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2025 DIGILAW 444 (MP)

Ved Prakash Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2025-08-06

MANINDER S.BHATTI

body2025
ORDER : 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed while praying for following reliefs: "(i) To issue a writ of certiorari for setting aside impugned order dated 24/06/2025 (Annexure P/12) and hold it as illegal and arbitrary. (ii) To grant any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper under the facts and circumstances of the case in favour of petitioner. (iii) To award the cost of petition." 2. The facts as detailed in the memorandum of petition reveal that the present petitioner was initially appointed as Assistant Faculty pursuant to an advertisement dated 20/01/1992 (Annexure P/1). The order of appointment of the petitioner was issued on 23/04/1992 (Annexure P/2). The petitioner performed his services with utmost dedication and to the satisfaction of all concerned. The Center for Entrepreneurship Development Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as 'CEDMAP') is an autonomous body registered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1973. The CEDMAP has its own rules and regulations and as per the regulations, which are named and styled as Centre for Entrepreneurship Development Madhya Pradesh (CEDMP) Staff Regulations, 1991, there exists provisions for constitution of a governing body and in Rule 6 and 8, office bearers of the governing body are mentioned. In Rule 9, there are provisions for appointment of Executive Directors. In the case in hand, the petitioner herein who was to be superannuated on 31/12/2023, by a resolution, passed by the governing body of CEDMAP on 29/08/2023 (Annexure P/8), was conferred with the benefit of extension of services for a period of 2 years commencing from 01/01/2024 till 31/12/2025. As per the decision so taken by the governing body, the petitioner started performing his duties. In the meantime, as the then Executive Director Mrs. Anuradha Singhai was placed under suspension, hence, vide order dated 04/09/2024 Shri Ambresh Adhikari, Joint Director of Directorate of Industries was assigned duties of officiating Director of CEDMAP. The officiating Director now vide order impugned dated 24/06/2025 (Annexure P/12) has terminated the services of the petitioner while giving one month notice w.e.f. 24/07/2025. Assailing the impugned order, this petition has been filed. 3. Senior Counsel contends that the order impugned is non est and untenable in the eye of law having been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of service jurisprudence. Assailing the impugned order, this petition has been filed. 3. Senior Counsel contends that the order impugned is non est and untenable in the eye of law having been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of service jurisprudence. It is the contention of the Senior Counsel that the impugned order on the face of it, is stigmatic and could not have been passed without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and without conducting a full fledged inquiry. It is contended by the Senior Counsel that it is not a case of termination simpliciter, on the contrary, the respondent ventured upon to terminate the services while levelling serious allegations of irregularities. The order impugned reflects that there are allegations of negligence, indiscipline and irresponsible attitude of the present petitioner. The aforesaid allegations clearly reveal that the same cast stigma and in such circumstances, it was sine qua non for the respondents to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. 4. In support of her contention, Senior Counsel has placed reliance on decisions of the Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. Vs. Brijesh Kumar and Anr. Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 10546/2019 and Swati Priyadarshini Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. 2024 SCC Online 2139. It is contended by the Senior Counsel that even termination of a contractual employee, requires opportunity of hearing as laid down by this Court in the case of Rahul Tripathi Vs. Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Mission, (2001) 3 MPHT 397 . Senior Counsel further contends that CEDMAP is an entity which is amenable to the writ jurisdiction as the same falls within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, while placing reliance on the judgment of this court passed in WP No. 2065/2011 (IFCI Limited Vs. The Chairman & Anr.). 5. Senior Counsel further contends that in the case in hand, the Executive Director who has passed the impugned order was only holding the officiating/current charge and therefore, was not competent to pass the impugned order and in support of the said contention, Senior Counsel has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Kumar Pandey Vs. State of M.P. and Ors. in WP No. 1352/2017. State of M.P. and Ors. in WP No. 1352/2017. Senior Counsel further submits that it is a case where services of the petitioner were extended by decision of the governing body and the said decision could not have been nullified on the strength of the impugned order by a person who was holding the post of officiating Director. It is thus, contended that the order impugned having been passed by an incompetent authority, deserves to be set aside. 6. Per contra, counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 submits that the petition deserves to be dismissed. It is a case where the petitioner was appointed on contractual basis vide order dated 02/01/2024 (Annexure R/1) and the petitioner himself admitted in Annexure R/2 that his extension of services was on contractual basis and the said contractual services were to remain in force till 31/12/2025. It is further contended by the counsel that as per the Regulations, the services of the petitioner could have been dispensed with upon giving a prior notice of 30 days. It is further contended by the counsel that the order in the present case has been passed by the Executive Director and against the said order, there exists remedy of appeal which lies before the Chairman. Thus without availing the said remedy, the petitioner directly approached this Court by way of this petition which is not maintainable. 7. It is further contended by the counsel that Regulation 56 clearly reveals that termination of services of an employee under a contract or agreement, does not amount to a penalty within the meaning of Regulation 56, hence, there was no occasion or requirement to conduct any inquiry as per Regulation 57. It is contended by the counsel that termination of contractual service, neither amounts to a major penalty nor amounts to a minor penalty and thus, the contention of the counsel that holding of inquiry was a condition precedent, is ill founded and unsustainable. It is further contended by the counsel that in the present case, specific averments which are contained in Annexure R/1 and Annexure R/2 filed with the return, have not been controverted by the petitioner in the rejoinder. The entire rejoinder is silent as regards status of the petitioner being a contractual employee. It is further contended by the counsel that the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India and Ors. The entire rejoinder is silent as regards status of the petitioner being a contractual employee. It is further contended by the counsel that the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India and Ors. vs. S.N. Goyal, (2008) 8 SCC 92 has held that a contract of personal services is not enforceable in view of Section 14 the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and an aggrieved employee can only seek damages but no specific performance is permissible. Hence in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S. N. Goyal (supra), the petition deserves to be dismissed. Counsel has also placed reliance on the decision of this Court passed in WP No. 19905/2019 (Tauqeer Ahmed Ansari Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.) in which this Court has placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in S.N. Goyal (Supra). 8. No other point is pressed or argued by the parties. 9. Heard rival submissions of the parties and perused the record. 10. Firstly, so far as the objection as regards maintainability of the petition is concerned, the same is rejected in view of the judgement of this Court in IFCI Ltd. (Supra). Secondly, the petitioner is questioning the order of termination on the following grounds: (a) The order of termination has been passed by the authority which is not competent as petitioner extension of service was based on a decision of Governing Body. (b) The impugned order has been passed in gross violation of principles of natural justice. (c) No departmental inquiry has been conducted before passing the impugned order of termination. (d) The authority which has passed the impugned order, was holding the charge of post of Director on officiating basis, thus, could not have exercised the powers which are available to the substantive post of Director (e) Even in contractual appointment, if the order is stigmatic, the services cannot be dispensed with, without conducting inquiry while affording opportunity of hearing to the employee concerned. 11. A perusal of the record reflects that, in the case in hand, the order of extension of services of the petitioner, was based on the decision taken by the governing body in its meeting dated 29/08/2023. 11. A perusal of the record reflects that, in the case in hand, the order of extension of services of the petitioner, was based on the decision taken by the governing body in its meeting dated 29/08/2023. The governing body while considering agenda No.9, on the said date, approved that the petitioner's employment be continued for a period of 2 years i.e. from 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2025, on contractual basis. Accordingly, in terms of the decision of the governing body, appointment order of the petitioner dated 02/01/2024 was issued which is contained in Annexure R/1. Though, the said order does not use the term "appointment" but the same reflects that the management had decided to avail the services of present petitioner for a period of 2 years commencing from 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2025 on contractual basis. Therefore, the aforesaid terminology in the order reflects that the petitioner herein was appointed on contractual basis for a period of 2 years commencing from 01/01/2024 to 31/12/2025. Thus, the nature of employment of the petitioner was contractual (Annexure R/1), which has not been disputed by the petitioner. Now, the argument which is being advanced by the petitioner regarding holding an inquiry when the allegation of irregularities are concerned, it would be germane to refer to the celebrated decision of the Apex Court in the case of K.C. Joshi Vs. Union of India, (1985) 3 SCC 153 wherein the Apex Court held in paragraphs 19, 20 and 23 as under: "19. No doubt, it has been urged by the Respondent- Corporation that the order of termination was owing to the coming to an end of the Petitioner's fixed period of service under the contract, but it seems to me that when the Petitioner was terminated, the impugned order dated 4th June, 2004 clearly finds him guilty of misconduct, thereby casting a stigma on the Petitioner, and in that sense must be held to be an order of dismissal and not a mere order of discharge. It further seems that anyone who reads the order in a reasonable way, would naturally conclude that the Petitioner was found guilty of misconduct, and that must necessarily import an element of punishment which is the basis of the order and is its integral part. 20. It further seems that anyone who reads the order in a reasonable way, would naturally conclude that the Petitioner was found guilty of misconduct, and that must necessarily import an element of punishment which is the basis of the order and is its integral part. 20. It is trite to say, that when an authority wants to terminate the services of a temporary employee, it can pass a simple order of discharge without casting any aspersion against the temporary servant or attaching any stigma to his character. As soon as it is shown that the order purports to cast an aspersion on the temporary servant, it becomes idle to suggest that the order is a simple order of discharge. The test in such cases must be: does the order cast aspersion or attach stigma to the officer when it purports to discharge him? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then notwithstanding the form of the order, the termination of service must be held, in substance, to amount to dismissal. 12. The said view has been reiterated recently by the Apex Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar (Supra) wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 19 has held as under: "19 The services of the respondent have been determined solely on the ground of misconduct as alleged but without holding any regular inquiry or affording any opportunity of hearing to him. The termination order has been passed on the basis of some report which probably was not even supplied to the respondent. No show cause notice appears to have been issued to the respondent. Therefore, the order of termination of his services, even if on contractual basis, has been passed on account of alleged misconduct without following the Principles of Natural Justice. The termination order is apparently stigmatic in nature which could not have been passed without following the Principles of Natural Justice." 13. The aforesaid law so laid down by the Apex Court indicates that when the order of termination is stigmatic and punitive in nature, in such circumstances, holding of inquiry and adherence to the principles of natural justice is indispensable. The Apex Court observed that a stigmatic order, since, has direct bearing on the livelihood of an employee and also attaches stigma, thus holding of inquiry is a sine quo non. 14. The Apex Court observed that a stigmatic order, since, has direct bearing on the livelihood of an employee and also attaches stigma, thus holding of inquiry is a sine quo non. 14. If the impugned order of termination is subjected to penetrative scrutiny on the strength of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, it would reveal that paragraph 2 of the impugned order, contains allegations of negligence, indiscipline, as well as irresponsible attitude of the petitioner. The second paragraph of the impugned order is reproduced hereinunder: 15. The aforesaid reasons which are mentioned in the impugned order clearly reveal that the order impugned is stigmatic as the allegations of irregularities and negligence were levelled against the petitioner and as such, it could not have been said that the order impugned was an order of termination simpliciter. If the aforesaid allegations were levelled, then no order of termination could have been passed without conducting an inquiry while affording an opportunity of hearing to the present petitioner which undisputedly in the present case has not been done. Moreover, in the case in hand, the extension of services of the petitioner beyond the date of superannuation, was based on a decision which was taken by the governing st body in its 81 meeting dated 29/08/2023. Therefore, it is the governing body which had approved the petitioner's engagement on contractual basis beyond the age of superannuation. Therefore, the order contained in Annexure R/1 was merely an offshoot of the decision which was taken by the governing body dated 29/08/2023. As such, in the present case as the petitioner's contractual employment after the age of superannuation was based on the decision taken by the governing body, hence in the considered view of this Court, the Executive Director who was officiating on the said post, could not have terminated the services of the petitioner. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Girja Shankar Shukla vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Harda, 1973 JLJ 405 has already held as under: "I agree with Brother Verma., J. that the authority of the decision in Ramratan Vs. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Girja Shankar Shukla vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Harda, 1973 JLJ 405 has already held as under: "I agree with Brother Verma., J. that the authority of the decision in Ramratan Vs. State of M.P. 1964 MPLJ 86 : AIR 1964 Madhya Pradesh 114 so far as it lays down the law that where any action is to be taken or an order is to be passed by an officer of a particular rank, that act cannot be validly performed or the order can be validly passed by an officer of subordinate rank discharging current duties of that post, is still unshaken and that the decision enunciates correctly the legal position." 16. The argument of counsel for the respondent that as per Regulation 3(d) of the Regulations, the Executive Director was the authority competent to pass the order and remedy of appeal was available with the Chairman, is also in the considered view of this Court, ill-founded. The Regulations which are being strongly relied upon by the counsel for the respondent, contains Clause/Regulation No.2 which provides as under: "2. APPLICABILITY (I) Subject to the provisions of sub regulations these regulations shall apply to every whole-time employee of CEDMP. (a) Who was in the service of CEDMP on the date of commencement of these Regulations or (b) Who is or has been appointed or taken in the service of CEDMP on or after the said date of commencement of these Regulations. (II) These Regulations shall not apply, except as otherwise provided by or in pursuance of these Regulations or to such extent as may be specially or generally prescribed by the Governing Body to (a) Staff employed on a part-time basis or on contracts. (b) Apprentices, casual workers employed on daily wages and job workers. (c) Employees who are on deputation from the central or State governments or from any other body from special terms have been laid down in agreement which the respective lending authorities as the case may be." 17. A perusal of Clause/Regulation No.2 (II) reveal that the Regulations are not applicable to an employee who is engaged on contractual basis and therefore, in such circumstances, the Executive Director, under the garb of Regulation 3(d) could not have passed the impugned order. A perusal of Clause/Regulation No.2 (II) reveal that the Regulations are not applicable to an employee who is engaged on contractual basis and therefore, in such circumstances, the Executive Director, under the garb of Regulation 3(d) could not have passed the impugned order. Parties have not brought any other circular or guidelines which contain provisions for contractual appointment of the staff of CEDMAP. However, the fact remains that in the present case the contractual appointment of the petitioner was based on the decision taken by the governing body, therefore, the governing body in the present case was the appointing authority of the petitioner and any order of termination, could not have been passed, unless and until there was approval by the governing body. Therefore, even otherwise the order impugned has been passed by an incompetent authority. 18. Thus, in view of the matter, the impugned order dated 24/06/2025 (Annexure P/12) deserves to be and is accordingly quashed. However, liberty is reserved with the competent authority of the respondents to proceed afresh against the present petitioner, while ensuring adherence to the observations made hereinabove in light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Brijesh Kumar (Supra). 19. Accordingly, with the aforesaid observations, this petition stands allowed.