ORDER 1. Leave granted 2. The first respondent invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad by filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution[W.P. No. 18099/2020] challenging the building permission issued in favour of the appellants by the Kakatiya Urban Development Authority[Development Authority] for constructing a high-rise building. The writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. Aggrieved, the first respondent carried such dismissal in an intra-court appeal. The writ appellate court, by the impugned judgment and order dated 05th June, 2023[Impugned Order], disposed of the appeal by directing as under: - "Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the following directions will meet the ends of justice: i) Since O.S. No. 42 of 2008 is of the year 2008 and already fifteen years have gone by, it is time that the suit is brought to a logical conclusion one way or the other. Therefore, let O.S. No. 42 of 2008 along with I.A. No. l581 of 2008 pending before the court of VII Additional District Judge, Warangal, be concluded expeditiously preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; ii) Till the verdict in O.S. No. 42 of 2008 1s delivered, building permission granted by the authority in favour of respondents No.4 and 5 on 31.01.2018, as affirmed on 25.04.2020, shall be kept in abeyance and shall abide by the decision of the civil court." 3. The appellants, who were the respondents before the High Court, have taken exception to the impugned order on multiple grounds. 4. It is not in dispute that the first respondent had instituted a civil suit in the year 2008 seeking specific performance of a contract in respect of the property[Suit Property], where construction has subsequently been raised by the appellants based on the building permission under challenge in the aforesaid writ petition. Initially, an ad-interim injunction was granted restraining the defendants in the suit from dealing with and/or alienating the suit property, valid till 9th September, 2008 and it was extended next to operate till 23rd September, 2008. Admittedly, thereafter, the order of injunction was not extended. The defendants in the suit not being bound by any restraining order, transferred the suit property to the appellants. 5. Admittedly, thereafter, the order of injunction was not extended. The defendants in the suit not being bound by any restraining order, transferred the suit property to the appellants. 5. We have also noticed that the civil suit itself was dismissed for default by an order dated 11th September, 2012 and ultimately got restored by an order dated 29th June, 2016, without the court re-imposing the injunction. 6. Therefore, as things stood on the date the writ appellate court disposed of the appeal filed by the first respondent, any order of injunction restraining the defendants in the civil suit from alienating the suit property was not subsisting. 7. However, at paragraph 20 of the impugned order, the writ appellate court made the following observation: - "20. In our considered opinion, answer to both the questions posed above would have to be in the negative. If such alienation is permitted on the face of an injunction order, the very purpose of institution of the civil suit would stand frustrated. When the civil court has passed an injunction order restraining the vendors from alienating the schedule property to any third party, question of alienating such land by way of sale deed would not arise. The order of ad interim injunction is dated 12.08.2008 whereas the sale deeds were executed on 18.08.2016. This is a matter which required consideration by the authority." (emphasis supplied) 8. In our considered opinion, the judgment of the writ appellate court is premised on an entirely erroneous appreciation of the factual position. There being no subsisting order of injunction when the writ appeal of the first respondent came to be disposed of by the impugned order, passing an order keeping the building permission in abeyance did not arise. 9. This being the sole reason on which the writ appeal succeeded, we have no hesitation in observing that the impugned order is indefensible. 10. However, Ms. Prerna Singh, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent contends that there were other grounds raised in the writ petition which were not dealt with by the writ appellate court. Inter alia, such grounds are to the effect that the appellants had (i) obtained the building permission by practicing fraud on the development authority and (ii) encroached a public road. According to her, these are significant grounds which the writ appellate court ought to have considered. Inter alia, such grounds are to the effect that the appellants had (i) obtained the building permission by practicing fraud on the development authority and (ii) encroached a public road. According to her, these are significant grounds which the writ appellate court ought to have considered. There being no consideration worth the name, she appeals to us to order a remand. 11. We have heard Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants. He has taken us through the show cause notice issued by the development authority based on the complaint of the first respondent and the deliberations of the Vice-Chairman of the development authority upon receipt of the response of the appellants as well as after hearing the parties including the first respondent. 12. From the order dated 25th April, 2020 of the Vice-Chairman, we find that despite opportunity extended to the first respondent to produce documentary evidence in support of his allegations (that there has been change of land use without conversion of the agricultural land on which the subject construction is being raised and that in the process a public road has been encroached), no such evidence had been produced. Recording that there was no ground to proceed, the show cause notice was discharged by the Vice-Chairman. 13. It is also not in dispute that the construction in question commenced in 2016 and the writ court's jurisdiction was invoked as late as in 2020. 14. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, more particularly the failure and/or neglect of the first respondent to prove his allegations by producing relevant documentary evidence before the Vice-Chairman, we are of the considered opinion that interference by the writ appellate court by the impugned order on a non-existent ground was unwarranted and such order cannot be sustained. It is made clear, in modification of the impugned order, that construction already raised as well as construction to be raised further by the appellants pursuant to the building permission granted by the development authority shall be subject to and abide by the outcome of the suit. 15. Needless to observe, raising of further construction shall be at the entire risk and peril of the appellants. 16. We refrain from making any observation on the merits of the rival claims and leave it to the civil court to decide the suit on its own merits. 17. 15. Needless to observe, raising of further construction shall be at the entire risk and peril of the appellants. 16. We refrain from making any observation on the merits of the rival claims and leave it to the civil court to decide the suit on its own merits. 17. With the aforesaid modification of the impugned order, the civil appeal stands allowed. 18. We have been assured that the parties will cooperate with the civil court to bring about an early conclusion of the suit. 19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.