JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. A. Sattar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr. A.K. Rai, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. 2. This is an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) & 2 read with Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 challenging the order dated 18.11.2024 passed in Misc. (J) Case No.1077/2023 arising of the Title Suit No.678/2023 whereby the injunction application so filed by the appellant who was the plaintiff was dismissed. 3. The question arises in the instant proceedings as to whether this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction which is a limited jurisdiction should interfere with the impugned order dated 18.11.2024 passed in Misc. (J) Case No.1077/2023. For the purpose of the said, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the case of the appellant as stated in the plaint. 4. From a perusal of the plaint, it is apparent that a written agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant on 26.04.2023 which was duly registered in the Office of the Sub- Registrar, Kamrup (Metro) at Guwahati and numbered as Deed No.8718 dated 26.04.2023. The said agreement is a part of the instant proceedings. 5. From a perusal of the said agreement, it is apparent that for the purpose of sale of the Schedule-A and Schedule-B plots of land as mentioned in the said agreement, the total consideration fixed was Rs.70,00,000/-. Out of the said amount, Rs.2,11,000/- was paid on the date on which the agreement was entered into and the remaining amount of Rs.67,89,000/-was to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. 6. It is further seen from Clause-6 of the said agreement that the respondent herein had informed that there are four cases which are pending in the Court in connection with the land which are the subject matter of the said agreement. The said cases are Title Suit No.444/2017, Title Suit No.54/2018, Compliant Case C.R. No.1956/2017 as well as Misc. (J) Case No.910/2017. The defendant assured the plaintiff as per the agreement that he would withdraw/settle the aforesaid cases along with any other case/petition (if any) pending in the Court relating to the schedule plot of land within 30 days from the date of execution of the agreement. 7. (J) Case No.910/2017. The defendant assured the plaintiff as per the agreement that he would withdraw/settle the aforesaid cases along with any other case/petition (if any) pending in the Court relating to the schedule plot of land within 30 days from the date of execution of the agreement. 7. In Clause-7 of the said agreement, it has been also mentioned that the defendant who is the seller had taken a loan from the ICICI Bank, Guwahati Main Branch by mortgaging the Schedule-B land and the defendant also assured the plaintiff that he would clear the loan before execution of the registered Sale Deed. 8. It is the further case of the plaintiff in the suit that pursuant to the said agreement, the defendant had handed over the possession to the plaintiff on the 26.04.2023. Subsequently, it is also mentioned that on 04.05.2023, the plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- to the defendant. In addition to that, on 29.05.2023, a further amount of Rs.40,00,000/- was paid to the defendant by cash. It has also been averred in the plaint that on 30.06.2023, another amount of Rs.1,50,000/- was paid by cheque and another sum of Rs.50,000/- was paid by cheque on 04.08.2023. It is therefore the case of the plaintiff that she had paid a total consideration of Rs.49,11,000/- to the defendant out of the total consideration of Rs.70,00,000/-. 9. The further case of the plaintiff in the suit is that the plaintiff had been requesting the defendant to execute the Deed of Sale but the defendant on one pretext or the other was delaying the execution of the Deed of Sale. It is further alleged in the plaint that on 15.10.2023, the defendant entered into the suit property by breaking the locks of the gate which was in possession of the plaintiff. Being shocked, an FIR was filed before the Officer-in-Charge of the Bhangagarh Police Station 16.10.2023. The plaintiff also apprehending that the defendant may take appropriate steps for selling the said suit property to somebody else filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (M) on 16.10.2023 not to grant the defendant any sale permission for sale of the suit property. 10. The plaintiff also apprehending that the defendant may take appropriate steps for selling the said suit property to somebody else filed an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup (M) on 16.10.2023 not to grant the defendant any sale permission for sale of the suit property. 10. It has been specifically averred in the plaint that the plaintiff has performed her part of the contract and she has means to pay the balance consideration of Rs.20,89,000/- and she is also willing and ready with the money to perform her part of contract by paying the balance consideration to the defendant. 11. On the basis of the above, the plaintiff sought for a decree for specific performance of the Agreement dated 26.04.2023 and for permanent injunction to the effect that the defendant, his representatives, agents, employees, attorneys, etc. from alienating the suit property to any other person/persons and/or also restraining from undertaking any kind of developmental and/or construction work on the whole and/or any part or parcel of the suit land. 12. Along with the said suit, an injunction application was filed by the plaintiff which was registered and numbered as Misc. (J) Case No.1077/2023. In the said injunction application, the plaintiff relying upon the averments made in the plaint sought for a temporary injunction restraining the opposite parties, his men, agents, servants, etc. from selling, transferring, alienating, disposing, mortgaging, hypothecating, giving possession and/or encumbering the Schedule A and B land property and/or the parts/parcels of the schedule property by any mode of transfer and/or encumber in near future. In addition to that, the plaintiff has also prayed that the opposite party, his men, agents, servants, representatives may further be restrained from undertaking any kind of developmental and/or construction works on the whole and/or any part or parcel of Schedule A and Schedule B land either by himself or through any other person/party, builder/promoter etc. as the case may be. 13. Upon filing of the said suit, the learned Trial Court vide an order dated 07.11.2023 issued notice and directed both the parties to maintain status quo over the suit property as regards its alienation and the nature and character. Pursuant thereto, the defendant who is the respondent herein had appeared and filed his written statement as well as the written objection. 14. Pursuant thereto, the defendant who is the respondent herein had appeared and filed his written statement as well as the written objection. 14. In the said written statement, it was stated that the agreement so entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant was a contingent contract and was subject to settling of or withdrawing of certain cases that too within a period of 30 days. In paragraph No.12 of the written statement, the defendant had admitted that he had executed the deed of agreement for sale. The defendant further denied in his written statement that the amount Rs.40,00,000/- was paid by the plaintiff. The money receipts dated the 29.05.2023 was also denied by the defendant on the ground that he had never issued the said money receipt and his signature was taken on blank stamp paper and later on the same was converted to money receipt to cause undue harassment to the answering defendant. The fact as regards filing of the FIR was admitted but it was stated that the said FIR was filed to cause undue harassment to the defendant. The defendant herein also filed a written objection to the injunction application stating therein that the three conditions for grant of an injunction are not satisfied. It was also mentioned that the plaintiff had not come with clean hands. 15. This Court had perused the impugned order passed on 18.11.2024 by the learned Trial Court. From a perusal of the order of the learned Trial Court, it is seen that the learned Trial Court after reciting the facts without any reason or otherwise arrived at an opinion that the contention of the petitioner/appellant herein was not bona fide. It was further observed by the learned Trial Court that too without any reasons that the petitioner has not been able to satisfy the Court that she had a prima facie case to go for trial which is sine qua non. It was also observed that non-interference by the Court would result in irreparable injury/loss and the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner which the petitioner had failed to prove and accordingly dismissed the injunction application. 16. It was also observed that non-interference by the Court would result in irreparable injury/loss and the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner which the petitioner had failed to prove and accordingly dismissed the injunction application. 16. The reason as to why the learned Trial Court had come to an opinion that the petitioner did not have a prima facie case; the reason as to why the learned Trial Court came to an opinion that the balance of convenience was not in favour of the petitioner/appellant herein and the reason why the learned Trial Court came to an opinion that there would not be any irreparable loss, harm and injury to the petitioner are completely absent. This very aspect of the matter can be seen from paragraph No.8 of the impugned order which is reproduced herein under: “ 8. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case it appears that the contention made by the petitioner is not bonafide and as such petitioner/plaintiff has not furnished a prima facie case. To get a temporary injunction the petitioner has to satisfy the Court that she has a prima facie case to go to trial which is sine que non, non-interference by the Court would result in irreparable injury/loss and the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner, to which the petitioner has failed to fulfill the above test/conditions. Thus, the prayer of the instant petition is not allowed. The earlier ad-interim order dated 07.11.2023 is vacated.” 17. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court take note of the submission so made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties. These submissions are being taken into account in view of the manner in which the learned Trial Court had disposed of the injunction application and to adjudge as to whether in the said suit, there is a requirement for a grant of an injunction. 18. Mr. A. Sattar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that it is an admitted fact that there was a registered agreement entered into. He submitted that from the averments made in the plaint as well as the documents enclosed to the plaint, it would be seen that out of the amount of Rs.70,00,000/- an amount of Rs.49,11,000/- have been duly paid which is supported by documents. He submitted that from the averments made in the plaint as well as the documents enclosed to the plaint, it would be seen that out of the amount of Rs.70,00,000/- an amount of Rs.49,11,000/- have been duly paid which is supported by documents. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that though the defendant denies the payment of Rs.40,00,000/- but it is merely a denial and this is an aspect which has to be taken into consideration at the trial of the suit. He further submitted that the petitioner/appellant herein is ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. The learned counsel further submitted that the respondent herein who is the defendant had illegally taken over the possession over the suit land. He submitted that the plaintiff/appellant herein seeks by way of the instant appeal that there should be an injunction insofar as not to alienate the suit property till the disposal of the suit. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant therefore submitted that there is a prima facie case for going for trial. He further pointing out to the plaint as well as the written statement submitted that on the competing claims, there is a balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff/appellant that there should be an injunction as regards a restraint from transferring and/or creating third party rights. The learned counsel further submitted that if during the pendency of the suit, third party rights are created, not only it would lead to multiplicity of the proceedings but also there would be inconvenience to the appellant as well as third parties who may not have notice of the present proceedings. The learned counsel therefore submitted that in the interest of justice, an order of temporary injunction as prayed for ought to have passed in the present proceedings. 20. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Rai, the learned counsel submitted that that the instant suit so filed by the plaintiff is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court on the ground that the plaintiff knew very well that there was a suit being Title Suit No.54/2018 pending before the learned Court of the Civil Judge No.3, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati filed by the husband of the plaintiff with regard to the same land and this very aspect of the matter have been suppressed. 21. 21. The learned counsel further submitted that the suit land in question have already been transferred and handed over in favour of one Smti. Indu Pareek before the institution of the suit on the basis of a notarized compromise agreement dated 12.10.2023 and as such, the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction as sought for. 22. The learned counsel further submitted that as the contract in question is a contingent contract which was subject to fulfillment of the clauses contained in Clause-6 of the agreement dated 26.04.2023, the said contract cannot be specifically enforced and in that regard has referred to Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 wherein it is stipulated that there can be no injunction granted when a contract cannot be specifically enforced. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiff in this case have not come up with clean hands inasmuch as false statements have been made to the effect that Rs.40,00,000/- have been paid to the respondent whereas no such payment have been made. He further submitted that the very documents which have been enclosed are fraudulent documents and on the basis thereof, the question of grant of an injunction did not arise. The learned counsel submitted that when a party does not come before the Court with clean hands, he/she is not entitled to any equitable relief. 23. I have heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and have given my anxious consideration. 24. The impugned order dated 18.11.2024 passed by the learned Trial Court in the opinion of this Court appears to be unreasonable, irrational, perverse as well as in violation to the well settled principles of law. Normally, when the Trial Court exercises a discretionary jurisdiction, the appeal before the Appellate Court is only an appeal in principle. Under such circumstances, the Appellate Court does not interfere with the exercise of the discretion. But in a case of the present kind, where the learned Trial Court had exercised the jurisdiction in such a manner which is very much contrary to the settled principles of law, this Court had no other option but to set aside the order dated 18.11.2024. In this regard, this Court finds it relevant to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case Wander Ltd. and Another Vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., (1990) Supp. In this regard, this Court finds it relevant to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case Wander Ltd. and Another Vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., (1990) Supp. SCC 727 and paragraph No.14 of the said judgment is reproduced herein under: “ 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J.in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph : (SCR 721) “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’.” The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle.” 25. In the backdrop of the above, as the learned Trial Court did not consider the materials and have passed an unreasonable, irrational, perverse order, this Court has heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties as to whether the appellant herein who is the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction insofar as not to alienate the suit property in any manner whatsoever till the disposal of the suit. 26. From the materials on record, there is no denial that the defendant/respondent herein had executed the registered agreement for sale dated 26.04.2023. There is a dispute as to whether the possession of the suit land was handed over to the plaintiff and then the plaintiff was dispossessed. The plaintiff categorically stated that she had paid an amount of Rs.49,11,000/- and in that regard relied upon certain documents. The said aspect however have been denied. The question as to whether such a payment has been made or not is a subject matter of the trial. But for the purpose of an injunction, it is the opinion of this Court that there is a prima facie case for going for trial, more so when the plaintiff had categorically pleaded that she was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract. 27. Now let this Court take note of the second aspect as to whether the balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiff for the grant of an injunction. The competing claims being looked into by this Court, it appears that if an injunction is not granted and third party rights are being created, it would lead to multiplicity of the suit and it would further be difficult for the purpose of passing an effective decree, if the learned Trial Court at the end of the trial comes to an opinion that the suit is required to be decreed. It is also relevant to observe that post the 2018 Amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, grant of the relief of specific performance is no longer discretionary but obligatory. Considering the above, it is the opinion of this Court that there is a balance of convenience for grant of an injunction in favour of the plaintiff. 28. It is also relevant to observe that post the 2018 Amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, grant of the relief of specific performance is no longer discretionary but obligatory. Considering the above, it is the opinion of this Court that there is a balance of convenience for grant of an injunction in favour of the plaintiff. 28. As regards the question of irreparable loss, harm and injury, it is well settled that in respect to a contract for sale of an immovable property, there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the non- performance of the act and as such it is the opinion of this Court that if there is no injunction granted as prayed for, it would cause irreparable loss, harm and injury. 29. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands disposed of with the following observation and direction: (a) The instant appeal stands allowed thereby setting aside the impugned order dated 18.11.2024. (b) The injunction application filed along with the instant appeal stands allowed thereby restraining the defendant, his men, agents, servants, representatives, etc. from selling, transferring, alienating, disposing, mortgaging, hypothecating, giving possession and/or encumbering the Schedule-A and Schedule-B property and/or the parts/parcels of the Schedule Property by any mode of transfer and/or encumber, in near future, in favour of any other person(s), party(ies) etc., as the case may be till disposal of the suit. (c) It is also seen from the records that the LCR of Title Suit No.444/2025 is tagged along with the present appeal. The Registry is directed to forthwith return the records to the learned Court below.