JUDGMENT : Rajesh Shankar, J. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing/setting aside the order dated 09.01.2008 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur (hereinafter referred to as “the PLA”) in P.L.A. Case No. 90/2007 in exercise of its power conferred under Section 22(C) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1987), whereby the petitioner was directed to pay the awarded amount of compensation of Rs.2,63,000/- to the claimant i.e., the respondent no. 1 within one month from the said order, failing which she was made entitled to recover and realize the compensation amount through the process of law with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on account of death of her husband namely, Kuna Singh Sardar in motor vehicle accident. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent no. 1 had filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 for herself and on behalf of her two minor children i.e., the respondent nos. 2 and 3 before the P.L.A, Jamshedpur constituted under Section 22(B) of the Act 1987 claiming compensation of Rs.3,20,000/- along with interest on account of death of her husband namely, Kuna Singh Sardar in motor vehicle accident which was said to have been taken place on 05.08.2006 caused by a truck bearing registration No. HR-38J-6871 near Village Khunti, Chandil, District Seraikella-Kharsawan. Thereafter, a case was registered as P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007. The petitioner filed the written statement challenging the maintainability of the said case stating that the P.L.A. had no jurisdiction to entertain the cases related to Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 as the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals were separately constituted for the said purpose. 3. It is further submitted that after receipt of the notice from the P.L.A, the petitioner deputed Mr. Arun Kumar Tiwary, Advocate as Investigator who reported the petitioner vide his report dated 19.07.2007 that altogether four cases were filed by the claimant(s) at different courts for grant of compensation on account of death of Late Kuna Singh Sardar who had died in the motor vehicle accident occurred on 05.08.2006 and thus it was clear that the claimant(s) had not come to the court with clean hands. 4. 4. It is also submitted that the claimants had suppressed the material fact that they had already filed compensation cases before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (M.A.C.T), Seraikella and Jamshedpur vide Compensation Case Nos. 1/2007 and 155/2006 respectively which were dismissed on 01.06.2007 and 07.07.2007 respectively. Hence, on this score alone, the claim application being P.L.A No. 90 of 2007 filed by the claimant(s) was fit to be dismissed. 5. It is further submitted that the P.L.A in its order dated 09.01.2008 completely ignored and did not even discuss the points raised by the petitioner in the written statement. It is also submitted that the P.L.A constituted under the Act, 1987 had no jurisdiction to decide the issue which was required to be adjudicated on the basis of reasoning and evidence led by the parties. 6. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 submits that P.L.A Case Nos. 90 of 2007 and 92 of 2007 were filed by the claimants under Section 166 and Section 140 of the Act, 1988 respectively. P.L.A Case No. 92 of the 2007 was allowed by the P.L.A awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the claimant(s) which was also paid by the petitioner. Moreover, Compensation Case No. 1 of 2007 filed by the claimants before the District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T at Seraikella under Section 166 of the Act, 1988 was dismissed as withdrawn and the said fact has been mentioned in the award dated 09.01.2008 passed in P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007. The Compensation Case No. 155 of 2006 was filed under Section 140 of the Act, 1988 before the court of District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T at Jamshedpur which was also dismissed as withdrawn on 07.07.2007 and presently, no case is pending before any court except the present one. It is also submitted that there is no deliberate suppression of fact by the respondent no. 1. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. The thrust of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to entertain claim cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 since a separate tribunal has been constituted for the said purpose. 1. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. The thrust of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to entertain claim cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 since a separate tribunal has been constituted for the said purpose. It is further contended that four cases regarding payment of compensation on account of death of Late Kuna Singh Sardar were filed by the claimant(s) in different courts and as such, the P.L.A, Jamshedpur committed serious error in awarding the compensation to the claimant(s). 9. To appreciate the said contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, I have perused judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “ Inter Globe Aviation Ltd. Vs. N. Satchidanand ” reported in (2011) 7 SCC 463 , the relevant paragraph of which reads as under: 27. The nature of proceedings before the Permanent Lok Adalat is initially a conciliation which is non-adjudicatory in nature. Only if the parties fail to reach an agreement by conciliation, the Permanent Lok Adalat mutates into an adjudicatory body, by deciding the dispute. In short, the procedure adopted by the Permanent Lok Adalats is what is popularly known as “CON - ARB” (that is, “conciliation -cum- arbitration”) in the United States, where the parties can approach a neutral third party or authority for conciliation and if the conciliation fails, authorise such neutral third party or authority to decide the dispute itself, such decision being final and binding. The concept of “CON - ARB” before a Permanent Lok Adalat is completely different from the concept of judicial adjudication by the courts governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Permanent Lok Adalat not being a “court”, the provision in the contract relating to exclusivity of jurisdiction of courts at Delhi will not apply. 10. In the case of “ Bar Council of India Vs. Union of India ” reported in (2012) 8 SCC 243 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 24. Parliament can definitely set up effective alternative institutional mechanisms or make arrangements which may be more efficacious than the ordinary mechanism of adjudication of disputes through the judicial courts. Such institutional mechanisms or arrangements by no stretch of imagination can be said to be contrary to constitutional scheme or against the rule of law. Parliament can definitely set up effective alternative institutional mechanisms or make arrangements which may be more efficacious than the ordinary mechanism of adjudication of disputes through the judicial courts. Such institutional mechanisms or arrangements by no stretch of imagination can be said to be contrary to constitutional scheme or against the rule of law. The establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats and conferring them jurisdiction up to a specific pecuniary limit in respect of one or more public utility services as defined in Section 22-A(b) before the dispute is brought before any court by any party to the dispute is not anathema to the rule of law. Instead of ordinary civil courts, if other institutional mechanisms are set up or arrangements are made by Parliament with an adjudicatory power, in our view, such institutional mechanisms or arrangements cannot be faulted on the ground of arbitrariness or irrationality. 25. The Permanent Lok Adalats under the 1987 Act (as amended by the 2002 Amendment Act) are in addition to and not in derogation of the fora provided under various statutes. This position is accepted by the Central Government in their counter-affidavit. 26. It is necessary to bear in mind that the disputes relating to public utility services have been entrusted to Permanent Lok Adalats only if the process of conciliation and settlement fails. The emphasis is on settlement in respect of disputes concerning public utility services through the medium of Permanent Lok Adalat. It is for this reason that sub-section (1) of Section 22-C states in no unambiguous terms that any party to a dispute may before the dispute is brought before any court make an application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for settlement of dispute. Thus, settlement of dispute between the parties in matters of public utility services is the main theme. However, where despite the endeavours and efforts of the Permanent Lok Adalat the settlement between the parties is not through and the parties are required to have their dispute determined and adjudicated, to avoid delay in adjudication of disputes relating to public utility services, Parliament has intervened and conferred power of adjudication upon the Permanent Lok Adalat. 27. However, where despite the endeavours and efforts of the Permanent Lok Adalat the settlement between the parties is not through and the parties are required to have their dispute determined and adjudicated, to avoid delay in adjudication of disputes relating to public utility services, Parliament has intervened and conferred power of adjudication upon the Permanent Lok Adalat. 27. Can the power conferred on Permanent Lok Adalats to adjudicate the disputes between the parties concerning public utility service up to a specific pecuniary limit, if they do not relate to any offence, as provided under Section 22-C(8), be said to be unconstitutional and irrational? We think not. It is settled law that an authority empowered to adjudicate the disputes between the parties and act as a tribunal may not necessarily have all the trappings of the court. What is essential is that it must be a creature of statute and should adjudicate the dispute between the parties before it after giving reasonable opportunity to them consistent with the principles of fair play and natural justice. It is not a constitutional right of any person to have the dispute adjudicated by means of a court only. Chapter VI-A has been enacted to provide for an institutional mechanism, through the establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats for settlement of disputes concerning public utility service before the matter is brought to the court and in the event of failure to reach any settlement, empowering the Permanent Lok Adalat to adjudicate such dispute if it does not relate to any offence. 11. Learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of “ M/s Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Bodya Oraon & Anr .” [W.P.(C) No. 1975 of 2007] has answered the reference by observing that the Permanent Lok Adalat has power to adjudicate upon any dispute after following the procedure of making all efforts of settlement as provided under Section 22(C) of the Act, 1987. It has also been observed that upon failing the parties to arrive at settlement, the Permanent Lok Adalat should adjudicate the dispute between the parties under Section 22(C)(8) of the Act, 1987. 12. The issue as to whether the P.L.A has jurisdiction to decide motor accidental claim, is no more res-integra. It has also been observed that upon failing the parties to arrive at settlement, the Permanent Lok Adalat should adjudicate the dispute between the parties under Section 22(C)(8) of the Act, 1987. 12. The issue as to whether the P.L.A has jurisdiction to decide motor accidental claim, is no more res-integra. Moreover, the establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats and conferring them jurisdiction to settle the dispute up to a specific pecuniary limit in respect of one or more public utility services as defined in Section 22-A(b) before the dispute is brought before any court by any party to the dispute, is not anathema to the rule of law. If any institutional mechanism other than ordinary civil courts is set up or arrangement is made by the parliament with an adjudicatory power, then such institutional mechanism or arrangement cannot be faulted on the ground of arbitrariness or irrationality. However, the nature of proceeding before the Permanent Lok Adalat is initially of conciliation which is non-adjudicatory in nature and only if the parties fail to reach an agreement by conciliation, the Permanent Lok Adalat mutates into an adjudicatory body, by deciding the dispute. The P.L.A is thus competent to entertain the cases under Sections 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, but the same have to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down under Section 22(C) of the Act, 1987. 13. Thus, the main issue for consideration before this Court is as to whether the P.L.A, Jamshedpur has followed the procedure laid down under Section 22(C) of the Act, 1987 while deciding the claim of the claimants. 14. Now, coming back to the case in hand. In the impugned order itself it has been observed that during the conciliation proceeding, the insurance company denied to conciliate the case on the ground that the driving licence of the offending vehicle was not provided for verification and as such, the case was taken up for determination on merit under Section 22(C)(8) and 22(D) of the Act, 1987. The said fact has not been controverted by the petitioner and as such, I do not find any substance in the contention of the petitioner that the P.L.A had no jurisdiction to award compensation to the claimants. The said fact has not been controverted by the petitioner and as such, I do not find any substance in the contention of the petitioner that the P.L.A had no jurisdiction to award compensation to the claimants. Apart from that, the petitioner has already complied the order of the Permanent Lok Adalat passed in P.L.A Case No. 92 of 2007 filed under Section 140 of the Act, 1988, by paying interim compensation amounting to Rs.50,000/- to the claimants and as such, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the question regarding passing of the award of compensation under Section 166 of the Act, 1988 by the Permanent Lok Adalat in P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007. 15. So far as the claim of the petitioner to the extent that the claimants had filed four cases regarding compensation on account of death of Kuna Singh Sardar, it transpires from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the claimants that two cases i.e., Compensation Case No. 155 of 2006 and Compensation Case No. 01 of 2007 filed before the Court of District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T, Jamshedpur and District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T, Seraikella respectively were dismissed as withdrawn. Moreover, P.L.A Case No. 92 of 2007 and P.L.A Compensation Case No. 90 of 2007 were filed before the P.L.A Jamshedpur under Sections 140 and 166 of the Act, 1988 respectively and compensation of Rs.50,000/- was awarded to the claimants in P.L.A Case No. 92 of 2007 under no fault liability whereas the claimants have been awarded compensation of Rs.2,63,000/- in P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007 i.e., the present one. Thus, I am of the view that since two compensation cases filed before the Tribunal at Jamshedpur and Seraikella were already withdrawn, the P.L.A, Jamshedpur has not committed any illegality in awarding compensation to the claimants vide impugned order dated 09.01.2008. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the P.L.A, Jamshedpur in P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007 awarding compensation of Rs.2,63,000/- to the claimants. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the P.L.A, Jamshedpur in P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007 awarding compensation of Rs.2,63,000/- to the claimants. So far as the distribution of compensation amount amongst the claimants as well as mother of the deceased as ordered by the P.L.A in the impugned order dated 09.01.2008 is concerned, I am of the view that the same is required to be modified in the interest of justice in view of the fact that almost 17 years have elapsed since passing of the award and two claimants (the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 herein) who were minors at the time of passing of the award have now become major. Moreover, learned counsel for the parties are not in a position to inform this Court as to whether the mother of the deceased is still alive. As such, the impugned order dated 09.01.2008 is modified to the following extent: (1) The entire compensation amount of Rs.2,63,000/- shall be paid to the wife of the deceased i.e., respondent no. 1 namely, Smt. Ulashi Singh through an account payee cheque. (2) The respondent no. 1 will also be paid an interest @ 6% per annum by the petitioner on the compensation amount from the date of filing of P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007 till the disbursement of the compensation amount to the said respondent. (3) The entire compensation amount with interest shall be paid to the respondent no. 1 within one month from the date of passing of this order. 17. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid direction.