JUDGMENT : NIKHIL S. KARIEL, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Manan K. Paneri for the petitioner and learned AGP Mr. J.K. Shah for the respondent No.1 – State. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioner challenges an order passed by the SSRD dated 26.12.2024, whereby the SSRD has rejected the application for condonation of delay. 3. It would appear in this regard that the petitioner had challenged order passed by the Deputy Collector, Dhrangadhra, dated 24.12.1990 under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, before the SSRD after a delay of approximately 33 years and since the Revisional Authority was of the opinion that the delay has not been sufficiently explained, the application for condonation of delay had been rejected. 4. The issue in question is with regard to land bearing Survey No.360 – New Survey No.609 situated at village: Jasmatpur, Ta. Dhrangadhra, Dist. Surendranagar. It appears that the land was originally admeasuring 5 Acres and 13 Gunthas and was owned by the father of the respondent No.3 herein and whereas by way of family settlement, the land had been divided into four portions i.e. 1.30 / 1.31 Acres in favour of three brothers and remaining 2 Gunthas, where the well was situated came in the share of all three brothers. The issue in question is with regard to land, which had come in favour of one Parsottam Hirjibhai Patel, admeasuring 1 Acre and 31 Gunthas and whereas the said Parsottam Hirjibhai Patel had sold 1 Acre and 8 Gunthas out of the said land by way of registered sale deed dated 10.04.1968 to one Ravjibhai Jerambhai. It appears that the said Ravjibhai Jerambhai had sold the land to one Vanmali Oghavajibhai vide registered sale deed dated 31.08.1968. It appears that the said Vanmali Oghavajibhai had sold the land to father of the petitioner Narshibhai Khimabhai vide registered sale deed dated 20.04.1974. It would appear that the entry with regard to registered sale deed in favour of the father of the petitioner, had been mutated in the revenue record vide entry No.664 dated 15.11.1976. It appears that the said entry had been certified on 22.12.1976. 5. It would appear that the entry with regard to registered sale deed in favour of the father of the petitioner, had been mutated in the revenue record vide entry No.664 dated 15.11.1976. It appears that the said entry had been certified on 22.12.1976. 5. It appears that later on, show cause notice dated 31.07.1990 had been received by the father of the petitioner under the provisions of Section 9(1)(2)(3) of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, more particularly for breach of Section 8 of the said Act. It appears that the Deputy Collector, Dhrangadhra, had conducted the proceedings of the Fragmentation Case No.32/87-88 and had passed order dated 24.12.1990 inter alia holding that the sale of 1 Acre and 8 Gunthas had resulted in creation of fragment and all the transactions starting from the transaction of 1968 till the transaction in favour of the father of the petitioner, had been declared as invalid and all the opponents were imposed with penalty of Rs.50/-. It is the said order, which was sought to be challenged before the SSRD after a huge delay and whereas the SSRD had rejected the application for condoning delay. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Paneri for the petitioner would submit that the SSRD had grossly erred in rejecting the revision application on the ground of limitation. It is submitted that while the Deputy Collector vide order of the year 1990, had directed that the petitioner / his father being removed from the land in question, yet till date, he had not been removed therefrom. It is submitted that on the other hand, the legal heirs of the original seller namely the respondent Nos.3.1 and 3.2 herein, had without any authority, sold the land in favour of the respondent No.5 herein and whereas while the revenue entry No.4228 had been posted in the revenue record at which time, the petitioner had come to know about order dated 24.12.1990 for the first time. It is submitted that the SSRD had committed an error, while not appreciating that the period of limitation would start from the date of knowledge and not from the date of the order. 7. It is submitted that the SSRD had committed an error, while not appreciating that the period of limitation would start from the date of knowledge and not from the date of the order. 7. Learned advocate would further submit that the SSRD had also erred in not considering the aspect of condonation of delay liberally and pragmatically and whereas reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 649 . 8. Learned advocate would further submit that the order of the year 1990 by the Deputy Collector was not correct, since the father of the petitioner at the relevant point of time, had held the land, which was contiguous to the land in question and hence, it could not be held that a fragment had been created. Learned advocate would further submit that as such, the order itself was without jurisdiction since before the land had been purchased by the late father of the petitioner, the land had been sold twice and whereas no action had been taken by the respondent authorities from the year 1968 to the year 1990 and as such, even the mutation entry pursuant to the transaction in favour of the father of the petitioner had been mutated in revenue record in the year 1976. It is submitted by learned advocate that since the order itself was without jurisdiction as the same was not taken within reasonable time, the order was nonest and hence, could be challenged at any point of time. Learned advocate would strenuously argue that as such, the late father of the petitioner had no knowledge about order of the year 1990 and whereas it is for the first time that the petitioner had come to know about the order, when entry with regard to the sale of property, had been mutated in the month of June, 2023 and whereas the period of limitation ought to have been reckoned from that date only. Learned advocate Mr. Paneri has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka Vs. Jasjit Singh , (1993) 2 SCC 507 in support of his contentions. Learned advocate Mr. Paneri has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka Vs. Jasjit Singh , (1993) 2 SCC 507 in support of his contentions. Making such submissions, learned advocate would request this Court to quash and set aside the order passed by the SSRD and direct the SSRD to hear the Revision Application on its merits. 9. On the other hand, the present petition is vehemently opposed by learned AGP Mr. Shah on behalf of the respondent State. Learned AGP would submit that father of the present petitioner was a party in the proceedings before the Deputy Collector, where the order dated 24.12.1990 was passed, hence, the petitioner could not claim ignorance about the fact of such an order being passed. It is further submitted by the learned AGP that the entry No.937 had been posted in the revenue record on 02.03.1991 reflecting the order dated 24.12.1990 and as such on the face of such an entry, the petitioner could not claim ignorance about the order of the year 1990. Learned AGP would further submit that as such, the order dated 24.12.1990 was not an order without jurisdiction and assuming without admitting that the same could be construed as an order without jurisdiction then also, the same ought to have been challenged before an appropriate authority and it had to be set aside by the said authority. It is submitted by the learned AGP that the law on this issue is well settled inasmuch as an order even one which is invalid, does not bear the stamp of invalidity on its forehead and same had to be declared so and set aside by a competent authority / Court. 10. On merits, learned AGP would submit that the father of the petitioner being a party in the proceedings before the Deputy Collector was well entitled to take all defences available before the Deputy Collector and having failed to take the same or even if they had not been taken into consideration by the authority concerned, then it was open for the petitioner to have challenged the same before the appropriate authority in accordance with law. It is submitted that having slept over his rights for more than 3 decades it is too late for the petitioner to make arguments on merits and whereas it is submitted that the SSRD had rightly rejected the application for condonation of delay and whereas it is submitted that this Court may not interfere with the said decision. 11. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. Learned advocate for the petitioner has assailed the order of the SSRD on the ground that the SSRD had failed to appreciate that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of knowledge and not from the date of the order, that the order of the Deputy Collector, which was impugned before the SSRD, was one without jurisdiction and hence, it could be challenged at any point of time and on merits of the issue. To this Court, none of the arguments made by the learned advocate can be countenanced and the reasons thereof are as follow: (A) On Date of knowledge : 12. While it is attempted to be submitted by the petitioner that he became aware of the order dated 24.12.1990, which was impugned before the SSRD only in the month of June, 2023, when the entry No.4228 was entered in the revenue record in the month of June, 2023. It is the case of the petitioner that under such circumstances, limitation period should have been counted from June, 2023 and not from the date of the order. To this Court, it would appear that such contention could have been raised by the petitioner, if it was the case of the petitioner that he/his late father were not joined as a party in the proceedings in which order dated 24.12.1990 was passed or in case, where even inspite of being joined, he had not been given adequate opportunity. Both the contingencies are not available in the instant case since it would clearly appear that father of the petitioner was joined as respondent No.4 in the proceedings where order dated 24.12.1990 was passed and more particularly since from the order itself, it is clear that father of the petitioner had filed his reply in the said proceedings. Both the contingencies are not available in the instant case since it would clearly appear that father of the petitioner was joined as respondent No.4 in the proceedings where order dated 24.12.1990 was passed and more particularly since from the order itself, it is clear that father of the petitioner had filed his reply in the said proceedings. To this Court, it would appear that when father of the petitioner had been joined as a party respondent and he had been provided with adequate opportunity, more particularly the reply filed by the father of the petitioner had also been taken into consideration, therefore, the petitioner could not be heard to contend that he came to know about the order only in the month of June, 2023. The father of the petitioner being aware of the proceedings, being joined as a party respondent and having filed his reply in the said proceedings, there could not be any doubt about the fact that the father of the petitioner was aware about the order of the year 1990 and hence, the contention with regard to the date of knowledge not being available to the petitioner, is not countenanced. (B) On Delay 13. In so far as the aspect with regard to delay being liberally concerned, it would appear that learned advocate is relying upon the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (Supra). It would appear in this regard that while the Hon’ble Supreme Court had inter alia laid down the principles to be borne in mind while considering an application for condonation of delay, yet it would appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not set out any principle, which would inter alia help the petitioner. In the instant case, it would appear that the petitioner and / or his late father were party to the proceedings in which the order had been passed and had received sufficient opportunity, then cogent reasons had to be placed for seeking condonation of delay of approximately 33 years. The only reason, which had been submitted was with regard to the date of knowledge, which this Court has not countenanced as above and hence, to this Court, it would appear that the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Esha Bhattacharjee (Supra) would not help the cause of the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. The only reason, which had been submitted was with regard to the date of knowledge, which this Court has not countenanced as above and hence, to this Court, it would appear that the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Esha Bhattacharjee (Supra) would not help the cause of the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. (C) On Jurisdiction 14. While it is attempted to be submitted by petitioner that the order dated 24.12.1990 was without jurisdiction, the ground to say so being that the proceedings with regard to a sale of the year 1968 had been initiated in the year 1990, more particularly, when the father of the petitioner was the third purchaser in the year 1974, an entry with regard to said purchase had been mutated in the revenue record in the year 1976. To this Court, it would appear that the contentions of the petitioner are more with regard to sustainability of order dated 24.12.1990, rather than with regard to the jurisdiction to pass such an order. An order can be stated to be without jurisdiction, when an authority, which is not having the powers to adjudicate the proceedings, had passed a final order. An order can be stated to be without jurisdiction, if the authority passing the order, had not considered any statutory bar, which had to be overcome before the matter could be adjudicated on its merits. On the other hand, as it appears, the Deputy Collector was the competent authority under the Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, to consider the aspect of whether the transactions shall fall foul of the Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 or not. The submissions on behalf of the petitioner being that the proceedings were grossly delayed was an issue, which could have been set up as a defence by the petitioner against the order before an appropriate authority. The same to this Court, would not entitle the petitioner to claim that the order was one without jurisdiction. On the other hand, in so far as the aspect of lack of jurisdiction is concerned, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Ors. Vs. Bombay Action Group, (2011) 3 SCC 363 would be relevant. Paras 16 to 19 are quoted herein below for profit: “16. On the other hand, in so far as the aspect of lack of jurisdiction is concerned, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Ors. Vs. Bombay Action Group, (2011) 3 SCC 363 would be relevant. Paras 16 to 19 are quoted herein below for profit: “16. It is a settled legal proposition that even if an order is void, it requires to be so declared by a competent forum and it is not permissible for any person to ignore the same merely because in his opinion the order is void. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil [ (1996) 1 SCC 435 : AIR 1996 SC 906 ] , Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. [ (1997) 3 SCC 443 : AIR 1997 SC 1240 ] , M. Meenakshi v. Metadin Agarwal [ (2006) 7 SCC 470 ] and Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup [ (2009) 6 SCC 194 ] , this Court held that whether an order is valid or void, cannot be determined by the parties. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. 17. In State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [ (1991) 4 SCC 1 :1991 SCC (L&S) 1082: (1991) 17 ATC 287 : AIR 1991 SC 2219 ] this Court held that a party aggrieved by the invalidity of an order has to approach the court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and therefore, not binding upon him. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon the judgment in Smith v. East Elloe RDC [ 1956 AC 736 : (1956) 2 WLR 888 : (1956) 1 All ER 855] , wherein Lord Radcliffe observed : (AC pp. 769-70) “… An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity [on] its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.” 18. It bears no brand of invalidity [on] its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.” 18. In Sultan Sadik v. Sanjay Raj Subba [ (2004) 2 SCC 377 : AIR 2004 SC 1377 ] , this Court took a similar view observing that once an order is declared non est by the court only then the judgment of nullity would operate erga omnes i.e. for and against everyone concerned. Such a declaration is permissible if the court comes to the conclusion that the author of the order lacks inherent jurisdiction/competence and therefore, it comes to the conclusion that the order suffers from patent and latent invalidity. 19. Thus, from the above it emerges that even if the order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said order/notification is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for seeking such declaration. The order may be hypothetically a nullity and even if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds including the standing of the petitioner or on the ground of delay or on the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one person, it may not be so for another purpose or another person.” 14.1 Considering the law as reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it would appear that whether an order is valid or void could not be determined by the parties and such determination had to be done by a competent forum when approached by party concerned. In absence of any challenge to such an order before a competent forum, the party could not claim that the said order would not be binding on the said party. In absence of any challenge to such an order before a competent forum, the party could not claim that the said order would not be binding on the said party. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has inter alia explained that any order by a competent authority will remain effective and capable of legal consequences, unless it is interfered with by a competent authority, most importantly, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that even in a challenge mounted by one of the parties on the ground that the order is a nullity and is an invalid order, the Court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds including on the ground of delay or on the ground of doctrine of waiver. Thus, it is clear that while an order even if one is a valid or is an invalid order would be required to be set aside by a competent forum and whereas a Court may well refuse to entertain challenge to such order inter alia on the ground of delay in questioning the same. (D) On merits 15. In so far as submissions on merits made by the learned advocate is concerned, to this Court, it would appear that such questions are not required to be gone into. As noticed hereinabove, father of the petitioner having been afforded an appropriate opportunity before the Deputy Collector in the proceedings, wherein order dated 24.12.1990 had been passed and the father of the petitioner having filed a reply in the said proceedings and thereafter, having chosen not to question the said order before the appropriate authority, no interference is called for. 16. Again, at this stage, reliance is placed by this Court on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mrinmoy Maity Vs. Chhanda Koley and Others , 2024 INSC 314 , paras 9 and 10 being relied upon for the profit. “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be born in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.” 17. Having regard to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as above and having regard to the discussions, observations and conclusions arrived at hereinabove, to this Court, no case for interference is made out and hence, present petition stands disposed of as rejected in limine.