ORDER : 1. The case in hands is a classic case portraying victimization of a Government Servant in the hands of higher authorities. And when the strings are in the hands of none other than the Minister of the Department, it is feat certain that the officers including the disciplinary authorities would act in tandem with the instructions in order to appease him or to avert his displeasure. 2. The facts behind the above prelude are, that :- 2.1. The petitioner was appointed as Lower Division Clerk on 02.01.1980 in respondent No.4-Chhatargarh Kraya Vikraya Sahkari Samiti Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Samiti’) and was later reached the post of Manager and was working as such. 2.2. In the meantime, the State Government introduced the Rajasthan Civil Services (Special Selection and Special Conditions of Service for Selection of Chief Executives/Executive Officers for Apex Co-operative Institutions and District Level Banking/ Wholesale Consumer and Marketing Co-operative Institutions) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules of 1995’), providing for appointment on the post of the General Manager. The Rules of 1995 provide the manner of selection and other related provision and clearly provide that the appointing authority shall be Government of Rajasthan or any other authority empowered for this purpose by the State. 2.3. The petitioner after undergoing the prescribed procedure, was appointed on the post of the General Manager of the society by way of order dated 21.09.1995. The appointment order clearly mentioned that his tenure would be for three years or till the date of superannuation, whichever is earlier. 2.4. While the petitioner was working as General Manager, a complaint came to be filed by the respondent No.6-Hari Kishan Joshi; a preliminary inquiry in relation to the allegations was got conducted by the Joint Registrar, who found all the allegations to be false and thus, furnished a report dated 14.03.1997. While giving clean chit, the inquiry officer had clearly observed that said Hari Kishan Joshi has raised very same issues earlier also, and every time such allegations were found false. 2.5. Since said Hari Kishan Joshi persisted upon his complaint, another preliminary inquiry was ordered to be held and this time by the Administrator. The Administrator too gave a report dated 24.05.1997 that the petitioner was not guilty of any financial irregularities or corruption. 2.6. 2.5. Since said Hari Kishan Joshi persisted upon his complaint, another preliminary inquiry was ordered to be held and this time by the Administrator. The Administrator too gave a report dated 24.05.1997 that the petitioner was not guilty of any financial irregularities or corruption. 2.6. Suddenly, an order dated 04.09.1997 came to be passed by the Joint Registrar, whereby one Vinod Chokdar was given charge of the General Manager of the Samiti and simultaneously the Administrator of the Samiti was directed to place the petitioner under suspension and initiate disciplinary proceedings under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CCA Rules, 1958’). 2.7. The order aforesaid was scrupulously rather religiously complied with and the petitioner was suspended by way of order dated 11.09.1997 with a stipulation that a separate charge-sheet and memorandum of charges was in offing. 2.8. A notice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings alongwith memorandum of charges also came to be issued to the petitioner on 23.09.1997. 2.9. The petitioner submitted consent of one Manmal Sharma to act as his defence counsel, but even such assistance of defence counsel was not allowed to the petitioner, and as alleged by the petitioner, copies of various documents which he demanded also were not provided to him. 2.10. The petitioner filed a preliminary reply dated 06.02.1998 while seeking leave to file detailed reply on receipt of the documents. Needless to mention that the petitioner denied all the allegations levelled against him. 2.11. Inquiry officer conducted and concluded the inquiry and forwarded his report (page No.161) to the disciplinary authority. A notice dated 13.11.1998 came to be issued alongwith a copy of the inquiry report and the petitioner was asked to furnish representation against the inquiry report and to show cause why an order as deemed appropriate under Rule 14(7) of the CCA Rules, 1958 be not passed. 2.12. The petitioner submitted his representation and had raised grievance not only about non-supply of the copies of the documents demanded but also about not allowing defence counsel. The objection on merit or correctness of the findings were also raised and it was prayed that the inquiry report be discarded and the petitioner be exonerated. 2.13. The disciplinary authority as predestined, did not agree with the representation so submitted by the petitioner and passed an order dated 28.12.1998 and dismissed him from services. The objection on merit or correctness of the findings were also raised and it was prayed that the inquiry report be discarded and the petitioner be exonerated. 2.13. The disciplinary authority as predestined, did not agree with the representation so submitted by the petitioner and passed an order dated 28.12.1998 and dismissed him from services. 2.14. It is interesting to note that in the meantime, the Registrar, Co-operative Societies sent a communication dated 15.09.1997 to the Secretary, Co-operative Department and asked him to cancel the petitioner’s appointment/deputation on the post of General Manager and repatriate him to the parent department. It may be born in mind that the communication dated 15.09.1997 made a specific and categorical reference of the directions issued by the Minister. 2.15. Pursuant to the communication dated 15.09.1997 sent by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, the Assistant Secretary, Co-operative Department vide order dated 09.03.1998 canceled the deputation of the petitioner as Manager of the Chhatargarh Kraya Vikraya Sahkari Samiti Ltd. and repatriated him to parent department with retrospective effect from 11.09.1997 while also confirming the order dated 11.09.1997 passed by the Administrator Chhatargarh Kraya Vikraya Sahkari Samiti Ltd. 3. Learned Senior Counsel having unfurled the factual canvas, at the outset submitted that the petitioner has been victimized simply because he had terminated one Ramdhan Yadav, who was closely related to the then Minister. While asserting that petitioner’s career and service record had remained unblemished, learned Senior Counsel contended that it was only at the instance of the Minister, the entire proceedings have been initiated. 4. He argued that the order dated 11.09.1997, whereby the petitioner has been placed under suspension clearly depicts that the same had been done pursuant to the communication dated 04.09.1997 (Annexure-7), which was apparently issued in furtherance of the direction given by the Minister. 5. While inviting Court’s attention towards the endorsement made on the communications dated 04.09.1997 and suspension order dated 11.09.1997, learned Senior Counsel argued that there is no room for doubt that the proceedings have been initiated at the instance of the Minister. 6. Mr. Joshi, learned Senior Counsel argued that on the date of initiation of proceedings (11.09.1997), the petitioner was working as General Manager under the Rules of 1995 and as per the definition given under the Rules of 1995, his appointing authority was the State Government and thus, the Administrator had no jurisdiction to proceed against him. 7. 6. Mr. Joshi, learned Senior Counsel argued that on the date of initiation of proceedings (11.09.1997), the petitioner was working as General Manager under the Rules of 1995 and as per the definition given under the Rules of 1995, his appointing authority was the State Government and thus, the Administrator had no jurisdiction to proceed against him. 7. Learned Senior Counsel also argued that the Joint Registrar of the Co-operative Society could not have issued any direction to the Administrator or Deputy Registrar to place the petitioner under suspension and initiate disciplinary proceedings. 8. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules, 1958, for which the Administrator was not a competent authority and it was only the State Government which could have initiated and conducted the disciplinary proceedings, if deemed expedient. 9. It was argued that the order dated 09.03.1998, whereby the petitioner’s deputation was canceled that too with retrospective effect from 11.09.1997 was not only arbitrary but also contrary to settled canons of law. 10. While contending that deputation can not be canceled with retrospective effect, he alleged that the same has been done simply in order to give proceedings in the hands of the officers (of the Co-operative Department) who were directly under the control and supervision of the then Minister. 11. Learned Senior Counsel highlighted that for the self-same allegations, two preliminary inquiries had been conducted by none other than the officers of the department; FIRs were filed; two proceedings under section 74 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1965’) were initiated and in all those proceedings, the petitioner was not found involved in any sort of irregularities never less financial irregularities, yet the inquiry officer had recorded a finding of guilt against the petitioner and found three charges proved while holding that three charges were partly proved. 12. 12. While maintaining his argument that the Administrator could not have proceeded against the petitioner as he was in the State services, learned Senior Counsel alternatively argued that even if it is assumed that after repatriation, the petitioner became an employee of the Society, then his conduct was to be examined as per Sahakari Upbhokta Wholesale Bhandar/Krya Vikrya Sahakari Samiti’s Employees Service Conditions, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Conditions of 1991’) and accordingly, his disciplinary authority would be Chief Executive Officer, as per Condition No.26 of the Conditions of 1991. 13. He elaborated his contention by saying that consequent to the petitioner’s repatriation, he started holding the post of Manager (as he was holding prior to deputation by order dated 21.09.1995), and hence, his disciplinary authority was General Manager and not the Administrator or Board of Directors. 14. Learned Senior Counsel argued that a look at the order reveals that a disciplinary authority has not applied its independent mind and thus, the suspension so also initiation of the disciplinary proceedings is arbitrary besides being without jurisdiction. 15. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the inquiry was vindictive and the report had been given as desired rather directed by the Minister in order to ensure that the petitioner is held guilty of all the charges. Learned Senior Counsel prayed that the petition be allowed and the order of dismissal dated28.12.1998 passed by the Administrator be quashed and set aside and the petitioner be allowed all consequential benefits following the quashment of the order of dismissal. 16. Mr. Shrimali, learned counsel appearing for the respondent- State submitted that the inquiry officer so also the disciplinary authority had provided full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and proceeded in accordance with law. He added that a detailed inquiry report had been furnished and disciplinary authority had passed an order in furtherance of the inquiry report, hence, no interference is warranted. He added that the petitioner has been found guilty of various financial irregularities and hence, rightly dismissed from services. 17. Mr. Mrigraj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-Society submitted that the petitioner being a Manager was the Chief Executive Officer and therefore, as per the Conditions of 1991, the Selection Committee/Board was the disciplinary authority. He added that the petitioner has been found guilty of various financial irregularities and hence, rightly dismissed from services. 17. Mr. Mrigraj Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-Society submitted that the petitioner being a Manager was the Chief Executive Officer and therefore, as per the Conditions of 1991, the Selection Committee/Board was the disciplinary authority. In relation to petitioner’s argument that the proceedings under Rule 16 of CCA Rules, 1958 could not have been commenced against the petitioner, he argued that the question of jurisdiction was required to be raised by the petitioner at the first available instance, viz. before the inquiry officer but since such objection had not been raised and the petitioner had taken part in those proceedings, such argument cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage. 18. In relation to Mr. Joshi’s argument, that two officers having conducted preliminary inquiries and two authorities having passed favourable orders under section 74 of the Act of 1965, how could the inquiry officer take a different view? learned counsel argued that proceedings under section 74 of the Act of 1965 and preliminary inquiry are entirely different and were on different counts. He argued that simply because the police had filed a negative final report and the same had been accepted by the Court, the petitioner cannot be absolved of his charges as strictness of proof in criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are entirely different. 19. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 20. Indisputably, the petitioner was appointed on the post of General Manager under the Rules of 1995 for a period of three years, which would have otherwise continued up to 20.09.1998. Before the petitioner could complete his tenure of three years, two preliminary inquiries were got conducted one by the Joint Registrar and another by the Administrator on almost similar allegations and in both of them the allegations were found to be unsubstantiated. 21. Apparently in order to bring the petitioner under the services of Cooperative department one Vinod Chokdar was deputed on the post of General Manager of the society and while doing so, the Joint Registrar not only sent a copy thereof to the Administrator but also directed him to place the petitioner under suspension and initiate proceedings under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules, 1958. The legal position that as a Joint Registrar, he could not do so was known to him and that is why, he forwarded a copy of said order to the Registrar for ratification. 22. The Administrator, had obviously, no option but to apparently follow the directions and place the petitioner under suspension on11.09.1997. A copy of said order was sent to the Joint Registrar indicating therein that the same had been done in furtherance of his order dated 04.09.1997 – in a bid to show that compliance had been done. 23. There is nothing on record to show that what impelled the respondents to proceed against the petitioner on 04.09.1997. The order dated 04.09.1997 is absolutely silent in this regard; so is the order of suspension dated 11.09.1997. One fails to comprehend that when two preliminary inquiries and proceedings under section 74 of the Act could not unearth anything against the petitioner, what was the material with the respondents, except the dictates of the Minister to launch proceedings against the petitioner. 24. On 11.09.1997, the petitioner was working as a General Manager when the Administrator decided to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, charge-sheet was issued (on 23.09.1997) but since the petitioner was on deputation, he was under control and supervision of the State Government, per force Rules of 1995. The Administrator had therefore, no jurisdiction to proceed against the petitioner. 25. That apart, in case the Administrator was of the view that the petitioner was governed by the Conditions of 1991 and not the Rules of 1995, then he ought to have followed the procedure provided under the Conditions of 1991 and not under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules, 1958 treating him in state’s services. Revocation or cancellation of petitioner’s deputation with retrospective effect cannot validate the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction on the fateful day i.e. 11.09.1997. 26. It is interestingly to note that on 15.09.1997, the Registrar wrote to the Secretary of the State Government to cancel his selection under the Rules of 1995. While doing so, he made a reference of some report in which the complaints were found proved but such report had neither been forwarded nor has the same been placed on record by the respondents. While doing so, he made a reference of some report in which the complaints were found proved but such report had neither been forwarded nor has the same been placed on record by the respondents. Relevant extract of the above referred communication dated 15.09.1997 will not be out of context to reproduce hereunder:- lgdkjh foHkkx jktLFkku] t;iqj ?ekad@112@123@lfojk@ekdsZ@Nrjx<+@79@ikVZ TT fnukad% 15&9&97 Jheku 'kklu lfpo] lgdkfjrk foHkkx] jktLFkku ljdkj] t;iqjA fo"k;%& Jh dSyk'kpUnz tujy eSustj Nrjx<+ ?; fo?; lgdkjh lfefr fy0 Nrjx<+ ftyk chdkusj dk p;u fujLr djus ckcrA -------- fo"k;kUrxZr fuosnu gS fd jktLFkku ljdkj lgdkfjrk foHkkx ds vkns'k dzekad i018 ¿134 } ? lg@95 fnukad 21&9&95 ds }kjk Jh dSyk'kpUnz] O;oLFkkid] Nrjx<+ ?z; fo?; lgdkjh lfefr] Nrjx<+ dk laLFkkvksa ds eq[; dk;Zdkfj;kas ds fy, cuk, x, fo'ks"k p;u fu;e 1995 ds vUrxZr p;u djrs gq, mUgsa tujy eSustj ?0fo0l0l0fy0 ds Nrjx<+ ds in ij inLFkkfir fd;k x;k FkkA Jh dSyk'kflag lsaxj dks mDr in ij dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djus dh frfFk ls rhu o"kZ ds fy, vFkok mudh lsokfuo`r fnukad rd tks Hkh iwOkZ gks dh vof/k ds fy, inLFkkfir fd;k x;k Fkk rFkk os orZeku esa Hkh blh in ij dk;Zjr gSaA xrfnuksa esa JhdSyk'kpUnz ds dk;Z ds laca/k esa vfu;ferrk,a gksus dh f'kdk;r izkIr gksus ij ekuuh; lgdkfjrk ea=h egksn; }kjk la;qDr jftLV?kj chdkusj ls rRlaca/kh tkap djokbZ xbZA tkap fjiksVZ esa buds dk;Z laca/kh f'kdk;rs izekf.kr gksus ds QyLo:i ekuuh; lgdkfjrk ea=h egksn; }kjk viuh Vh0la[;k 713@fu0le@97 fnukad 21&3&97 ls ;g funsZ'k fn, x, dh JhdSyk'kpUnz lsaxj dk fo'ks"k p;u fu;ekas ds vUrxZr fd;k x;k p;u fujLr fd;k tkosA jkT; ljdkj ds Lrj ls tkjh lgdkjh laLFkkvksa ds eq[; dk;Z&dkfjkas ds fy, cuk, x, fo'ks"k p;u 1995 ds fu;e la[;k 16 ch ds vuqlkj ,sls deZpkfj;kas dh fu;qfDr ,oa inLFkkiu jkt0 ljdkj ;k jftLV?kj lgdkfjrk foHkkx] jktLFkku t;iqj }kjk dh tkosxh rFkk fu;e la[;k 16 lh ds vuqlkj jkT; ljdkj ;k jftLV?kj bUgs inLFkkfir LFkku ls iqu% okfil ys ldrs gSA Jh dSyk'kpUnz ds fu;qfDr ,oa inLFkkiu vkns'k fnukad 21&9&95 dh 'krZ la[;k&4 ds vuqlkj fu;qfDr vof/k esa vf/kdkjh dk dk;Z larks"ktud ugha gksus ij muds iSr`d in ij@foHkkx esa okfil Hkst fn;k tkosxkA pwafd fo"ks'k p;u fu;eksa ds vUrxZr Jh dSyk'kpUnz lsaxj tujy eSustj ?0fo0l0l0fy0 Nrjx<+ dh fu;qfDr ,oa inLFkkiu vkids dk;kZy; Lrj ls gqvk Fkk rFkk ekuuh; lgdkfjrk ea=h egksn; ds vkns'kksa ls budk fo'ks"k p;u fujLr djok;k tkdj] bUgsa viuh isr`d laLFkk esa okfil Hkstk tkuk gS] vr% d`i;k vkids Lrj ls mDr dk;Zokgh vfoyEc djkus dk d"V djsaA 27. Above communication dated 15.09.1997 unravels that there was direct control and supervision of the then Cooperative Minister. It has been mentioned in the letter that pursuant to preliminary inquiry got conducted by the respondents, the petitioner was found guilty but by such date nothing was found against him. Even if it is assumed that petitioner’s working was not satisfactory, the State Government itself ought to have taken a call to proceed against him that too after recording its own satisfaction and not on the basis of derived satisfaction. Even if it is assumed that petitioner’s working was not satisfactory, the State Government itself ought to have taken a call to proceed against him that too after recording its own satisfaction and not on the basis of derived satisfaction. 28. The factual matrix of the case speaks volumes about the manner in which the respondents have proceeded against the petitioner that too at the instance of the Minister. 29. This Court is not much convinced with the argument of Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-Society that the petitioner ought to have raised such objection before the inquiry officer. The objection regarding jurisdiction can be taken even at the stage of proceedings before Hon’ble the Supreme Court as the same goes to the root of the matter. The petitioner has raised the issue of jurisdiction at best available opportunity, hence, such contention cannot be nipped in the bud. 30. That apart, if the respondents’ stand is accepted that after deemed repatriation, the petitioner became an employee of the Society with retrospective effect from 11.09.1997, then the procedure to be adopted was the one provided under the Conditions of 1991 and not under CCA Rules, 1958, which Rules are applicable only to the Government employees because Societies’ employees are governed by Rule of 1991. 31. This Court cannot side-track the fact that on two occasions almost similar complaints were filed by one Hari Kishan Joshi which were examined by the officers of the department - one by the Joint Registrar and another by the Administrator himself. In the face of such reports, there was no occasion for the very same authority (Administrator) to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. 32. In the face of such reports, there was no occasion for the very same authority (Administrator) to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. 32. In order to see the legality of the order of suspension and initiation of the proceedings, reproduction of order dated11.09.1997 will be apt:- dk;kZy; iz'kkld Nrjx<+ ?; fo?; lgdkjh lfefr;ka fy0 Nrjx<+ ?ekad% ,Q0@iz'kkld@Nr-dz-fo-@97 fnukad dk;kZy; vkns'k Jh dSyk'kpUnz lsaxj O;oLFkkid Nrjx<+ ?; fo?; lgdkjh lfefr fy0 Nrjx<+ dh lfefr esa xaHkhj vfu;ferrk,a fd;s tkus] QthZ fjdkWMZ rS;kj djus] vkns'kksa dh vogsyuk djus ,oa tkucw>dj vius drZO;ksa ds izfr ltxolrZu u jgus] lfefr dh Nfo dks /kwfey djuk] fo'okl Hkax djus] vuq'kklughurk ds d`R; dj lfefr dh lk[k dks fxjkus ,oa lfefr dks gkfu esa igqapkus ds xaHkhj vkjksiksa dks e/; utj j[krs gq, rRdky izHkko ls fuyafcr fd;k tkrk gSA fuyacu dky esa budk eq[;ky; Nrjx<+ dz; fo?z; lgdkjh lfefr fy0 Nrjx<+ esa jgsxkA Jh dSyk'kpUnz lsaxj dks fuyacudky esa fu;ekuqlkj fuokZg HkRrk ns; gksxkA vkjksi i= ,oa vkjksiksa dk fooj.k i`Fkd ls tkjh fd;k tk jgs gSaA lgh@& iz'kkld Nrjx<+ ?z; fodz; lgdkjh lfefr fy0 Nrjx<+ 33. A perusal of the order dated 11.09.1997 clearly shows that the disciplinary authority has not applied its mind to the facts of the case, inasmuch as on the date of initiating disciplinary proceedings the material with him was two reports one furnished by the Joint Registrar and another report dated 24.05.1997 furnished by himself. Had the Administrator actually and objectively considered the material on record, he could not have initiated the proceedings, as there was no material evincing financial irregularities by the petitioner. 34. Though various submissions have been made by learned Senior Counsel and learned counsel for the respondent-State about the correctness and otherwise of the findings recorded by the inquiry officer, but since this Court is of the view that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner are wholly without jurisdiction, vindictive and actuated by mala-fide, this aspect is not required to be gone into. 35. Even without appreciating the evidence on record and examining the veracity of findings, it can conveniently be said that the disciplinary authority and inquiry officer proceeded with pre-mediated mind to ensure petitioner’s ouster from the services –both of them were under influence of the Minister. 36. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. 37. 35. Even without appreciating the evidence on record and examining the veracity of findings, it can conveniently be said that the disciplinary authority and inquiry officer proceeded with pre-mediated mind to ensure petitioner’s ouster from the services –both of them were under influence of the Minister. 36. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed. 37. The initiation of the inquiry against the petitioner by memorandum of charges dated 23.09.1997 is hereby quashed being without jurisdiction, arbitrary and mala-fide. 38. Since the initiation of proceedings itself has been quashed, as a natural fall-out, the inquiry report so also impugned order 28.12.1998 (Annexure-27) also become non-est; the same are also quashed. 39. The petitioner shall be deemed to have continued in service until attaining the age of superannuation. The respondent-Society shall calculate the amount of salary including all increments which the petitioner would have otherwise drawn had he not been dismissed. The same shall be paid within a period of three months from today. 40. In case the same is not paid within the period aforesaid, it shall carry interest @ 9% p.m. from the date of order instant till the payment is made. 41. The petitioner will also be free to represent for pendente lite interest on the arrears of salary in accordance with law. 42. This case calls for exemplary cost for the harassment which the petitioner had endured on account of colourable exercise of powers at the hands of the respondents, but this Court deters from doing so in view of the request of Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the Society.