is based on the ground that the same is unintelligible, the same would be equivalent of providing no reasons at all.
If the challenge to an award is based on impropriety or perversity in the reasoning, then it can be challenged strictly on the grounds provided under Section 34 of the ARBITRATION ACT . If the challenge to an award is based on the ground that the same is unintelligible, the same would be equivalent of providing no reasons at all. Coming to the last aspect concerning the challenge on adequacy of reasons, the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 has to adjudicate the validity of such an award based on the degree of particularity of reasoning required having regard to the nature of issues falling for consideration. The degree of particularity cannot be stated in a precise manner as the same would depend on the complexity of the issue. Even if the Court comes to a conclusion that there were gaps in the reasoning for the conclusions reached by the Tribunal, the Court needs to have regard to the documents submitted by the parties and the contentions raised before the Tribunal so that awards with inadequate reasons are not set aside in casual and cavalier manner. On the other hand, ordinarily unintelligible awards are to be set aside, subject to party autonomy to do away with the reasoned award. Therefore, the courts are required to be careful while distinguishing between inadequacy of reasons in an award and unintelligible awards. 36. At this juncture it must be noted that the legislative intention of providing Section 34 (4) in the ARBITRATION ACT was to make the award enforceable, after giving an opportunity to the Tribunal to undo the curable defects. This provision cannot be brushed aside and the High Court could not have proceeded further to determine the issue on merits. 37. In case of absence of reasoning the utility has been provided under Section 34 (4) of the ARBITRATION ACT to cure such defects. When there is complete perversity in the reasoning then only it can be challenged under the provisions of Section 34 of the ARBITRATION ACT .
37. In case of absence of reasoning the utility has been provided under Section 34 (4) of the ARBITRATION ACT to cure such defects. When there is complete perversity in the reasoning then only it can be challenged under the provisions of Section 34 of the ARBITRATION ACT . The power vested under Section 34 (4) of the ARBITRATION ACT to cure defects can be utilised in cases where the arbitral award does not provide any reasoning or if the award has some gap in the reasoning or otherwise and that can be cured so as to avoid a challenge based on the aforesaid curable defects under Section 34 of the ARBITRATION ACT . However, in this case such remand to the Tribunal would not be beneficial as this case has taken more than 25 years for its adjudication. It is in this state of affairs that we lament that the purpose of arbitration as an effective and expeditious forum itself stands effaced.” 10. In the present case, it will be seen that there are no reasons whatsoever by which random sums under the three heads as noted hereinabove came to be awarded to the Claimant. Further, it is common ground, as categorically pleaded by the respective counsels on both the sides, that the award is unintelligible. In such circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that this is not a case by which the award can be saved by allowing any gaps in the reasonings to be filled. Rather, in terms of paragraph No.35 of the decision of the Apex Court in Dyna Technologies (Supra), this is a for setting aside the award itself as being unintelligible. However, given the fact that we are of the opinion upon perusal of the records of the case, that both the Claimant- respondent and appellant herein are equally responsible for frustration of the contract, this is not a fit case for remand to the Tribunal. Accordingly, the present Appeal succeeds and is allowed. The award dated 17.12.2020 passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator is hereby set aside. ORDER IN CIVIL APPLICATION :- In view of the order passed in the main matter i.e. First Appeal No. 2775 of 2024, this application does not survive and stands disposed of accordingly.