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2025 DIGILAW 460 (HP)

Panna Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-03-24

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : (Rakesh Kainthla, J.) The present petition has been filed for quashing of FIR No. 75 of 2018 dated 18.04.2018 registered against the petitioner at Police Station Bhuntar, District Kullu (H.P) for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 447, 323, 504 and 201 of Indian Penal Code (“in short IPC”) and the consequential proceedings pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu (H.P) in Case No.119 of 2019 titled as State of H.P. Vs. Panna Devi. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant-respondent No.2 made a complaint to the police that she was constructing a boundary wall with her husband on 18.04.2018 at 12:30 pm when the petitioner – Panna Devi objected to the construction of the boundary wall. She abused the informant and claimed that the land belonged to her. The spot was demarcated on 01.12.2017, and the land was found to be owned by the informant. The petitioner- Panna Devi, gave beatings to the informant. The informant sustained injuries. Her husband tried to rescue her, but he was also beaten. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. A medical examination of the informant and her husband was conducted. The injuries sustained by them were found to be simple. The place was demarcated, and the disputed portion was found to be owned by the informant. The police recorded the statements of the witnesses and filed a charge sheet before the learned trial Court. 3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the informant has concocted a false story. The petitioner and the informant’s family had a land dispute. The petitioner is peacefully occupying the land in her portion. Civil suits are also pending between the parties. The informant and her husband were constructing the boundary wall after encroaching upon the petitioner’s land. The petitioner objected, and she was beaten by the informant and her husband. She reported the matter to the police, and FIR No.74/2018 was registered at the police station. She was medically examined, and the injuries sustained by her were found to be grievous. The police filed a charge sheet in FIR No.74/2018, and the matter is pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu (H.P). She reported the matter to the police, and FIR No.74/2018 was registered at the police station. She was medically examined, and the injuries sustained by her were found to be grievous. The police filed a charge sheet in FIR No.74/2018, and the matter is pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu (H.P). The informant got the FIR registered as a counterblast to the FIR of the petitioner. The dispute between the parties is civil. No fruitful purpose would be served by the continuation of the proceedings before the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and FIR and the consequent proceedings be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a reply denying the contents of the petition. However, the filing of the FIR by both parties was not disputed. It was asserted that the police conducted the investigation and found sufÏcient material to corroborate the allegations of the parties. Hence, the charge- sheet was prepared and filed before the competent Court for judicial verdict. It was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard Mr Dibender Ghosh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1-State and Ms. Meera Devi, learned counsel for respondent No. 2. 6. Mr Dibender Ghosh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the FIR was lodged by the informant as a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the petitioner. The allegations in the FIR lodged by the informant are vague and do not constitute the commission of a cognizable offence. The continuation of the trial will amount to an abuse of process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and FIR be quashed. 7. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1-State, submitted that the allegations made by the informant were duly corroborated by the witnesses during the investigation. The demarcation was conducted, and the place of the incident was found in the informant’s possession. This shows that the petitioner was the aggressor. The police have submitted the charge sheet in the FIRs filed by the respective parties, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. The demarcation was conducted, and the place of the incident was found in the informant’s possession. This shows that the petitioner was the aggressor. The police have submitted the charge sheet in the FIRs filed by the respective parties, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. This Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the FIR and should permit the learned trial Court to determine the truthfulness of the FIR lodged by the respective parties. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. Ms Meera Devi, learned counsel for respondent No.2 adopted the submissions made by learned Additional Advocate General and submitted that the petitioner had given a beating to the informant and her husband by trespassing into her land. She was an aggressor and the charge sheet was rightly filed against her. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufÏciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efÏcacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceeding can be quashed.” 11. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ). 12. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. A perusal of the FIR shows that the petitioner had trespassed into the informant’s land, and she gave beatings to the informant and her husband. The place of the incident was demarcated and was found to be owned by the informant. Therefore, the contents of the FIR disclose the commission of cognisable offence. 14. It was submitted that the petitioner had also lodged an FIR No.74 before the FIR was lodged by the informant. The petitioner lodged the FIR as a counterblast to the FIR of the informant. This submission cannot be adjudicated at this stage. This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations because it is a matter of trial to be adjudicated by the learned Trial Court where the matter is pending. The petitioner lodged the FIR as a counterblast to the FIR of the informant. This submission cannot be adjudicated at this stage. This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations because it is a matter of trial to be adjudicated by the learned Trial Court where the matter is pending. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 15. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) “6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufÏcient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 16. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 17. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating ofÏcer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 18. Heavy reliance was placed upon Usha Chakraborty Vs. State of West Bengal, Criminal Appeal No.256 of 2022, decided on 30.01.2023. However, this judgment will not assist the petitioner. The allegations in Usha Chakraborty (supra) were found to be vague, which is not the case here because specific allegations of beatings were made against the petitioner. The allegations in the FIR of the cited case showed a civil dispute. In the present case, trespassing into the land of a person, beating him/her and abusing him/her constitute the commission of the offence. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the cited judgment. 19. No other point was urged. 20. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 21. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.