ORDER : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. This Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letter Patent is filed by the original-petitioner challenging the oral judgment dated 08.08.2024. By the aforesaid oral judgment, the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition of the appellant wherein, the appellant had prayed for quashing and setting the order dated 24.07.2010 terminating the appellant from service from the date of dismissal i.e. 21.10.1990. 2. Heard Mr. P.A. Jadeja, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. Dharmesh Devnani, learned Counsel for M/s. Nanavati Associates for the respondents. 3. The facts in brief are as under:- 3.1. The appellant was employed with the respondent-Bank as a Shroff/Godown Keeper at the Dhoraji Branch. For certain misconducts, 8 in number, a charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988 was issued to the petitioner-appellant. The Inquiry proceeded as far as charges No.2 to 8 are concerned and an Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 15.04.1991. Pursuant to the report so submitted, a show cause notice was issued on 29.07.1991 as to why a penalty be not enforced. By an order dated 14.10.1991, a penalty of stoppage of two annual increments of pay with cumulative effect in terms of Clause 17.6(d) of the Bipartite Settlement was imposed. As far as charge No.1 is concerned which was in context of an incident dated 17.05.1988 of abusing one Sri S.A. Kanabar and assaulting him, since criminal proceedings were already initiated for offences under Section 506(2) and 332 of the Indian Penal Code the Inquiry Officer on request of the appellant-petitioner did not proceed further in context of that charge. The appellant was convicted by a judgment and order dated 22.09.1999 relying on Section 10(1) (b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and in terms of the Bipartite Settlement. Since the appellant was convicted an order of dismissal from service was passed on 21.10.1999. 3.2. The appellant petitioner challenged his conviction before the Competent Court and by judgment and order dated 07.01.2010, the appellant was acquitted. The Bank reopened the inquiry vis-a-vis charge No.1 and submitted a report dated 30.06.2010. By the report so submitted, the findings with regard to charge No.1 were held to be proved. 3.2. The appellant petitioner challenged his conviction before the Competent Court and by judgment and order dated 07.01.2010, the appellant was acquitted. The Bank reopened the inquiry vis-a-vis charge No.1 and submitted a report dated 30.06.2010. By the report so submitted, the findings with regard to charge No.1 were held to be proved. A Show cause notice was issued on 01.07.2010 together with which a copy of Inquiry Officer’s report dated 30.06.2010 was filed and a copy of which was given to the appellant and a fresh order of dismissal dated 24.07.2010 was passed dismissing the petitioner from service. 4. Before the learned Single Judge, which submissions have been reiterated before us the order of dismissal was assailed by the learned Counsel Mr. P.A. Jadeja on the following grounds; (i) Learned Counsel Mr. Jadeja for the appellant would submit that once an inquiry was conducted earlier for which a penalty of dismissal was not imposed and only an order of stoppage of two increments for future effect was passed, it was not open for the Bank to reopen the inquiry and pass a fresh order of penalty. This, in the opinion of the learned Counsel was barred by res judicata. He would submit that a second inquiry of the charges in question could not have been initiated and reopened after a period of more than 20 years. (ii) Taking us to the show cause notice dated 01.07.2010 and the reply filed by the appellant to the show cause notice, learned Counsel Mr. Jadeja would submit that even the appellant delinquent was not given a chance of cross-examination or leading any evidence or examining any witnesses and therefore, apart from the inquiry procedure being held in violation of principles of natural justice, the charge could not have been held to be proved in absence of any evidence. Moreover, the order of dismissal passed with effect from 1991 was bad. 5. Mr. Dharmesh Devnani, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents would support the order of the learned Single Judge. Taking us to the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge, he would submit that the second inquiry in fact was the first in context of charge No.1, the delinquent had participated, the charge was held to be proved and therefore, the order of dismissal was just and proper. Taking us to the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge, he would submit that the second inquiry in fact was the first in context of charge No.1, the delinquent had participated, the charge was held to be proved and therefore, the order of dismissal was just and proper. It was not a case of the second inquiry for the same charge, but however, in view of the criminal trial pending before the Competent Court, the authority in its wisdom did not inquire into the charge and on conviction dismissed the appellant from service in light of the settlement, thereafter once acquitted, the inquiry was conducted for the charge which was otherwise held in abeyance and the charge was held to be proved. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Singh vs. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 was cited to take us to the relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was quoted by the learned Single Judge. 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties, at the cost of reiteration, as so done by the learned Single Judge, we find that in all 8 charges were levelled against the appellant by charge-sheet dated 30.11.1988. For charges No.2 to 8, an Inquiry Officer held the inquiry proceedings, submitted a report on 15.04.1991 and a penalty order dated 14.10.1991 was passed. Charge No.1 which pertained to assault in context of the appellant behaving in a drunken manner, since criminal proceedings had already been initiated under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code on 17.05.1988, inquiry with regard to that charge was kept in abeyance. The appellant faced conviction by judgment and order dated 22.09.1999. On his conviction, the Bank on 21.10.1999 in light of the para 17.3(b) of the Bipartite Settlement imposed an order of dismissal. When the judgment of conviction was reversed and it resulted in acquittal, the departmental / disciplinary authority in its wisdom thought it fit to re-initiate the inquiry with regard to the charge which was not inquired into. The Inquiry Officer’s report dated 30.06.2010 in context of charge No.1 is on record. 7. Having perused the findings of the Inquiry Officer’s report, we find that when the inquiry was held on 16.06.2010, the appellant was defended through a defence representative Shri P. D. Patel. The Inquiry Officer’s report dated 30.06.2010 in context of charge No.1 is on record. 7. Having perused the findings of the Inquiry Officer’s report, we find that when the inquiry was held on 16.06.2010, the appellant was defended through a defence representative Shri P. D. Patel. Management witnesses were produced and since the documents were already given to the appellant, he was advised accordingly. Based on assessment of evidence of the management witnesses which the appellant cross-examined, Inquiry Officer even on the cross-examination of the appellant found the charge to be proved. The penalty of dismissal was so imposed. 8. We have examined the decision of the learned Single Judge in context of the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant on the aspect of the inquiry being defective and so also the order of penalty being illegal on the ground of res judicata. It is well settled by the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the standard of proof in criminal trials as compared to that of disciplinary proceedings are distinct and different. In a criminal case, a charge has to be proved by strict rules of evidence whereas in departmental proceedings, a charge can be proved by preponderance of probabilities. It is also not in dispute that in the event of a conviction, it is open for an employer to invoke the same and pass an order of penalty without holding any inquiry. That is what the disciplinary authority did when the appellant faced conviction. In its wisdom it did not hold an inquiry pending the criminal prosecution. Once the conviction was upturned, the charge was inquired into. This position of law has been discussed by the learned Single Judge in Paragraph Nos.8.1 and 8.2, which we reproduce and which read as under:- “8.1. In the case between Ajay Kumar Singh vs. Flag Officer Commanding-in-chief and others, (2016) 9 SCC 179 , wherein, relevant Paras-25 to 27 read thus: “25. It is fairly well settled that acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. [vide Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Haldia and Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 764 , T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. v. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255 ] 26. Acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle a person to automatic reinstatement. [vide Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Haldia and Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 764 , T.N.C.S. Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. v. K. Meerabai, (2006) 2 SCC 255 ] 26. Acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle a person to automatic reinstatement. In Union of India and Ajay Anr. v. Bihari Lal Sidhana, (1997) 4 SCC 385 , it was held as under:- “5. It is true that the respondent was acquitted by the criminal court but acquittal does not automatically give him the right to be reinstated into the service. It would still be open to the competent authority to take decision whether the delinquent government servant can be taken into service or disciplinary action should be taken under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules or under the Temporary Service Rules. Admittedly, the respondent had been working as a temporary government servant before he was kept under suspension. The termination order indicated the factum that he, by then, was under suspension. It is only a way of describing him as being under suspension when the order came to be passed but that does not constitute any stigma. Mere acquittal of government employee does not automatically entitle the government servant to reinstatement. As stated earlier, it would be open to the appropriate competent authority to take a decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law, if otherwise, available. Since the respondent is only a temporary government servant, the power being available under Rule 5(1) of the Rules, it is always open to the competent authority to invoke the said power and terminate the services of the employee instead of conducting the enquiry or to continue in service a government servant accused of defalcation of public money. Reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money.” 27. Only if the employee had been honourably acquitted, could he make a claim for reinstatement. Reinstatement would be a charter for him to indulge with impunity in misappropriation of public money.” 27. Only if the employee had been honourably acquitted, could he make a claim for reinstatement. In the case in hand, the tribunal acquitted the appellant-DK Singh:-(i) as in the case of AK Singh and UK Singh, tribunal disbelieved the identification of appellant- DK Singh by PW- 14 (Manager) and PW-18 (Cashier) and (ii) the weapons that were alleged to have been recovered on the basis of confession of DK Singh on 12.08.1998 appears to have been photographed on 29.07.1998 by the prosecution, the tribunal thus rejected the prosecution case that weapons, bag and suitcase were recovered on the basis of confession given by DK Singh. Unlike AK Singh and UK Singh’s case, DK Singh did not have incriminating fingerprint evidence at the scene of occurrence and DK Singh raised defence plea of alibi.” 8.2. In the case between State of Haryana & Anr. vs. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 , relevant Para-4 reads thus: “4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. Ail materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passengers from American jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair common-sense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a ending is certainty available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has elevance to the charge leveled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.” 9. It is therefore not a case where a subsequent order of penalty is barred by the principle of res judicata, inasmuch as the first order of penalty of stoppage of two increments was in context of charges No.2 to 8. The order of dismissal dated 21.10.1999 was based on pure and simple conviction for which no inquiry was held though a charge was framed. It was on acquittal in the year 2010 that for the charge in question, inquiry was initiated not even afresh but for the first time as the charge was kept in abeyance. Based on evidence in which the charge- sheeted officer the appellant participated, the order of penalty was passed after following due process of law inasmuch as a show cause notice was issued to which the respondent replied. 10. It is in light of these facts that we have narrated hereinabove that the learned Single Judge arrived at the conclusion that she did. It will be apt to reproduce paras 9 to 14 of the order of the learned Single Judge, which read as under: “9. 10. It is in light of these facts that we have narrated hereinabove that the learned Single Judge arrived at the conclusion that she did. It will be apt to reproduce paras 9 to 14 of the order of the learned Single Judge, which read as under: “9. In light of the aforesaid undisputed facts and considering the position of law as referred above, upon issuance of the charges levelled against the petitioner herein on 30.11.1988, the charge nos. 2 to 8 came to be proved against the petitioner and in view of the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner herein, wherein, petitioner was convicted by an order dated 21.10.1999, petitioner came to be dismissed from services under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 . The petitioner himself approached the Court seeking reinstatement in service. Upon which the Court directed the respondent – Bank to decide the case of the petitioner for reinstatement within a period of 12 weeks. The discretion lies with the respondent Bank either to reinstate the delinquent – employee or to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee. The Bank chose to continue with the departmental proceedings with respect to charge no.1 and issued show cause notice to the petitioner on 01.07.2010. Upon issuance of show cause notice as referred above, petitioner was granted opportunity of hearing and after following due procedure of law, the petitioner was held guilty for the charges framed by the respondent Bank and the order was passed, terminating the services of the petitioner, w.e.f. the date of dismissal/ i.e. w.e.f. 21.10.1999. 10. This Court has also considered the charges levelled against the petitioner, whereby, (I) the petitioner had exhibited drunkenness and/or riotous and or disorderly and/or indecent behaviour on the premises of the Bank. (II) the petitioner had exhibited willful insubordination and/or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of the management or of a superior, and (III) the petitioner had done acts prejudicial to the interest of the bank, and/or gross negligence and/or negligence involving and/ or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. 11. The aforesaid charges having been proved against the petitioner, and the same having been confirmed by the Appellate Authority, this Court does not find any reason to interfere in the aforesaid findings arrived at by the competent authorities. 11. The aforesaid charges having been proved against the petitioner, and the same having been confirmed by the Appellate Authority, this Court does not find any reason to interfere in the aforesaid findings arrived at by the competent authorities. Further, the petitioner was dismissed from services on 21.10.1999 and was not an employee of the bank. As stated by the petitioner himself, having accepted that if the petitioner is not the employee of the bank, the question of reinstatement would also not arise. However, the bank thought it fit to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and give the petitioner a fair chance in the said proceedings, in view of the fact that, on an order of conviction passed against the petitioner, the petitioner’s services were dismissed by the respondent – Bank under Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 . 12. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Clause- 17.5(c), 17.5(e) and 17.5(j) of the Memorandum of Settlement arrived at, on 14.12.1966 between the management of the Bank and their workmen, which reads thus: “17.5(c) “Drunkenness or riotous or disorderly and indecent behavior on the premises of the bank’ 17.5(e) ‘Willful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful and reasonable order of the management or of a superior.’ 17.5(j) ‘doing any any act prejudicial to the interest of the bank, or gross negligence or negligence involving or likely to involve the bank in serious loss. ” 13. At this stage it is apposite to refer to the Bipartite settlement dated 19.10.1966, more particularly, Chapter-XIX –Disciplinary Action and Procedure Therefor’ which reads thus: “(d). If he prefers an appeal or revision application against his conviction and is acquitted, in case he had already been dealt with as above and he applies to the management for reconsideration of his case, the management shall review his case and may either reinstate him or proceed against him under the provisions set out in Clauses 19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharge, and the provision set out above as to pay, allowances and the period of suspension will apply, the period up-to-date for which full pay and allowances have not been drawn being treated as one of suspension. In the event of management deciding, after enquiry not to continue him in service, the employee shall be liable only for termination with three months’ pay and allowance in lieu of notice, as directed above.” 14. In the event of management deciding, after enquiry not to continue him in service, the employee shall be liable only for termination with three months’ pay and allowance in lieu of notice, as directed above.” 14. In the facts of the present case, bipartite agreement enables the respondent bank either to reinstate the petitioner or initiate the departmental inquiry. It is apposite to refer to Clause-3(d) of the Bipartite settlement stated 10.04.2002, i.e. ‘Disciplinary Action against Workmen Staff and Procedure therefore’, which reads thus: “3(d). If he prefers an appeal or revision application against his conviction and is acquitted, in case he had already been dealt with as above and he applies to the management for reconsideration of his case, the management shall review his case and may either reinstate him or proceed against him under the provisions set out in Clauses 11 and 12 infra relating to discharge and the provision set out above as to pay, allowances and the period of suspension will apply the period up-to-date for which full pay and allowances have not been drawn being treated as one of suspension. In the event of management deciding, after enquiry not to continue him in service, the employee shall be liable only for termination with three months pay and allowance in lieu of notice, as directed above.” 11. In the case of Ajay Devendrakumar Acharya vs. State of Gujarat , delivered in Special Civil Application No. 10372 of 2023, the Division Bench of this Court on 02.02.2024, has dealt with an issue as to whether it is open for the authority to conduct a departmental inquiry even if acquittal is awarded. Relevant paragraph Nos. 13.1, 13.2 and 13.3 of the judgment are reproduced and read as under:- 13.1 It is well settled that in the nature of proceedings where there are departmental proceedings, the scope of judicial review is extremely limited and restricted. It is not for this court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to assess and reassess the evidence when the test of evidence is preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Para 25 of the decision in the case of Narender Singh (supra) observes that it is now well settled that the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in a departmental proceeding. Para 25 of the decision in the case of Narender Singh (supra) observes that it is now well settled that the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in a departmental proceeding. Similarly, para 12 of the decision in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) need reproduction which indicate that the rules of appreciation of evidence viz-a-viz criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings are not similar. 13.2 Para 12 of the decision in the case of Ajit Kumar Nag (supra)reads as under: “12. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with service Rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.”[Emphasis Supplied] 13.3 In criminal law the burden of proof on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a court of law whereas in a departmental inquiry a penalty can be imposed on a delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of preponderance of probability.” 11.1. In view of the above, when we find that the inquiry Officer has found sufficient material to prove the guilt of the appellant on preponderance of probability, the penalty imposed cannot be said to be barred by res judicata. The learned Single Judge has committed no error in coming to the conclusion warranting dismissal of the petition. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.