ORDER : J. C. DOSHI, J. 1. By way of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed to quash and set aside the judgement and order dated 31.3.2017 passed by the Honourable Sessions Court in Criminal Revision Application no. 348/2014 confirming the order dated 24.9.2013, dismissed the complaint u/s. 203 of Cr. P.C. passed by the Ld. Magistrate and be pleased to further direct to proceed with the complaint in accordance with law. 2. Brief facts of the case are as under: 2.1 The petitioner lodged complaint being criminal case no. 135 of 2012 in the court of Honourable Metropolitan Magistrate, court no.5, Ahmedabad against the accused nos.2 & 3 u/s.406, 420, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471 & 114 of IPC stating the accused nos. 2 & 3 who were agricultural tenant of the land bearing survey no.195/197/1 of village Chosar, Taluka: Daskroi, Dist: Ahmedabad which land, on consolidation was given block no.162 54 882 admeasuring about 1-Hec 11 Are 54 Sq. mtrs which is of the ownership of the petitioner and the produce were shared. At around before the date of the complaint, the petitioner came to know that some scandal has been committed with respect to the said land and on inquiry, the petitioner found that the respondent no.2 & 3 have committed various offences in order to grab the said land as also without following the procedure, the land has been shown in their name. The relevant documents were also produced before the Honourable Court and therefore, had prayed for further investigation u/s.156(3) of Cr.P.C. 2.2 The Honourable Court by its order, sent the same for inquiry to Karanj Police Station. The Ld. Magistrate by an order dated 24.9.2013, dismissed the said complaint u/s.203 of Cr.P.C. holding that no prima facie case is made out. 2.3 The petitioner being aggrieved by the same, preferred Special Criminal Application no.910 of 2014 in this Honourable Court and prayed for quashing and setting aside of the said order. Honourable Court by its order dated 27th August, 2014 allowed the petitioner to avail the remedy of revision. 2.4 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied by the same, the petitioner preferred revision application no.348 of 2014 before the Honourable Sessions Court, Ahmedabad. The Honourable Sessions Court by its order dated 31.3.2007, rejected the said revision application. 2.5 Hence, present petition. 3. Honourable Court by its order dated 27th August, 2014 allowed the petitioner to avail the remedy of revision. 2.4 Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied by the same, the petitioner preferred revision application no.348 of 2014 before the Honourable Sessions Court, Ahmedabad. The Honourable Sessions Court by its order dated 31.3.2007, rejected the said revision application. 2.5 Hence, present petition. 3. Assailing the concurrent findings of fact, learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that both the courts below have committed serious error in rejecting the private complaint registered by the petitioner for the aforestated offences. After reading private complaint, he would submit that looking to the allegations levelled in the complaint, the learned Court below were at least required to send the documents for FSL, so that it can come on record that the signature made on the registered sale deed is genuine or otherwise. He would further submit that the learned Court below have rejected the complaint simply on the ground that dispute is of a civil nature and the complaint of which has been filed after long passage of time. He would further submit that the complainant no sooner came to know about selling of the disputed land by forging the signature of the deceased, he filed private complaint. Upon above submissions, he prays to allow the petition. 4. On the other hand, learned advocate for the private respondents would submit that even on the civil front, the petitioner has filed civil suit under Order 7 Rule 11(D) of the CPC, which he has lost. He would further submit that even the Coordinate Bench of this Court in CRA No.480 of 2015 believed that the suit is hopelessly time barred by law of limitation and therefore, the judgment delivered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court also applies to the dispute between the parties and is squarely covered the present issue. Upon such submissions, he prays to dismiss the petition. 5. Learned APP while reminding this Court about supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would submit that until the petitioner establishes that there is palpable illegality in the impugned orders, this Court cannot intervene the correct such illegalities. Upon such submissions, he prays to dismiss the petition. 5. Learned APP while reminding this Court about supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, would submit that until the petitioner establishes that there is palpable illegality in the impugned orders, this Court cannot intervene the correct such illegalities. He would further submit that both the learned Court below have rightly noted that the sale was taken place in 1976, which was never challenged and revenue entry was mutated after issuing notice under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code. He would further submit that even the second sale was taken place. He would further submit that complaint was also made to the SIT headed by the Collector, who has thoroughly examined the issue and found nothing in the matter and yet, the petitioner has filed criminal complaint, which was also sent for investigation u/s 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He would further submit that the police has again thoroughly investigated the issue and again found no substance in the complaint and therefore, the learned Court below have rightly rejected the complaint. He would further submit that nonetheless, even on civil front, the petitioner has lost. He would further submit that even the CRA filed by the private respondents before this Court has been allowed and the suit filed by the petitioner for cancellation of sale deed has been rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(D) of the Code. Upon such submission, he requests to dismiss the petition. 6. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties, at the outset, let refer the nature of scope of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is enlightened in case of Garment Crafts Vs. Prakash Chand Goel reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 15 and 16, held as under:- “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to re-appreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to re-appreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal [Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and Others v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others, (2010) 1 SCC 217 ]. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional1 jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. 16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 has observed:- “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.” 6.1 With profit, I may also refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Sameer Suresh Gupta Through Pa Holder Versus Rahul Kumar Agarwal , 2013 (9) SCC 374 , considering the nature of scope of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that article were considered by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai. After considering various facets of the issue, the two-Judge Bench culled out the following principles: (SCC pp. 694-96, para 38) "(1)Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. What could be noted that the petitioner who is seeking to reverse the concurrent findings of fact of the learned Court below is required to establish that the learned Court below have not applied mind correctly, have not appreciated the evidence correctly and the findings which the learned Court below have reached should not have been the findings of ordinary prudence. In the present case, the petitioner has filed the complaint as stated herein above alleging that the sale deed of the land in question was forged one, which was registered on 2.2.1976. It is the case of the petitioner that he was not aware of execution of the sale deed, which was registered in 1976 and that his and his brother’s signature on the sale deed are forged. However, the investigation carried out by the investigating officer pursuant to the order passed by the learned trial Court indicates that prior to filing of present complaint, the petitioner has also lodged complaint before the SIT headed by the Collector, which was rejected by the SIT. Even thereafter, revenue entry was mutated after issuing notice under the provisions of the Land Revenue Code. Even, second sale has taken place. Further, the investigating officer carried out investigation in the complaint and found nothing. The learned Court below believed that no person of ordinary prudence can sit idle for long passage opf time. The learned Court below also found that it was a case of civil nature and correctly dismissed the complaint. 8. Even, in civil proceedings, the petitioner has failed to success in CRA No.480 of 2015 filed before this Court by the private respondents. The Coordinate Bench of this Court has observed thus:- “5.3 In accordance with the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Dilboo (Smt)(Dead) By LRS. And Others vs. Dhanraji (Smt) (Dead) and Others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 702 , it is evident that registration of the document is deemed knowledge of such registration. The period of limitation cannot be extended merely because an averment is made in the plaint that they came to know of such document only in the year 2010. And Others vs. Dhanraji (Smt) (Dead) and Others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 702 , it is evident that registration of the document is deemed knowledge of such registration. The period of limitation cannot be extended merely because an averment is made in the plaint that they came to know of such document only in the year 2010. It will be in the fitness of things to reproduce the law as set out by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Van Oil Petroleum Ltd vs. MV Denali (IMO NO 9438016) (EX NAME MV MARIE PAULE) rendered in O.J. Appeal No. 15 of 2018, more particularly paragraphs 7 to 10 which read as under: “7. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that as fraud is alleged, and therefore, considering Section 17 of the Limitation Act, the period till the knowledge of the fraud is required to be excluded is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that on one hand, even according to the plaintiff also, the Indian Limitation Act shall not be applicable. Even otherwise, on merits, the aforesaid has no substance. Even considering the averments in the Plaint, except the bare averments in Paragraph-3, there are no further averments / particulars of fraud. It is required to be noted that even the fraud is alleged not at the time of the transaction but it is alleged with respect to the subsequent transfer of the Vessel. Therefore, the fraud is not as such alleged at the time of entering the transaction for supply of Bunker. There are no such pleadings or allegations in the Plaint at all. As observed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ullasbhai Parsottambhai (Legal heirs of decd.) and Ors. vs. Patel Dineshbhai Ramabhai reported in 2014 (1) GLR 596 , in order to make out a case of fraud or coercion, all the material facts in support of such allegations must be laid out in full and with a high degree or precision. In the aforesaid decision, in Paragraphs-76 and 77, it is observed and held as under: “76. vs. Patel Dineshbhai Ramabhai reported in 2014 (1) GLR 596 , in order to make out a case of fraud or coercion, all the material facts in support of such allegations must be laid out in full and with a high degree or precision. In the aforesaid decision, in Paragraphs-76 and 77, it is observed and held as under: “76. It is a plain and basic rule of pleadings that in order to make out a case of fraud or coercion there must be (a) an express allegation or fraud, and (b) all the material facts in support of such allegations must be laid out in full and with a high degree of precision. In other words, if coercion or fraud is alleged, it must be set out with full particulars. (See Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel v. Nirmala Jayprakash Tiwari, reported in 2010 (5) SCC 104 ) 77. In Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, reported in AIR 1951 SC 280 , it was held thus: 24. We turn next to the questions of undue influence and coercion. Now, it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate and separable categories in law and must be separately pleaded. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now, if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice, however, strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. (See Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure)” 7.1 In the case of Mohanbhai Maganbhai Patel vs. Miral Vallabhbhai Surani reported in 2016 JX (Guj) 1290, a Division Bench of this Court has observed and held that the particulars about alleged fraud must be stated in the pleadings. (See Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure)” 7.1 In the case of Mohanbhai Maganbhai Patel vs. Miral Vallabhbhai Surani reported in 2016 JX (Guj) 1290, a Division Bench of this Court has observed and held that the particulars about alleged fraud must be stated in the pleadings. It is further observed that pleading has to claim a statement in a concise form of material facts on which the party relies for his claim or defence. 8. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the plaintiff is invoking Section 17 of the Limitation Act and is praying for exclusion of time on the ground of fraud. However, it is required to be noted that fraud as such is alleged in view of the subsequent development of transfer of Vessel from one owner to another owner and there are no allegations and/or pleadings with respect to fraud at the time of entering into transaction of supply of Bunker to the Vessel. As observed hereinabove, the period of limitation would start running from 29.03.2012 even considering the specific averments and pleadings in the Plaint. As per Section 9 of the Limitation Act, when once the time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it. Therefore, even considering Section 9 of the Limitation Act, once the period of limitation has started running from 29.03.2012, any subsequent act or omission on the part of the defendant on the basis of which some fraud is alleged, the period of limitation would not be saved considering Section 17 of the Limitation act, as alleged or contended. 9. At this stage, it is required to be noted that even there are no specific averments and/or pleadings in the Plaint invoking Section 17 of the Limitation Act and praying for exclusion of the time. 10. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge has committed any error in rejecting the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge holding that even considering the averments in the Plaint as they are, the suit clearly barred by law of limitation. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge holding that even considering the averments in the Plaint as they are, the suit clearly barred by law of limitation. Rejection of the Plaint by the learned Single Judge is absolutely in consonance with the object and purpose of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.” 6. Thus, from the facts narrated hereinabove, it is evident that when the provisions of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 19 of the Evidence Act are considered in the facts of the case on hand, the plaintiffs’ suit praying for a declaration to set aside the sale deed on 02.02.1976 is clearly barred by limitation. 7. In other words, when apparently the suit is hopelessly time barred, merely alleging fraud without supporting material could not extend the period of limitation and make the case of the plaintiffs disputed. Thus, the plaint of the respondents ought to have been rejected by the learned trial Court in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Having failed to do so, I deem it fit to quash and set aside the impugned order passed by the trial Court. 8. In the premises aforesaid, order dated 03.10.2015 passed by the 6th (Ad-hoc) Additional Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Ahmedabad below Ex. 52 in Regular Civil Suit No. 814 of 2012 is hereby quashed and set aside. Civil Revision Application is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute.” 9. Resultantly, present petition fails being bereft of merit and stands dismissed. Notice discharged.