JUDGMENT : G. S. AHLUWALIA, J. This first appeal under Section 96 of CPC has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 13-10-2001, passed by Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Regular Civil Suit No. 167A/1994, by which the suit filed by plaintiff/appellant for specific performance of contract has been dismissed. 2. Original plaintiff - Ummed Singh died during the pendency of suit, and accordingly, his legal representatives were brought on record. This appeal is being pursued by the legal representatives of original plaintiff -Ummed Singh. 3. The facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal, in short, are that a house bearing old Municipal No. 14/642 (new No. 10/573) situated in Kota Wala Mohalla, Gwalior is the disputed property. It was pleaded that the house in question belongs to the defendants and eight tenants are in possession of the property. One room is lying vacant, and in that room goods of the plaintiff are kept, and the room is locked by plaintiff. Other tenants, namely, Ram Charan, Naresh Rajoria, Vanshi, widow of Ramsingh, Kamla, Harveer Sikarwar, Hari Kulshrestha, Kashi Nath, Narayan Singh, have verbally handed over the possession of the tenanted premises to the plaintiff and have also agreed to pay rent to the plaintiff. It is submitted that aforesaid arrangement has been made by the defendants themselves. It was further pleaded that defendant No. 1 - Karan Singh was the karta of joint Hindu family property, and in his absence, defendant No. 2 - Lakhan Singh was looking after the property, being the manager of joint Hindu family property. Thus, it was pleaded that both of them are entitled and empowered to enter into an agreement on behalf other family members of the joint Hindu family. Accordingly, plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase the said house for a consideration of Rs. 46,000/- and paid Rs. 3,000/- by way of advance. The agreement to sell was executed on 9-8-1986. It was agreed that the sale deed shall be executed by 30-11-1986. It was further pleaded that now defendants Nos. 1 and 2, with dishonest intentions, are talking to defendant No. 3 for sale of the house. Accordingly, on 21-8-1986, defendants Nos. 3 and 4 requested the plaintiff to take his advance money back because they are going to purchase the property, otherwise, the plaintiff would face dire consequences. When the plaintiff inquired from defendants Nos. 1 and 2, with dishonest intentions, are talking to defendant No. 3 for sale of the house. Accordingly, on 21-8-1986, defendants Nos. 3 and 4 requested the plaintiff to take his advance money back because they are going to purchase the property, otherwise, the plaintiff would face dire consequences. When the plaintiff inquired from defendants Nos. 1 and 2 then plaintiff was informed that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are intending to sell the house to defendants Nos. 3 and 4. Accordingly, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 also requested the plaintiff to take his advance money back and made it clear that they would not alienate the house to the plaintiff, but they would sell the house to defendants Nos. 3 and 4 only. It was also threatened that in case if the plaintiff creates some trouble, then defendants are capable to deal with the plaintiff. Thus it was pleaded that it is clear that defendants are now not intending to alienate the property, whereas plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract. It was further stated that plaintiff is ready to pay the remaining amount of Rs. 43,000/- and is ready and willing to get the sale deed executed. It was further pleaded that very soon, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 will execute the sale deed in favor of defendants Nos. 3 and 4. Accordingly, suit for specific performance of contract was filed. 4. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 filed their written statement and admitted that the property belonged to defendants Nos. 1 and 2. It was specifically stated that by a registered sale deed dated 28-07-1986, the property has already been sold to Smt. Parvati. It was also pleaded that copy of the said sale deed has already been filed by plaintiff himself. Thus, it was claimed that plaintiff was aware of the sale transaction which took place between defendant No. 2 and Smt. Parvati. It was denied that on the arrangement made by defendants, the tenants have handed over the possession of these tenanted premises to the plaintiff. It was denied that the property in dispute was a joint Hindu family property, and it was also denied that defendant No. 1 was the karta khandan. It was also denied that in absence of defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 was looking after the family. It was denied that the property in dispute was a joint Hindu family property, and it was also denied that defendant No. 1 was the karta khandan. It was also denied that in absence of defendant No. 1, defendant No. 2 was looking after the family. The execution of the agreement to sell was also denied by defendant No. 1. It was further pleaded that at the time of filing of suit, plaintiff had paid a court fee of only Rs. 50/- and only on the objection raised by defendants, the Trial Court, by order dated 4-10-1991, had directed the plaintiff to pay the deficit court fee and for compliance of the said order, plaintiff had taken multiple opportunities, and after about one year, plaintiff had made an application on 5-10-1992 to the effect that since the court fee is excessive, therefore, plaintiff could not arrange for the same and again prayed for a month’s time. Thus it was pleaded that the plaintiff, without making payment of court fee, was trying to grab the property. It was further pleaded that filing of various applications by the plaintiff for grant of time to pay the court fee clearly shows that plaintiff was financially poor and he was not in a position to pay the court fee of Rs. 4,000/-. Therefore, he was not in a position to purchase the property for a consideration amount of Rs. 46,000/-. In special plea, it was further pleaded that document dated 9-8-1986, which is being projected by the plaintiff as an agreement to sell, appears to be a concocted document because from the self- attested photocopy of the said document, which has been received by defendants along with the notice, it is clear that in the said photocopy, neither the names and details of the witnesses are mentioned nor the signatures of the witnesses are there. Thus, it is clear that plaintiff had retained the document with an intention to tamper and manipulate the same. It is further submitted that application dated 13-10-1998, which was filed after 12 years, to the effect that agreement to sell was kept in the safe custody, clearly discloses the forged act of the plaintiff. It is further submitted that even according to plaintiff, other co-owners are also there, but none of them had signed the agreement to sell dated 6-8-1986. It is further submitted that even according to plaintiff, other co-owners are also there, but none of them had signed the agreement to sell dated 6-8-1986. Even according to plaintiff, aforesaid agreement is merely a proposal which had never resulted in a concluded contract. Plaintiff himself has filed copy of the sale deed dated 2- 5-1987, which was executed in favor of defendant No. 4, Smt. Parvati, but plaintiff has not prayed for declaration of the said sale deed as null and void, and has also not paid the court fee for the said prayer, and accordingly, it was submitted that the plaint/suit filed by plaintiff has rendered infructuous. 5. It is not out of place to mention here that Smt. Parvati, defendant No. 4, also died during the pendency of the suit, and accordingly her legal representatives were brought on record. 6. Defendant No. 4 (c) - Smt. Sadhana Tomar also filed her written statement and took the same defence which was taken by defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 7. The Trial Court, after framing issues and recording evidence, dismissed the suit. 8. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by the court below, it is submitted by counsel for appellant that the court below has failed to see that agreement to sell was executed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract. Plaintiff and defendants had examined the handwriting experts to show that whether agreement to sell was signed by defendants or not. However, the Trial Court has wrongly relied upon the evidence of the handwriting expert examined by defendants. It is further submitted that Sadhana Tomar (D.W.2) had claimed that Parvati Bai had executed a Will in her favour but since she had not examined any attesting witness and has not proved the Will as per Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, therefore, Sadhana Tomar (D.W.2) would not inherit the property which was purchased by Parvati Bai - defendant No. 4. However, it is fairly considered that Ramavatar Tomar, who was also impleaded as defendant No. 4(b), was the husband of Smt. Sadhana Tomar. It is fairly admitted that Ramavatar has expired, therefore, in view of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, even otherwise Smt. Sadhana Tomar would inherit the property or share which came to her husband Ramavatar Tomar. 9. It is fairly admitted that Ramavatar has expired, therefore, in view of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, even otherwise Smt. Sadhana Tomar would inherit the property or share which came to her husband Ramavatar Tomar. 9. Per contra, the appeal is vehemently opposed by counsel for the respondent. It is submitted that the Trial Court has dismissed the suit after appreciating the material available on record in proper perspective. 10. Heard learned counsel for parties. 11. The first question for consideration is as to whether an agreement to sell was ever executed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff or not; Second, whether plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract or not; and Third, what is the effect of non-challenge of the sale deed executed in favour of defendant No. 4 - Smt. Parvati? Whether plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract or not? 12. The words "readiness" and "willingness" are two different words having different meanings. "Readiness" means the financial capacity of the plaintiff to pay the remaining consideration amount, as well as to bear the registration expenses, whereas "willingness" is the conduct of plaintiff. Thus, a person might be financially strong but may not be willing to execute/perform his part of contract. Therefore, in order to succeed in a suit for specific performance of contract, plaintiff is required to prove that not only he was ready to perform his part of contract, but he was also willing to do that. 13. So far as the financial capacity of plaintiffs to pay the remaining amount of Rs. 43,000/-, as well as the registration charges, is concerned, the situation is writ large. Initially, the suit was filed with a court fee of Rs. 50/-, i.e., Rs. 30/- for declaration, and Rs. 20/- for permanent injunction. The Trial Court, by order dated 4-10-1991, had held that appellant/plaintiff has not valued the suit properly and has not paid the proper court fee, and accordingly, instead of rejecting the plaint, decided to give one more opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint. Suit was filed on 20-11- 1986, and application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was filed on 19-02-1990, and application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was allowed on 4-10-1991. Suit was filed on 20-11- 1986, and application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was filed on 19-02-1990, and application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was allowed on 4-10-1991. However, on 5-12-1992, an application was made by plaintiff under Sections 148 and 149 of CPC to the effect that court fee is very excessive and therefore the plaintiff could not arrange for the same. Under these circumstances, one month’s time may be granted to pay the court fee, and accordingly court fee of Rs. 4080/- was paid only on 7-1-1993. 14. Thus, it is clear that although the suit was filed on 20-11-1986 but with great difficulty, plaintiff could pay the court fee of Rs. 4080/- only on 7-1-1993, i.e., after approximately 7 years of filing of suit. In view of the specific application filed by plaintiff on 5-12-1992, it is clear that the plaintiff was not in a position to make arrangement of court fee of Rs. 4080/- also. Application which was filed under Section 148/149 of CPC on 5-12- 1992 reads as under:- Thus, it is clear that financial position of the plaintiff was not such where they could have easily made arrangement for payment of court fee of Rs. 4080/- but they took approximately 7 years to pay the said court fee. Under these circumstances, contention of the plaintiff that he was ready and willing to pay the remaining consideration amount of Rs. 43,000/- and was also in a position to bear the expenses of registration charges, appears to be false and without any basis. 15. That was not the end of the matter. Present appeal was filed on 23-11-2001, and along with the memo of appeal, only a court fee of Rs. 130/- was paid. IA No. 6366/2001 was filed by appellant/plaintiff under Section 148 CPC seeking extension of time to pay the court fee of Rs. 4130/-. Thus, it is clear that even on the date of presentation of this appeal, i.e., on 23-11- 2001, appellant/plaintiff was not in possession of court fee of Rs. 4080/-, and accordingly, he had sought time to pay the deficit court fee of Rs. 4130/-. Thereafter, this Court, by order dated 3-7-2013, granted 15 days’ time to pay the court fee failing which the appeal was directed to be dismissed. As per the record of this Court, deficit court fee of Rs. 4080/-, and accordingly, he had sought time to pay the deficit court fee of Rs. 4130/-. Thereafter, this Court, by order dated 3-7-2013, granted 15 days’ time to pay the court fee failing which the appeal was directed to be dismissed. As per the record of this Court, deficit court fee of Rs. 4000/- was paid by appellants on 19-7-2013, i.e., approximately after 12 years of filing of this appeal. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiff was never in possession of sufficient funds to pay the consideration amount of Rs. 43,000/- as well as he was also not in a position to bear the expenses of registration charges. Thus, it is clear that plaintiff was never ready to perform his part of contract. 16. Even otherwise, no document, i.e., like bank statement, etc. was filed to show that plaintiff was in possession of sufficient funds to pay the consideration amount and registration expenses. 17. Once the plaintiff was not in possession of sufficient means to pay the remaining consideration amount of Rs. 43,000/-, and was also not in a position to bear the registration expenses, then it is clear that he was also not willing to perform his part of contract. Thus it is held that the plaintiff was neither ready nor willing to perform his part of contract. Whether the agreement to sale was ever executed between the parties? 18. Plaintiff - Ummed Singh Sikarwar had stated that an agreement to sell, Exhibit P-1, was executed on 9-8-1986 and he had given an amount of Rs. 3000/- by way of advance and at that time Sitaram and Ram Shankar were present on the spot. Sitaram (P.W.3) has stated that talks pertaining to purchase of the house were going on for the last one year, whereas plaintiff - Ummed Singh, in paragraph 16 of his cross-examination, has stated that the talks regarding purchase of house took place only 4 days prior to the execution of the agreement to sell. 19. Sitaram (PW-3) has specifically admitted in paragraph 3 of his cross-examination that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are permanent residents of Agra and they occasionally come to Gwalior. He has also stated that he never had any talks with defendants prior to execution of agreement to sell. He has also admitted that he was not known to defendants Nos. 1 and 2. 1 and 2 are permanent residents of Agra and they occasionally come to Gwalior. He has also stated that he never had any talks with defendants prior to execution of agreement to sell. He has also admitted that he was not known to defendants Nos. 1 and 2. This witness was not in a position to give the details of family members of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. In paragraph 5 of his cross-examination, he admitted that he is the real brother of plaintiff - Ummed Singh. He further admitted that it was nowhere mentioned in the agreement to sell, Exhibit P-1, that from the date of said agreement, tenants were directed to pay the rent to plaintiff - Ummed Singh. 20. After considering the evidence led by the plaintiff and Sitaram (PW-3), the Trial Court has held that the witnesses do not appear to be reliable one. Furthermore, the Trial Court has also not relied upon the evidence of Rajiv (PW-4), who was the handwriting expert, but has relied upon the evidence of Jaiprakash Verma (DW-3), who was also the handwriting expert. 21. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that the Trial Court has rightly held that plaintiff has failed to prove that agreement to sell, Exhibit P-1, was ever executed. Furthermore, if the tenants were directed by defendants to pay the rent to plaintiff, then plaintiff could have examined some or one of the tenants to prove that they were ever instructed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to pay the rent to plaintiff but that has not been done by the plaintiff. 22. Under these circumstances, it is held that plaintiff has failed to prove that agreement to sell, Exhibit P-1, was ever executed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in favor of plaintiff. 23. Accordingly, it is held that not only the plaintiff has failed to prove that agreement to sell, Exhibit P-1, was ever executed by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, but has also failed to prove that even otherwise, he was in possession of sufficient funds to pay the remaining consideration amount as well as to bear the expenses of registration charges. What would be the effect of non-challenge of the sale deed executed in favour of defendant No. 4 - Smt. Parvati? 23. 1 and 2, but has also failed to prove that even otherwise, he was in possession of sufficient funds to pay the remaining consideration amount as well as to bear the expenses of registration charges. What would be the effect of non-challenge of the sale deed executed in favour of defendant No. 4 - Smt. Parvati? 23. It appears that a sale deed was executed during the pendency of suit, and accordingly, Smt. Parvati Bai, who had purchased the property, was impleaded as defendant No. 4. Although in the light of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, Parvati Bai would have been bound by the decree, but once the plaintiff was aware of the fact that a sale deed has been executed in favor of Parvati Bai, and Parvati Bai was also impleaded as defendant, then under the facts and circumstances of the case, it was also necessary for the plaintiff to seek the declaration of sale deed in favor of Parvati Bai as null and void. Even that has not been done. 24. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of considered opinion that the Trial Court did not commit any mistake by dismissing the suit filed by plaintiff. 25. Ex-consequenti, judgment and decree dated 13-10-2001, passed by Third Additional District Judge, Gwalior, in Regular Civil Suit No. 167A/1994 is hereby affirmed. 26. Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.