Gouri Shankar Jain, S/o. Late Madan Lal Jain v. State of Jharkhand
2025-02-18
AMBUJ NATH
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : AMBUJ NATH, J. Nobody appears on behalf of O.P. No. 02 despite valid service of notice. 2 . Accordingly, this Cr.M.P. is being disposed of after hearing of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners as well as learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State. 3. Heard the parties. 4. This Cr.M.P. has been filed on behalf of the petitioners invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. with the prayer for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in connection with C/1 Case No. 18/2015, whereby and wherein, the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa after enquiry has found prima facie the case to be true under Sections406 & 420 of the I.P.C. 5. The case of the complainant is that he is the registered dealer for supply of iron-ore. He has been granted license under the Jharkhand Mineral Dealer’s Rule, 2007 from the office of D.M.O., Chaibasa for sale and supply of iron ore. It is alleged that the petitioners are directors of Divya Jyoti Sponge Iron Pvt. Ltd. and they are also engaged in trading of iron ore. The petitioners had entered into agreement with the complainant for purchase of iron ore worth Rs. 80,22,172/-. The complainant had supplied iron ore as per the contract between them. However, Rs. 35,00,000/- has been paid and the remain balance is still due. Despite several reminders, the petitioners did not pay the due amount, thereafter, this case has been filed. 5. After enquiry, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa found the prima facie case to be true under Sections 406 & 420 of the I.P.C. and thereafter issued the process of appearance of the petitioners. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “Uma Shankar Gopalika Vrs. State of Bihar & Anr.” as reported in [ (2005) 10 SCC 336 ], paragraph no. 6 of which read as under:- “6. xxxxx xxxx xxxx It is well settled that every broach of contract would not give rise to an effence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there usts any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating.
xxxxx xxxx xxxx It is well settled that every broach of contract would not give rise to an effence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there usts any deception played at the very inception. If the intention to cheat has developed later on, the same cannot amount to cheating. In the present case it has not where been stated that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Sections 420 of the I.P.C.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. He has further relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah Vrs. State of Gujarat & Anr.” as reported in [ (2019) 9 SCC 148 ], in which it has held that; 11. “Having observed the background principles applicable herein, we need to consider the individual charges against the appellant. Turning to Section 405 read with 406 of IPC, we observe that the dispute arises out of a loan transaction between the parties. It falls from the record that the respondent no.2 knew the appellant and the attendant circumstances before lending the loan. Further it is an admitted fact that in order to recover the aforesaid amount, the respondent no. 2 had instituted a summary civil suit which is still pending adjudication. The law clearly recognizes a difference between simple payment/investment of money and entrustment of money or property. A mere breach of a promise, agreement or contract does not, ipso facto, constitute the offence of the criminal breach of trust contained in Section 405 IPC without there being a clear case of entrustment. 12. In this context, we may note that there is nothing either in the complaint or in any material before us, pointing to the fact that any property was entrusted to the appellant at all which he dishonestly converted for his own use so as to satisfy the ingredients of Section 405 punishable under Section 406 of IPC. Hence the learned Magistrate committed a serious error in issuing process against the appellant for the said offence. Unfortunately, the High Court also failed to correct this manifest error. 13. Now coming to the charge under Section 415 punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
Hence the learned Magistrate committed a serious error in issuing process against the appellant for the said offence. Unfortunately, the High Court also failed to correct this manifest error. 13. Now coming to the charge under Section 415 punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. In the context of contracts, the distinction between mere breach of contract and cheating would depend upon the fraudulent inducement and mens rea. (See Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 ). In the case before us, admittedly the appellant was trapped in economic crisis and therefore, he had approached the respondent no. 2 to ameliorate the situation of crisis. Further, in order to recover the aforesaid amount, the respondent no. 2 had instituted a summary civil suit seeking recovery of the loan amount which is still pending adjudication. The mere inability of the appellant to return the loan amount cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, as it is this mens rea which is the crux of the offence. Even if all the facts in the complaint and material are taken on their face value, no such dishonest representation or inducement could be found or inferred.” (Emphasis Supplied). 8. Learned A.P.P. has opposed the prayer for quashing of the criminal proceeding and submitted that the Court of learned A.C.J.M., West Singhbhum at Chaibasa, after enquiry, has found the prima facie case to be true against the petitioners for the offence under Section 406 & 420 of the I.P.C. 9. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of this case, it appears that the iron ore was supplied to the company of the petitioners as per the contract between the parties. The same was never entrusted to them. As such, no case for the offence under Section 406 of the I.P.C. will be made out. As far as, offence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is concerned, it appears that offence alleged, prima facie appears to be in the nature of civil dispute between the parties. No element of cheating can be made out from the facts and circumstances of this case. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts, continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioners will amount to abuse of process of this Court.
No element of cheating can be made out from the facts and circumstances of this case. 10. In view of the aforesaid facts, continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioners will amount to abuse of process of this Court. Accordingly, the entire criminal proceeding of Complain C/1 Case No. 18/2015 is quashed. The impugned order dated 13.12.2017, parenting issuance of process against the petitioners is set aside. 11. This Cr. M.P. is allowed. Pending, I.A., if any, stands disposed of.