JUDGMENT : SANJEEV J.THAKER, J. 1. The present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the CPC”) challenging the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Valsad in Regular Civil Appeal No.11 of 2021, confirming the judgment and decree dated 01.11.2021 passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge Valsad in Regular Civil Suit No.9 of 2021. 2. For the sake of brevity and convenience, the parties are referred to at their original status as that in the suit. 3. The brief facts arising in the present Second Appeal are that the plaintiff had filed Regular Civil Suit on the ground that the plaintiff and father of defendant and his family members had good relation and both parties agreed to exchange between themselves the property mentioned at paragraph nos.1 and 2 of the plaint. It is a case of the plaintiff that the said exchange of land between the plaintiff and the defendant were as per their mutual understanding and free will and the plaintiff and the defendant applied before the Mamlatdar by a letter dated 15.03.1983 for changing the ownership of the suit property in the record and the Mamlatdar had passed an order, thereby refusing to effect the exchange between the parties by letter dated 23.09.1983. 4. It is the case of the plaintiff that thereafter the defendant on one or the other pretext started delaying the execution of transferring the land and on 27.01.2021, the plaintiff came to know that the suit property is going to be sold by the defendant and therefore, the plaintiff filed Civil Suit No.9 of 2021 before the 3 rd Additional Senior Civil Judge Valsad. The defendant appeared in the said suit and filed application under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and after considering the plaint and the documents annexed with the plaint, the Trial Court rejected the said suit being barred by law. The defendant appeared in the said suit and filed application under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and after considering the plaint and the documents annexed with the plaint, the Trial Court rejected the said suit being barred by law. Aggrieved by the said order the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Appeal No.11 of 2021 and after reappreciating findings of the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court dismissed the said appeal hence the present Second Appeal is filed and the substantial questions of law suggested in the memo of appeal are as under: “(4.1) Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court is tenable in the eyes of law in absence of framing of the points as per Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C.? (4.2) Whether the impugned order dated 01.11.2021 passed by the Trial court to reject the suit under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 is justified and tenable in the eyes of the law, especially when no application is moved by the defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 as well as no specific contention is taken in the written statement that the suit is barred by the law of limitation? (4.3) Whether the Appellate Court and Trial Court are justified to hold that the cause of action occurred in the year of 1983 and not in the year of 2021? (4.4) Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court and order of the Trial Court are not contrary to the principle of the law laid down by the catena of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the limitation is a question of law and fact both and hence it requires adjudication in the trial? (4.5) Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court and order of the Trial Court are not contrary to the principle of the law laid down by the catena of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the rejection or grant of the revenue entry does not decide the property rights and they are only for the fiscal purpose? (4.6) Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court and order of the Trial Court are legally tenable when they hold that the transfer of agriculture land which took place in the year 1979 to 1980 is contrary to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act? (4.6) Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court and order of the Trial Court are legally tenable when they hold that the transfer of agriculture land which took place in the year 1979 to 1980 is contrary to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act? (4.7) Whether the judgment of the Appellate Court and order of the Trial Court are tenable in the eyes of law when there is no cancellation agreement between the parties who exchanged the agricultural land in the year 1979 to 1980?” 5. Learned advocate for the plaintiff has mainly argued that the Appellate Court has without framing points of determination under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC has decided the said appeal and therefore also the Second Appeal is required to be admitted on substantial questions of law. It has also been argued by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that as there was no application moved by the defendant under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the Trial Court could not have decided the said application as contention was taken in the written statement that the suit is barred by law of limitation. It has also been argued by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that the Appellate Court and the Trial Court could not have come to the conclusion that the cause of action occurred in the year 1983, as it is the case of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff is in possession of the property since 2021 and the cause of action has arisen only in the year 2021, when the defendants and unknown persons threatened the plaintiff of dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit premises. It is also argued by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that from the bare reading of the plaint and the documentary evidence produced with the plaint, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court could not have come to the conclusion that the suit that has been filed by the plaintiff is barred by law. It is also argued by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that from the bare reading of the plaint and the documentary evidence produced with the plaint, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court could not have come to the conclusion that the suit that has been filed by the plaintiff is barred by law. It has also been argued by the learned advocate for the plaintiff that after the letter was written to the Mamlatdar in the year 1983, the defendants have not cancelled the said letter and or the consent given by them before the Mamlatdar of exchange of land and unless and until there is a cancellation by the defendant, the cause of action to file the present suit would be there and the Trial Court and the Appellate Court could not have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff had to file a suit within three years from the year 1983, and therefore as there are substantial questions of law involved in the present Second Appeal the Second Appeal is required to be admitted. 6. Learned advocate for the defendant has mainly argued that the relief that have been sought in the plaint is for specific performance of an understanding that has been alleged to have been arrived at in the year 1983. It is the case of the plaintiff that in view of the understanding that was arrived at in the year 1983 and a letter that was written by the father of the plaintiff and the defendant on 15.03.1983, wherein it was specifically agreed to exchange the properties belonging to the plaintiff and the defendant more particularly stated in para nos.1 and 2 of the plaint and therefore the plaintiff is seeking a specific performance of an understanding that was arrived at in the year 1983 and the suit that has been filed is filed in the year 2021 and therefore, the suit is hopelessly time barred. It is argued that, it is not required that an application is required to be filed under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and the Trial Court can decide the same under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. It is argued that, it is not required that an application is required to be filed under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC and the Trial Court can decide the same under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. It has been argued by the learned advocate for the defendant that the plaint is hopelessly time barred as the cause of action has arisen in the year 1983, when the Mamlatdar had rejected the said letter and therefore the only option that the plaintiff had was to file a suit for specific performance in the year 1983 to get a registered document executed in favour of the plaintiff with respect to the suit property. 7. It has been also argued by the learned advocate for the defendant that even the letter that has been written by the Mamlatdar which has been produced vide exhibit 3/2 dated 23.09.1983, it has been specifically stated by Mamlatdar that the said application of exchange of land cannot be entertained by the Mamlatdar and a registered sale deed has to be executed between the parties and therefore the cause of action to file the suit had arisen in the year 1983. Moreover, in the cause of action at paragraph 5. the plaintiff has also stated that the cause of action has arisen when the Mamlatdar on 23.09.1983 had given in writing that a sale deed has to be executed and therefore, the suit is hopelessly time barred. 8. Learned advocate for the defendant has relied upon the judgment in case of (i) Nikhila Divyang Mehta & Ors Vs. Hitesh P. Sanghvi & Ors. , (ii) The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution Vs. B.Gunashekhar & Another in Civil Appeal No.5200 of 2025, (iii) In case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta And Others Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation , 2024 (0) AIJEL-SC 73647 , and it has been argued that there are no substantial questions of law involved in the present Second Appeal and the present Second Appeal is required to be dismissed. 9. B.Gunashekhar & Another in Civil Appeal No.5200 of 2025, (iii) In case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta And Others Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation , 2024 (0) AIJEL-SC 73647 , and it has been argued that there are no substantial questions of law involved in the present Second Appeal and the present Second Appeal is required to be dismissed. 9. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having taken into consideration the order that has been passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Court and having taken into consideration the plaint and the documents annexed with the plaint, the following are the admitted facts: (a) The defendant is the owner of the suit land. (b) A letter was written to the Mamlatdar on 23.09.1983 of exchange of the land. (c) The Mamlatdar by his reply to the said letter stated that unless and until there is a registered sale deed whereby the suit property is transferred to the plaintiff, he cannot enter the name of the plaintiff as an owner of the property. The said letter dated 23.09.1983. (d) The plaintiff in plaint has stated that the cause of action to file the present suit has arisen when the Mamlatdar refused to entertain the letter of exchange of the suit property and directed the parties to execute a sale deed with respect to the suit property. (e) The plaintiff has sought for specific performance of the understanding that was arrived at in the year 1983. 10.In this background, the fact remains that the first cause of action that has arisen for the plaintiff is in the year 1983, when the plaintiff and the defendants agreed to exchange the suit lands and a letter to that effect was written in the year 1983. The provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC are as under: “11. The provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC are as under: “11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;] (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9: [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp- paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]” 11.The remedy under the said provision is an independent and special remedy whereby the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss the suit at the threshold without proceeding to record evidence and conducting a trial on the basis of evidence adduced if the Court is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision. 12.In the present case, the main relief that has been sought in the plaint is for specific performance of the understanding that has been arrived at in the year 1983. 12.In the present case, the main relief that has been sought in the plaint is for specific performance of the understanding that has been arrived at in the year 1983. In the present case it has been averred in the plaint that there were good relationship between the plaintiff and the father of defendant in the year 1979-1980 and pursuant to the said relationship a joint application was written to the Mamlatdar to effect the exchange of land for exchanging the names of plaintiff and the defendant in the said land but thereafter, on 23.09.1983 the Mamlatdar has refused to give effect to the said exchange and had categorically stated in the said refusal that only on registered sale deed can the property, be stated to be in the name of the plaintiff and till the filing of the suit, the plaintiff has not taken any step for affecting the said exchange of properties therefore, the cause of action started to run for filing the suit from 23.09.1983, and the period of limitation expired after the period of three years i.e. on 23.09.1986 and the suit for specific performance was to be filed within three years from the date fixed for the performance and if no such date is fixed when the plaintiff has noticed that the performance is refused and in the present case, the Mamlatdar has refused the said exchange on 23.09.1983 and therefore the period of limitation would commence from 23.09.1983. Therefore the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have rightly rejected the plaint under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. 13. Learned advocate for the defendant has relied on the judgment in case of Nikhila Divyang Mehta & Ors (Supra) in para nos.5, 17, 19 and 20 as under: “5. The plaintiff-Shri Hitesh P. Sanghvi instituted Suit No.1758/2017 in the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, against four persons including Smt. Harshaben Vijay Mehta, Smt. Nikhila Divyang Mehta, Smt. Ami Rajesh Parikh and Shri Nilav Divyang Mehta as defendant Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively seeking direction from the court to declare the Will dated 04.02.2014 and the Codicil dated 20.09.2014 executed by his late father Pramod Kesurdas Sanghavi and all consequential actions thereof to be null and void as also for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from entering into any transaction in furtherance of the aforesaid Will and Codicil. 17. 17. There is no dispute to the fact that the Will was executed and registered by the father of the plaintiff on 04.02.2014 and the Codicil came to be executed and registered on 20.09.2014. The plaintiff, as per his own averments in plaint, had acquired knowledge of the aforesaid Will and Codicil through defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (sisters), only in the first week of November, 2017. 19. The relief of declaration claimed in the suit at hand does not fall under Articles 56 and 57 and, therefore, by necessary implication, Article 58 would stand attracted which provides for a limitation period of three years to obtain any other declaration other than that mentioned under Articles 56 and 57. It provides that for such a declaration, the limitation is three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. 20. The use of the words “when the right to sue first accrues” as mentioned in Article 58 is very relevant and important. It categorically provides that the limitation of three years has to be counted from the date when the right to sue first accrues.” In view of the said fact, the primary relief that has been sought in the said suit is for specific performance and therefore, the ancillary relief for injunction cannot be stated to be independent relief and therefore also the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have rightly rejected the said plaint. 14. Learned advocate for the defendant has also relied upon the judgment in case of The Correspondence, RBANMS Educational Institution (Supra), in para no.15.2 it has held as under: “15.2. In the present case, juxtaposing the above legal principles to the facts of the case, we find that the respondents' claim suffers from multiple fatal defects that go to the root of the case, which are as follows: 15.2.1. First, there is no privity between the respondents and the appellant. The agreement to sell, is not between the parties to the suit. According to Section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, only the owner, or any person authorised by him, can transfer the property. We have already held that an agreement to sell does not confer any right on the proposed purchaser under the agreement. The agreement to sell, is not between the parties to the suit. According to Section 7 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, only the owner, or any person authorised by him, can transfer the property. We have already held that an agreement to sell does not confer any right on the proposed purchaser under the agreement. Therefore, as a natural corollary, any right, until the sale deed is executed, will vest only with the owner, or in other words, the vendor to take necessary action to protect his interest in the property. According to the respondents, the property belongs to the vendors and according to the appellant, the property vests in them. Since the respondents are not divested any right by virtue of the agreement, they cannot sustain the suit as they would not have any locus. Consequently, they also cannot seek any declaration in respect of the title of the vendors. But when the title is under a cloud, it is necessary that a declaration be sought as laid down by this Court in the judgment in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs and others27. Therefore, the suit at the instance of the respondents/plaintiffs is not maintainable and only the vendors could have approached the court for a relief of declaration. In the present case, strangely, the vendors are not arrayed as parties to even support any semblance of right sought by the respondents/plaintiffs, which we found not to be in existence. Further, the respondents/plaintiffs claim to have paid the entire consideration of AIR 2008 SC 2033 : MANU/SC/7376/2008 Rs.75,00,000/- in cash, despite the introduction of Section 269ST to the Income Tax Act in 2017 and the corresponding amendment to Section 271 DA. As held by us, the agreement can only create rights against the proposed vendors and not against third parties like the appellant herein. As the agreement to sell does not create any transferable interest or title in the property in favour of the respondents/ plaintiffs, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, we hold that the attempt of the plaintiffs to disclose the cause of action through clever drafting, based solely on an agreement to sell, must fail, as such disclosure cannot be restricted to mere statement of facts but must disclose a legal right to sue. 15.2.2. 15.2.2. Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, as we have seen and held above, the respondents have no legal right that can be enforced against the appellant as their claim is impliedly barred by virtue of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Their remedy, if any, lies against their proposed vendors. The plaint averments remain silent regarding the execution of a registered sale deed in favour of the respondents, which alone can confer a valid right on them to file a suit against the appellant as held by us earlier. Another, remedy available to them is to institute a suit against the vendors for specific performance. This principle was clearly established in K. Basavarajappa (supra), wherein this Court held that an agreement holder lacks locus standi to maintain actions against third parties. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is extracted below: “8. … By mere agreement to sell the appellant got no interest in the property put to auction to enable him to apply for setting aside such auction under Rule 60 and especially when his transaction was hit by Rule 16(1) read with Rules 51 and 48. Consequently he could not be said to be having any legal interest to entitle him to move such an application. Consequently no fault could be found with the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court rejecting the entitlement of the appellant to move such an application.” 15.2.3. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the judgements relied upon by the appellant are not applicable, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the ratio laid down by this court, is applicable irrespective of the stage at which it is relied upon. What is relevant is the ratio and not the stage. Such contentions go against the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Once a ratio is laid down, the courts have to apply the ratio, considering the facts of the case and once, found to be applicable, irrespective of the stage, the same has to be applied, to throw out frivolous suits. Such contentions go against the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Once a ratio is laid down, the courts have to apply the ratio, considering the facts of the case and once, found to be applicable, irrespective of the stage, the same has to be applied, to throw out frivolous suits. There is no gainsaying in contending that the other party must be put to undergo the ordeal of entire trial, when the plaintiff’s claim is either barred by law or the plaint fails to disclose a cause of action, as it would amount to abuse of process of law, wasting the precious time of the courts. On the other hand, the judgments relied upon by the respondents do not come into their aid as the judgments referred to by them also lay down the proposition that the plaint can be rejected if on a meaningful reading of it, fails to disclose a cause of action or is barred by law. In the present case, from the facts, we also find this to be a case of champertous litigation, between the plaintiffs and the vendors, who are not parties to the suit. Though champertous litigations have been recognized in our country to some extent by way of amendment to CPC by certain states, considering the facts of the present case and the averments in the plaint, we only find the litigation to be inequitable, unconscionable or extortionate. 15.2.4. Further, the respondents are not in possession of the property. Whereas, the appellant's possession since 1905 is admitted in the plaint itself. In such circumstances, where the plaintiffs are not in possession and the defendant is in settled possession for over a century, a suit for bare injunction by a proposed transferee is clearly not maintainable. Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 prohibits grant of injunction when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. In the present case, the respondents, being mere agreement holders, have no personal interest in the suit schedule property that can be enforced against third parties. The “personal interest” is to be understood in the context of a legally enforceable right, as when there is a bar in law, the mere existence of an interest in the outcome cannot give a right to sue. The “personal interest” is to be understood in the context of a legally enforceable right, as when there is a bar in law, the mere existence of an interest in the outcome cannot give a right to sue. As held by us above, no declaratory relief has been sought as contemplated under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. This principle was clearly established in Jharkhand State Housing Board (supra), in which, this Court emphasized that where title is in dispute, a mere suit for injunction is not maintainable. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder:- “ 11. It is well settled by catena of judgments of this Court that in each and every case where the defendant disputes the title of the plaintiff it is not necessary that in all those cases plaintiff has to seek the relief of declaration. A suit for mere injunction does not lie only when the defendant raises a genuine dispute with regard to title and when he raises a cloud over the title of the plaintiff, then necessarily in those circumstances, plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for bare injunction.” 15.2.5. Yet another defect in the plaint is regarding the identity of the property. The respondents/plaintiffs, as seen above, have admitted to the possession of the appellant over the suit property. The plaint, on one hand, raises a dispute as to whether the property claimed by the respondents is the same as that possessed by the appellant, and on the other hand, seeks only a relief of permanent injunction restraining the appellant/defendant from alienating the property, without seeking a declaration affirming the title of their vendors. The entitlement of the plaintiffs to the possession rests on the title of their vendors and it is not an independent right. Without possession and without seeking a declaration of title, not only is the suit barred but the cause of action is also fictitious.” 15. Learned advocate has also relied upon the judgment in case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta And Others (Supra) , in para no.30 and 31 it is held as under: “30. Thus, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Thus, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient. In this regard, useful reference may be made to G. Amalorpavam and others vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai and others8, wherein this Court held as under: - '9. The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.' 31. As already noted hereinabove, the High Court did set out all the issues framed by the Trial Court in the body of the judgment and was, therefore, fully conscious of all the points that it had to consider in the appeal. Further, we do not find that any particular issue that was considered by the Trial Court was left out by the High Court while adjudicating the appeal. In effect, we do not find merit in the contention that the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside on this preliminary ground, warranting reconsideration of the first appeal by the High Court afresh.” In view of the fact that the said judgment is on the issue of Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC and in view of the fact that while deciding the First Appeal, the Appellate Court has decided all the issues that were framed by the Trial Court in body of the judgment and therefore fully conscious of all the points while deciding the appeal and under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC the Trial Court and the Appellate Court only have looked into the plaint and the documents annexed with the plaint, there are no substantial questions involved in the present Second Appeal and the present Second Appeal is required to be dismissed. 16. In view of the fact that the plaintiff is seeking specific performance of the application that was filed before the Mamlatdar in the year 1983 which has been refused in the year 1983, the present suit is hopelessly time barred and has rightly been rejected by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Court. 17. It is required to be noted that in Second Appeal, the scope is very limited and the Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence. 17. It is required to be noted that in Second Appeal, the scope is very limited and the Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence. In the case of Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty reported in 1996 (6) SCC 177 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “11. This Court, time without number, pointed out that interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the lower courts.” 18. In the case of Jaichand (Dead) through Lrs and Other v. Sahnulal and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “28. It is thus clear that under Section 100 CPC, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence.” 19. In view of the facts stated herein above there are no substations questions of law involved in the present second appeal and the questions suggested in the memo of appeal more particularly reproduced at para 4 herein above are not substantial questions of law and therefore also the present second appeal is required to be dismissed at the admission stage. 20. Under the circumstances, this Second Appeal is devoid of any substantial question of law. Both the learned Trial Court and First Appellate Court have rightly decided the issue between the parties in the right perspective and as stated above no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal. The plaintiff has failed to prove their case before the learned Trial Court as well as before the First Appellate Court. This Court does not find any substance in the present Second Appeal as the same is devoid of any merit both on facts and law and the same is dismissed. In view of the disposal of the Second Appeal, the Civil Application for stay does not survive and the same is accordingly disposed of.