ORDER : G. S. Ahluwalia, J. This second appeal, under section 100 of CPC, has been filed against the judgement and decree dated 6/5/2016 passed by First Additional District Judge, Mungavali, District Ashoknagar in Civil Appeal No. 67A of 2012, as well as, judgement and decree dated 5/1/2011 passed by Civil Judge Class 1, Mungavali in Civil Suit No. 3A of 2007. 2. Appellants are defendants who have lost their case from both the Courts below. 3. Facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that respondent filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction pleading inter alia that he is the owner and in possession of area 1.045 hectares out of 1.494 hectares of Survey No. 112 situated in village Atreji, Tahsil Mungavali, District Ashoknagar. On the southern side of the land, land of defendant No. 1 is situated whereas on the eastern side, land of Ram Prasad is situated and on the western side remaining land of survey No. 112 is there and on the northern side, land of defendants is situated. It was claimed that plaintiff is the sole owner and in possession of the property in dispute, as it was purchased by plaintiff from the father of defendants namely Feran Singh by registered sale deed dated 30/5/1998 for a consideration amount of Rs.1,05,000/- and since then plaintiff is in possession of the property in dispute and even today he is in possession thereof. On 1/9/2007, at about 10:00 a.m., plaintiff was ploughing his field with the help of a Tractor. At that time defendant Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6 and 2-3 other persons came at the disputed property and tried to stop the plaintiff from cultivating the land. When plaintiff replied that he has purchased the property from their father and why they are picking quarrel then it was challenged by defendant Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6 by claiming that the land belongs to them and therefore they would cultivate the land and tried to forcibly dispossess the plaintiff and also started denying the right and title of plaintiff. However the plaintiff did not allow defendant Nos. 1,2,4 and 6 to take possession and with great difficulty he persuaded them to go back. However while going back defendants extended a threat that they would take possession and accordingly suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction was filed. 4. However the plaintiff did not allow defendant Nos. 1,2,4 and 6 to take possession and with great difficulty he persuaded them to go back. However while going back defendants extended a threat that they would take possession and accordingly suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction was filed. 4. Defendants filed their written statement and denied the right and title of plaintiff. It was claimed that defendant Nos. 1-6 are in cultivating possession of the property in dispute and defendants are owner of survey No. 112 area 1.045 hectares. It was claimed that Feran Singh was not the father  of all the defendants but he was the father of defendant Nos. 1-3 only whereas he was grandfather of defendant Nos. 4-6. It was denied that Feran Singh had executed a sale deed in respect of Survey No. 112 area 1.045 hectares, but it was claimed that he had mortgaged the property. On the date of execution of sale deed one receipt was executed by plaintiff in presence of attesting witnesses Raghuvir Singh and Hazrat Singh by agreeing that in case if Feran Singh returns the entire amount within a period of 2 years then the deed of reconveyance would be executed. It was claimed that Feran Singh continued to be in possession of the property in dispute and after his death defendants are in possession. The incident as alleged by plaintiff on 1/9/2007 was denied. In special plea it was stated that on the basis of sale deed plaintiff has got his name mutated in the revenue records but it was done without information to Feran Singh. As soon as Feran Singh got the information, he immediately filed an appeal before SDO Mungavali which was allowed by SDO and the mutation done in favour of plaintiff was set aside. Being aggrieved by the order passed by SDO, plaintiff preferred an appeal before Additional Commissioner, Gwalior which was registered as Appeal No. 425/02-03 and Additional Commissioner, Gwalior Division, Gwalior also dismissed the appeal. It is submitted that this fact was also suppressed by the plaintiff. It is submitted that Feran Singh had returned the entire amount on 30/5/1998 in the presence of witnesses. It was further pleaded that as the entire amount was returned to plaintiff, therefore, plaintiff should have executed the deed of reconveyance but it was not done. Accordingly it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 5. It is submitted that Feran Singh had returned the entire amount on 30/5/1998 in the presence of witnesses. It was further pleaded that as the entire amount was returned to plaintiff, therefore, plaintiff should have executed the deed of reconveyance but it was not done. Accordingly it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 5. The trial court after framing issues and recording evidence decreed the suit. Being aggrieved by the judgement and decree passed by the trial court appellants preferred an appeal which too has been dismissed. 6. Challenging the judgement and decree passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by counsel for appellant that the sale deed dated 30/5/1998 (Ex. P/1) was not out and out sale but it was a mortgage by conditional sale as on the very same day i.e. on 30/5/1998, plaintiff had executed a receipt to the effect that in case Feran Singh returns an amount of Rs. 2,22,600/- within a period of 2 years then he would return the land otherwise he would not return the land and the parties would also be required to execute a sale deed in respect of the land which was agreed to be sold by executing notarised agreement to sell (Ex. P/2). It is submitted that the Courts below committed material illegality by holding that Ex. P/3 was the receipt executed in respect of notarised agreement to sell and not in respect of sale deed in question Ex. P/1. It is further submitted that even the receipt for returning of sale deed was filed by plaintiff himself and therefore the Courts below should not have ignored the same and accordingly proposed the following substantial questions of law:- i) Whether on the facts and material brought on record by the plaintiff and defendants, the learned courts below have erred in decreeing the suit filed for declaration of title and permanent injunction? ii) Whether learned courts below have erred in holding the sale deed dtd. 30.5.1998 to be a real transaction of sale whereas the same was executed without delivery of possession & for security of money taken by Feran Singh, father of defendants 1-3? iii) Whether Feran Singh, executant of sale deed (Ex. ii) Whether learned courts below have erred in holding the sale deed dtd. 30.5.1998 to be a real transaction of sale whereas the same was executed without delivery of possession & for security of money taken by Feran Singh, father of defendants 1-3? iii) Whether Feran Singh, executant of sale deed (Ex. P/1) being illiterate, entire burden of proof was on the plaintiff to prove that the sale deed was executed by Feran Singh after understanding the contents of the same and in absence of such evidence learned courts below have erred in presuming the sale deed to be a proved document? iv) Whether findings of possession recorded by learned courts below (based only on recital of delivery of possession mentioned in the sale deed) being perverse on facts and contrary to law are not sustainable ? Fact remains that mutation of the plaintiffs name was not effected in the revenue record and batankan or partition has also not been done so far. v) Whether learned court below has erred in not framing issue with regard to plea taken by the defendants to the effect that the suit is not maintainable for want of relief of possession AND non challenging the orders passed by revenue courts passed against the plaintiff ? vi) Whether learned courts below have erred in not giving any weightage to the documents Ex. P/2 and P/3 which are sufficient to prove that the sale deed was not a real transaction of sale ? vii) Whether learned lower appellate court has erred in dismissing the applications filed under order 41 rule 25 and 41 rule 27 CPC on the ground of delay without considering relevancy of public documents submitted in additional evidence ? viii) Whether the judgement and decree passed by learned courts below and findings recorded therein being based on non consideration of evidence and pleadings and being based on wrong assumptions, are not sustainable ? 7 . Per contra, the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for respondent. It is submitted that the receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance was only in respect of notarised agreement to sell and not in respect of sale deed dated 30/5/1998 (Ex.P/1). 8. Heard, learned counsel for the parties. 9. Since the parties are represented by their counsel therefore the appeal is heard finally. 10. Plaintiff has relied upon the receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance (Ex. 8. Heard, learned counsel for the parties. 9. Since the parties are represented by their counsel therefore the appeal is heard finally. 10. Plaintiff has relied upon the receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance (Ex. P/3) which reads as under. 11. This receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance was also executed on 30/5/1998 and sale deed Ex. P1 was also executed on 30/5/1998 i.e. on the same day. Plaintiff has also relied upon one agreement to sell executed on 30/5/1998 itself (Ex. P/2), according to which Feran Singh had agreed to sell survey No. 104/1 and 256/2 for a consideration of Rs.95,000/-. The sale deed was to be executed within a period of 2 years. If this agreement to sell which was got notarised was an agreement to sell then there was no need to execute the receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance (Ex.P/3). Even according to the plaintiff himself the notarized agreement to sell was not an agreement of sale but it was an agreement of mortgage. 12. Be that whatever it may be. 13. The next question for consideration is with regard to interpretation of receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance. 14. From plain reading of Ex.P./3, it is clear that this receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance speaks about two things — (i), in case the amount of Rs. 2,22,600/- is refunded by Feran Singh and Ram Singh within 2 years then the land which was sold by sale deed would be returned by executing a deed of reconveyance and on failure to do so he would not return the land, and (ii) in case if the amount is not returned then defendant shall be under an obligation to execute a sale deed in respect of the land mentioned in notarised agreement to sell. 15. Therefore it is clear that the receipt (Ex.P/3) is also in relation to sale deed (Ex. P/1). Since this document has been filed by plaintiff himself therefore there is no doubt with regard to genuineness and correctness of this document. 16. Under these circumstances, it is clear that plaintiff purchased certain piece of land by sale deed dated 30/5/1998 (Ex. P/1) and had also executed a notarised agreement to sell in respect of other land on 30/5/1998. On the very same day. 16. Under these circumstances, it is clear that plaintiff purchased certain piece of land by sale deed dated 30/5/1998 (Ex. P/1) and had also executed a notarised agreement to sell in respect of other land on 30/5/1998. On the very same day. he also executed receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance by mentioning that he would return the land in case the amount of Rs.2,22,600/- is repaid within a period of 2 years, otherwise he would retain the land and in that situation defendant will also be under an obligation to execute the sale deed in respect of land mentioned in the notarised agreement to sell. 17. Now the next question for consideration is as to whether defendants have proved that amount of Rs. 2,22,600/- was refunded by Feran Singh and if not then what would be the effect ? 18. So far as the notarised agreement to sell is concerned, admittedly, plaintiff has not filed suit for specific performance of contract in respect of survey No. 104/1 and 256/2. Therefore effect of receipt for execution of deed of reconveyance shall be considered only in respect of sale deed (Ex.P/1). 19. Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under: "(c) Mortgage by conditional sale.- Where, the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property— on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, the transaction is called mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale: Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale." Thus, from plain reading of proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, it is clear that unless and until the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale, no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Dharmaji Shankar Shinde v. Rajaram Shripad Joshi reported in (2019) 8 SCC 401 has held as under:- 10. Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act contains the definition of “mortgage by conditional sale”. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Dharmaji Shankar Shinde v. Rajaram Shripad Joshi reported in (2019) 8 SCC 401 has held as under:- 10. Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act contains the definition of “mortgage by conditional sale”. In a “mortgage by conditional sale”, the transfer is made as a security to a loan taken by the mortgagor-owner; whereas in a “sale with a condition to repurchase”, the sale is made by the vendor-owner reserving with himself a right to repurchase it within a stipulated time. A sale with a condition of retransfer is not a mortgage since the relationship of debtor and creditor does not exist and there is no debt for which the transfer is made as a security. Whether the document is a “mortgage by conditional sale” or “sale with a condition to repurchase” is to be ascertained from the intention of the parties. It is trite law that the intention of the parties should be gathered from the recitals of the document itself. 11. Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act deals with “mortgage by conditional sale” which reads as under: “58. (c) Mortgage by conditional sale.—Where the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property— on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee, a mortgagee by conditional sale: Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale.” (emphasis supplied) 12. The proviso to Section 58(c) was added by Act 20 of 1929. Prior to the amendment, there was a conflict of decisions on the question whether the condition contained in a separate deed could be taken into account in ascertaining whether a mortgage was intended by the principal deed. The conflict was resolved by adding proviso to Section 58(c). The proviso to Section 58(c) was added by Act 20 of 1929. Prior to the amendment, there was a conflict of decisions on the question whether the condition contained in a separate deed could be taken into account in ascertaining whether a mortgage was intended by the principal deed. The conflict was resolved by adding proviso to Section 58(c). Considering the scope of proviso to Section 58(c) which was added by Act 20 of 1929 and elaborating upon the distinction between “mortgage by conditional sale” and “sale with agreement to repurchase”, in Bhaskar Waman Joshi v. Narayan Rambilas Agarwal [Bhaskar Waman Joshi v. Narayan Rambilas Agarwal, (1960) 2 SCR 117 : AIR 1960 SC 301 ] , it was held as under: (AIR p. 304, para 7) “7. The proviso to this clause was added by Act 20 of 1929. Prior to the amendment there was a conflict of decisions on the question whether the condition contained in a separate deed could be taken into account in ascertaining whether a mortgage was intended by the principal deed. The Legislature resolved this conflict by enacting that a transaction shall not be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition referred to in the clause is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale. But it does not follow that if the condition is incorporated in the deed effecting or purporting to effect a sale a mortgage transaction must of necessity have been intended. The question whether by the incorporation of such a condition a transaction ostensibly of sale may be regarded as a mortgage is one of intention of the parties to be gathered from the language of the deed interpreted in the light of the surrounding circumstances. The circumstance that the condition is incorporated in the sale deed must undoubtedly be taken into account, but the value to be attached thereto must vary with the degree of formality attending upon the transaction. The definition of a mortgage by conditional sale postulates the creation by the transfer of a relation of mortgagor and mortgagee, the price being charged on the property conveyed. In a sale coupled with an agreement to reconvey there is no relation of debtor and creditor nor is the price charged upon the property conveyed, but the sale is subject to an obligation to retransfer the property within the period specified. In a sale coupled with an agreement to reconvey there is no relation of debtor and creditor nor is the price charged upon the property conveyed, but the sale is subject to an obligation to retransfer the property within the period specified. What distinguishes the two transactions is the relationship of debtor and creditor and the transfer being a security for the debt. The form in which the deed is clothed is not decisive. The definition of a mortgage by conditional sale itself contemplates an ostensible sale of the property.” 13. As per the proviso to Section 58(c), if the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in the separate documents then the transaction cannot be a “mortgage by conditional sale” irrespective of whether the documents are contemporaneously executed; but the converse does not hold good. Observing that the mere fact that there is only one document, it does not necessarily mean that it must be a mortgage and cannot be a sale, in Chunchun Jha v. Sk. Ebadat Ali [Chunchun Jha v. Sk. Ebadat Ali, AIR 1954 SC 345 ] , it was held as under: (AIR pp. 346-47, paras 6-8) “6. The first is that the intention of the parties is the determining factor: see Balkishen Das v. Legge [Balkishen Das v. Legge, 1899 SCC OnLine PC 32 : (1899-1900) 27 IA 58] . But there is nothing special about that in this class of cases and here, as in every other case, where a document has to be construed, the intention must be gathered, in the first place, from the document itself. If the words are express and clear, effect must be given to them and any extraneous enquiry into what was thought or intended is ruled out. The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal effect of the words which they used. If however, there is ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what was intended. The real question in such a case is not what the parties intended or meant but what is the legal effect of the words which they used. If however, there is ambiguity in the language employed, then it is permissible to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine what was intended. As Lord Cranworth said in Alderson v. White [Alderson v. White, (1858) 2 De G & J 97 : 44 ER 924] : (ER p. 928) ‘… The rule of law on this subject is one dictated by commonsense; that prima facie an absolute conveyance, containing nothing to shew that the relation of debtor and creditor is to exist between the parties, does not cease to be an absolute conveyance and become a mortgage merely because the vendor stipulates that he shall have a right to repurchase. In every such case the question is, what, upon a fair construction, is the meaning of the instruments?’ Their Lordships of the Privy Council applied this rule to India in Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din [Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din, 1890 SCC OnLine PC 3 : (1889-90) 17 IA 98] , IA at p. 102 and in Jhanda Singh v. Wahid-Ud- Din [Jhanda Singh v. Wahid-Ud-Din, 1916 SCC OnLine PC 61 : (1915-16) 43 IA 284] , IA at p. 293. 7. The converse also holds good and if, on the face of it, an instrument clearly purports to be a mortgage it cannot be turned into a sale by reference to a host of extraneous and irrelevant considerations. Difficulty only arises in the borderline cases where there is ambiguity. Unfortunately, they form the bulk of this kind of transaction. 8. Because of the welter of confusion caused by a multitude of conflicting decisions the legislature stepped in and amended Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. Unfortunately that brought in its train a further conflict of authority. But this much is now clear. If the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents then the transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. But the converse does not hold good, that is to say the mere fact that there is only one document does not necessarily mean that it must be a mortgage and cannot be a sale. But the converse does not hold good, that is to say the mere fact that there is only one document does not necessarily mean that it must be a mortgage and cannot be a sale. If the condition of repurchase is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale, then it is a matter for construction which was meant. The legislature has made a clear cut classification and excluded transactions embodied in more than one document from the category of mortgages, therefore it is reasonable to suppose that persons who, after the amendment, choose not to use two documents, do not intend the transaction to be a sale, unless they displace that presumption by clear and express words; and if the conditions of Section 58(c) are fulfilled, then we are of opinion that the deed should be construed as a mortgage. (emphasis supplied) In Chunchun Jha [Chunchun Jha v. Sk. Ebadat Ali, AIR 1954 SC 345 ] , after considering the recitals in the document thereon and the surrounding circumstances thereon, the Supreme Court held that there was a relationship of debtor and creditor between the parties existing at the time of the suit transaction. 14. The question in each case is the determination of the real character of the transaction to be ascertained from the provisions of the deed viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. If the words are plain and unambiguous then in the light of the evidence of the surrounding circumstances, they must be given their true legal effect. If there is any ambiguity in the language employed, the intention is to be ascertained from the contents of the deed and the language of the deed is to be taken into consideration to ascertain the intention of the parties. Evidence of contemporaneous conduct of the parties is to be taken into consideration as the surrounding circumstances. 15. After referring to a number of judgments and the essentials of agreement to qualify as a “mortgage by conditional sale”, in Vithal Tukaram Kadam v. Vamanrao Sawalaram Bhosale [Vithal Tukaram Kadam v. Vamanrao Sawalaram Bhosale, (2018) 11 SCC 172 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 72] , it was held as under: (SCC p. 178, para 14) “14. The essentials of an agreement to qualify as a mortgage by conditional sale can succinctly be broadly summarised. The essentials of an agreement to qualify as a mortgage by conditional sale can succinctly be broadly summarised. An ostensible sale with transfer of possession and ownership, but containing a clause for reconveyance in accordance with Section 58(c) of the Act, will clothe the agreement as a mortgage by conditional sale. The execution of a separate agreement for reconveyance, either contemporaneously or subsequently, shall militate against the agreement being mortgage by conditional sale. There must exist a debtor and creditor relationship. The valuation of the property and the transaction value along with the duration of time for reconveyance are important considerations to decide the nature of the agreement. There will have to be a cumulative consideration of these factors along with the recitals in the agreement, intention of the parties, coupled with other attendant circumstances, considered in a holistic manner.” 21. The Supreme Court in the case of Sopan v. Syed Nabi, reported in (2019) 7 SCC 635 has held as under:- "11. In the above circumstance the suit seeking redemption of mortgage was not sustainable. If at all the agreement of reconveyance (Ext. 24) was to be pressed into service, the appropriate course ought to have been for the plaintiff to institute a suit seeking for the relief of specific performance. In such suit the consideration would be on the touchstone of the principles required to be satisfied as governed under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. To that effect there should be appropriate pleading and evidence in support of the contentions which is not presently satisfied as the suit is instituted on a misconception." 22. Plain reading of receipt (Ex.P/3) makes it clear that sale deed dated 30/5/1998 (Ex.P/1) can be treated as sale with condition for reconveyance. The appellants/defendants have relied upon receipt (Ex.D/5) to show that Feran Singh had returned the mortgage amount to Parvat Singh. Receipt (Ex.D/5) was attested by Amar Singh and Prem Singh. 23. Prem Singh (DW3) has stated that Feran Singh had paid Rs.84,500/- to Parvat Singh vide receipt (Ex.D/5) and Parvat Singh had signed the receipt and this witness and Amar Singh had also signed as attesting witnesses. 24. Sale deed (Ex.P/1) is for a consideration amount of Rs.1,05,000/- and agreement to sell (Ex.P/2) is for Rs.95,000/-. Thus, Feran Singh had taken Rs.2,00,000/- from Parvat Singh and had agreed to refund Rs.2,26,000/- within two years (Ex.P/3). 24. Sale deed (Ex.P/1) is for a consideration amount of Rs.1,05,000/- and agreement to sell (Ex.P/2) is for Rs.95,000/-. Thus, Feran Singh had taken Rs.2,00,000/- from Parvat Singh and had agreed to refund Rs.2,26,000/- within two years (Ex.P/3). Admittedly, the entire aforesaid amount was not paid. Even assuming that by receipt dated 30/4/2000 (Ex.D/5), Feran Singh had repaid Rs.84,500/-, still it was not the entire consideration amount for which sale deed was executed. 25. Thus, it is clear that Feran Singh had not returned the entire consideration amount as mentioned in sale deed (Ex.P/1). 26. Furthermore, both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of fact that plaintiffs are in possession of land in question. It is true that revenue record raises presumption regarding possession, but that presumption is rebuttable presumption. Concurrent findings regarding possession are findings of fact. It is well established principle of law that this Court, in exercise of powers under S.100 of CPC, cannot interfere with findings of fact even if they are erroneous, unless and until they are shown to be be perverse. No perversity could be pointed out by counsel for appellants. 27. As no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal, therefore, judgement and decree dated 6/5/2016 passed by First Additional District Judge, Mungavali, District Ashoknagar in Civil Appeal No. 67A of 2012, as well as, judgement and decree dated 5/1/2011 passed by Civil Judge Class 1, Mungavali in Civil Suit No. 3A of 2007,are hereby affirmed. 28. Appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed.