JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing/deleting Section 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (in short ‘the SC & ST Act’) in FIR no. 108 of 2023, dated 11.12.2023 registered in Police Station Rakkar, Tehsil Rakkar, District Kangra and consequent proceedings arising out of the FIR. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police asserting that she was proceeding towards Hamirpur in her Scooty on 10.12.2023 at about 5:00 pm. She found that the petitioners had damaged the road leading to her house after entering her land. The informant objected. The petitioners touched her inappropriately. The petitioners attacked her with a Shovel (Jhamb). The informant called her family members. Her parents, brother and sister-in-law reached the spot. The petitioners gave them beatings. The petitioners abused them by the name of their caste. The informant and her family members sustained injuries in the incident. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR, the petitioners have filed the present petition. It has been asserted that the allegations levelled against the petitioners are false. No remarks were made by the petitioners. The informant or her family members do not belong to the scheduled caste. Their caste has been mentioned as Falehra Attri and Falehra Jasau in the Shajra Nasab, which are not scheduled castes. The informant’s family illegally managed to change their caste in other records.The allegation regarding the caste is vague and false, and no case is made out for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST Act. The petitioners are retired Government servants, and they enjoy a good reputation in the society. The petitioners had also lodged an FIR no. 107 of 2023 dated 10.12.2023 against the informant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST Act be deleted from the FIR. 4. I have heard Mr. Ashok Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Ashok Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. 4. I have heard Mr. Ashok Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 5. Mr. Ashok Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. There is no material on record to connect them with the commission of the crime. The informant’s caste is not mentioned in the list of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes issued by the State Government. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and Section 3(1)(s) of the SC & ST Act be ordered to be deleted. 6. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the FIR clearly mentioned that the petitioners had abused the informant in the name of her caste. They had obstructed her from proceeding further. They also gave beatings to her and her family members. The caste Falehra is mentioned in the list of the Scheduled Caste.Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceeding can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The Sajra Nasab shows the pedigree table of Kadaru. It does not mention the name of the informant or the name of her father. Therefore, these Sajra Nasabs cannot be connected to the informant. 12. Even otherwise, the Sajra Nasab mentions the caste Falehra. This caste has been mentioned at Sr. No. 44 in the list of Scheduled Caste (Annexure P5); hence, the submission that the caste Falehra is not mentioned in the list of Scheduled Caste is not correct. 13. Thus, the documents annexed to the petition do not support the plea of the petitioners that the informant does not belong to the scheduled caste. 14. It was not disputed in the petition, and it was also mentioned specifically in the FIR that the petitioners are members of a non-scheduled caste. 13. Thus, the documents annexed to the petition do not support the plea of the petitioners that the informant does not belong to the scheduled caste. 14. It was not disputed in the petition, and it was also mentioned specifically in the FIR that the petitioners are members of a non-scheduled caste. Therefore, the essential condition under Section 3 is that the accused should not belong to the scheduled caste, whereas the informant should belong to the scheduled caste is duly specified. 15. The FIR mentions that the petitioners had abused the informant in the name of her caste at a public place namely the road, therefore, the condition under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC &ST Act is duly satisfied. 16. The FIR also mentions that the petitioners had touched the informant inappropriately, given beatings to the informant, and caused damage to her property. These allegations, prima facie, make out the case for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323, 447, and 354 of IPC included in the First Schedule and constitute an offence punishable under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC & ST Act. 17. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false and they are the result of the FIR lodged at the instance of the petitioners. This submission cannot be adjudicated at this stage. This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations because it is a matter of trial to be adjudicated by the learned Trial Court where the matter is pending. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060: “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: “17. or not.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) “6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 19. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 20. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 21. No other point was urged. 22. Consequently, the present petition fails and is dismissed. 23. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.