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2025 DIGILAW 461 (HP)

Vineet Sood v. Poonam Sood

2025-03-24

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : (Rakesh Kainthla, J.) The present petition is directed against the order dated 16.08.2019 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala H.P. (learned Revisional Court) vide which the order dated 18.12.2017, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Palampur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) was upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the respondents/applicants filed an application before learned Trial Court for seeking maintenance. Learned Trial Court issued notices in an ordinary manner and through registered A.D. cover. The notices were not returned, hence, Dasti notice was be issued. Applicant No. 1 filed an affidavit on 20.07.2017 that the respondent had refused to accept the service of notice. A copy of the notice containing an endorsement of the process server was also filed. Hence, the Court vide order dated 05.08.2017 held that the respondent knew the date of the hearing but he had failed to appear before the Court. Hence, the respondent was proceeded against the ex-parte. The Court asked the applicants to lead evidence. Applicant No. 1 examined herself. Learned Trial Court granted maintenance @ Rs.15,000/- per month to applicant No. 1 and Rs.10,000/- per month to applicant No.2. 3. Being aggrieved from the order passed by learned Trial Court, the original respondent filed a revision which was decided by learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharmshala (Revisional Court). It was held that the respondent has the remedy of approaching the learned Trial Court under Section 126 (2) of Cr.P.C. He could seek a modification of the maintenance under Section 127 of Cr.P.C. Applicant No. 1 stated that the income of the respondent was Rs.65,000/- per month from the immovable property and Rs.80,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/- per month as a Development Officer in LIC. There was no reason to disbelieve the statement. The learned Trial Court had rightly granted the maintenance to the applicants, and no interference was required with the order passed by the learned Trial Court. 4. Being aggrieved from the orders passed by the learned Courts below, the respondent has approached this Court asserting that the learned Trial Court had wrongly proceeded ex parte against him based on an affidavit submitted by applicant No.1. The respondent was never served. 4. Being aggrieved from the orders passed by the learned Courts below, the respondent has approached this Court asserting that the learned Trial Court had wrongly proceeded ex parte against him based on an affidavit submitted by applicant No.1. The respondent was never served. There was no evidence to award maintenance Rs.15,000/- to applicant No.1 and Rs.10,000/- to applicant No.2. The applicants had left home without any reasonable cause, and the respondent had filed an application before Gram Panchayat to bring her back. He had also filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights, which is pending disposal. The income of applicant No.1 is more than Rs.2,65,000/-. The respondent has an aged & ailing mother and a widowed sister, who are dependent upon him. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the orders passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. 5. I have heard Mr. Rajneesh K. Lall, learned counsel for the respondent and Mr. Sumesh Raj, learned counsel for the applicants. 6. Mr. Rajneesh K. Lall, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in proceeding ex-parte against the respondent. The summons were not properly served and learned Trial Court erred in relying upon the affidavit of applicant No.1 to conclude due service. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure were not followed regarding the service of the notice. No Dasti summons could have been issued as per the provisions of Cr.P.C. Learned Revisional Court had also erred in holding that the respondent should have approached the learned Trial Court for setting aside the ex parte order. The respondent had a remedy of filing a revision, which could not have been dismissed on the ground that he should have approached the learned Trial Court. He relied upon the judgments of Balan Nair v. Bhawani Amma Valsalamma , 1987 Cri LJ 399 and Apex Marketing v. P.A. Times Industries, 2023 SCC OnLine HP 1862 in support of his submission. 7. Mr Sumesh Raj, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the learned Revisional Court had rightly held that the respondent knew about the maintenance proceedings, and he had failed to appear before the Court despite knowledge. Learned Trial Court had rightly proceeded ex-parte against the respondent and rightly accepted the uncontroverted testimony of applicant no. 1. 7. Mr Sumesh Raj, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the learned Revisional Court had rightly held that the respondent knew about the maintenance proceedings, and he had failed to appear before the Court despite knowledge. Learned Trial Court had rightly proceeded ex-parte against the respondent and rightly accepted the uncontroverted testimony of applicant no. 1. There is no infirmity in the order of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. Section 397 (3) of CrPC creates a bar from filing a second revision. It reads as under: “(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.” 10. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that if a person files a revision, he is precluded from filing the second revision. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan Vs. Krishnaveni (1997) 4 SCC 241 that the bar under Section 397 (3) of CrPC cannot be circumvented by filing a petition under Section 482 of CrPC. However, the High Court can intervene under Section 482 of CrPC when there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed: “10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person — accused/complainant — cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is a grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of a criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when trial is conducted expeditiously. 11. In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] a three-judge Bench was to consider the scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 and Section 397(2) of the Code. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put to facilitate expedient disposal of the cases but in Section 482 it is provided that nothing in the Code, which would include Section 397(2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On a harmonious construction of the said two provisions on this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order, still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. On a harmonious construction of the said two provisions on this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order, still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In that case, when allegations of defamatory statements were published in the newspapers against the Law Minister, the State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under Section 500 IPC. After obtaining the sanction, on a complaint made by the public prosecutor, cognizance of the commission of the offence by the appellant was taken to trial in the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed the charges under Section 406. The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. On a preliminary objection raised on maintainability, this Court held that the power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. 12. In V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695: (1980) 2 SCR 380 ] (SCR at p. 393) a four-judge Bench per majority had held that sub-section (3) of Section 397, however, does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Court under Section 397(1) of the Code. In Rajan Kumar Machananda case [1990 Supp SCC 132: 1990 SCC (Cri) 537] the case related to the release of a truck from attachment, obviously on the filing of an interlocutory application. It was contended that there was a prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397(2) of the Code. In that context, it was held that it was not revisable under Section 482 in the exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by provisions contained in Section 397(3), the revision is not maintainable. In that context, it was held that it was not revisable under Section 482 in the exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by provisions contained in Section 397(3), the revision is not maintainable. In the Dharampal case [ (1993) 1 SCC 435 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 333] which related to the exercise of power to issue an order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code, it was held that the inherent power under Section 482 was prohibited. On the facts, in that case, it could be said that the learned Judges would be justified in holding that it was not revisable since it was a prohibitory interim order of attachment covered under Section 397(2) of the Code but the observations of the learned Judges that the High Court had no power under Section 482 of the Code were not correct in view of the ratio of this Court in Madhu Limaye case [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 as upheld in V.C. Shukla case [ 1980 Supp SCC 92 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 695 : (1980) 2 SCR 380 ] and also in view of our observations stated earlier. The ratio in the Deepti case [ (1995) 5 SCC 751 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1020] is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case, an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of the Magistrate for an offence under Section 498-A IPC. The learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed the petition. In the revision at the instance of the accused, on a wrong concession made by the counsel appearing for the State that the record did not contain allegations constituting the offence under Section 498-A, the High Court without applying its mind had discharged the accused. On appeal, this Court after going through the record noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498-A IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused leading to the miscarriage of justice. On appeal, this Court after going through the record noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498-A IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, had committed an error of law in discharging the accused leading to the miscarriage of justice. In that context, this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. In view of the fact that the order of the High Court had led to the miscarriage of justice, this Court had set aside the order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate. 13. The ratio of Simrikhia case [ (1990) 2 SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] has no application to the facts in this case. Therein, on a private complaint filed under Sections 452 and 323 IPC the Judicial Magistrate, First Class had taken cognizance of the offence. He transferred the case for inquiry under Section 202 of the Code to the Second-Class Magistrate who after examining the witnesses issued a process to the accused. The High Court exercising the power under Section 482 dismissed the revision. But subsequently, on an application filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court corrected it. The question was whether the High Court was right in reviewing its order. In that factual backdrop, this Court held that the High Court could not exercise inherent power for the second time. The ratio therein, as stated above, has no application to the facts in this case. 14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for a decision on merits after consideration of the evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for a decision on merits after consideration of the evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. Since the High Court has left the matter to be considered by the Magistrate, it would be inappropriate at this stage to go into that question. We have only considered the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of the revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 397(3) and the inherent powers. We do not find any justification warranting interference in the appeal.” 11. This position was reiterated in Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, (2001) 8 SCC 522 , wherein it was held: “…though the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is very wide, the same must be exercised sparingly and cautiously, particularly in a case where the petitioner is shown to have already invoked the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. Only in cases where the High Court finds that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order was not correct, the High Court may, in its discretion, prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. It was further held, “Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code.” 12. A similar view was taken in Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation, (2005) 2 SCC 571 , and it was held: “5. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan [ (1999) 6 SCC 326 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118 ] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. It may also be noticed that this Court in Rajathi v. C. Ganesan [ (1999) 6 SCC 326 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118 ] said that the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised sparingly and such power shall not be utilised as a substitute for second revision. Ordinarily, when a revision has been barred under Section 397(3) of the Code, the complainant or the accused cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision before the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code as it is prohibited under Section 397(3) thereof. However, the High Court can entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code when there is a serious miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the court or when mandatory provisions of the law are not complied with and when the High Court feels that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to correct the mistake committed by the revisional court.” 13. This position was reiterated in Shakuntala Devi v. Chamru Mahto , (2009) 3 SCC 310 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 8: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 292 , wherein it was observed: - “24. It is well settled that the object of the introduction of sub-section (3) in Section 397 was to prevent a second revision to avoid frivolous litigation, but, at the same time, the doors to the High Court to a litigant who had lost before the Sessions Judge were not completely closed and in special cases, the bar under Section 397(3) could be lifted. In other words, the power of the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482, was not subject to the prohibition under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code and was capable of being invoked in appropriate cases. Mr Sanyal's contention that there was a complete bar under Section 397(3) of the Code debarring the High Court from entertaining an application under Section 482 thereof does not, therefore, commend itself to us. 25. On the factual aspect, the Magistrate came to a finding that the appellants were entitled to possession of the disputed plot. It is true that while making such declaration under Section 145(4) of the Code, the Magistrate could have also directed that the appellants be put in possession of the same. 26. 25. On the factual aspect, the Magistrate came to a finding that the appellants were entitled to possession of the disputed plot. It is true that while making such declaration under Section 145(4) of the Code, the Magistrate could have also directed that the appellants be put in possession of the same. 26. The question which is now required to be considered is whether the High Court was right in quashing the order passed by the Magistrate, which was confirmed by the Sessions Judge, on the ground that the application made by the appellants under Section 145(6) of the Code was barred firstly by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and also by virtue of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 14. Delhi High Court also took a similar view in Surender Kumar Jain v. State, ILR (2012) 3 Del 99 and held: — “5. The issue regarding the filing of a petition before the High Court after having availed the first revision petition before the Court of Sessions has come up before the Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly. While laying that section 397(3) Cr. P.C. laid the statutory bar of the second revision petition, the courts have held that the High Court did enjoy inherent power under section 82 (sic) Cr. P.C. as well to entertain petitions even in those cases. But, that power was to be exercised sparingly and with great caution, particularly, when the person approaching the High Court has already availed remedy of first revision in the Sessions Court. This was not that in every case the person aggrieved of the order of the first revision court would have the right to be heard by the High Court to assail the same order which was the subject matter of the revision before Sessions Court. It all depends not only on the facts and circumstances of each case but as on whether the impugned order brought about a situation that is an abuse of the process of the court, there was a serious miscarriage of justice or the mandatory provisions of law were not complied with. The power could also be exercised by this Court if there was an apparent mistake committed by the revisional court. The power could also be exercised by this Court if there was an apparent mistake committed by the revisional court. Reference in this regard can be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limave v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 , State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Aggarwal, (1979) 2 SCC 305 : AIR 1979 SC 87 , Rai Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) 1980 Cri LJ 202, Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation (2005) 2 SCC 571 .” 15. Therefore, the Court cannot exercise a revisional power, however, if a serious miscarriage of justice had taken place or a mandatory provision of law was not complied with, the Court can rectify the same while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 16. It was submitted that the learned Trial Court had erred in issuing the Dasti summons contrary to the provisions of Cr.P.C. and not ensuring that the service of the notice is effected as per provisions of Sections 62, 64 and 68 of the Cr.P.C. or Order 5 Rule 17 of CPC. This submission proceeds on the basis that provisions of Cr.P.C. or CPC apply to the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. This premise is incorrect. 17. It was laid down by this Court in Birbal v. Bimla Devi 1992 SCC OnLine HP 25: 1993 Cri LJ 1124 that Chapter IX of Cr.P.C. (containing section 125) is self-contained code and requires holding of a summary inquiry to decide the claim of the parties. The respondent has to be informed about the proceedings pending before the Court, and there is no requirement to follow the provisions of Chapter VI of the Cr.P.C. It was observed: - “11. Again, this Court finds no substance in this argument. As noticed earlier, Chapter IX of the Criminal Procedure Code is a self-contained one and S. 126 provides the procedure to be followed by the Magistrate for holding a summary inquiry to decide the claim of maintenance made before him, Consistent with the principles of, natural justice it has been provided that Magistrate will take all evidence in the presence of person against whom an order of payment of maintenance is proposed to be made. Therefore, when a claim is made the opposite party must be informed about it to enable it to appear in the Court either to admit it or to contest it by putting in its defence in writing, cross- examining the witnesses of the claimant and producing its own witnesses. The mode of service of notice is not provided in S. 126 Cr. P.C., therefore, it cannot be presumed that service of notice must be effected in accordance with the modes provided under Chapter VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Though, broad principles laid down under Ss. 61. fo 67 Cr. P.C. may be invoked yet the Magistrate is free to adopt any other mode keeping in view the urgent nature of relief sought before him. The Magistrate is only to ensure that the person against whom the claim is made is given due information thereof to enable him to appear and contest if he so desires. 12. If the Magistrate adopts the mode of sending the notice by registered post the service of such a notice cannot be termed as invalid as it is not provided under Chapter VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been held in a number of authorities by various High Courts that in addition to the modes provided under Chapter VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, mode of service by registered A.D. post may be adopted. In the opinion of this Court, for the reasons given hereinabove, if in the facts and circumstances of a case, the Magistrate considers it proper and expedient he may resort to the mode of service by registered post directly without sending notice by modes provided in Sections 61 to 67 of the Criminal Procedure Code. For holding this opinion, this Court has taken support from the Full Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court in Balan Nair v. Bhavani Amma Valsalamina, 1987 Cri LJ 399: (AIR 1987 Kerala 110 ).” 18. It was further held that if the other party refuses to accept the notice, an inference can be drawn that he was willfully avoiding the service. It was observed:- “5. As provided under S. 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is duty-bound to inform the person against whom the claim of maintenance is made to enable him to appear and contest the same. It was observed:- “5. As provided under S. 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is duty-bound to inform the person against whom the claim of maintenance is made to enable him to appear and contest the same. The Magistrate will further record evidence in the presence of that person if he puts in his appearance but the Magistrate cannot compel him if he chooses not to appear and contest the claim against him. In these circumstances, the Magistrate is at liberty to proceed ex parte but after satisfying himself that the person against whom the claim of maintenance is made is wilfully avoiding service or wilfully neglecting to attend the Court. The avoiding of service or failure to attend the Court should be deliberate. The perusal of the provision shows that the Magistrate is not required to record his satisfaction in his order and failure to do so will not vitiate the proceedings. On the other hand, it is always better if such a satisfaction of the Magistrate is explicit in his order. If not, it should be discernible from the facts and circumstances on the record to hold the ex-parte proceedings valid. (Please see: Balan Nair v. Bhawani Amma Valsalamma, 1987 Cri LJ 399 : (AIR 1987 Kerala 110) (FB) and S. Bhupinder Singh Makkar v. Smt. Narinder Kaur, 1990 Cri LJ 2265 (Delhi).) 6. In view of the above interpretation of proviso to sub- sec. (2) of S. 126 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the submission made by Shri Thakur deserves to be rejected. In the present case, the order dated 14-10-1988 for proceeding ex parte is as under:— “Respondent served for today as he has refused to take the R.A.D. Hence proceeded ex parte. Now for ex parte evidence file be put up on 28-11-1988.” 7. The satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate is discernible from this Order as the refusal of notice sent by registered post was sufficient for the Magistrate to come to the conclusion that the present petitioner was wilfully avoiding service. Now for ex parte evidence file be put up on 28-11-1988.” 7. The satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate is discernible from this Order as the refusal of notice sent by registered post was sufficient for the Magistrate to come to the conclusion that the present petitioner was wilfully avoiding service. Though there are concurrent findings of fact by both the courts below that there was proper service of the notice of petition of maintenance filed by the respondents, this Court has gone through the records of the lower court to find but whether registered A.D. notice which was refused by the petitioner, was sent at his correct address and whether the said refusal was sufficient to come to the conclusion that he was wilfully avoiding service. 19. Similarly it was held in Balan Nair (supra) that Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. does not provide for the form of a summons, and the other party has to be merely informed. Where the service was attempted, and the person avoided service, the Magistrate was competent to proceed ex parte against the other party. It was observed: “26. We have already indicated that Chap. IX of the Code does not specifically indicate that the process to be issued is in the form of summons as contemplated in Chap. VI of the Code. In essence and substance, what the Magistrate should issue is a notice to the person against whom the claim is made, informing him that such a claim has been made and that it is open to him to appear in Court and contest the claim. In serving the process, the broad principles contained in Part A of Chap. VI of the Code has to be followed. Other recognised ways of effecting service of notice such as by registered post also could be followed. We notice that one of us (Bhat, J.) in Chathu v. Gopalan, 1981 Ker LT 103 : (1981 Cri LJ 691) indicated that the person against whom maintenance claim has been made and working abroad could be served through a public servant employed in Indian Embassy. The decision proceeded on the assumption that Part A of Chap. VI of the Code is applicable to maintenance proceedings. It was not argued before that Bench that those provisions are not strictly applicable. The decision proceeded on the assumption that Part A of Chap. VI of the Code is applicable to maintenance proceedings. It was not argued before that Bench that those provisions are not strictly applicable. But on a liberal interpretation of S. 65 of the Code, this Court indicated that the second part of S. 65 could be utilised by the Court for service in contingencies where the person sought to be summoned is actually working abroad. The Court also noticed that S. 65 conferred power on the Magistrate to order fresh notice in such manner as he considers proper and read into this provision a very wide discretion of very broad import. We agree that the liberal interpretation given to the provision is warranted but we are of the opinion that strict application of Part A of Chap. VI itself is not called for in such cases. We therefore hold that service in regard to proceedings under Chap. IX is not to be effected strictly in terms of the provisions in Part A of Chap. VI of the Code, though the broad principles of the latter chapter could be invoked and service by registered post and through an officer of the Indian Embassy abroad would also be valid service. Where service is effected by registered post or through an Indian Embassy abroad, that would be sufficient service. Such service cannot be challenged on the ground that service has not been attempted in terms of the provisions of Part A of Chap. VI of the Code. 27. Where such service has been attempted and the person concerned wilfully avoids service and again where such service has been effected and the person concerned wilfully neglects to attend the Court, the Magistrate is competent to determine the case ex parte in accordance with the provisions in the proviso to S. 126(2) of the Code.” 20. It was held in Sukhirthammal v. Subramanian , 1985 SCC OnLine Mad 14 that the Magistrate has to satisfy himself that the husband is willfully avoiding the appearance in the Court. Non- compliance with the procedure may be a sufficient ground to set aside the ex parte order but it is not a sole ground to do so. It was observed:- “20. Non- compliance with the procedure may be a sufficient ground to set aside the ex parte order but it is not a sole ground to do so. It was observed:- “20. On going through the above rulings holding divergent views, I, with profound respect to the — learned Judges, am unable to share the view that an ex parte order will become invalid if there is no proper and valid service of summons in compliance with the provisions of the Cr. P.C. But, on the other hand, I fully agree with the opinion expressed by Venkataraman, J., in Meenakshi Ammal v. Somasundara Nadar, AIR 1970 Mad 242 : (1970 Cri LJ 817) and by the Full Bench of the Pun. and Har. High Court in Joginder Singh v. Balkaran Kaur, 1972 Cri LJ 93 , viz. that the non-compliance with the procedure prescribed for service of summons in the Cr. P.C. may be a good ground for allowing the application to set aside the ex parte order and that the mere non-observance of the proper procedure would not make the ex parte order invalid and entirely liable to be ignored.” 21. It was held in Balaka Baburao v. Balaka Ramanamma 1997 SCC OnLine AP 1037 that Chapter IX of CrPC is a self- contained code, and when the husband had refused to accept the summons, learned Magistrate could proceed ex parte against him. It was observed: “6. We carefully considered the rival contentions and we have applied our anxious consideration to the judgment rendered by a learned single Judge of this Court cited supra as well as the Full Bench decision of Kerala High Court cited supra. Our learned brother V. Raja Gopal Reddy, J has considered the scope of Sections 125 and 126 as well as Sections 60 to 69 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from all angles and he has rightly held that the decision in G.S.H. Prasada Rao's case (supra) does not lay down good law it is held— “Nowhere in Chapter IX of the Code, which deals with maintenance, the person against whom maintenance is sought was referred to as the accused or that the notice should be served in the same manner as prescribed for service of summons, to the accused to compel his appearance (Ch. VI of the Code), it is also relevant to note that, though the provisions relating to recovery of maintenance occur in the Code, by that circumstance alone, it should not lead us to think that the said proceedings are criminal in nature and content. Since no offence has been created under the said provisions of Ch. IX of the Code nor any punishment imposed, the said proceedings are not strictly criminal. The object of this provision is only to ameliorate the distressed and neglected women, children or parents. For the aforementioned reasons, I am of the view that the proceedings under this Chapter are essentially, of a civil nature. The service of summons under the Code is regulated under Ch. VI of the Code, relating to the “process to compel appearance”. Summons are not defined in the Code. The summons are normally issued to the accused persons and to the witnesses to compel their appearance in a criminal case. It is relevant to note that Sec. 69 a new provision has been added in the new Code, under which it is provided that a Court issuing summons to witnesses, in addition, may direct a copy of the summons to be served by registered post and the endorsement by Postal employee that the person refused to take delivery of the notice can be treated as duly served. This provision was made to avoid delay in the service of summons on the witnesses. Sec. 63 of the Code also provides for a letter being sent by post in case of service of summons on Corporate bodies and societies, to compel their appearance as accused. These provisions indicate that the Code itself indicated service of summons otherwise than in the manner prescribed under Ss. 61 and 62 of the Code even in criminal proceedings. Since the proceedings under this Chapter are essentially of a civil nature, the procedure for service of summons need not be strictly within the four corners of Ss. 61 and 62 of the Code. What is important is to see that the respondent was put on notice of the proceedings that are being taken against him, so as to enable him to defend himself. It is well to remember that the proceedings u/Sec. 125 of the Code are of summary nature and designed to provide a speedy remedy to the distressed women and old parents, from being starved”. 7. It is well to remember that the proceedings u/Sec. 125 of the Code are of summary nature and designed to provide a speedy remedy to the distressed women and old parents, from being starved”. 7. It is further held— “The learned Judge of this Court in G.S.H. Prasada Rao's case (supra), based his decision on the sole premise that the proceedings in Ch. IX of the Code being criminal proceedings, the service of notice should be effected only in accordance with the prpcedure prescribed in Ch. VI of the Code and any other mode of service be necessarily illegal. The learned Judge has not given a thought, to whether the proceedings in Ch. IX of the Code could be of a Civil nature and that there would be sufficient service of notice even if effected otherwise than mentioned in Ch. VI of the Code for the purpose of satisfying the requirement of the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 126 of the Code. There was also no consideration regarding the object of service of notice under this Section. The fact that the person against whom the order is sought to be passed under these proceedings was not an accused of any offence was also not kept in mind. Compelling a person to appear arises only when he is an accused or a witness in a criminal case. The Full Bench of Kerala High Court in the above case (supra), had taken pains to consider all these and other aspects”. 8. We are inclined to accept the reasoning of our learned brother and we accordingly hold following the Full Bench Decision of the Kerala High Court that service by registered post is one of the modes of service contemplated by the Code of Criminal Procedure in proceedings under Chapter VI of the Code. The question referred to us is accordingly held against the revision petitioner and in favour of the respondents.” 22. Therefore, the learned Magistrate is not bound by the provisions of Chapter VI of CrPC to effect service upon the respondent. He can devise his procedure to inform the other party about the proceedings pending before him, and issuance of dasti summons cannot be faulted because of the absence of any provision to this effect in Chapter VI of CrPC. 23. He can devise his procedure to inform the other party about the proceedings pending before him, and issuance of dasti summons cannot be faulted because of the absence of any provision to this effect in Chapter VI of CrPC. 23. A perusal of the record of the learned Trial Court shows that notice was sent to the address Plot No. 37, Poonam Apartment Saruchi Nagar, Kotra Bhopal, M.P. The respondent furnished the same address in the revision preferred by him. He also mentioned the same address before this Court in the petition and the affidavit filed by him in support of his petition.It shows that the notice was sent to the correct address. 24. Applicant No. 1 swore an affidavit before the learned Trial Court regarding due service. An endorsement was made by the Process Server on the summons that notice was tendered to the respondent, who read the notice but refused to accept it. The learned Trial Court had sufficient material before it to conclude that the respondent had sufficient knowledge of the proceedings pending against him, and the learned Trial Court was justified in proceeding ex-parte against the respondent. The respondent cannot take advantage of the fact that the name of the witness was not mentioned in the report of the Process Server or that the provisions of Cr.P.C. and CPC regarding the service were not complied with. 25. Applicant No.1 stated on oath that the respondent was getting a salary of Rs.17,039/-, a commission of Rs.1,00,000/- from LIC and an income of Rs.65,000/- from his property. Respondent was earning Rs.2,35,000/- per month. She further claimed that petitioner No. 2 spends Rs.20,000/- per year on her education. She was not cross-examined and there was no reason to disbelieve her testimony. Hence, the learned Trial Court was justified in granting the maintenance @Rs.15,000/- to applicant No.1 and Rs.10,000/- to applicant No.2. 26. No other point was urged. 27. Therefore, there is no reason to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to interfere with the orders passed by the learned Courts below. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 28. The present petition stands disposed of and so are the pending miscellaneous applications if any. 29. A copy of the judgment alongwith records of the learned Courts below be sent back forthwith.