ORDER : SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR, J. 1. This revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 13.01.2016 passed in Crl.A. No. 42/2015 by II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Chikkaballapura (sitting at Chintamani) where under the judgment of conviction dated 13.05.2015 passed in C.C. No. 103/2011 by Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Chintamani convicting the petitioner for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as the N.I. Act) has been affirmed. 2. Heard learned counsel for petitioner – accused and learned counsel for respondent – complainant. 3. Case of the respondent - complainant is that the petitioner - accused had borrowed hand loan of Rs.1,00,000/- for his family and other legal necessities in the second week of January 2010 before the witnesses, namely. Sri. Rajanna, Sri. L.A. Maregowda, Sri. C. Vasudev and Sri. Shaik Hussain and agreed to repay within 3 months and accordingly the respondent - complainant requested the petitioner - accused for repayment of the said hand loan. The petitioner - accused gave cheque dated 10.04.2010 bearing No. 578613 for Rs.1,00,000/- drawn on State Bank of India, Yelahanka New Town Branch, Bangalore. The respondent - complainant presented the said cheque for realization on 20.09.2010 and it was returned unpaid for reason `insufficient funds’ under memo dated 20.09.2010 which was received on 15.10.2010. Thereafter the respondent - complainant got issued a legal notice dated 03.11.2010 by registered post which was returned with shara that `party refused’, but, notice sent under certificate of posting was personally served on 12.11.2010. The petitioner – accused neither replied nor complied the demand made in the notice and therefore the respondent - complainant filed complaint against the petitioner – accused for offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The respondent - complainant examined himself as P.W.1 and got marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.7 and also examined two witnesses as P.W.2 and P.W.3. Statement of the petitioner - accused has been recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The petitioner - accused has not led any defense evidence. The trial Court appreciating the evidence on record has convicted the petitioner - accused for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Said judgment of conviction was challenged by the petitioner - accused before the Sessions Court in Crl.A. No. 42/2015. Said appeal came to be dismissed affirming the judgment of conviction. 4. The trial Court appreciating the evidence on record has convicted the petitioner - accused for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Said judgment of conviction was challenged by the petitioner - accused before the Sessions Court in Crl.A. No. 42/2015. Said appeal came to be dismissed affirming the judgment of conviction. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner – accused would contend that the cheque has not been issued for payment of debt but it has been issued for a different transaction to some other person and that cheque has been misused by the respondent - complainant. He placed reliance on the documents produced under memo at the time of recording statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the cheque has been issued to one Sri. Lakshmaiah as a security for the transaction entered into by the petitioner with him. He further contended that the notice sent under certificate of posting has been served on the petitioner on 06.11.2010 and the notice sent by RPAD/Speed Post returned with endorsement `party refused’ and on the cover of the said notice it is endorsed that `delivery has been attempted on 06.11.2010’ and therefore there is deemed service of notice on 06.11.2010. Considering the said deemed service of notice on 06.11.2010, the complaint filed on 23.12.2010 is beyond period of limitation. He further contended that there is interpolation in the date of cheque Ex.P.1 and petitioner - accused made an application to send the cheque to an expert to ascertain the said interpolation, but, his application has been rejected and the said order rejecting the application has not been challenged. He placed reliance on the following decisions. (i) Crl. Revision Petition No.1888/2016 – Channappa Vs. Thimmaiah (ii) 2010 Crl.L.J 3315 – T.S. Muralidhar Vs. H. Narayana Singh (iii) ILR 2008 KAR 4629 – Shiva Murthy Vs. Amruthraj (iv) 2001 (1) KCCR 437 – Sri. G.Premdas Vs. Sri. Venkataraman (v) AIR 2024 SC 4103 – Sri. Dattatraya Vs. Sharanappa (vi) (2011) 4 SCC 726 – Tatipamula Naga Raju Vs. Pattem Padmavathi 5. Learned counsel for respondent – complainant would contend that the R.P.A.D./Speed Post cover has been returned after 12.11.2010 to the respondent and therefore, service has to be considered on 12.11.2010 and complaint filed on 23.12.2010 is within time. The allegation of interpolation on the date of the cheque has not been established. Pattem Padmavathi 5. Learned counsel for respondent – complainant would contend that the R.P.A.D./Speed Post cover has been returned after 12.11.2010 to the respondent and therefore, service has to be considered on 12.11.2010 and complaint filed on 23.12.2010 is within time. The allegation of interpolation on the date of the cheque has not been established. The order rejecting the application has not been challenged and it became final. P.W.2 and P.W.3 have been examined who have deposed regarding the transaction of petitioner – accused borrowing Rs.1,00,000/- from the respondent – complainant. The signature on the cheque is admitted and therefore a presumption has to be drawn under Section 139 of the N.I. Act that the cheque is issued for discharge of debt. The said presumption has not been rebutted. Considering the said aspect, the trial Court has rightly convicted the petitioner – accused for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The appellate Court re-appreciating the evidence on record has rightly dismissed the appeal, affirming the judgment of conviction. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court has perused the impugned judgments and the trial Court records. 7. Signature on the cheque has been admitted by the petitioner - accused. As the signature is admitted, a presumption has to be drawn that the cheque has been issued for discharge of a debt. Said presumption is a rebuttable presumption. The standard of proof for rebutting the said presumption is preponderance of probability. 8. The petitioner - accused has taken up the defence that the cheque is issued to one Sri. Lakshmaiah in a different transaction as a security for that transaction and that cheque has been misused by the said Sri. Lakshmaiah through this respondent - complainant. In that regard, suggestion has been made to the respondent - complainant who has been examined as P.W.1 and said suggestion has been denied by him. In order to establish the said defence, the petitioner – accused at the time of his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. has given his statement in writing and also produced memo with documents. The documents produced by the petitioner - accused will not indicate any transaction between Sri. Lakshmaiah and the petitioner- accused. Therefore, the petitioner – accused has failed to establish his defence that he had given cheque to one Sri. Lakshmaiah as security for transaction entered into with the said Sri. The documents produced by the petitioner - accused will not indicate any transaction between Sri. Lakshmaiah and the petitioner- accused. Therefore, the petitioner – accused has failed to establish his defence that he had given cheque to one Sri. Lakshmaiah as security for transaction entered into with the said Sri. Lakshmaiah. Therefore, presumption drawn under Section 139 of N.I. Act remains unrebutted. 9. Learned counsel for petitioner – accused placing reliance on the decision in the case of Channappa (supra) has contended that no document has been produced to prove lending of money by the respondent – complainant to the petitioner - accused. 10. In view of non-rebuttal of presumption drawn under Section 139 of N.I. Act, the complainant need not prove the alleged transaction of lending. Said presumption would enure to the benefit of the respondent - complainant that the cheque was issued for discharge of debt. 11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kalamani tex and Another Vs. P Balasubramanian , reported in 2021 (5) SCC 283 has held as under: “13. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA . The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these ‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. This point of law has been crystalized by this Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat in the following words: “18. In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the trial court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. This approach of the trial court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the appellant accused.” 12. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Jain Vs. Ajay Singh reported in AIR Online 2023 SC 807 has held as under: “55. As rightly contended by the appellant, there is a fundamental flaw in the way both the Courts below have proceeded to appreciate the evidence on record. Once the presumption under Section 139 was given effect to, the Courts ought to have proceeded on the premise that the cheque was, indeed, issued in discharge of a debt/liability. The entire focus would then necessarily have to shift on the case set up by the accused, since the activation of the presumption has the effect of shifting the evidential burden on the accused. The nature of inquiry would then be to see whether the accused has discharged his onus of rebutting the presumption. If he fails to do so, the Court can straightaway proceed to convict him, subject to satisfaction of the other ingredients of Section 138 . If the Court finds that the evidential burden placed on the accused has been discharged, the complainant would be expected to prove the said fact independently, without taking aid of the presumption. The Court would then take an overall view based on the evidence on record and decide accordingly.” 13. Learned counsel for petitioner – accused would contend that there is interpolation on the date of cheque Ex.P.1. On looking to the date on the cheque, Ex.P.1 with bare eyes, one can find no interpolation in the date. 14. Learned counsel for petitioner – accused would contend that cheque is issued in the month of January and month January, that is, `1’ has been altered to `4’. As per the case of the respondent - complainant, the alleged lending of money is during second week of January 2010 and cheque has been issued for making repayment of the amount borrowed during April 2010. As per the case of the respondent - complainant, the alleged lending of money is during second week of January 2010 and cheque has been issued for making repayment of the amount borrowed during April 2010. Said alleged interpolation has not been established by producing any cogent evidence. Application filed by the petitioner seeking appointment of an expert to ascertain interpolation on the date of check has been rejected by the trial Court and as no challenge is made to the said order, it has attained finality. 15. Learned counsel for petitioner – accused would contend that when Rs.1,00,000/- has been paid by the respondent - complainant to the petitioner – accused has not been stated either in complaint or in evidence. On perusal of complaint and evidence of respondent - complainant i.e. P.W.1 there is specific mention that the lending of money is during second week of January, 2010. Even P.W.2 and P.W.3 have stated that the petitioner – accused has borrowed Rs.1,00,000/- from the respondent – complainant during January, 2010. 16. The demand notice has been issued on 03.11.2010 and the said demand notice has been issued by speed post with acknowledgment due and also under certificate of posting. Ex.P.4 is the postal receipt and Ex.P.5 is certificate of posting. Ex.P.6 is return postal cover sent by Speed Post. Notice sent under certificate of posting is an ordinary post. On Ex.P.6 - return postal cover there is an endorsement that on 06.11.2010 delivery has been attempted and there is an endorsement `DL’, that is, `door locked’. There is an endorsement on it on 08.11.2010 as `ID’ that is, `intimation delivered’. On the said cover there is an endorsement by the postal authority that `article has been returned as party refused’. If intimation delivery on 08.11.2010 is taken as deemed service of notice, the complaint filed on 23.12.2010 is within one month from the date of cause of action, i.e. 24.11.2010 as required under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act. 17. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel for petitioner – accused that there is delay in filing the complaint is not sustainable. 18. Learned counsel for petitioner – accused would contend that the cheque is dated 10.04.2010 and it has been presented on 29.09.2010 for encashment. What was the reason for delay in presenting the cheque has not been put forth by the respondent - complainant. 19. 18. Learned counsel for petitioner – accused would contend that the cheque is dated 10.04.2010 and it has been presented on 29.09.2010 for encashment. What was the reason for delay in presenting the cheque has not been put forth by the respondent - complainant. 19. The respondent - complainant who has been examined as P.W.1, in his cross-examination, has stated that cheque was misplaced and therefore he presented the cheque during September, 2010. 20. The cheque is dated 10.04.2010 and validity of cheque is for 6 months and during validity of the cheque it can be presented. The cheque presented on 29.09.2010 is within its validity. 21. Considering all the above aspects and appreciating the evidence on record, the trial Court has rightly convicted the petitioner – accused under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The appellate Court reappreciated the evidence on record and rightly dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner – accused challenging the judgment of conviction. Considering all these aspects, there are no grounds to set aside the well reasoned judgments passed by the trial Court and the appellate Court. 22. In the result, petition is dismissed.