ORDER : 1. This petition has been filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner challenging the legality, validity and propriety of award dated 30.05.2004 passed by the Labour Court in Case No.227/2001, by which the respondent no.1 was directed to be reinstated on the post of peon with all consequential benefits as claimed by the respondent no.1. 2. The facts, as detailed in the petition reflect that the respondent/workman, had approached the Labour Court disputing termination of services. The Labour Court, vide impugned award, which is contained in Annexure-P/1, has issued direction for reinstatement of the workman as well as grant of 50% back wages. 3. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the award passed by the Labour Court is unsustainable inasmuch as the Labour Court has travelled beyond the scope of reference. It is contended by counsel that the reference which was referred to the Labour Court, did not contain any whisper regarding the grant of minimum wages yet, in operative part of the award, there is a direction to grant minimum wages to the workman. Further contention of the counsel that the workman in the present case was employed elsewhere and in order to demonstrate, document which was contained in D/1 was submitted along with the Statement of Claim. Said document was not disputed by the workman in his testimony and therefore, it was the burden upon the workman to establish before the Labour Court that he was not gainfully employed elsewhere. However, there was utter failure on the part of the workman to establish the same, therefore, there could not have any award of back wages and in support of his contention strong reliance has been placed on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Munni Bai Sen Vs. M.P. State Agriculture Marketing Board, 2019 (4) MPLJ 173 . Further contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that petitioner no.2 is not a Statutory Body constituted under any Act and is no more in existence. Petitioner no.2 was constituted in terms of Annexure-P/2 and there is a circular which was issued by the Department of School Education, by which, the provisions were made to constitute Shala Vikas Samiti and, the said Samiti is not permanent in nature. Petitioner no.2 was constituted in terms of Annexure-P/2 and there is a circular which was issued by the Department of School Education, by which, the provisions were made to constitute Shala Vikas Samiti and, the said Samiti is not permanent in nature. The said entity worked for the time being, and as such, no liability of reinstatement and pay wages could have been fastened upon the petitioner no.2. It is the further contention of the learned counsel that there has to be finding as regards the employment during the period of termination but there are no finding by the Labour Court so as to warrant the award pertaining to the back wages. 4. Per contra, counsel for the respondent submits that the documents which have been filed along with the petition were not produced before the Labour Court. The Employer did not adduce any evidence either oral or documentary, which is evident from the perusal of the award, therefore, the document which are being sought to be relied upon along with the memorandum of the petition, cannot be taken note of. It is further contended by counsel that the Labour Court was only required to answer the reference. The reference was never questioned by the petitioner at any point of time, therefore, the reference which was forwarded in terms of section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, already attained finality and, at this stage, interference with the award is impermissible. It is further contention of the counsel that this is not within the scope of Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the award and this aspect has already been dealt with by Apex Court in the case of Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Another, (2015) 4 SCC 458 . The counsel further placed reliance in the case of Gauri Shankar Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 12 SCC 754 . 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Record reflects that the following reference was forwarded to the Labour Court :- ^^Jh gsear dqekj firk Jh vfcadk izlkn iVsfj;k dk lsok i`Fkdhdj.k oS/k ,oa mfpr gS \ ;fn ugha rks os fdl lgk;rk ds ik= gSa ,oa bl laca/k esa D;k funZs’k fn;s tkus pkfg;sA** 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Record reflects that the following reference was forwarded to the Labour Court :- ^^Jh gsear dqekj firk Jh vfcadk izlkn iVsfj;k dk lsok i`Fkdhdj.k oS/k ,oa mfpr gS \ ;fn ugha rks os fdl lgk;rk ds ik= gSa ,oa bl laca/k esa D;k funZs’k fn;s tkus pkfg;sA** 7. Perusal of the aforesaid reference reflects that the issue which was to be answered by the Labour Court was to the effect that as to whether the workman removal was valid or not and if the same was invalid then he was entitled to what relief. Before the Labour Court, the workman himself adduced evidence. He was cross-examined. So far the petitioner/employer is concerned, no evidence nary oral nor documentary was adduced by the Employer. Therefore, taking into consideration the aforesaid material, the Labour Court proceeded to pass the impugned award. The Labour Court observed in the award that no documentary evidence was adduced by the Employer and ultimately concluded that the workman was entitled to be reinstated along with 50% back wages. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that there could not have been any award pertaining to the Minimum Wages Act, as no application for grant of minimum wages was moved by the workman under the provisions of Minimum Wages Act. This contention of the employer is misconceived inasmuch as, the reference itself, stipulated the factum of consequential relief, in the event of declaring the termination to be invalid. The Labour Court, accordingly, while ordering reinstatement, concluded that the workman was not paid any retrenchment compensation and was paid less than the minimum wages during the period of employment commencing from 1994-95, thus issued direction for payment of 50% back wages. The Labour Court came to a conclusion that the termination of the workman was invalid and unwarranted and accordingly, proceeded to pass the award. The interference with the award of the Labour Court, is limited. The Apex Court in the case of Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192 held in para-21 as under :- "21. The Labour Court came to a conclusion that the termination of the workman was invalid and unwarranted and accordingly, proceeded to pass the award. The interference with the award of the Labour Court, is limited. The Apex Court in the case of Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192 held in para-21 as under :- "21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: “10. … The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. " The Apex Court also in the case of Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1 Panipat (Haryana), (2010) 5 SCC 497 held in para-13 and 14 as under :- "13. In our view, the approach adopted by the Division Bench is contrary to the judicially recognised limitations of the High Court's power to issue writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution — Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radha Krishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR 64 , Municipal Board, Saharanpur v. Imperial Tobacco of India Ltd. (1999) 1 SCC 566 , Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd. v. Ram Bahagat, (2002) 6 SCC 552 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 926, Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar v. ADJ, Varanasi, (2010) 5 SCC 510 : JT (2002) 8 SC 69, Mukand Ltd. v. Staff and Officers' Assn. Shahnawaz Akhtar v. ADJ, Varanasi, (2010) 5 SCC 510 : JT (2002) 8 SC 69, Mukand Ltd. v. Staff and Officers' Assn. (2004) 10 SCC 460 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 798, Dharamraj v. Chhitan, (2006) 12 SCC 349 : (2006) 11 Scale 292 and CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. (2008) 14 SCC 171 : (2008) 12 Scale 582 . 14. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radha Krishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR 64 the Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities entrusted with quasi-judicial functions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Speaking for the majority of the Constitution Bench, Gajendra Gadkar, J. observed as under: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7) “7. … A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” Thereafter, the Apex Court in the case of Jasmer Singh (supra) held in paras 20 to 23 as under :- “ 20. In view of the aforesaid statement of law the setting aside of the award by the learned Single Judge [State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 4468] which is affirmed by the Division Bench [Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013 SCC OnLine P&H 19757] is vitiated in law as the same is contrary to the judgments of this Court referred to supra, upon which the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance in support of the correctness of the finding recorded by the Labour Court on the various issues, particularly the finding of fact that the workman has worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and termination order is void ab initio in law for non- compliance with Sections 25-F clauses (a) and (b), 25-G and 25-H of the Act, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has rightly set aside the order of termination of services of the workman and awarded the order of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. 21. 21. The said relief in favour of the appellant workman, particularly the full back wages is supported by the legal principles laid down by this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184, wherein the Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a member, after considering three-Judge Bench [Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees, (1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 53] decision, has held that if the order of termination is void ab initio, the workman is entitled to full back wages. 22. The relevant paragraph of the decision is extracted hereunder : (Deepali Gundu case [ (2013) 10 SCC 324 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 184] , SCC p. 344, para 22) “22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer- employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments. 23. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh [State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 4468] which is affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court in [Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013 SCC OnLine P&H 19757] in its judgment and order are set aside and the award of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court is restored. The respondent employer is directed to comply with the award within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and send a report to this Court. The appeal is allowed with costs of Rs 25,000 payable to the appellant workman by the respondent employer.” The Apex Court in the case of Gauri Shankar (supra) held in paras 23 and 24 as under:- “23. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as per the legal principles laid down by this Court in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., (2010) 3 SCC 192 , wherein this Court has held thus, para-21: “21. The learned Single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as per the legal principles laid down by this Court in Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corpn., (2010) 3 SCC 192 , wherein this Court has held thus, para-21: “21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: ‘10. … The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State.’ [State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 Para-10] The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in [Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 458 : 24. Therefore, in view of the abovesaid case, the learned Single Judge in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India erroneously interfered with the award of reinstatement and future salary from the date of award till date of reinstatement as rightly passed by the Labour Court recording valid and cogent reasons in answer to the points of dispute holding that the workman has worked from 1-1-1987 to 1-4-1992 and that non- compliance with the mandatory requirements under Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act by the respondent Department rendered its action of termination of the services of the workman as void ab initio in law and instead the High Court erroneously awarded a compensation of Rs 1,50,000 in lieu of reinstatement. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench under their supervisory jurisdiction should not have modified the award by awarding compensation in lieu of reinstatement which is contrary to the well-settled principles of law laid down in a catena of cases by this Court.” 8. In view of aforesaid, it is crystal clear that the employer is disputing the award on the basis of the evidence which was not adduced by the employer before the Labour Court. The annexures which have been filed along with petition were not subject matter of controversy before the Labour Court. Hence, the Labour Court had no occasion to deal with the aforesaid documents. The employer undisputedly did not adduce any evidence and considering the aforesaid, the award impugned has been passed. The said award, in absence of any infirmity, does not require any interference. More particularly, when the employer to whom opportunity was afforded by the Labour Court to adduce evidence, did not adduce any evidence in support. The order-sheets of the Labour Court, which are available, reflect that opportunity to adduce evidence to the employer was afforded by interlocutory order dated 25.04.2004, 02.07.2004, 18.08.2004. Then vide order dated 20.08.2004, the right to adduce evidence was ultimately closed when there was failure on the part of the employer to adduce evidence, as such, it is a case where, the employer despite there being ample opportunity failed to adduce evidence and, hence, at this stage, is precluded from questioning the award which has been passed upon due analysis of the evidence/material produced before the Labour Court. Hence, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned award dated 30.05.2004 passed by the Labour Court. Petition stands dismissed.