JUDGMENT : ASHOK S.KINAGI, J. This Regular Second Appeal is filed by the appellants challenging the judgment and decree dated 28.03.2013, passed in R.A.No.159/2012 by the learned Principal District Judge, Mysore. 2. For convenience, the parties are referred to, based on their rankings before the trial Court. The appellants were the defendants, and the respondent was the plaintiff. 3. Brief facts, leading rise to the filing of this appeal are as follows: The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants seeking relief of declaration and permanent injunction. It is the case of the plaintiff that, the plaintiff had purchased the suit schedule property from Bandigowda S/o Siddegowda under the registered sale deed on 14.08.1992. It is contended that defendant No.1, being the wife of Bandigowda, had affixed her signature as a witness to the registered sale deed dated 14.08.1992. That, ever since the date of execution of the registered sale deed, the plaintiff is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. It is contended that the plaintiff approached the Mysore Urban Development Authority (for short ‘the MUDA’) on 28.12.2002 to obtain the title deed in her name regarding the suit schedule property. After the demise of Bandigowda, defendant No.1, by swearing to a false affidavit got changed the katha regarding the suit schedule property in her name being aware of the registered sale deed dated 14.08.1992. Defendant No.1, knowing fully well that she has no right and interest in the suit schedule property, to deprive the right of the plaintiff, defendant No.1 had executed a registered gift deed dated 30.08.2002 in favour of defendant No.2, who is none other than her daughter. Defendant No.1 had no right, title or interest to execute a registered gift deed in favour of defendant No.2. Defendant No.2 has not acquired any right, title or interest over the suit schedule property. The registered gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is not binding on the plaintiff. Hence, a cause of action arose for the plaintiff to file a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. Accordingly, prays to decree the suit. 3.1. The defendants filed a written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and also contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable in law or in facts. It is denied that the suit schedule property was originally owned and possessed by Bandigowda. Accordingly, prays to decree the suit. 3.1. The defendants filed a written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and also contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable in law or in facts. It is denied that the suit schedule property was originally owned and possessed by Bandigowda. It is denied that, he sold the suit schedule property for valuable consideration of Rs.1,32,000/- to the plaintiff under a registered sale deed on 14.08.1992. It is contended that Bandigowda was neither the absolute owner nor the purchaser of the suit schedule property, and he had no right to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. It is contended that the defendants are in possession of the suit schedule property. Defendant No.1 after the demise of Bandigowda, submitted an application to MUDA for executing the registered sale deed. The MUDA executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant No.1 on 21.08.2002. Based on the registered sale deed, defendant No.1 became the absolute owner of the suit schedule property, and she gifted the suit schedule property in favour of defendant No.2 by executing a registered gift deed dated 30.08.2002. Hence, defendant No.2 is in possession of the suit schedule property. Hence, he prays to dismiss the suit. 3.2. The Trial Court, based on the above said pleadings, framed the following issues: 1) Whether the plaintiff proves her title to the suit property? 2) Does she further prove her lawful possession over the suit property as on the date of the suit? 3) Whether the alleged interference is true? 4) Whether the suit is barred by time? 5) Whether the Court fee paid is sufficient? 6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the reliefs as sought? 7) What order or decree? 3.3. The plaintiff, to substantiate her case examined her power of attorney as PW.1, examined 3 witnesses as PW.2 to PW.4, and marked 14 documents as Exs.P1 to P14. In rebuttal, the defendants examined themselves as DW.1 and DW.2 and marked 22 documents as Exs.D1 to D22. The trial Court, after recording the evidence, hearing on both sides, and on assessing the verbal and documentary evidence, answered issue Nos.1 to 4 and 6 in the negative, and issue No.5 in the affirmative and issue No.7 as per final order. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed vide judgment dated 23.02.2012. The trial Court, after recording the evidence, hearing on both sides, and on assessing the verbal and documentary evidence, answered issue Nos.1 to 4 and 6 in the negative, and issue No.5 in the affirmative and issue No.7 as per final order. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed vide judgment dated 23.02.2012. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.273/2003 preferred an appeal in R.A.No.159/2012 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Mysore. 3.4. The First Appellate Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, framed the following points for consideration: 1) Whether the findings of the trial Court that the plaintiff failed to establish title to the property and that she is in possession of the property, is not proper and calls for interference? 2) What order or decree? 3.5. The First Appellate Court, after hearing the parties, and re-assessing the verbal and documentary evidence, answered point Nos.1 and 2 in the affirmative, and point No.3 as per final order. The appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.273/2003 dated 23.02.2012 was set aside, and the suit of the plaintiff was decreed, and it is declared that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property, and the defendants or any person claiming under them are hereby restrained by an order of permanent injunction from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The defendants, aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in R.A.No.159/2012, has filed this Regular Second Appeal. 4. This Court, on 12.08.2014, admitted the appeal to consider the following substantial question of law : “When the trial Court on the basis of the evidence placed on record dismissed the suit of the respondent for declaration and injunction, whether the First Appellate Court was justified in reversing the said findings and in doing so, did not assign appropriate reasons to overcome the findings of the trial Court and thereby committed an illegality in the impugned judgment and decree?” 5. Heard the arguments of Sri Vigneshwar S. Shastri, learned Senior counsel for the defendants, and also Sri G.L.Vishwanath, learned Senior counsel for the plaintiff. 6. Learned Senior counsel for the defendants submits that the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is not in compliance with Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC . Heard the arguments of Sri Vigneshwar S. Shastri, learned Senior counsel for the defendants, and also Sri G.L.Vishwanath, learned Senior counsel for the plaintiff. 6. Learned Senior counsel for the defendants submits that the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is not in compliance with Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC . He submits that the First Appellate Court has not framed correctly the points for adjudication. The First Appellate Court has recorded a general expression in the impugned judgment, and no proper reasons have been assigned by the First Appellate Court. He submits that the impugned judgment passed by the First Appellate Court is contrary to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of H.S IDDIQUI ( DEAD ) BY L RS . V S A.R AMALINGAM reported in AIR 2011 SC 1492 . Hence, on these grounds, he prays to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court and remit the matter to the trial Court with a direction to pass the judgment in accordance with law. 7. Per contra, learned Senior counsel for the plaintiff submits that the First Appellate Court has reappreciated the entire evidence on record, and has rightly passed the impugned judgment. He also submits that though in every paragraph of the impugned judgment, the First Appellate Court has recorded the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent therein, but from the careful perusal of the paragraphs, the First Appellate Court has reappreciated the entire evidence, and recorded its findings that the plaintiff has become the absolute owner by a registered sale deed executed by Bandigowda. He also submits that the First Appellate Court, considering Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 , has rightly passed the impugned judgment. Hence, on these grounds, he prays to dismiss the appeal. 8. Perused the records, and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. 9. R EG . S UBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW : The plaintiff has filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, contending that MUDA allotted the suit schedule property in favour of Bandigowda, a grant certificate was issued in favour of Bandigowda and the possession was subsequently delivered in favour of Bandigowda. Bandigowda’s name appeared on the katha, and he paid the tax on the suit schedule property. Bandigowda’s name appeared on the katha, and he paid the tax on the suit schedule property. Based on the records, i.e., the grant certificate, the possession certificate, katha and tax paid receipt, the plaintiff had purchased the suit schedule property from Bandigowda. It is also contended that defendant No.1 is the attesting witness to the registered sale deed executed by Bandigowda in favour of the plaintiff. Subsequently, Bandigowda died, leaving behind defendant Nos.1 and 2. After the demise of Bandigowda, defendant No.1 approached the MUDA, and submitted an application to execute a title deed in her favour. The MUDA considering the representation, executed the registered sale deed in favour of defendant No.1. Defendant No.1, by playing fraud on the MUDA got executed the registered sale deed in her favour and further, to deprive the legitimate right of the plaintiff, executed the registered gift deed in favour of defendant No.2. Neither defendant No.1 nor defendant No.2 acquired the title over the suit schedule property under the registered sale deed executed by MUDA in favour of defendant No.1, and the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2. It is also stated that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff, to substantiate his case, has produced the documents at Exs.P1 to P14, and also examined 3 witnesses as PW.2 to PW.4. On the other hand, the defendants examined themselves as DW.1 and DW.2, and marked 22 documents. The trial Court, considering the verbal and documentary evidence, held that the plaintiff had failed to prove her title and possession over the suit schedule property and consequently, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove title and possession over the suit schedule property. The trial court, while passing the impugned judgment, has not considered Section 43 of the Act of 1882, and proceeded to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, preferred an appeal in R.A.No.159/2012. The First Appellate Court, considering Section 43 of the Act of 1882 revered the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, and consequently, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, preferred an appeal in R.A.No.159/2012. The First Appellate Court, considering Section 43 of the Act of 1882 revered the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, and consequently, decreed the suit of the plaintiff. From the perusal of para Nos.14, 15, 16, 21, 24, 29 and 30 of the judgment of the first Appellate Court, it is evident that the first Appellate Court has recorded the contentions of the learned counsel for respondent therein, and further, framed the following points for consideration, which reads as under: 1) “Whether the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff failed to establish the title to the property and she is in possession of the property, is not proper and call for interference? 2) What order or decree?” 10. From the perusal of the impugned judgment, the First Appellate Court has not properly framed correctly the points for adjudication, and further, they are not in substantial compliance with Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC . The Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the guidelines. The First Appellate Court has to see, how the Court has to proceed, and decide the case. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of J UMMA M ASJID , M ERCARA V S . K ODIMANIANDRA D EVIAH AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1962 SC 847 , at para No.18 of the judgment, held the following: “The preponderance of judicial opinion is in favour of the view taken by the Madras High Court in Alamanaya Kunigari Nabi Sab v. Murukuti Papiah, and approved by the Full Bench in the decision now under appeal. In our judgment, the interpretation placed on Section 43 in those decisions correct and the contrary opinion is erroneous. We accordingly hold that when a person transfers property representing that he has a present interest therein, whereas he has, in fact, only a spes successionis, the transferee is entitled to the benefit of Section 43 , if he has taken the transfer on the faith of that representation and for consideration. In the present case, Santhappa, the vendor in Ex. In the present case, Santhappa, the vendor in Ex. III, represented that he was entitled to the property in praesenti, and it has been found that the purchaser entered into the transaction acting on that representation. He therefore acquired title to the properties under s. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, when Santhappa became in titulo on the death of Gangamma on February 17, 1933, and the subsequent dealing with them by Santhappa by way of release under Ex. A did not operate to vest any title in the appellant.” 11. From the perusal of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the First Appellate Court should take into consideration the various particulars mentioned in Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC , and reappreciate the entire evidence, apply its mind, and decide the case considering the material on record. From the perusal of the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court, there is no substantial compliance with Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC . Considering the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in H.S IDDIQUI (Supra), the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court is contrary to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of H.S IDDIQUI (Supra). Hence, the matter requires reconsideration by the First Appellate Court without expressing any opinion on the merits in issue. The trial Court did not examined Section 43 of the Act of 1882, but the First Appellate Court has examined Section 43 of the Act of 1882. From the perusal of the judgment of the trial Court, the trial Court ought to have examined Section 43 of the Act of 1882. Both the learned Senior counsel appearing for the parties, submit that the matter be remitted to the trial Court with a direction to examine Section 43 of the Act of 1882, and all other contentions. Their submissions are placed on record. The parties have no opportunity to raise the points on the plea of estoppel under Section 43 of the Act of 1882 before the trial Court. Accordingly, I answer the substantial question of law in the Negative. 12. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER : The Regular Second Appeal is allowed. The parties have no opportunity to raise the points on the plea of estoppel under Section 43 of the Act of 1882 before the trial Court. Accordingly, I answer the substantial question of law in the Negative. 12. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER : The Regular Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 28.03.2013, passed in R.A.No.159/2012 on the file the learned Principal District Judge, Mysore, and the judgment and decree dated 23.02.2012 passed in O.S.No.273/2003 are set aside. The suit is restored to its original file. The trial Court is directed to examine Section 43 of the Act of 1882, and the other issues, and pass appropriate judgment in accordance with law based on the available evidence on record. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 18.08.2025 without awaiting any further notice. All the contentions of the parties are kept open. As the suit is of the year 2003, the trial court is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible. Office is directed to return the records to the trial court forthwith. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the pending IA’s if any, does not survive for consideration. Accordingly, disposed of.