JUDGMENT : (AMIT RAWAL, J.) The present Intra-Court appeal at the behest of the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Society and others is directed against the judgment of the Single Bench dated 19.12.2023 in WPC No.14402/2022, wherein the order dated 25.03.2022 under Section 68(1) of the Co-operative Societies Act passed by the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Society, Thiruvananthapuram, and notice dated 25.03.2022, Ext.P10 have been quashed by holding that it is not in compliance with the provisions of Section 68(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and direction has been issued to fix the liability individually. 2. Before the arguments in the aforementioned appeal could be commenced, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners, who were the ex-members of the committee in respect of the period 01.04.2013 to 31.03.2018, during which the alleged misappropriations and illegalities regarding the appointment and disbursal of loans with lessor interest have occurred, raised the objection qua maintainability of the appeal, in view of the order dated 18.01.2024 passed in WA No.95/2024 filed by the Arayoor Service Co-operative Bank against the same very judgment., which was permitted to be withdrawn with a further submission that the State counsel did not express any aversion in adhering to the directions of the identical judgment in the aforementioned writ appeal as well as in the present writ appeal. In other words, it is contended that the State is estopped from challenging the same, an attempt is being made to re-argue the matter. 3. On the other hand, Mr.Vipindas, learned Government Pleader, pointed out that the Arayoor Service Co- operative Bank had already been under the legal scanner in various proceedings, including Writ Appeal No. 226 of 2024, decided on 27.05.2024, wherein the show cause notice was issued to the Society regarding the proceedings for mismanagement and in the meantime, appointed a former District Judge as an interim Administrator, restraining the Managing Committee of the Co-operative Society from taking any decision to run the Co-operative society, noticing the fact that the Kerala Bank had also extended the loan facility of Rs.9,40,00,000/- and the Society had been in default in making the payment. It was further contended that ultimately, with the change of the counsel, the liability of the appellant therein was discharged, the interim order was complied with and the writ appeal was closed. 4. It was further contended that ultimately, with the change of the counsel, the liability of the appellant therein was discharged, the interim order was complied with and the writ appeal was closed. 4. Even otherwise it is submitted that RP.No.296/2025 has been filed in the WA.No.95 of 2024 to expunge the following findings with regard to the contention of the State recorded in paragraph 4 of the order dated 18.01.2024: “4. Learned Government Pleader submits that the Registrar would not be averse in adhering to any directions this Hon'ble Court deem it appropriate.” 5. In fact, it was an attempt to overcome the institution of the writ appeal by the State, and this fact is also brought to the notice of this Court in the hearing dated 24.02.2025, recorded by us, that it was an attempt to preempt the right of the State to assail the order. 6. It is settled law that the person who comes to the court with unclean hands such act cannot be ignored in any of the proceedings in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath ( 1994 (1) SCC 1 ) and (1994 AIR 853). In this view of the matter, we overrule the aforementioned objections and proceed to decide the inter-court appeal on merits. 7. There had been a series of litigation prior to the institution of the writ petition in question. In the earlier round of litigation, when the proceedings were initiated under Section 68(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Society Act, writ petitioners had approached this Court vide Writ Petition No. 12783/2021. The Single Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 21.02.2022, Ext.P7, quashed the order under challenge of disqualification and appointment of the administrator with a direction to the Joint Registrar to pass fresh orders after affording an opportunity of hearing, fixing the liability individually. The aforementioned judgment was assailed before the Division Bench in two appeals, one by the State as WA.No.443 of 2022 and the other by the writ petitioners as W.A.No.300/2022, both the writ appeals were dismissed by judgment dated 6.4.2022. 8. The aforementioned judgment was assailed before the Division Bench in two appeals, one by the State as WA.No.443 of 2022 and the other by the writ petitioners as W.A.No.300/2022, both the writ appeals were dismissed by judgment dated 6.4.2022. 8. In pursuance of the judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in all the proceedings the inspection had already taken place vide Ext.P1 on 28.09.2018 noticing certain irregularities regarding the membership, disbursement of the loan, settlement of the arrears for the period 2013-2018, and functioning of the Society. The aforementioned inspection was as per the provisions of Section 66 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. 9. Section 68 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act empowers the Joint Registrar envisaging various situations, either through a complaint or order or inspection, to initiate the proceedings in order to point out that any person of the committee had been responsible for misappropriation or misutilisation of funds or the powers vested in them by virtue of the bye-laws in extending any of the facilities not provided in the bye-laws. Section 68 (2) envisages notice to all individual persons as to why the surcharge proceedings for the recovery of amounts attributed to each individual as per the provisions of 68(1) should not be recovered. 10. It is pertinent to mention here that the report as envisaged under Section 68(1) of the Act had already fixed the liability individually of each of the persons, much less of certain persons who had either not been on the rolls of the committee or had retired or joined later or against the dead persons. But the liability was fixed individually, and after Ext.P2, the surcharge proceeding under Section 68(2) which was Ext.P11 in the earlier round of litigation, dated 16.06.2021, was quashed by noticing that the person who assumed the ofÏce/management after the period of inspection could not have been charged, the period which was beyond 31.03.2018. 11. In compliance of the directions of the Single Bench, proceedings under section 68(2) was initiated, deleting the persons who had not been responsible in the management of the Society or had retired or joined later or was not involved or not on duty during the period of misappropriation, ie., from 01.04.2013 to 31.03.2018. 11. In compliance of the directions of the Single Bench, proceedings under section 68(2) was initiated, deleting the persons who had not been responsible in the management of the Society or had retired or joined later or was not involved or not on duty during the period of misappropriation, ie., from 01.04.2013 to 31.03.2018. The Joint Registrar, Thiruvananthapuram, fixed the liability individually of the persons referred to as in Subsection 1 of Section 68 of the Act, of a loss of 2,17,37,762/- to be levied from the responsible party, and vide Ext.P10 of same day individual notices have been sent to all the erring ofÏcials. In those Exts.P9 and P10 proceedings, though assailable under Section 83(J) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies by way of appeal, were assailed before the Single Bench in WPC.No. 14402/2022. Learned Single Bench on analysis of the previous judgments as well as provision of the Act and various authority in the judgment under challenge, found that there had been a considerable decrease in the liabilities by excluding the persons who were not on the rolls of the Society as noticed in the previous round of litigation, but set aside Exts.P9 and P10 on the ground that they are bad for the reasons of not noticing the receipt of the considerable amount by the Society. In other words, it also says that the author of the order, ie., Joint Register in Exts.P9 and P10 had not understood the directions of this court to mean a reassessment of the individual liabilities of the members by including the person who died and excluding the persons who were not in ofÏce as the surcharge proceedings necessarily has civil consequence. In other words, the pith and substance of the judgment is that the orders under challenge before the Single Bench did not fix the liability individually, ie., in stricto sensu of the provision of Subsection 1 of Section 68 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. 12. In other words, the pith and substance of the judgment is that the orders under challenge before the Single Bench did not fix the liability individually, ie., in stricto sensu of the provision of Subsection 1 of Section 68 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. 12. Adv.Vipindas, the senior Government Pleader submitted that by minutely examining the orders Exts.P9 and P10 dated 25.03.2022, it is evident that the persons who were not on the rolls or had retired or left or dead have been excluded, and the legal heirs have been assigned the responsibilities, including the one who had been in control and charge of the affairs of the committee for the period aforementioned, ie., 01.04.2013 to 31.03.2018, by fixing the responsibility individually strictly as per the provisions of the Act aforementioned. 13. Even otherwise, despite raising an objection in the counter statement regarding non-availment of the alternative remedy, there has been no adjudication either at the beginning or in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment under challenge. 14. The learned Single Bench has assumed the role of an expert by giving the findings in paragraph 19, treading on path of appreciation of disputed question of fact which is not in the domain of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as it is yet to be decided by the Registrar, subject to the stand of all persons who have been issued notice vide proceedings under Section 68(2) vide Ext.P10. It is an attempt to forestall and preempt the right and delay of the adjudication of the surcharge proceedings. In none of the findings in Ext.P9, the liability has been fixed jointly and severally but individually. But the entire focus had been on other issue, therefore, there is abdication, abberration and opaqness, therefore it is liable to be set aside. 15. On the other hand, Mr.Sabari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners and Adv.M.Sasindran for the 11 th respondent, supported the findings of the Single Bench to contend that Ext.P9 does not strictly comply with the requirement of law as envisaged under Subsection 1 of Section 68 of the Act as the expression used is ‘person’ and not the committee as a whole. In other words, the liability cannot be fixed jointly and severally as has been done by Ext.P9. In other words, the liability cannot be fixed jointly and severally as has been done by Ext.P9. There is no assumption of the role of expert in examining the nitty-gritty of the liabilities by treading on the path of the appreciation of the disputed question of fact, as urged by the Government Pleader. The judgment is perfectly legal and justified based upon the authoritative pronouncements, therefore requires no ponderance or adjudication as attempted to be done in the present intra-court appeal. 16. We have heard the counsel for the parties and appraised the paper book. 17. In the previous round of litigation, the Single Bench of this Court had framed certain questions while rendering the adjudication, those questions are extracted hereunder: “(a) Though the inspection under Section 66 related to the period from 01.04.2013 to 31.03.2018, the proceedings under Section 68 included period beyond 31.03.2018, which is not contemplated.” (b) Persons who assumed ofÏce/management after the period of inspection under Section 66 (ie. after 31.03.2018 have been surcharged under Section 68(2), which is impermissible. (c) Persons who were not in management for the entire period in respect of which Section 66 inspection was conducted, but only portions thereof, have been mulcted with liability for the entire period, which is unsustainable. (d) Liability of persons in management during the period in respect of which Section 66 inspection was conducted but were no more when Section 68 proceedings were initiated, is fastened on the other members of the Committee, which is erroneous. (e) No opportunity was afforded to pay off the liability and avoid an order of surcharge. 18. On the basis of the aforementioned questions, had disposed of the writ petition, W.P(C).12783 of 2021, paragraph 17 of the judgment dated 21.02.2022 reads thus: “ Resultantly, Ext. P11 order and the consequential orders of disqualification and appointing an administrator are quashed. The 1 st respondent shall pass fresh orders in the light of the findings entered into in this judgment, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties. Let orders be passed within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Since administrator had been in management from 18.06.2021 he shall continue in ofÏce subject to the outcome of the proceedings.” 19. For redressing the controversy, it would also be appropriate to extract the provisions of Section 68 of the Act. Since administrator had been in management from 18.06.2021 he shall continue in ofÏce subject to the outcome of the proceedings.” 19. For redressing the controversy, it would also be appropriate to extract the provisions of Section 68 of the Act. 68.Surcharge.- (1) If in the course of an audit, inquiry, inspection or the winding up of a society, it is found that any person, who is or was entrusted with the organization or management of such society or who is or has, at any time been an ofÏcer or an employee of the society, has made any payment contrary to the Act and the rules or the bye-laws, or has caused any loss or damage in the assets of the society by breach of trust, or wilful negligence or mismanagement or has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property belonging to such society or has destroyed or caused the destruction of the records, the Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of the committee, liquidator or any creditor, inquire himself or direct any person authorised by him by an order in writing in this behalf, to inquire into the conduct of such person. (2) Where an inquiry is made under sub-section (1), the Registrar may, after giving the person concerned, an opportunity of being heard, by order in writing, require him to repay or restore the money or other property or any part thereof, with interest at such rate, or to pay contribution and costs or compensation to such extent, as the Registrar may consider just and equitable. 60[(3)Where the money, property, interest, cost or compensation is not repaid or restored as per sub-section (2), the Registrar shall take urgent steps to recover such amounts from the concerned persons as arrears of public revenue due on land as specified in Section 79 of the Act.] 20. 60[(3)Where the money, property, interest, cost or compensation is not repaid or restored as per sub-section (2), the Registrar shall take urgent steps to recover such amounts from the concerned persons as arrears of public revenue due on land as specified in Section 79 of the Act.] 20. On perusal of the provisions of Subsection 1 of Section 68, it is evident that the competent authority, in the course of audit, inquiry, inspection or winding up, finds that any person who was interested in the organization, management of the Society or at any point of time had been the ofÏcer or employee of the Society made a payment contrary to the Act and Rules of the bye-laws, or causes loss and damage, the competent authority/Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of the committee, liquidator, or any creditor, inquire himself or direct any person authorised by him by an order in writing to inquire into the conduct of such person, whereas Subsection (2) provides that after giving the opportunity of the person mentioned in Subsection 1, shall require the person if found liable to pay the money along with the interest at such rate to be fixed by the Registrar. The entire thrust of the judgment of Single Bench had been on the premise that the order Exts.P9 and P10 failed to address the provisions of Subsection 1 of Section 68 by fixing the liability individually. We would like to refer to the following paragraphs of the judgment: 18. In Ext.P7 judgment, this Court has specifically said that as regards loss caused to the Society by the deceased ofÏce bearers, appropriate steps have to be taken in accordance with the law. Necessarily, when liability is to be fixed on deceased persons, their legal representatives will have to be put on notice, and liabilities can be fixed only to the extent of the assets that they have inherited from the deceased. This Court had specifically held in Ext. P7 that the liability is not joint and several as between the members of the Committee. As such, the liability if any of the deceased cannot be fastened to the other members of the Committee. Exts.P9 and P10, hence, to the extent they do not proceed to fix the liability of the deceased persons in accordance with the law, cannot be sustained. 19. As such, the liability if any of the deceased cannot be fastened to the other members of the Committee. Exts.P9 and P10, hence, to the extent they do not proceed to fix the liability of the deceased persons in accordance with the law, cannot be sustained. 19. Another aspect that is relevant is with regard to the findings on the difference between the value of the assets and liabilities. The amounts were fixed in the surcharge proceedings in Ext. P6 based on a finding that there is an increase in the difference between assets and liabilities to the extent of Rs.22,75,590/-. It is not known how the very same amount has formed the basis for fixing the surcharge in Exts. P9 and P10, while admittedly, a sum of Rs.64,87,118/- has been remitted, thus causing a considerable decrease in the liabilities. It does not stand to reason that after the liabilities have reduced considerably, the increase in the difference between the assets and liabilities will remain the same in Ext.P6 and Exts. P9 and 10. Apparently, the remittance of the amount has not even been considered while fixing the liability in Exts.P9 and P10. This is only one glaring example of the discrepancies in the reconsideration, which is claimed to have been done after the judgment of this Court. As contended by the petitioners and as is evident from the Exts. P9 and P10 report, there has only been a re-assessment of the liabilities of each person based on their period in OfÏce, and there has not been any reconsideration of the issue of whether the surcharge proceedings are to be initiated based on the findings in the inquiry. When fresh orders are directed to be issued after quashing the order of surcharge issued earlier, what is required is not a mere quantification based on the materials collected in the enquiry. Nor could the respondents have taken into account the very same amount in Ext.P6, which is already set aside, and apportion the said amount differently between members, based on their period in the Committee alone. That was not what was directed in Ext. P7. A surcharge proceeding necessarily has civil consequences, and after rendering a finding regarding the liability of petitioners individually, the amount of liability is to be quantified based on the actual loss that has been sustained by the Society. That was not what was directed in Ext. P7. A surcharge proceeding necessarily has civil consequences, and after rendering a finding regarding the liability of petitioners individually, the amount of liability is to be quantified based on the actual loss that has been sustained by the Society. Such an actual loss has to be calculated on the basis of the materials which are available. When Ext.P10 itself gives credit to amounts that have been repaid, it was necessary that the heads of liabilities for surcharge are also subjected to necessary changes. It would appear from a reading of Exts. P9 and P10 that the author of the order has only understood the directions in the judgment of this Court to mean a re- assessment of the individual liabilities of the members by including persons who have died and excluding persons who are not in ofÏce. I am hence of the opinion that Exts.P9 and P10 cannot be sustained since they are not in accordance with the law laid down in the decisions referred to above or in accordance with the directions issued in Ext.P7 and are also not sustainable on the facts revealed in the enquiry. They are bad for the reason that they have not considered amounts which have been received by the Society, admittedly. They are also bad for the reason that they proceed on the basis of the liability of the Committee rather than on individual liability, which needs to be assessed in terms of Section 68, Exts.P9 and P10 are hence set aside. There will be a direction to the 1 respondent to pass fresh orders in accordance with the direction contained in Ext. P7 judgment as afÏrmed by the Division Bench and based on the observations made above, if they intend to continue with proceedings pursuant to Exts.P1 and P2. WP(C) No.17689 of 2022 20. The prayer in the writ petition is to quash Ext.P10 order produced therein and for a direction to the 2nd respondent to hand over the minutes of the Society taken by him as evidenced by Ext. P9 receipt and to give necessary aid for the discharge of duties to the Managing Committee members as and when required. The prayer in the writ petition is to quash Ext.P10 order produced therein and for a direction to the 2nd respondent to hand over the minutes of the Society taken by him as evidenced by Ext. P9 receipt and to give necessary aid for the discharge of duties to the Managing Committee members as and when required. Ext.P10 proceeds on the basis that the petitioners had forcefully taken possession of the minutes book of the Society and the same is to be retrieved by means of proceedings under Section 34 of the KCS Act. It can be seen from Ext.P9 that the minutes book had been taken custody of by the 2nd respondent, and hence, the basis of Ext.P10 order does not exist. Ext.P10 cannot hence be sustained and is hence quashed. Regarding the prayer for a direction to the 2nd respondent to hand over the minutes book to the petitioner and to provide aid for the functioning of the Committee, since the period of the Committee has expired on 4.11.2023, the prayer is no longer relevant, and hence no further orders are necessary. The writ petition is disposed of as above. WP(C)No. 20803 of 2022 21. The prayer in the writ petition is for a direction to respondents 1 and 3 to hand over the administration of the bank to the petitioners as the term of the Administrator was over on 20.06.2022 and in view of Exts.P6 and P7 orders issued pursuant to Exts.P4 and P5 judgments. In the judgment in W.P.(C)No.14402 of 2022, Exts.P4 and P5, which have been produced as Exts.P9 and P10 therein, have been quashed. The term of the Committee constituted by the petitioners also expired on 4.11.2023. What is hence required is a proper election to the Committee and handing over charge to the newly elected Committee. In the above circumstances, this writ petition is disposed of directing the respondents to take steps to conduct the election to the Committee of the 2nd respondent Bank at the earliest.” 21. Moreover, on perusal of the order Ext.P9, it is evident that steps were taken to rectify the mistake that occurred in the earlier round while passing the order under Subsection 1 of Section 68, and the liability as per Ext.P9 was only on the persons who had been in control of the management for the period 01.04.2013 to 31.03.2018. Moreover, on perusal of the order Ext.P9, it is evident that steps were taken to rectify the mistake that occurred in the earlier round while passing the order under Subsection 1 of Section 68, and the liability as per Ext.P9 was only on the persons who had been in control of the management for the period 01.04.2013 to 31.03.2018. Even otherwise, all the individual persons have now been prima facie found to be involved and have a right to defend on receipt of the show cause notice, Ext.P10, by filing a reply and lead evidence in support of their respective stands. In our considered view it was an attempt to thwart and delay the adjudication of the proceedings contemplated to be initiated under Section 68. We do not find any ambiguity or non- compliance of the provisions of Subsection 1 of Section 68, whereby the order Ext.P9 lacks in fixing of liability on an individual person. Even the learned Single Bench has failed to address the different heads whereby liabilities were fixed on different persons. The order Ext.P9 is self contained and descriptive. Even otherwise no explanation has come forth in not availing the alternative remedy. Be that as it may. 22. The reasoning of the Single Bench that the expression “any person” could not mean the member of the committee, in our considered view, is also not a correct interpretation for the reason that the person mentioned in Section 68 would also include in the management committee as per the ratio decidendi culled out in Mahendran v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General) (2019 (3) KLT 627). 23. Section 2(e) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act defines the ‘committee’, which means a governing body of the Co-operative Society by whatever name it is called, to which the Management of the affairs of the Society is entrusted, whereas Section 2 defines the ofÏcer. Thus by going by the provisions of Section 2(e), the person mentioned in Section 68 would also include the managing committee members. Even otherwise, as per the provisions of Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, the persons shall also include a company or association or body of the individuals and Section 9 of the Co-operative Societies Act prescribes the registration of the Society shall render it to a body co-operate. 24. Even otherwise, as per the provisions of Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, the persons shall also include a company or association or body of the individuals and Section 9 of the Co-operative Societies Act prescribes the registration of the Society shall render it to a body co-operate. 24. We are of the view that the judgment of the Single Bench cannot be sustained for the petitioners/respondents would have a right to defend while replying to the show cause notice as noticed above, in accordance with law and the matter may culminate into any of the findings either in favour of or against the respondents but not in the manner and mode as noticed above. The judgment of the Single Bench is set aside. Writ Appeal stands allowed.

Joint Registrar Of Cooperative Societies v. Y. r. vincent