JUDGMENT : Nelson Sailo, J. Heard Mr. B. Picha, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. N. Ratan, learned Addl. Advocate General for the State respondents. This is a writ appeal filed by the appellant/writ petitioner (hereafter referred to as the petitioner) against the Judgment & Order dated 12.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No. 250 (AP)/2023 dismissing the writ petition. 2. The facts of the case in brief is that the petitioner joined as Forester (Grade-II) on 15.06.1987 in the Department of Environment & Forest, Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh and is working as such since then. It is the case of the petitioner that ever since he joined in service, he has not earned any promotion till date. As per the Arunachal Pradesh Forest Department (Executive Service) Recruitment Rules, 1974 (Rules of 1974), the next promotional post from the post of Forester (Grade-II) is to the post of Dy. Forest Ranger (DFR) and the method of promotion is by way of seniority-cum-merit from amongst the Foresters (Grade-II) who have rendered not less than 5 years of service. Further, 75% of the vacancies are reserved for matriculate Foresters (Grade-II) while 25% vacancies are reserved for non-matriculate Foresters (Grade-II). 3. Subsequently, a separate recruitment rules for the post of DFR was framed viz; the Recruitment Rules for the Post of Dy. Forest Ranger, 2003 (Rules of 2003) which provided that promotion to the post of DFR can be made from amongst Foresters having minimum 5 years of regular service in the grade 100% by way of promotion. The Rules of 2003 was thereafter repealed by the Dy. Forest Ranger/Forester/Forest Guard Recruitment Rules, 2019 (Rules of 2019) but the criteria for promotion to the post of DFR remains the same. 4. The Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh in the Department of Vigilance issued orders dated 02.04.2013, 06.06.2017, 11.05.2018 & 25.02.2020 by which, in order to be eligible for being considered for promotion to the next higher post, one requires to obtain vigilance clearance certificate. Since the petitioner could not secure vigilance clearance certificate, he could not be considered for promotion to the post of DFR. Being aggrieved with the orders issued by the Vigilance Department mandating vigilance clearance for being considered for promotion, the petitioner filed WP(C) (AP) 250/2023 challenging the said orders. However, the learned Single Judge, vide the impugned Judgment & Order dated 12.04.2024 dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved with the orders issued by the Vigilance Department mandating vigilance clearance for being considered for promotion, the petitioner filed WP(C) (AP) 250/2023 challenging the said orders. However, the learned Single Judge, vide the impugned Judgment & Order dated 12.04.2024 dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the instant intra court appeal. 5. Mr. B Picha, learned counsel submits that the ground for challenging the impugned orders issued by the Vigilance Department is two-fold. He submits that firstly, the impugned orders cannot be said to be valid since the recruitment rules itself does not prescribe that one should have vigilance clearance certificate. Secondly, the impugned orders having been issued in the form of executive instructions, the same cannot be applied to the petitioner’s case. He therefore submits that the impugned orders are not sustainable in law and should be set aside. 6. Elaborating his argument, the learned counsel submits that the rules regulating the conditions of service can be changed in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution of India but not by way of executive instructions. He submits that even if executive instructions are issued, the same can be done for filling up the gap when there is no clarity in the rules or there is ambiguity and uncertainty in the rules. However, in the instant case, since there is no gap in the rules, the impugned orders introducing the requirement of having vigilance clearance certificate in order to be considered for promotion cannot be sustained and should be set aside and quashed. 7. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is an employee of the Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh in the Environment & Forest Department and therefore, he cannot be governed by the guidelines or rules framed by the Vigilance Department. That the impugned orders also violate the rights of the petitioner conferred by Article 14, 16, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of India. He submits that in fact the petitioner was permitted to construct his residential building by the District Administration and therefore, he is not an unauthorized occupant. In this connection he relies upon the certificate issued to the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila on 23.05.2017. He submits that in fact the petitioner was permitted to construct his residential building by the District Administration and therefore, he is not an unauthorized occupant. In this connection he relies upon the certificate issued to the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila on 23.05.2017. He submits that at any rate even if the petitioner is to be considered as an unauthorized occupant, remedial steps can be taken by the respondent authorities by invoking the Arunachal Pradesh Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 2023. The learned counsel submits that the learned Single Judge failed to consider all these aspects and therefore, the impugned judgment & order should be set aside. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the following authorities:- 1. C. Sankaranarayanan, Etc., Etc. Vs. The State of Kerala , 1971(2) SCC 361 2. The Dist. Registrar, Palghat & Ors. Vs. M. B. Koyakutty & Ors. (1979) 2 SCC 150 3. S. L. Sachdev & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1980) 4 SCC 562 4. K. Kuppusamy & Anr. Vs. State of T. N. & Ors., (1998) 8 SCC 469 5. Dr. Rajinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., (2001) 5 SCC 482 6. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., Chandigarh Vs. Manmohan Singh & Anr. (2007) 9 SCC 337 7. Coal India Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Saroj Kumar Mishra, (2007) 9 SCC 625 8. Ajaya Kumar Das Vs. State of Orissa and Ors. , (2011) 11 SCC 136 9. Union of India & Ors. Vs. Krishna Kumar & Ors. (2019) 4 SCC 319 10. Dr. Hira Lal Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (2020) 4 SCC 346 11. Madhyaman Broadcasting Ltd. Vs. Union of India , (2023) 13 SCC 401 12. State of Haryana, Etc. Etc. Vs. Shamsher Jang Bahadur, Etc. Etc. , (1972) 2 SCC 188 8. Mr. N. Ratan, learned Addl. Advocate General, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner is relying upon the certificate issued to him on 23.05.2017 by the Deputy Commissioner and District Vigilance Officer, West Kameng, District Bomdila, which states that the petitioner has constructed private building on Government land at Bomdila and although he does not possess any formal land allotment order, the official records revealed that he had obtained permission from the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, West Kameng district for carrying out the construction works of the said building. The learned Additional Advocate General submits that the order dated 02.04.2013 otherwise provides that the NOC is to be obtained from the concerned Deputy Commissioner who is required to clearly state that the Government official has not encroached upon any Government property nor has he caused any damage or abetted encroachment on the public property by a private person. He therefore submits that the certificate relied upon by the petitioner has no relevance. 9. The learned Addl. Advocate General further submits that like any other recruitment rules, the recruitment rules for the post of DFR does not contain exhaustive details as to how the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) is to be conducted and therefore, in order to fill such gap, executive instructions to supplement the recruitment rules as permissible in law has been issued through the impugned orders. The impugned orders have been issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution of India to supplement and not supplant the recruitment rules. The petitioner therefore cannot have any legitimate grievance against the impugned orders. 10. The learned Additional Advocate General also submits that there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the petitioner is in occupation of a plot of land belonging to the Government and has also made some construction. Therefore, having regard to the stipulation made in the impugned orders, the petitioner cannot be considered for promotion until and unless he obtains a vigilance clearance certificate from the competent authority. The learned Addl. Advocate General in support of his submission relies upon the case of S.K Nausad Rahaman & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2022) 12 SCC 1 . 11. We have heard the submissions made by the learned counsels for the rival parties and we have perused the materials available on record. 12. The facts broadly are not in dispute. The grievance of the petitioner is that the Govt. of Arunachal Pradesh in the Vigilance Department has issued the impugned orders dated 02.04.2013, 06.06.2017, 11.05.2018 & 25.02.2020 by which, it has been provided that in order to be eligible to be considered for promotion, vigilance clearance is to be obtained from the concerned Deputy Commissioner, clearly stating that the Government official concerned has neither encroached upon any Government property nor caused any damage or abated encroachment on the public property by a private person. The impugned orders also go to show that the reason behind making such a stipulation is due to there being numerous cases where the occupants of Government accommodation either occupy the Government accommodation permanently or demolish the same to construct new buildings. Such stipulation was made in the impugned orders dated 02.04.2013 and 06.06.2017. Subsequently, by the impugned orders dated 11.05.2018 and 25.02.2020, further details as regards to complaint, charge-sheet in the disciplinary proceedings, sanction for prosecution etc. and the status are required to be indicated. That the vigilance clearance will then be issued by the Under Secretary, Vigilance Department by following the procedure prescribed in the orders. 13. The Recruitment Rules of 1974, 2003 & 2019 no doubt do not stipulate that one has to have the vigilance clearance certificate in order to be considered for promotion to the post of DFR but it is an admitted position in law that executive instructions can be issued by the competent authority over and above the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India but the executive instructions should be complementary to the statutory rules and not derogatory or in conflict with the same. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of C. Sankaranarayanan, Etc., Etc. (supra) to impress upon the Court that conditions of service can be changed only in exercise of the powers contained in Article 309 of the Constitution of India. There is no dispute in this regard and that in the present case, it cannot be said that the recruitment rules are sought to be replaced by the executive instructions. The same has only been issued to ensure that the persons being considered for promotion do not have vigilance case pending, whether it be for encroachment of Government’s property or any such criminal complaint or cases of like nature. 15. Reliance has also been placed to the case of The Distt. Registrar, Palghat & Ors. (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that when the statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India is silent on a particular point, the Government can fill up the gap. 15. Reliance has also been placed to the case of The Distt. Registrar, Palghat & Ors. (supra), wherein the Apex Court held that when the statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India is silent on a particular point, the Government can fill up the gap. This authority in fact helps the case of the State respondents since the recruitment rules is not comprehensive in nature and do not provide the criteria as to who can be considered for promotion to the next higher post or the procedure to be followed by the DPC. 16. The case of S. L. Sachdev & Anr. (supra) has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner to impress upon the Court on classification beyond what the rule provides amounts to amend the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. However, in the present case, the question of there being classification does not arise. All that the impugned orders provide is that one needs to have the vigilance clearance certificate in order to be eligible to be considered for promotion to the next higher post and such requirement has to be fulfilled by all those concerned will be eligible as per the recruitment rules. 17. The case of K. Kuppusamy & Anr. (supra) and Dr. Rajinder Singh (supra) is also based on the same principle and we do not find the same to be applicable to the instant case. The case of Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., Chandigarh (supra) has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner to contend that circular cannot override rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. It goes without saying that rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are superior to any such circular or instructions etc. issued in the form of executive instructions. As already stated herein above, it is not a case where the executive instructions issued through the impugned orders have been found to be superior to the recruitment rules. Only that it is supplementary to the recruitment rules since they are silent on the issue concerned. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that by the issuance of the impugned orders, the rights of the petitioner conferred by Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India has been violated. Only that it is supplementary to the recruitment rules since they are silent on the issue concerned. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that by the issuance of the impugned orders, the rights of the petitioner conferred by Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India has been violated. It may however be seen that the impugned orders requiring one to have vigilance clearance certificate in order to be eligible to be considered for promotion to the next higher post was issued as far back as on 02.04.2013 and the same is applicable to all those concerned and not just to the petitioner alone. Further, the petitioner claims to have been eligible for promotion in the year 2017 and therefore by filing his writ petition only in the year 2023, there is also delay on his part to approach this court. We however would not like to enter on the delay aspect at this stage. As already noticed, the requirement for having vigilance clearance certificate for further promotion in service being is universal and applicable to all concerned across the board. Therefore, in our considered opinion the same cannot be said to be violative of the Constitutional provisions as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that since the petitioner is an employee with the Environment, Forest & Climate Change Department, his service condition cannot be governed by the impugned orders issued by the Vigilance Department. Such submission in our opinion is fallacious since each Department under the State Government has its own role to play. The Vigilance Department undoubtedly would not only be concerned with vigilance cases pending with the employees within the Vigilance Department but also with all other Government employees working under the State Government. Therefore, the submission made by the petitioner’s counsel that the petitioner cannot be governed by the orders or instructions issued by any other Department apart from the Environment, Forest & Climate Change Department cannot be accepted. 20. Thus, upon due consideration of the case in its entirety, we find no ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Having come to such a conclusion, we do not find the necessity to make a reference to the other authorities cited by the parties. 21. 20. Thus, upon due consideration of the case in its entirety, we find no ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Having come to such a conclusion, we do not find the necessity to make a reference to the other authorities cited by the parties. 21. In the result, the Writ Appeal fails and the same is dismissed.