JUDGMENT : T. Vinod Kumar, J. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed against the order dt.23.01.2025 in I.A. No.73 of 2025 in O.S. No.18 of 2025 on the file of VI Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Family Court, Ranga Reddy District at Kukatpally. 2. The Appellants herein are respondent Nos.2 and 3 in the underlying Interlocutory Application and defendant Nos.2 and 3 in the suit filed by respondent No.1 herein as plaintiff for perpetual injunction. 3. In the aforesaid suit, the respondent No.1/plaintiff has filed the underlying Interlocutory Application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 r/w Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘C.P.C.’) to grant ad-interim injunction order restraining the Appellant herein and all persons claiming through or under them from illegally interfering with the "Petition Schedule Property", in any manner whatsoever pending disposal of the main suit. 4. The trial Court, considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.1/plaintiff and upon perusal of the material papers, affidavit, petition documents filed in support thereof, passed an order ex parte ad-interim injunction in favour of petitioner, restraining the respondent from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the petitioner/plaintiff over the schedule property till 13.02.2025 vide order dt.23.01.2025. The trial Court further extended the interim order till 07.04.2025 vide order dt. 13.02.2025. 5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the trial Court, the Appellants/respondent Nos.2 and 3 had filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal. 6. Appellants/respondent Nos.2 and 3 contend that respondent No.1/plaintiff is not in physical possession of the petition schedule property, while the appellants/defendant Nos.2 and 3 are in physical possession of the petition schedule property with security staff and CCTV coverage and covered by a compound wall. 7. Appellants/respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein further contend that the impugned order under appeal is unsustainable in law, since the trial Court had failed to record reasons for dispensing with issuance of notice and for grant of ex parte ad-interim injunction, till 13.02.2025 to the respondents/defendants as contemplated under Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC. 8. By contending as above, the Appellants/respondent Nos.2 and 3 have sought for dismissal of the underlying Interlocutory Application. 9. 8. By contending as above, the Appellants/respondent Nos.2 and 3 have sought for dismissal of the underlying Interlocutory Application. 9. It is vehemently contended on behalf of the Appellants that the trial Court without issuing notice to the Appellants herein and in violation of Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC, without recording reasons for dispensing with issuance of notice to the Appellants herein, has granted the ad interim ex parte injunction order dt. 23.01.2025. 10. It is also further contended that respondent No.1/plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land and the trial Court has erred in not recording any findings about the requirement of prima face case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury for grant of injunction ex-parte in favour of the respondent No.1/plaintiff. 11. By contending as above, appellants sought for setting aside the order of the trial Court in granting the ad interim ex parte injunction order dt. 23.01.2025. 12. Per contra, on behalf of respondent No.1 it is contended that the respondent has the ownership and possession over the petition schedule property and the notice to be sent under order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC was sent and served upon the appellants and inspite of the same the appellants choose not to enter appearance before the Court below. 13. The Respondent No.1 further contends that the trial Court has rightly allowed the interlocutory application and granted ad interim ex parte injunction in favour of respondent/plaintiff, as prima facie case exists in their favour, the presence of adequate reasons, and the threat of dispossession; and that the Court below relying upon the certified copy of sale deed, Pahanies and Revenue proceedings which show the title and possession of the Respondent/plaintiff has categorically noted that a prima facie case is made out in favour of Respondent/plaintiff. 14. The Respondent No.1 further contends that the though on behalf of Appellants it was claimed of Respondents having not pleaded any threat of dispossession, the pleadings of the respondent herein in the underlying I.A exhaustively establish that there is an imminent threat of dispossession inasmuch as the appellants herein on 05.01.2025 tried to trespass into the petition schedule property, placing a board with the respondent No.1/defendant No.1’s name and tried to grab it. Subsequently on 08.01.2025, respondents/defendants came with another board stating that the petition schedule property belongs to respondent No.2/defendant No.2. Subsequently on 08.01.2025, respondents/defendants came with another board stating that the petition schedule property belongs to respondent No.2/defendant No.2. Thus, on behalf of Respondent it is contended that the court below by considering all the above aspects had rightly granted injunction. 15. Heard Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Rehan Ahmed, learned Counsel for the Appellants and Sri Vivek Reddy learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Rohit Pogula, learned Counsel for the Respondents and perused the record. 16. In order to appreciate the respective submission it is necessary to refer to Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC which expressly states that “ The Court shall in all cases except where it appears that object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of application for the same to be given to opposite party… provided that where it is proposed to grant any injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the Court shall record reasons for its opinion that an object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay.” 17. The Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi , [(1993 ) 3 SCC 161] held that: “32. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The courts have to be more cautious when the said power is being exercised without notice or hearing the party who is to be affected by the order so passed. That is why Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code requires that in all cases the court shall, before grant of an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite-party, except where it appears that object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. By the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, a proviso has been added to the said rule saying that “where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay…”. 34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. 34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. Before the proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said “the court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite-party”. The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the court “shall record the reasons” why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplus age for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor (1875 1 ch D 426) and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor ( AIR 1936 PC 253 (2). This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare ( 1975 (1) SCC 559 ).” 18. This Court in Sri K. Sathya Reddy V. Smt. D. Usha Rani (rendered by his Lordship Hon'ble Sri Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao, as His Lordship then was) had relied upon Shiv Kumar Chadha (supra) and held that before granting an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and notice should be dispensed only when the object of granting injunction itself would be defeated by delay. 19. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law, whenever a Court considers that it is necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed. 20. The Court below has passed a detailed order stating that the petitioner/plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in her favour through her averments supported by the documents filed including the copy of sale deed, Pahanies and revenue proceedings. 20. The Court below has passed a detailed order stating that the petitioner/plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in her favour through her averments supported by the documents filed including the copy of sale deed, Pahanies and revenue proceedings. The Court below observed that there is a threat of dispossession, the very purpose of filing the suit will be defeated if notice is ordered. Hence issuance of prior notice is dispensed with. 21. It is evident that the trial Court while issuing the ex-parte injunction, dispensing with issuance of notice of injunction had comprehensively recorded reasons of it being satisfied that if the ex-parte injunction is not granted, object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay. Thus, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court granting an exparte ad-interim injunction with recorded reasons is in compliance with the mandatory provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 of CPC. 22. Further, it is also to be noted that the appellant herein had filed the present appeal against the order of the trial Court granting ex parte ad interim injunction. However, if one takes note of the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC, it can be seen that Court has discretion to pass order of injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC without issuing notice to opposite party if it appears to the Court that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay. On passing of such an order, without issuing notice to the opposite party, the person obtaining such an ex parte order is required to comply with the conditions prescribed under Rule 3 of CPC by serving notice to the opposite party immediately. Upon service of notice, the opposite party is required to take steps for vacating the said order by filing its counter to the interlocutory application. Upon such filing of the counter, the Court is required to dispose of the same within 30 days from the date on which the injunction was granted and if the Court fails to do so, it should record reasons for such inability. 23. It is only when the opposite party on receiving the notice filing counter to the interlocutory application and the said application not being disposed of within 30 days will get a right to file an appeal against the said order in terms of Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC. 23. It is only when the opposite party on receiving the notice filing counter to the interlocutory application and the said application not being disposed of within 30 days will get a right to file an appeal against the said order in terms of Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1(r) CPC. Thus, the Code itself provides for an alternate remedy against ex parte ad interim injunction order granted. 24. The Apex Court in A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan , [ (2000) 7 SCC 695 ] dealing with ex-parte ad-interim injunction had held as under: 17. From a reading of the said judgment, it appears to our mind that it is only an extraordinary circumstance under which the aggrieved person can prefer an appeal against an ad interim injunction order. But, as a matter of course, the aggrieved person cannot approach the appellate or revisional Court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. It was a case where an application to vacate an ad interim injunction was filed and as the said application to vacate the same, was not disposed of within the stipulated time under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 3A C.P.C., the parties therein approached the Appellate Court and, in that context, the Supreme Court has held that an appeal is maintainable. But, however, it impliedly cautioned that in the normal course, the aggrieved party cannot approach the appellate or revisional Court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. It is only when there is an inaction on the part of the Courts in following the mandate provisions, then only the aggrieved party can approach the Appellate Court. 18. So, it is clear that though an appeal is maintainable, such an appeal should be filed only in an extraordinary circumstance under which the party is able to explain as to why he prefers an appeal in the High Court instead of choosing to file a petition to vacate the ad interim injunction. Even in case of appeal against an ad interim injunction, the appellate Court will not be bound to apply its mind to all the contentions, which the Original Court is bound to consider on the case shown by the party affected by ad interim order. 24. Even in case of appeal against an ad interim injunction, the appellate Court will not be bound to apply its mind to all the contentions, which the Original Court is bound to consider on the case shown by the party affected by ad interim order. 24. The immediate remedy that is available to the opposite party in case of issuing temporary injunction without issuing notice, is under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 4 C.P.C which enables the Original Court to vary or set aside or discharge the ex parte order. In the light of the above provisions and also the legal propositions, no appeal lies, as a matter of course, against an ex parte order, except in extraordinary circumstances or the rarest of the rare cases where the order is perverse or bias or suffers from lack of jurisdiction, but it is not the case of the petitioner. 25. The above ratio laid down by the Supreme Court has been applied by the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh while considering Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC against an order of ex parte ad interim injunction in the case of Innovative Phaarma Surgicals v. Pigeon Medical Devices (P) Ltd , [(2004) SCC OnLine AP 369] 26. In the facts of the present case as noted above, the Court below having granted ex parte ad-interim injunction initially on 23.01.2025 recording reasons for granting such an order the appellant herein ought to have taken steps for getting the aforesaid order vacated by filing its counter. It is not shown to this Court that the appellant herein having filed his counter before the trial Court and the trial Court not disposing of the application within 30 days for him to approach this Court by the present appeal. For the said reason this Court is of the view that the present CMA has to fail. 27. In the result, the CMA is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. However, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter. No costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any shall stand closed. No order as to costs.