JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioners seek, among others, a declaration that Note 1 to Rule 12(9) of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Rules (the Rules) framed under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (the Act) is ultra vires the provisions of the Act to the extent it provides for levying a fee for the area of buildings exceeding 3000 square feet proposed in lands falling under the Act. 2. The learned Senior Counsel Sri. B.G. Harindranath instructed by Sri. Amith Krishnan, Sri. P.K. Soyuz, Sri. K.C. Vincent, Sri. Jacob Sebastian, Sri. P. Sathisan and Sri. Shanavas Khan, on behalf of the petitioners, made the following submissions: 2.1. Section 27A (3) only stipulates that if the application under that Section, namely for regularisation of conversion made before the coming into force of the Act, is allowed, the applicant shall be liable to pay a fee at such rate as may be prescribed. Therefore, the provisions above do not empower the Government to levy a fee for the construction of apartments after regularisation, and hence, the Rule is ultra vires the Act. The power to make subordinate legislation is derived from the enabling Act and it is fundamental that the delegate on whom such a power is conferred has to act within the limits of authority conferred by the Act. There is no conversion of land contrary to the provisions of the Act. In fact, the conversion with respect to the unnotified lands made prior to the commencement of the Act was legal. The KLU Order promulgated under the Essential Commodities Act did not put fetters on the power of the landowner from converting a paddy land/wetland prior to the commencement of the Act i.e. before 12-8-2008. 2.2. Section 27A (6) of the Act specifies that no permission is needed for constructing residential buildings up to 120 sq.m. on 4.04 Ares or commercial buildings up to 40 sq.m. on 2.02 Ares. It clarifies that housing complexes do not qualify as residential buildings under this exemption. If the exempted area is later increased, the owner must pay a fee as per Section 27A(3), which only allows for a conversion fee upon regularisation. Therefore, the provisions do not grant the Government, the authority to levy additional fees for apartment construction, making the Rule ultra vires the Act. If the exempted area is later increased, the owner must pay a fee as per Section 27A(3), which only allows for a conversion fee upon regularisation. Therefore, the provisions do not grant the Government, the authority to levy additional fees for apartment construction, making the Rule ultra vires the Act. For one purpose a landowner has to pay three fees to the Government, which is illegal and not contemplated in the Act. The unreasonable levy of additional fees for conversion amounts to extortion. It is a well-settled position of law that the fee sought by the Government should be reasonable and commensurate with the benefit derived by the petitioner. If permission is granted under the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967, the landowner has the right to use the land as desired, without dictation from authorities. In cases where permission is granted under Section 9 on paddy lands in the data bank through Form 1, no fee is imposed for construction and therefore a levy of fee for construction under Note 1 is discriminatory as well. 2.3. Regarding unnotified lands, there is only a regularisation of records and no actual conversion. The government's service is limited to correcting the BTR, and thus, any fee imposed must have a direct correlation to this service. The classification of fees based on building area lacks rational connection to the Act's goals, violating the equality principle under Article 14 of the Constitution. Rules must align with the parent statute and cannot extend beyond its provisions. The correction of the BTR allows for construction, and imposing additional charges based on square footage for construction is irrational and arbitrary. The levy is hit by Article 265 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, Article 300A of the Constitution guarantees property owners protection from deprivation without legal authority; therefore, any law must be constitutional and sustainable. Section 27A of the Act grants the competent authority the power to permit the use of unnotified lands for various purposes. As such, imposing a fee based on building area is inconsistent with legislative intent and unjustifiable. The petitioners also point out that for those lands that were converted prior to 30.12.2017, no fee is leviable and therefore equals are being treated unequally as persons holding lands whose nature have already been changed are treated differently. 2.4. As such, imposing a fee based on building area is inconsistent with legislative intent and unjustifiable. The petitioners also point out that for those lands that were converted prior to 30.12.2017, no fee is leviable and therefore equals are being treated unequally as persons holding lands whose nature have already been changed are treated differently. 2.4. The learned counsel relied on the following judgments to support their contentions: Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 , Jindal Stainless Limited and Another v. State of Haryana and Others, (2017) 12 SCC 1 , Kunj Behari Lal Butail and Others v. State of H.P. and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 40 , Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State of Kerala and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 327 , Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Another v. State of Bihar and Others, 2018 KHC 7066, District Collector, Ernakulam and others v. Fr. Ltd. and Another v. State of Bihar and Others, 2018 KHC 7066, District Collector, Ernakulam and others v. Fr. Jose Uppani and others, 2020 (4) KHC 394 , Gujarat Ambuja Exports Ltd. (M/s) and another v. State of Uttarakhand and others, 2016 (3) SCC 601 , Dental Council of India v. Biyani Shikshan Samiti, 2022 (2) KLT Online 1045 (SC), D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 , Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Others v. Shrey Mercantile (P) Ltd and Others, (2005) 4 SCC 245 , Ramesh Chandra Sharma and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2024) 5 SCC 217 , Saji C.M. and others v. State of Kerala and Others, 2015 (4) KLT 452 , In Re: Delhi Laws Act, AIR 1951 SC 332 , Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. and Others v. State of U.P. and Others, (1990) 1 SCC 109 , Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority v. Vidya Chetal, (2019) 9 SCC 83 , State of U.P. and others v. Sitapur Packing Wood Suppliers and Others, (2002) 4 SCC 566 , State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. TVL South Indian Sugar Mills Association and Others, (2015) 13 SCC 748 , Sant Saran Lal and another v. Parsuram Sahu Alias Kishan Lal Sahu and Others, AIR 1966 SC 1852 , Wipro Limited v. Assistant Collector of Customs and Others, (2015) 14 SCC 161 , Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd and Others v. Union of India and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 641 , Bharathidasan University and Another v. All India Council for Technical Education and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 676 , Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board v. Indraprastha Gas Limited and Others, (2015) 9 SCC 209 , Union of India and Others v. S. Srinivasan, (2012) 7 SCC 683 , Gupta Modern Breweries v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, (2007) 6 SCC 317 , Bimal Chandra Banerjee and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (1970) 2 SCC 467 , Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Another v. State of Orissa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 400 , Cheranelloor Grama Panchayath, Ernakulam and Another v. Joe Thattil, 2020 (5) KHC 669 , Abdul Salam v. State of Kerala, 2021 (6) KLT 452 , Baby v. District Collector, 2021 (6) KLT 316 , Global Education Trust v. State of Kerala, 2020 (6) KLT 738 , Mohammed Ashraf v. State of Kerala, 2021 (3) KLT 334 , Philomina Joseph v. Revenue Divisional Officer, 2022 (1) KLT 509 , Revenue Divisional Officer v. Ajith Kumar Shenoy, 2022 (1) KLT Online 1162, Jafarkhan v. K.A. Kochumakkar and others, 2012 (1) KHC 523 (DB), Shahul Hameed v. Principal Secretary, Local Self Government, 2018 (1) KLT 1008 , Shivadasan v. Revenue Divisional Officer, 2017 (3) KLT 822 , Dr. Umesh Chandra Maheshwari v. Mathura/Vrindavan Development, 2018 SCC Online All 877, State of H.P. and Others v. Shivalik Agro Poly Products and Others, (2004) 8 SCC 556 , State of Tamil Nadu and Another v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Association, (2021) 15 SCC 534 , Baby M.K. and Others v. District Collector, Ekm. and Others, 2021 (6) KHC 318 . 3. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader Sri. S. Renjith, opposing the prayers in the writ petitions, submitted as follows: 3.1. The Kerala Land Utilization Order, 1967 has no scheme or enabling provisions to legalise any illegal conversion. There is no doubt that one can approach the District Collector under the KLU Order, for the purpose of using the land for any other purpose. However, there is no provision to regularise any illegal conversion. To avoid such an anomaly, the Paddy Act was enacted. The Government have enacted the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land & Wet Land Act, 2008 to prevent illegal conversion and reclamation of wetland and paddy lands in the State of Kerala. 3.2. The existing Paddy Land Act does not provide for the constitution of a Paddy Cultivators Relief Fund and the Government thought that such a fund is to be constituted for providing financial assistance to paddy cultivators to promote paddy cultivation in the State of Kerala. Some of the holders of the paddy land are unwilling to cultivate the paddy lands and wetlands because of the increased expenses for cultivating paddy lands. Some of the holders of the paddy land are unwilling to cultivate the paddy lands and wetlands because of the increased expenses for cultivating paddy lands. Section 27A(3) of the Act, doesn't restrict the Government from levying fees based on the plinth area/area of the building. The Government can in any manner. i.e., based on the extent of the land or the area of the building, or both, levy a fee for the reclamation of land, and thus discourage/restrict to the maximum extent, massive constructions in reclaimed land. Section 27A(6) of the Act clearly specifies the intention of the Legislature, showing that the legislature has imposed restriction and limitation over the land and that too was done in certain provisions on the basis of the extent of land. Section 27A (1) of the Act categorised the usage of land for three purposes, namely, residential or commercial or other purposes and added that the owner shall apply to the RDO for utilising the unnotified land following the provisions. 3.3. Section 30 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act provides the rule-making power. Accordingly, the Government can make Rules to carry out the provisions of the Act. The legislative measure arose from widespread illegal conversions of agricultural land, necessitating a framework to protect the ecological balance and agricultural production. The authority to levy fees is grounded in the legislative intent to regulate land conversion responsibly, ensuring compliance with ecological standards and safeguarding agricultural interests. Thus, Rule 12(9) remains valid and necessary to implement the objectives of the Act effectively. 3.4. The learned Government Pleader relied on the following judgments to support his contentions: Prabhakara Reddy A. and Company v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, (2016) 1 SCC 600 , Cardamom Marketing Corporation and Another v. State of Kerala and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 255 , Ravinder Sood v. State and Others, 2020 KHC 2764. 4. Heard the learned counsel on both sides at length and perused the records. 5. The object of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (the Act) reads thus: “An Act to conserve the paddy land and wetland and to restrict the conversion or reclamation thereof, in order to promote growth in the agricultural sector and to sustain the ecological system, in the State of Kerala.” Section 27A of the Act is extracted hereunder. “27A. “27A. Change of nature of unnotified land: (1) If any owner of an unnotified land desires to utilise such land for residential or commercial or for other purpose, he shall apply to the Revenue Divisional Officer for permission in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal or any other authority, the Revenue Divisional Officer may, after considering the reports of the Village Officer concerned, pass such orders as deemed fit and proper on such applications, ensuring that there is no disruption to the free flow of water to the neighbouring paddy lands, if any, through such water conservancy measures as is deemed necessary: Provided that, if the area of such parcel of land where the application is allowed is more than 20.2 Ares, ten per cent of such land shall be set apart for water conservancy measures. (3) If the application is allowed, the applicant shall be liable to pay a fee at such rate as may prescribed: Provided that, no such fee shall be collected if the applicant proves that the land where the application is allowed is, filled up or naturally filled up before the 4th day of July 1967, the date of commencement of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967, after completing such procedure, as may be prescribed. (4) If the application is allowed, the Revenue Divisional Officer shall ensure that the reclamation of the unnotified land shall not adversely affect the cultivation of paddy or any other crops, if any, in the adjoining land and shall specify such water conservancy measures as is necessary to ensure such cultivation: Provided that in specifying such water conservancy measures, the Revenue Divisional Officer may, if he deems fit, refer to satellite maps of the area maintained by Government agencies. (5) No permission under this section shall be necessary where the purpose for which the unnotified land is converted or attempted to be converted or utilized or attempted to be utilized is for paddy cultivation. (5) No permission under this section shall be necessary where the purpose for which the unnotified land is converted or attempted to be converted or utilized or attempted to be utilized is for paddy cultivation. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (13 of 1994) or in the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (20 of 1994), no permission under this section shall be necessary for constructing a residential building having a maximum area of 120 square meters in a maximum extent of 4.04 ares of land or a commercial building having a maximum area of 40 square meters in a maximum extent of 2.02 ares of land: Provided that the construction of a housing complex or complexes or flats or multi-storied residential complexes shall not come within the meaning of residential building specified in this sub-section: Provided further that this exemption shall be granted only once. (7) The exemption under sub-section (6) shall be applicable only to owners of unnotified lands under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland (Amendment) Act, 2018: Provided that if the area of the residential building or commercial building exempted under sub- section (6) is subsequently increased by new extension, the exemption under sub-section (6) shall cease to have effect and the owner of the land as on the date of detection of the new extension shall be liable to pay fee as per sub-section (3). (8) Where conversion of an unnotified land is required for any public purpose, the Revenue Divisional Officer shall submit a report to Government outlining the measures to be adopted to ensure that the reclamation shall not disrupt the free flow of water to the neighbouring paddy lands, if any, and shall suggest such water conservancy measures as is necessary to ensure this. (9) The Government may, on receipt of a report under sub- section (8), issue permission to reclaim unnotified land for public purpose: Provided that where permission is granted, the Government may make necessary modifications to the recommendations of the Revenue Divisional Officer as deemed fit: Provided further that, if the area of such parcel of land where the application is allowed is more than 20.2 Ares, ten per cent of such land shall be set apart for water conservancy measures. (10) The order issued under sub-section (2) and (9) shall clearly indicate the survey number of the lands and the extent of the land in each survey number for which sanction has been accorded, the extent of the land in which water conservancy measures are to be adopted by the applicant and a sketch of such land indicating the aforementioned details shall be appended to the order. (11) The Revenue Divisional Officer may, either suo motu or on the application of any aggrieved party, cancel any order issued under sub-section (2) if the conditions specified in the order issued therein are not complied by the applicant, either fully or partially. (12) No order of cancellation under sub-section (11) shall be made by the Revenue Divisional Officer unless the applicant thereof has been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter. (13) Any application received for the change of nature of unnotified land from the date of commencement of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland (Amendment) Act, 2018 shall be considered and disposed of only in accordance with the provisions of the Act.” 5.1. The Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act aims to protect paddy lands and wetlands in Kerala. The Act emphasises the importance of preserving these areas to promote agricultural growth and maintain ecological balance. Section 27A (3) of the Act provides for the regularisation of conversions that occurred before the coming into force of the Act, provided an application is made and the required fees paid. Essentially, this means that previous land conversions can be legitimised, but the Act doesn't impose further restrictions on those lands once they are regularised. Thus, if the processes outlined in Section 27A are completed, construction or other activities on those lands are permissible, and the Act does not apply to them anymore. 5.2. The only fee contemplated for regularising the records is one under Section 27A(3), which is based on the extent of the land and not on the construction or its size. The fee itself is levied to regularise conversions that happened before the Act came into force. 5.3. The levy impugned is challenged on the ground that the same is ultra vires the Paddy Act. The doctrine of ultra vires envisages that a rule making body must function within the purview of the rule making authority conferred on it by the parent Act. 5.3. The levy impugned is challenged on the ground that the same is ultra vires the Paddy Act. The doctrine of ultra vires envisages that a rule making body must function within the purview of the rule making authority conferred on it by the parent Act. As the body making rules or regulations has no inherent power of its own to make rules, but derives such power only from the statute, it has to necessarily function within the purview of the statute. It is trite that the court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or non- conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity. 5.4. Delegated legislation should not travel beyond the purview of the parent Act. If it does, it is ultra vires and cannot be given any effect. Ultra vires may arise in several ways; there may be simple excess of power over what is conferred by the parent Act; delegated legislation may be inconsistent with the provisions of the parent Act or statute law or the general law; there may be non- compliance with the procedural requirement as laid down in the parent Act. It is the function of the courts to keep all authorities within the confines of the law by applying the doctrine of ultra vires. The Rules, regulations, schemes, bye-laws, orders made under statutory powers are all comprised within the ambit of delegated legislation. The powers of statutory bodies are derived, controlled and restricted by the statutes that create them and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. Any action of such bodies in excess of their power or in violation of the restrictions placed on their powers is ultra vires. The powers of statutory bodies are derived, controlled and restricted by the statutes that create them and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. Any action of such bodies in excess of their power or in violation of the restrictions placed on their powers is ultra vires. Rules are duly made relative to the subject matter on which the statutory bodies act subordinate to the terms of the statute under which they are promulgated. Regulations are in aid of the enforcement of the provisions of the statute. One of the principles of delegated legislation is that the Rules so made must not endeavour to include in its ambit what the Act itself does not contemplate or possess. 5.5. The Supreme Court, in several cases including in Union of India and Others v. S. Srinivasan, 2012 (7) SCC 683 and the earlier judgments in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Others. Vs. Union of India and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 641 , General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and Another v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav and Another, (1988) 2 SCC 351 , Additional District Magistrate (Rev) Delhi Admn. v. Siri Ram, (2000) 5 SCC 451 , Sukhdev Singh and Others v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Another, (1975) 1 SCC 421 , Kunj Behari Lal Butail and Others v. State of H.P. and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 40 , Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Company Limited and Another v. Union of India and Others, (2009) 16 SCC 569 laid down the following principles: (i) The rule must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed. (ii) It must also come within the scope and purview of the rule-making power of the authority framing the rule. (iii) Conferment of rule-making power by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act. (iv) Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. (v) Rules shall not be ultra vires the Constitution and shall not go against the legislative policy of the statute. (vi) Subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity that is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. (vii) Subordinate legislation yields to plenary legislation and so a rule made under a statute can be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. (vi) Subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity that is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. (vii) Subordinate legislation yields to plenary legislation and so a rule made under a statute can be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. (viii) Rules made under a statute cannot be unreasonable. (ix) Rule made under a statute must establish the pattern of conduct to be followed and shall not be used to enlarge the powers beyond the scope intended by the legislature. (x) When a statute confirms a general rule making power, the rule so made shall satisfy the test of falling within the scope of such power and must fulfill the object and purpose of the enabling Act. (xi) The delegate on whom a rule making power is conferred with has to act within the limits of the authority conferred by the Act. (xii) The powers of statutory bodies are derived, controlled and restricted by the statutes which create them and any action of such bodies in excess of their power or in violation of the restrictions placed on their powers is ultra vires. 5.6. As stated above, delegated legislation refers to rules, regulations, or orders made by an authority under powers granted by a parent statute. It is essential that such delegated laws remain within the confines of the power conferred by that statute. For a rule to have legal effect, it must conform to the provisions of the enabling Act and fall within the scope of rule-making authority specified in that Act. The authority given to make rules does not permit exceeding what has been legislatively intended, and the Rules cannot contradict or supplant statutory provisions. They must supplement existing laws without creating new substantive rights not outlined in the parent Act. When a legislature grants general rule-making power for carrying out an Act's purpose, it does not grant unrestricted powers. If a body makes rules beyond its conferred powers or inconsistent with statutory law, those rules are considered ultra vires (beyond one's legal power) and are void. 5.7. The learned Government Pleader argues that the fee imposed on buildings exceeding 3,000 square feet on unnotified lands reflects the legislative intent of the Paddy Act and falls under the authority to create rules for its implementation. 5.7. The learned Government Pleader argues that the fee imposed on buildings exceeding 3,000 square feet on unnotified lands reflects the legislative intent of the Paddy Act and falls under the authority to create rules for its implementation. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the Act’s objectives and cannot be upheld. When considering the provisions of the Act alongside its objectives, it is clear that the power to levy a fee based on the extent of construction is not granted. Even if the government's objectives are commendable, without an enabling statutory provision, the fee cannot be collected. Consequently, the argument that the levy is ultra vires is to be upheld, as the Act's intent and the scope of rule-making authority under Section 30 do not permit such fees. The only fee allowable under the Act for regularising land conversions is outlined in Section 27A(3), and no additional fee for construction is contemplated. Since the Act does not regulate building construction, such a levy cannot be justified. In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, (1985) 1 SCC 641 the Supreme Court found that the rules imposed a fee for the registration of books and publications, but the parent Act did not confer the authority to impose such a fee. The power to make a Rule to levy a tax or fee, if any, has to be done within the limits prescribed by the Act and not in transgression of the Act. It has to limit itself to the powers granted to it by the Act. 5.8. In view of the findings rendered above, there cannot be any doubt that Note 1 to Rule 12(9) of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Rules (the Rules) framed under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (the Act) travels beyond the parent Act and therefore the same has to be held illegal and invalid. 6. The petitioners argue that the fee imposed lacks reciprocity, making it invalid. They assert that the regularisation of unnotified land changes under Section 27A(3) is contingent on the payment of this fee, reflecting a two-way exchange. In contrast, the fee imposed under Rule 12(9) does not meet the definition of a fee, as it does not correspond to any specific benefit for the payer, rendering the levy unjustifiable. They assert that the regularisation of unnotified land changes under Section 27A(3) is contingent on the payment of this fee, reflecting a two-way exchange. In contrast, the fee imposed under Rule 12(9) does not meet the definition of a fee, as it does not correspond to any specific benefit for the payer, rendering the levy unjustifiable. The levy through Rule 12(9) does not satisfy the definition of fee. The term “fee” can mean a license fee and the same does not necessarily mean a fee in return for services. If a license fee is collected, there cannot be any argument that the said fee has to be only for the services rendered. The nature of services to be rendered in return for a levy to make it a fee has been considered by the Supreme Court in several cases and in all of them it has been held that the services must confer some benefit on the person to make the fee. The Supreme Court has distinguished between a tax and a fee under the Indian Constitution. A tax is a mandatory payment to a public authority for general state expenses, merged into the government's revenue, without providing specific benefits to the taxpayer. In contrast, a fee is a payment made for specific services rendered, characterised by quid pro quo (reciprocity). 6.1. The following principles emerge from the judgments of the Apex Court: 1. The fee which is charged for regulation is classifiable as a Fee and an element of quid pro quo is not required. 2. Regulatory fees shall not be excessive and must be reasonable. 3. There shall be a reasonable relationship between the levy of the fee and the service rendered and a mathematical exactitude is not necessary. 4. License fee does not mean a fee in lieu of services. 5. No quid pro quo needs to be established in regulatory fees and not required to find out whether there is a correlatable quid pro quo to the quantum of the levy. 6. Quid pro quo is not a condition precedent for the levy of a regulatory fee. 7. The only examination required in levying of regulatory fee is whether it is excessive or unreasonable. 6.2. There is no contention by the government in the instant case that the levy is a tax and not a fee. 6. Quid pro quo is not a condition precedent for the levy of a regulatory fee. 7. The only examination required in levying of regulatory fee is whether it is excessive or unreasonable. 6.2. There is no contention by the government in the instant case that the levy is a tax and not a fee. It is also not shown that the person who is making the payment is granted any benefit. In the absence of any contention on the part of the government that the fee in the instant case is a regulatory fee or that it is a license fee, their contention has to fail for want of any services being given to the person making the payment. The distinction between tax and fee itself is the element of quid pro quo which characterizes a fee. Indisputably, the fee under Rule 12(9) is not tied to any specific service provided by the Government and therefore the levy of the fee is bad on that count as well. 6.3. The Government argues that the fee serves as a mechanism to discourage large-scale developments restricted by the Act and that it is intended to fund a "Paddy Cultivators Relief Fund." This fund aims to support paddy farmers and promote sustainable agriculture, aligning with the Act's goal of protecting agricultural interests. However, this argument also cannot be accepted for the reasons previously outlined. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners further argued that imposing a fee without statutory backing is also hit by Article 265 of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows: “265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law: No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.” 7.1. The question as to whether the term “tax” under Article 265 of the Constitution of India includes imposts of every kind namely; tax, duty, cess or fees has been answered by the Supreme Court in its decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur, Rajasthan v. McDowell and Co. Ltd. 2009 KHC 5214 as follows. “20. “The Tax”, “Duty”, “Cess” or “fee” constituting a class denotes to various kinds of imposts by State in its sovereign power of taxation to raise revenue for the State. Within the expression of each specie each expression denotes different kind of impost depending on the purpose for which they are levied. Ltd. 2009 KHC 5214 as follows. “20. “The Tax”, “Duty”, “Cess” or “fee” constituting a class denotes to various kinds of imposts by State in its sovereign power of taxation to raise revenue for the State. Within the expression of each specie each expression denotes different kind of impost depending on the purpose for which they are levied. This power can be exercised in any of its manifestation only under any law authorizing levy and collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 which uses only expression that no “tax” shall be levied and collected except authorized by law. 21. It in its elementary meaning conveys that to support a tax legislative action is essential, it cannot be levied and collected in the absence of any legislative sanction by exercise of executive power of State under Article 73 by the Union or Article 162 by the State. Under Article 366(28) “Taxation” has been defined to include the imposition of any tax or impost whether general or local or special and tax shall be construed accordingly. “Impost” means compulsory levy. 22. The well-known and well-settled characteristic of “tax” in its wider sense includes all imposts. Imposts in the context have following characteristics: (i) The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty. (ii) “Law” in the context of Article 265 means an Act of legislature and cannot comprise an executive order or rule without express statutory authority. (iii) The term “tax” under Article 265 read with Article 366(28) includes imposts of every kind viz. tax, duty, cess or fees. (iv) As an incident of sovereignty and in the nature of compulsory exaction, a liability founded on principle of contract cannot be a “tax” in its technical sense as an impost, general, local or special.” 7.2. Again in the judgment reported in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Another v. State of Bihar and Others, 2018 KHC 7066, the Apex Court considered the argument that the compulsory exaction without the authority of law directly infringes the fundamental rights under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) and also Article 265 of the Constitution of India and specifically considered the question as to whether the prohibition contained in Article 265 is confined only to levy and collection of tax or it would also extent to levy or collection of a fee. Answering the said issue, the Supreme Court in the Judgment in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Another (Supra) relying on McDowell and Co. Ltd categorically held that the expression “fee” is also comprehended in the expression “tax” for the purpose of Article 265 and even for the collection of a “fee”, authority or law (i.e. legislative support) is mandatorily required under the Constitution. The legal position above noted was again approved by the nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jindal Stainless Limited and Another v. State of Haryana and Others, (2017) 12 SCC 1 . 7.3. The Supreme Court again reiterated this position in Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority and Another v. Rajesh Sharma and Others, 2023 SCC Online SC 530, holding that, as per Article 265 of the Constitution of India, there shall not be any levy of tax/fees/charges except in accordance with law and/or as provided under the statute. 7.4. In Bimal Chandra Banerjee and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (1970) 2 SCC 467 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: “18. No tax can be imposed by any bye-law or rule or regulation unless the statute under which the subordinate legislation is made specially authorises the imposition even if it is assumed that the power to tax can be delegated to the executive. The basis of the statutory power conferred by the statute cannot be transgressed by the rule making authority. A rule making authority has no plenary power. It has to act within the limits of the power granted to it.” 7.5. In Gupta Modern Breweries v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Ors. (2007) 6 SCC 317 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: “20. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the regulatory powers are generally to be widely construed. However, empowering the State Government to impose taxes, fees or duties and such demands must be authorised by the statute and must contain sufficient guidelines.” 7.6. Given the above, I hold that the levy is opposed to Article 265 of the Constitution of India as no statutory provision enabled the Government to collect a levy like the one impugned in the writ petition. 8. Given the above, I hold that the levy is opposed to Article 265 of the Constitution of India as no statutory provision enabled the Government to collect a levy like the one impugned in the writ petition. 8. It is relevant to note that once the conversion of the land is permitted under the KLU Order and the land is classified as purayidom/garden land in the Basic Tax Register (BTR), the provisions of the 2008 Act and its amendments are inapplicable. The case of LLMC, Kizhakkambalam Grama Panchayath and others v. Mariumma and another, 2015 (2) KLT 516 (DB) affirms that the classification change in the BTR upon valid conversion is binding and must be respected by authorities. The imposition of conversion charges or fees under Rule 27A of the amended Rules or related provisions of the 2008 Act is ultra vires when the conversion was approved or applications were made before 30.12.2017. This has been stated in Mohammed Ashraf v. State of Kerala (supra). The demand for such charges disregards the principle of legitimate expectation, as landowners who followed the legal framework of the KLU Order reasonably expected that the 2008 Act or its amendment would not bind them further. 8.1. This Court has repeatedly held that lands legally utilised or converted prior to the incorporation of Section 27A of the 2008 Act cannot be subjected to the restrictions or requirements introduced by the amended Act. The Division Bench relied on earlier judgments, including Aishabeevi v. Superintendent of Police, 2014 (3) KLT 1078 , which clarified that constructions undertaken without explicit orders under the KLU Order cannot be retrospectively deemed illegal. Furthermore, the Government of Kerala's circular dated 13.08.2018, exempted constructions completed under building permits issued before 30.12.2017 from compliance with Section 27A, reinforcing the principle that the amended provisions of the 2008 Act apply only to lands not legally utilised before the amendments. Thus, lands already converted or utilised, with or without explicit permissions under the KLU Order, before the amendments of 2008 retain their legal status. These precedents ensure that the stricter provisions of the 2008 Act do not unfairly burden landholders who acted within the framework of the earlier KLU Order, safeguarding their legitimate expectations and upholding principles of non-retroactivity in law. 8.2. This position of law is made clear by the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in The Tahsildar & Anr. These precedents ensure that the stricter provisions of the 2008 Act do not unfairly burden landholders who acted within the framework of the earlier KLU Order, safeguarding their legitimate expectations and upholding principles of non-retroactivity in law. 8.2. This position of law is made clear by the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in The Tahsildar & Anr. v. Renjith George, 2025 KHC Online 7012 held that despite the insertion of a separate definition of unnotified land, the legislature has treated both “paddy land” and “unnotified land” at par for the purpose of their conversion as non-agricultural lands. The nature of land, whether paddy land or unnotified land thus becomes immaterial when applying its conversion to non-agricultural purposes. It is also held that the Amendment Act will apply to the applications that were already pending consideration before the Amendment Act came into force. 8.3. It has to be noticed that the application under Section 27A itself is contemplated when an owner of an unnotified land or paddy land under the Act desires to utilise such land for residential or commercial or for other purposes. Thus, it is clear that the application itself is for enabling the owners to use their land for residential or commercial or for other purposes and it is the said application that is being allowed after collecting a fee mentioned in Section 27A(3). Once the steps under Section 27A and the change in records are completed, there cannot be any further restriction placed or any levy demanded under the provisions of the Act. On this ground also, the levy has to be held to be bad and inoperative. 9. It is to be noted that the right of the land owners after completing the steps under the Paddy Act to enjoy their property is seriously curtailed by the proposed levy. Article 300A guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his property saved by the authority of law. It is trite that under Article 300A of the Constitution, nobody can be deprived of the property and right of residence, otherwise in the manner prescribed by law. The right to property of a person would include a right to construct a building, though such right can be restricted by reason of legislation. It is trite that under Article 300A of the Constitution, nobody can be deprived of the property and right of residence, otherwise in the manner prescribed by law. The right to property of a person would include a right to construct a building, though such right can be restricted by reason of legislation. The fee in the instant case has to be taken as one potentially infringing upon their rights guaranteed under Article 300A as it deprives the right of the petitioners to enjoy their property to the fullest by effecting construction, a fundamental aspect of property enjoyment, by imposing an unreasonable fee, amounting to an unreasonable restriction on the right to use and enjoyment the property. 9.1. When the right to construct is seriously inhibited by a levy, which is hit by Article 265 of the Constitution of India, equally the restriction would also violate the letter and spirit of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 10. Based on the findings rendered above, the irresistible conclusion is that the levy cannot be sustained and therefore the same is declared as inconsistent with the provisions of the statute in question. Accordingly, it is declared that Note 1 to Rule 12(9) is ultra vires the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 and Rules and the Amendment Act, 2018 to the extent it imposes a levy of fee of Rs.100/- per sq. feet exceeding 3000 sq. ft. 11. Consequently: (1) No demand for the above fee shall be made against the petitioners and their applications for building permits shall be considered without insisting on the payment referred above and subject to the provisions of the relevant Building Rules. The pending applications for building permits, if any, shall be considered within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. (2) The amounts, if any, collected from the petitioners under Note 1 to Rule 12(9) of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Rules (the Rules) framed under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (the Act) shall be refunded to them within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 12. The writ petitions are allowed as above.