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2025 DIGILAW 43 (AP)

Tummala Hema Kumar v. N Jyoshna

2025-01-06

V.SUJATHA

body2025
ORDER : V.Sujatha, J. This petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short “Cr.P.C.”) to quash the proceedings in Cr.No.335 of 2019, before Alipiri Police Station, Tirupathi Urban for the offences punishable under Sections 448 , 323 , 506 r/w 34 IPC and under Sections 3(1)(g), 3(1)(r),3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST POA Act. 2. The petitioners herein are the accused Nos.1 to 4 & 6 and the respondent No.1 is the de-facto complainant. The respondent No.1 had lodged a private complaint on 18.07.2019 alleging that she is studying 4 th year LLB and her husband is working at Amara Raja Factory and are staying as tenants in the house of the petitioner No.1. While so, due to some reasons best known to them, when the petitioner No.1 asked the de-facto complainant and her husband to vacate their house, the de-facto complainant filed a suit in O.S.No.81 of 2017. Thereafter, when the petitioner No.1 received summons in the aforesaid case, a rental agreement was executed between both the parties with the intervention of the elders, wherein the petitioner No.1 agreed to continue the de-facto complainant and her husband as tenants till 22.04.2020. Subsequently, after completion of one year, the de-facto complainant found eggs, sticks, saffron along with lemon, salt, hairs etc., in front of her house and when she questioned the petitioner No.1, an altercation took place between them and the petitioner No.1 beat the de-facto complaint and abused her in the name of her caste. Alleging the same, the de-facto complainant filed a complaint before the NHRC. Thereafter, on 14.02.2019, the de-facto complainant received a phone call, wherein she was demanded to vacate the house. As such, the de-facto complainant along with her family got shifted to Yerramitta from Cherlopalli and after shifting, she noticed that some of the household articles are missing. Alleging the same, the complaint dated 18.07.2019 vide FIR No.335 of 2019, before the Alipiri Police Station, Tirupathi Urban for the offences punishable under Sections 448 , 323 , 506 r/w 34 IPC and under Sections 3(1)(g), 3(1)(r),3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST POA Act was filed by the de-facto complainant and the same is being challenged in the present Criminal Petition. 3. 3. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners while reiterating contentions raised in the petition has further contended that the alleged offence as stated by the de-facto complainant had taken place on 23.01.2019 at about 12.30 p.m. and the present complaint was lodged by the de-facto complainant on 18.07.2019 and as such, there is nearly a delay of five and half months in filing the complaint by the de-facto complainant. Further, the de-facto complainant, in her complaint dated 18.07.2019, had nowhere stated the particulars of time and date as to when the alleged offence has been taken place. Therefore, the averments made by the de-facto complainant in her complaint dated 18.07.2019 are vague and bald. Hence, the proceedings are liable to be quashed against the petitioners. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 and learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that there are allegations as against the petitioners in the complaint. He submits that the provisions of law indicated in the charge sheet may be looked into by the Court to come to a just conclusion with regard to the culpability of the petitioners. As such, this petition is liable to be dismissed. 6. When the petition came up for admission on 29.07.2019, this court has passed the following order: “…But, in view of the questions of fact and law raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, there shall be an interim stay against any coercive steps including arrest of the petitioner in connection with Crime No.335 of 2019 of Alipiri P.S., Tirupati Urban till 23.08.2019. The questions of fact and law that are raised deserve investigation.” 7. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is as follows: “Whether the proceedings in Cr.No.335 of 2019, before Alipiri Police Station, Tirupathi Urban for the offences punishable under Sections 448 , 323 , 506 r/w 34 IPC and under Sections 3(1)(g), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST POA Act, are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 8. Section 482 of Cr.P.C saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. 9. Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows: In “ R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab , [ AIR 1960 SC 866 ] ”, the Apex Court laid down the following principles: “(i) Where institution/continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice; (ii) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction; (iii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and (iv) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.” 10. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 . It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “ Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar , [ AIR 1990 SC 494 ] ” 11. In “ State of Haryana v. BhajanLal, [ 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ] ” the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 12. Admittedly, the Police had registered FIR.No.335 of 2019 for the offences punishable under sections 448, 323 , 506 r/w 34 IPC and under Sections 3(1)(g), 3(1)(r),3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST POA Act against the petitioners. For better appreciation, the aforesaid Sections are extracted hereunder: Section 448 IPC - Punishment for house-trespass: Whoever commits house-trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term, which may extend to one year, or with fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. For better appreciation, the aforesaid Sections are extracted hereunder: Section 448 IPC - Punishment for house-trespass: Whoever commits house-trespass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term, which may extend to one year, or with fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Section 323 IPC - Punishment for Voluntarily Causing Hurt: Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Section 506 IPC - Punishment for Criminal Intimidation: Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term, which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc- and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, of with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. Section 3(1) of SC & ST POA Act: (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe:- Section 3(1)(g)- wrongfully dispossesses a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe from his land or premises or interferes with the enjoyment of his rights, including forest rights, over any land or premises or water or irrigation facilities or destroys the crops or takes away the produce there from; Section 3(1)(r) -intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; Section 3(1)(s)- abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view; Section 3(2)(Va)- Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, commits any offence specified in the Schedule, against a person or property, knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with such punishment as specified under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for such offences and shall also be liable to fine. 13. On a perusal of the complaint dated 18.07.2019, lodged by the de-facto complainant, it can be seen that nowhere in the said complaint it was mentioned that the petitioners have trespassed into the de-facto complainants house and except stating that an year after the execution of the rental agreement, the de-facto found eggs, sticks, saffron along with lemon, salt, hairs etc., in front of her house and when she questioned the petitioner No.1, an altercation took place between them and the petitioner No.1 beat the de- facto complaint and abused her in the name of her caste. 14. Further, it is the case of the petitioners that the alleged offence as stated by the de-facto complainant took place on 23.01.2019 at about 12.30 p.m. and the present complaint which is under challenge was lodged by the de-facto complainant on 18.07.2019. As such, there is nearly a gap of six (06) months in filing the present complaint. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that time and again the Hon’ble Apex Court in Manoj Kumar Sharma and Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. As such, there is nearly a gap of six (06) months in filing the present complaint. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that time and again the Hon’ble Apex Court in Manoj Kumar Sharma and Ors. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. , [ AIR 2016 SC 3930 , with regard to the delay of lodging the FIR has held as follows: “ Delay of lodging of FIR 18. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story.” 15. The Apex Court in Jai Prakash Singh Vs. State of Bihar and Anr. , [ (2012) 4 SCC 379 ] has held as follows: “12. The FIR in criminal case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence though may not be substantive piece of evidence. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR in respect of the commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of eye- witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. If there is a delay in lodging the FIR, it looses the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of large number of consultations/deliberations. Undoubtedly, the promptness in lodging the FIR is an assurance regarding truth of the informant's version. A promptly lodged FIR reflects the first hand account of what has actually happened, and who was responsible for the offence in question”. 16. In the case on hand, the alleged offence had took place on 23.01.2019 and thereafter on 18.07.2019, the de-facto complainant lodged a complaint against the petitioners before Alipiri Police Station, Tirupati Urban and the same was registered as FIR No.335 of 2019 and as such there is a gap of nearly six (06) months from the date of offence to the date of filing the complaint. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case laws, it can be derived that the delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the allegations that are leveled against the petitioners are general and omnibus in nature and feels it appropriate to quash the proceedings in Cr.No.335 of 2019, before Alipiri Police Station, Tirupathi Urban for the offences punishable under Sections 448 , 323 , 506 r/w 34 IPC and under Sections 3(1)(g), 3(1)(r),3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST POA Act. 18. In view of the same, the proceedings in Cr.No.335 of 2019, before Alipiri Police Station, Tirupathi Urban, against the petitioners hereby quashed. 19. Accordingly, this criminal petition is allowed. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this petition shall stand closed.