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2025 DIGILAW 445 (AP)

Shaik Khadar Babu @ Khadar v. Mareedu Venkata Rao

2025-03-11

NINALA JAYASURYA, SUMATHI JAGADAM

body2025
JUDGMENT : Sumathi Jagadam, J. The unsuccessful petitioner/applicant, aggrieved by the Order dated 30.01.2018 in LGOP No. 633 of 2012 passed by the Principal District Judge, West Godavari at Eluru, preferred the present appeal to set aside the impugned order. The said OP was filed under Section 7A (1), Section 8 and Section 10 of the A.P. Land Grabbing Prohibition Act, 1982. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 3. The brief facts as set out in the O.P. are that the petitioner owns 65 sq. yards of the petition schedule property in Sy.No.577 of Eluru Municipal Corporation. The predecessor of the petitioner’s grand-father Shaik Amma Saheb acquired remaining land in Sy.No.577 i.e., 171 Sq.Yards and his name was incorporated in the municipal records in 1959 as occupier and trustee of Imam Khasim Panja and using the extent of 171 Sq.Yards in Sy.No.577 for religious purposes. 4. The petitioner assumed the role of Trustee on the death of his father, who was functioning as Trustee, and has been conducting religious meetings for the last 25 years. The petitioner is paying electricity bills and taxes owed to the Municipal Corporation. The respondent purchased the petition schedule property of an extent of 72 Sq.yards of land under a registered sale deed on 03.12.2009. The respondent having knowledge regarding the ownership, purchased the land and the respondent and his vendors grabbed the petition scheduled property. 5. The respondent’s vendors have constructed the RCC building without permission from the Municipality. After purchasing the petition schedule property, along with the RCC building, the respondent built the first floor, without obtaining permission. 6. The petitioner made a representation to the District Collector, which was forwarded to the Revenue Authorities. As no action was taken to stop the illegal activities of the respondent, the appellant/petitioner filed a petition under Sections 7, 8, and 10 of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) to direct the respondent to evict the petition schedule land and to re-deliver the same to the applicant after demolishing the structures thereon, and to grant Rs.1,00,000/- towards compensation and damages etc. 7. 7. The respondent filed a counter asserting that he purchased the property, which includes an RCC building and 72.1 square yards of land, from Kantheti Suresh and Uma Maheswara Rao under the registered sale deed vide Doc.No.7023 dated 03.12.2009. He obtained a house loan from the UCO Bank of India, Eluru branch. The respondent’s vendors’ predecessors in title purchased a total extent of 72.1 square yards under two registered sale deeds dated 02.11.1888 and 03.08.1925. 8. The respondent’s property covered under the sale deed was 72.1 Sq.yards, out of which 65 sq. yards fell under T.S.No.576 and 0.07 sq. yards fell under T.S.No.577. The respondent’s vendors purchased seven (7) sq. yards of property from the petitioner's predecessors through a Registered Sale Deed vide Doc.No.1909 dated 03.08.1925. He pleaded that the petitioner holds no rights over the property and sought dismissal of the petition. 9. Before the Trial Court, the petitioner / applicant examined PWs. 1 to 6 and got marked Exs.A1 to A12. Respondent was examined as RW 1 and Exs. B1 to B5 were marked on his behalf. Exs.X1 to X5 were also marked. Ex.X1 is a Photostat copy of measurement sketch of TS Nos. 576 and 577; Ex.X2 is a copy of an extract of the Resettlement Fair Adangal and Ex.X3 is a copy of the survey register. Ex.X.4, the Property Tax Assessment Register, and Ex.X.5, the relevant sheet of the Property Tax Assessment Register relating to the respondent's house bearing D.No. 6B-1-6 for the year 2011-12 were also marked. Commissioner’s report and report of the Tahsildar, Eluru were marked as Ex.C1 and C2 respectively. 10. The Trial Court formulated the following points for consideration: i) Whether the petitioner has proved his right, title and possession over the petition schedule property? ii) Whether the petitioner is entitled for possession of petition schedule property and for damages of Rs.1,00,000/-? iii) Whether the petitioner has proved his case, to take cognizance under Section 8 of the Act? iv) To what relief? 11. The learned Trial Court, after thorough consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides and the legal precedents, dismissed the O.P., inter alia holding that the petitioner failed to prove his title and possession over the petition schedule property and that the respondent is not a Land Grabber. 12. iv) To what relief? 11. The learned Trial Court, after thorough consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of both sides and the legal precedents, dismissed the O.P., inter alia holding that the petitioner failed to prove his title and possession over the petition schedule property and that the respondent is not a Land Grabber. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner / appellant contended that the order of the Trial Court is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case and outcome of improper appreciation of the pleadings, the issues framed and the evidence on record, and that the same is therefore liable to be set aside. It was also contended on behalf of the appellant that the Court below has jurisdiction, and that the vendors of the respondent illegally constructed the RCC building without obtaining permission from the Municipality. After purchasing the said land along with the RCC building, the respondent also built a first floor without obtaining permission. He submits that when the respondent attempted to dig a borewell in the petition schedule property, the petitioner raised an objection and submitted representations to the Collector on three occasions. Although these representations were sent to the concerned revenue authorities, no proper action was taken to stop the respondent's illegal activities. The respondent and his vendors are land grabbers. 13. Whereas, the learned counsel for the respondent sought to sustain the order under challenge contending that the same is based on correct appreciation of evidence both oral and documentary and that the no interference is called for. 14. On an appreciation of the rival contentions made by the parties, this Court is required to consider the following question: Whether the petitioner established the title to the petition schedule property and whether the order under challenge warrants interference by this Court? 15. Before dealing with the point, the gist of the petitioner’s evidence may be referred to. 16. The petitioner was examined as P.W-1. His affidavit in lieu of chief examination is reiteration of the petition averments. Though in the cross-examination he stated that the document to show that the predecessors of Imam Khasim Panja purchased the site in question, he has failed to produce relevant documents to prove his title. P.W-3 has stated that the entire Panja land is occupied by the respondent's tenants and vendors, who owned the petition schedule property. Though in the cross-examination he stated that the document to show that the predecessors of Imam Khasim Panja purchased the site in question, he has failed to produce relevant documents to prove his title. P.W-3 has stated that the entire Panja land is occupied by the respondent's tenants and vendors, who owned the petition schedule property. P.W.4 stated that according to Ex.X-3, Kanthe Venkayya and Ratnam (the grand-fathers of the respondent’s vendors) owned 1287 sq. feet in T.S.No.576. According to Ex.X-5, the building is in the respondent's name and was constructed after obtaining approval from the Municipal Corporation. P.W.6 admitted that the respondent's vendors are in possession of the petition schedule property, which they acquired from their ancestors. In 2009, the respondent purchased a house and a vacant site situated on the western boundary of the petitioner's property from K. Suresh Babu and Uma Maheswara Rao. The ground floor was constructed in 2004, and the first floor was constructed in 2009. 17. It is the specific case of the defence side that they purchased land measuring 72.1 square yards under a registered sale deed dated 03.12.2009, which pertains to his vendor’s predecessors in title under a sale deed dated 02.11.1888 for an extent of 65 square yards and 7 square yards under a sale deed dated 03.08.1925. As such, the petitioner has no title over the petition schedule property, and the Imam Khasim Panja land was let out to third parties. Ex.B.5 clearly establishes that the trustees of Imam Khasim Panja sold seven (7) sq. yards of land to the grandfather of the respondent's Vendor. However, until the filing of the petition, neither the petitioner nor his predecessors in title challenged the sale deed covered under Ex.B-5 and kept quiet for nearly 87 years. Be that as it may. 18. PW.1 in his evidence stated that their predecessors purchased the petition schedule property, but he has no document to prove the same. He also stated that respondent vendors constructed the ground floor of the building and that the respondent extended the building by encroaching on the petition schedule property. PW.2 – the sister of the PW 1 had not stated anything worth noting in support of the case of PW.1. He also stated that respondent vendors constructed the ground floor of the building and that the respondent extended the building by encroaching on the petition schedule property. PW.2 – the sister of the PW 1 had not stated anything worth noting in support of the case of PW.1. PW.3 stated that the respondent’s vendors were in possession of the petition schedule property, that they constructed the ground floor in the petition schedule property in 2004, and that the respondent constructed the first floor in 2009. 19. A detailed examination of the evidence on record clearly establish that except making claim over the subject matter property, no substantial evidence was adduced by the petitioner to grant the relief prayed for and, therefore, the contention that the Trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence, cannot be accepted. 20. The Trial Court, in fact, recorded its categorical findings, which reads as follows: “o) All the factors on a cumulative consideration suggest that the version of the respondent is more probable and is nearer to the truth. Further, the self serving statements of the petitioner do not inspire the confidence and the same appears to be far from the truth, and it is without a doubt clear that the respondent has sufficiently repel the presumption. In the light of the rebuttal evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent, case of the petitioner pales into insignificance. So, it can safely be held that the petitioner has failed to establish his case.” 21. It is settled law that a person who claims title, ownership, or lawful possession of any such land has to establish the same by exhibiting relevant documents of his title, ownership, or lawful possession over the land. 22. However, the buildings and structures existing on the land would fall under the definition of ‘land’ in Sec. 2(c) of the Act. It is settled law that a person who claims title, ownership, or lawful possession of any such land has to establish the same by exhibiting relevant documents of his title, ownership, or lawful possession over the land. 22. However, the buildings and structures existing on the land would fall under the definition of ‘land’ in Sec. 2(c) of the Act. Section 2(e) defines `land grabbing' as hereunder: (e) "land grabbing" means every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorised structures; and the term "to grab land" shall be construed accordingly; 23. In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs Government of A.P. and others , [ (2002) 3 SCC 258 ] the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under “Special Courts, equipped with the powers of both Civil and Criminal Courts, could handle cases of alleged land grabbing, ownership disputes, and lawful possession issues under the provisions of the CPC and the CrPC. The Court?s decisions are binding on all involved parties. Mere allegations of land grabbing are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court, either suo motu or upon application by any individual or authority. To establish a case of land grabbing in civil proceedings, the complainant must prove both in terms of fact and intention that the accused has unlawfully occupied their land with the intent to illegally possess it. The definition of 'land grabbing' under Section 2(e) of the A.P. Act, similar to the Gujarat Land Grabbing Act 2020, requires lawful entitlement to the land to avoid being labelled as a 'land grabber'. A mere prima facie claim is insufficient; lawful entitlement is crucial.” 24. From the material on record, it is clear that the subject matter of the dispute was not only the building having plinth area but also the open land comprising an area. A mere prima facie claim is insufficient; lawful entitlement is crucial.” 24. From the material on record, it is clear that the subject matter of the dispute was not only the building having plinth area but also the open land comprising an area. In the summary of the claim, the petitioner specifically referred to "house and appurtenant land” and alleged that the respondent’s vendors illegally constructed the RCC building. After purchasing the land, the respondent also constructed the first floor, and since then, he has been in occupation of the said property. In such circumstances, the subject matter of the dispute was the building and the appurtenant open land. In Safiya Bee vs Mohd. Vajahath Hussain @ Fasi , AIR 2011 SC 421 it is held thus: “13. The High Court also erred in holding that only occupation of the open land and construction of a building thereon can be treated as land grabbing and that occupation of a building along with open land cannot be treated as land grabbing under the Act. When the land along with the building existing thereon is occupied, it will amount to land grabbing.” 25. However, in terms of Section 10 of the Act, the person who invokes the jurisdiction of the Special Court / Tribunal is required to prima facie prove his title and thereupon burden shifts to the opposite party that he is not a grabber of the petition schedule land and in possession of the same in his own right. 26. In the present case, PW-5, the Municipal Revenue Inspector of the Municipal Corporation, in cross-examination specifically stated that the property covered by Ex.X5 consists of ground and 1 st floor in the name of the respondent and constructed with approvals from the Municipal Corporation. Ex.C-1, the Advocate Commissioner’s report, along with Ex.C-2 i.e., the Tahsildar's report, lends support that the respondent is in possession of an extent of 72 Sq.yards of land covered under Sy. Nos. 576 and 577 and more so, Ex. B-5, the sale deed, clearly establishes that the trustees of Imam Kasim Panja sold 7 square yards of land to the grandfather of the vendor of the respondent. The said transaction has not been challenged for nearly 87 years, but the petitioner filed the O.P. making allegations of land grabbing against the respondent. 27. B-5, the sale deed, clearly establishes that the trustees of Imam Kasim Panja sold 7 square yards of land to the grandfather of the vendor of the respondent. The said transaction has not been challenged for nearly 87 years, but the petitioner filed the O.P. making allegations of land grabbing against the respondent. 27. By adducing evidence, the respondent discharged the burden and proved that he is in possession of the petition land in his own right and made construction with the permission of the Corporation. 28. In view of the aforementioned conclusions arrived at on a detailed examination and scrutiny of the record and the contentions, this Court holds that the judgment of the Court below is well considered, contains cogent reasons and warrants no interference, as no illegality or error could be established. All the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioner / appellant are rejected. Accordingly, the point is answered against the petitioner-appellant. 29. As a result, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. 30. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.