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2025 DIGILAW 437 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Indorama India Pvt. Ltd.

2025-03-22

VIVEK SINGH THAKUR

body2025
JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. This Review Petition has been preferred by the State against judgment dated 31.7.2023 passed in CWP No. 3331 of 2021, titled as M/s Indorama India Private Limited & another Vs. State of H.P. and others. 2. Review Petition has been preferred on the grounds mentioned in the petition, stating therein that Review Petitioner failed to bring into notice of the Court case laws on the subject as laid down by the Supreme Court and as such error apparent on the face of record has occurred and, therefore, judgment needs to be reviewed. 3. It has been contended that reliance placed by this Court on the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in General Radio and Appliances Co. Ltd. Vs. M.A. Khader , AIR 1986 SCC 1218 is error apparent on the record because this judgment has already been distinguished by the Supreme Court in case of Hindustan Lever and another Vs. State of Maharashtra and another , (2002) 9 SCC 438 and thus conclusion arrived at by this Court is in violation of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Lever’s case. 4. It has been further contended that conclusion arrived at by this Court that for sanction of Scheme of Arrangement by NCLT, in terms of provisions of Companies Act for transfer of leasehold right, no fresh deed or conveyance or instrument is required to be executed, is in direct conflict with law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Lever’s case. 5. Lastly, it has been claimed that judgment in Hindustan Lever’s case has been followed by the Delhi High Court in case titled as Delhi Towers Ltd. Vs. G.N.C.T. holding that stamp duty is applicable on the merger order passed by NCLT under the Companies Act. 6. Learned Advocate General has also contended that the word “instrument” would include sanction of the scheme as well as orders passed by the NCLT and, therefore, stamp duty is leviable upon such transfer as held in Hindustan Lever’s case. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that there is delay in filing the Review Petition. The grounds taken for reviewing the judgment are beyond the scope of review and there is no manifest error apparent on the record and the judgment being referred now, was never relied upon by Review Petitioners-State. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that there is delay in filing the Review Petition. The grounds taken for reviewing the judgment are beyond the scope of review and there is no manifest error apparent on the record and the judgment being referred now, was never relied upon by Review Petitioners-State. Lastly it has been stated that in compliance of judgment impugned in Review Petition, Review Petitioners have acted upon and raised demand of amount from the respondent vide communication dated 14.2.2024, issued by Deputy Director of Industries Single Window Clearance System, Baddi, District Solan, H.P. Not only this, in furtherance to the aforesaid communication/demand, respondents have deposited an amount of ?19,000/- vide receipt No. 71139, dated 14.6.2024 and ?1,33,68,720/- vide receipt No. 66381 dated 16.2.2024, which has been accepted by the Department of Industries on account of maintenance charges and transfer fee. 8. Referring the provisions of The Indian Stamp Act , 1899, The Indian Stamp (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Act , 1952, Bombay Stamp Act , 1958 and The Maharashtra Stamp Act , 1993 it has been contended by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no para-materia provision either in the Indian Stamp Act , 1899 or The Indian Stamp (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Act , 1952 corresponding to the provisions of The Bombay Stamp Act and/or The Maharashtra Stamp Act , which was in reference in Hindustan Lever’s case. It has been contended that judgment in Hindustan Lever’s case has been passed with reference to definitions described in Section 2(g)(iv) inserted by the Maharashtra Act No. 17 of 1993 in Bombay Stamp Act , 1958. Whereas, there is no such corresponding provision in the Stamp Acts applicable in the present case and thus reliance placed on Hindustan Lever’s case is misconceived. 9. To substantiate claim of respondents, learned counsel for the respondents has referred judgments of Division Benches of this High Court in M/s Sozin Flora Pharma LLP Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh , 2021 AIR (HP) 44 ; Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited Vs. State of H.P., 2020 AIR (HP) 86 . 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon judgment passed by the Supreme Court in S. Bagirathi Ammal Vs. Palani Roman Catholic Mission , (SC) 2009 (4) SCC (civil) 255 and Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati 2013 (4) SCC (Cri.) 265 11. State of H.P., 2020 AIR (HP) 86 . 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon judgment passed by the Supreme Court in S. Bagirathi Ammal Vs. Palani Roman Catholic Mission , (SC) 2009 (4) SCC (civil) 255 and Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati 2013 (4) SCC (Cri.) 265 11. In Kamlesh Verma’s case it was observed and held as under:- “11. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. A review is by· no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. This Court, in Parsion Devi & Ors. vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 715 , held as under: "7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. this Court opined: "What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an 'error apparent on the face of the record'). The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an 'error apparent on the face of the record', for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error."(emphasis ours) 8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tu/eshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 9. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tu/eshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". 12. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (2000) 6 sec 224, held as under: "54. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: "1. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: "1. Application for review of judgment.-(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order." Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter. 56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment. 58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sar/a Mudgal case, (1995) 3 sec 635 It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words "any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule" as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. The words "any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC" must mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule" as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Harl Vishnu Karnath v. Ahmad lshaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 , it was held: "[l]t is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of ' the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error, and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr Pathak for the first respondent contended on the A strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in - 'Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality, AIR 1953 Born 133' that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case." Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarta Mudgal case. The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance. 13. In a review petition, it is not open to the Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. This Court, in Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. & Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 651 , held as under: "10 .......... In a review petition it is not open to this Court to re- appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. c It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. c It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise." 14. Review is not re-hearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to re-open concluded adjudications. This Court, in Jain Studios Ltd. vs. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 501 , held as under: "11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant see~s the same relief which had been sought at the.time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases. 12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same B relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of "second innings" which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted." 15. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and C have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVll Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the Principles: 16. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the Principles: 16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: (A) When the review will be maintainable:- (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence F which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520 , to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., JT 2013 (8) SC 275. (B) When the review will not be maintainable:- (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should F not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 12. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 12. Though strong reliance has been placed by learned Advocate General on Hindustan Lever’s case, but this judgment is dealing with specific and distinct provisions of the Bombay Stamp Act as amended by Maharashtra Act, 1993, which is not applicable in present case and, therefore, review of the impugned order on the basis of judgment passed in Hindustan Lever’s case is not warranted. 13. Otherwise also non-consideration of a judgment which was not cited, cannot be a ground for review as that would lead to substitute the view already taken by the Court, which can be assailed by the Review Petitioners-State by filing appeal/Letters Patent Appeal and all the legal issues including the applicability of judgment of Hindustan Lever’s case would remain open to the Review Petitioner to be agitated before the competent forum to be contested. 14. Review Petition cannot be based upon a judgment which was never cited or relied upon during the hearing of the case. Even otherwise as discussed supra, judgment in Hindustan Lever’s case is not applicable to present case. 15. Review Petition also does not fulfill any of the criteria or paramateria upon which Review Petition can be preferred against a judgment, as enumerated by the Courts including Supreme Court in various judgments, some of which have been referred supra. 16. In view of above, I do not find any illegality, irregularity or perversity, amounting to error apparent on the face of record, manifestly causing miscarriage of justice and, therefore, no interference in Review Petition is warranted. Accordingly, Review Petition is dismissed.