JUDGMENT : HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK, J. 1. Present appeal is filed by the appellant – New India Assurance Company Ltd. against the judgment and award dated 27.03.2009 passed by the learned Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Kachchh at Bhuj in Workman Compensation (Fatal) Case No. 5 of 2008, whereby, the learned Commissioner has awarded compensation of Rs.4,15,960/- with interest @ 12% p.a. in favour of original claimants and also directed the appellant herein to pay penalty of Rs.2,07,980/- @ of 50% of the principal amount of compensation. 2. The short facts giving rise to present appeal are as under : 2.1 The deceased Babuji Amuji Thakore, aged 30 years was a workman employed by the respondent No.6 herein as his driver. He was working under the control of respondent No.6 and his wages were being paid by the respondent No.6. He used to work as a driver in truck bearing registration No.GJ-8- U-1409 and his monthly wages were Rs.4000=00 plus Rs.2500-00 per month as daily bhattha, in all his total wages were Rs.6,500=00 per month. The appellant is the insurer of respondent No.6. It is further the case of the appellant that on 15.06.2003 the deceased was on duty as a driver on the truck No. GJ-8-U-1409 and was going from Navlakhi to Binani and the truck was loaded with Coal. That, between the nights of 14.06.2003 and 15.06.2003 when the said truck was passing through Sarupganj, District Sirohi-Rajasthan the accompanied cleaner Manubha Bhavsinh attacked on the victim deceased Babuji Amuji and thereafter threw him below the wheel of the truck No. GJ-8-U-1409 and started the said truck and crushed him below the wheel of the truck the accident occurred as a result of which the deceased sustained severe injuries and succumbed to those injuries. 2.2 It is further the case of the appellant that, the accident occurred during the course of employment with respondent No.6 out of use of truck No.GJ-8-U-1409 of the ownership of respondent No.6. That, the claimants had represented to the respondent No.6 to pay compensation but, the appellant and respondent No.6 had not paid any compensation and therefore, the claimants had claimed Rs.4,15,960-00 being the amount of lumpsum compensation. That, the claimants had represented to the respondent No.6 to pay compensation but, the appellant and respondent No.6 had not paid any compensation and therefore, the claimants had claimed Rs.4,15,960-00 being the amount of lumpsum compensation. They had also claimed penalty at the rate of 50% of the lump sum amount by way of filing Workman Compensation (Fatal) Case No.5 of 2008, whereby, the learned Commissioner allowed the claim application vide judgment and award dated 27.03.2009 and directed the appellant and respondent No.6 to pay the compensation jointly and severally as above and also directed the appellant to pay penalty. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and award passed by the Commissioner, the appellant Insurance Company has filed the present First Appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr. Gadhia, appearing for the appellant – New India Assurance Company and learned advocate Mr. Hiren Modi, appearing for the respondent No. 6 –employer. 4.1 Though served, respondent Nos. 1 to 5 – original claimants have chosen not to remain present before the Court, hence, appeal is heard in their absence. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Gadhia, for the appellant, has submitted that as the main accident is not covered under the Act, they are not liable to indemnify the main action / accident and they are not liable to satisfy the impugned award as directed by the learned Commissioner. He has further submitted that the learned Commissioner has not considered the facts of the present case while passing the impugned award. He has further submitted that whether the act of the cleaner was considered to be an accident or it was to be considered as murder was not proved beyond reasonable doubt before the learned Commissioner and therefore, under such circumstances, the accident itself is in doubt. He has also submitted that the interest imposed by the learned Commissioner @ 12% is also on very higher side and therefore, the impugned judgment and award passed by the learned Commissioner is erroneous, illegal and unjust and the same is required to be quashed and set aside / modified, however, it is noticed that ultimately, in criminal case, the said accused was acquitted from the charges levelled against him and therefore, as the competent criminal Court has already acquitted the accused, this Court is unable to accept such submissions. 6. 6. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Modi, appearing for the respondent No.6 – original employer, has supported the submissions advanced by the learned advocate Mr. Gadhia and urged that appropriate orders may be passed. 7. I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and perused the material placed on record. This appeal itself is not maintainable so far as the liability of the present appellant is concerned. Learned Commissioner has rightly decided the issued while answering the same in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. The learned Commissioner has specifically given answers to those issues and held that the appellant Insurance Company is liable and ordered to pay only compensation to the tune of Rs.4,15,960/-. Now, so far as the second limb of submissions of learned advocate Mr. Gadhia that the interest awarded by the learned Commissioner is on higher side is concerned, in fact, it is provided under the statute that interest varies from 6% to 12% and it is a discretion of the Workmens’ Compensation and therefore, the learned Commissioner has rightly passed the order awarding 12% interest and therefore also, this Court is of the opinion that on both the counts, the present appeal fails. Now, so far as the liability to pay the penalty is concerned, it is already fasten upon the employer i.e. respondent No.6 herein and they have not challenged that direction by way of preferring any appeal and therefore, the liability to pay penalty is rightly fasten upon the employer respondent No.6 herein and it is hereby confirmed. 7.1 So far as the amount of penalty is concerned, it is already covered by the decision of this Court relying upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in First Appeal No.4211 of 2006, wherein, it has been observed that the liability to pay the penalty is on the insured and not on the Insurance Company. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder : “9. At this stage, it is appropriate to take into account the observations made by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. reported in 2023 (12) Scale 71, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "Analysis and Consideration 14. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder : “9. At this stage, it is appropriate to take into account the observations made by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. reported in 2023 (12) Scale 71, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "Analysis and Consideration 14. The act governing the present dispute, i.e., the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, has been, vide The Workmen’s Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2009, amended, by which the word “workmen” has been substituted by “employees” rechristened as the Employees Compensation Act, 1923. 15. What this Court must consider is whether the impugned judgement is sustainable in law? On merits, the consideration would be whether the order of the Commissioner, in light of the materials on record, can stand or not? In other words, the impugned judgement must stand true on two grounds, (i) statutory text; and (ii) whether the materials on record support the conclusion drawn therein or not? 16. Appeals within the act are governed by Section 30 which is extracted below for reference: – “30. Appeals. In other words, the impugned judgement must stand true on two grounds, (i) statutory text; and (ii) whether the materials on record support the conclusion drawn therein or not? 16. Appeals within the act are governed by Section 30 which is extracted below for reference: – “30. Appeals. — (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely :— an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; 1 [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A;] (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased 6 [employee], or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than 2 [ten thousand rupees or such higher amount as the Central Government may, by notification in the OfÏcial Gazette, specify]: Provided, further, that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties: [Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.] (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of section 5 of 4 [the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)] shall be applicable to appeals under this section.” (Emphasis Supplied) 17. (3) The provisions of section 5 of 4 [the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)] shall be applicable to appeals under this section.” (Emphasis Supplied) 17. The Act is unequivocal in stating that an appeal from an order of Commissioner can be entertained only if there exists a substantial question of law to be considered. It has been observed by this Court that the phrase “substantial question of law” within this Act shall be understood by its general meaning. When considering the general meaning of this phrase, naturally, the reference is to the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The rule therein is that framing of a substantial question of law is of cardinal importance. 18. A bare perusal of the impugned judgement shows that the Court did not frame any such question. 19. The wording of the Act indicates that the existence of such a question is a prerequisite to the appeal being entertained. 20. Illustratively, in North – East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Sujatha, (2019) 11 SCC 514 (Two-Judge Bench) amongst numerous other cases, this Court has observed: “12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a regular first appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can be heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case.” 21. The other ground making the order under challenge, amenable to interference when the scope of jurisdiction is circumscribed by it being exercised only in cases of “substantial question of law”, is perversity in the findings. Here, the impugned judgement does not, even remotely, reflect the observation that the findings arrived at by the Commissioner are perverse. The difference, between the two judgements, i.e., the order of the Commissioner and the judgment in First Appeal, was on the point of the employer- employee relationship having been established. The Commissioner held such relationship to have been established however, the appeal Court observed that “claimants have clearly failed to prove this aspect” 22. The difference, between the two judgements, i.e., the order of the Commissioner and the judgment in First Appeal, was on the point of the employer- employee relationship having been established. The Commissioner held such relationship to have been established however, the appeal Court observed that “claimants have clearly failed to prove this aspect” 22. It may here only be noted that the Commissioner had not returned any findings in respect of the validity of non- availability of the license of the deceased nor was it one of the questions framed by the Commissioner for consideration. In such a situation, while exercising powers within the limited purview allowed by section 30 of the Act, the learned Court below erred in making observations and giving a holding in that regard. 23. It has also been observed by this Court that the Commissioner is the last authority on facts involved in a case. In Golla Rajamma & Ors. v. Divisional Manager & Anr., (2017) 1 SCC 45 (2- Judge Bench) it was observed that “under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to reappreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.” 24. Keeping in view the said principles, the impugned judgement, ex-facie, appears to be in contravention thereto." 10. It appears that at the time of admission of the Appeal, the Court has not framed any substantial question of law however, considering the submission advanced by Mr. Mazmudar, learned counsel for the appellant and in view of above referred decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the substantial question of law arises for consideration before this Court is, whether the insurance company is liable to pay the penalty @ 50% upon failing to deposit the amount of compensation within 30 days or not? 11. Mazmudar, learned counsel for the appellant and in view of above referred decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the substantial question of law arises for consideration before this Court is, whether the insurance company is liable to pay the penalty @ 50% upon failing to deposit the amount of compensation within 30 days or not? 11. For that, the submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that so far as the liability to pay the penalty is concerned, if the awarded amount is not paid to the claimants within 30 days from the date of accident, then only they are entitled for 50% of penalty, as provided under the statute but that liability is cast upon the insurer by virtue of the contractual relationship and thus, liability to pay 50% of penalty is upon the insurer and not on the insurance company. 12. In view of the discussion made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above referred judgment, the contention raised by learned advocate for the appellant qua liability to pay penalty @ 50% is required to be considered. Therefore, present appeal is entertained only qua two aspects one is liabilities to pay the penalty and second is rate of interest. 13. At this stage, it is also relevant to take into account provision of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads as under:- "30. Therefore, present appeal is entertained only qua two aspects one is liabilities to pay the penalty and second is rate of interest. 13. At this stage, it is also relevant to take into account provision of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads as under:- "30. Appeals.— (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely: (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;(aa)an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A; (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased employee, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than thousand rupees or such higher amount as the Central Government may, by notification in the OfÏcial Gazette, specify: Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties: Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall be applicable to appeals under this section." 14. (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall be applicable to appeals under this section." 14. The provision of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act establishes that the High Court cannot interfere in the award passed by the Commissioner unless and until it is satisfied that the substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. The statutory provision restricts the interference of the High Court. However, considering the fact and the limitation to entertain present appeal, more particularly Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, only the circumstance which is enumerated under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, High Court can interfere with the award passed by the Commissioner. 15. It appears that so far as the amount awarded towards the quantum of compensation is concerned, the insurance company is unable to point out any illegality or irregularity in the impugned judgment and order. Hence, so far as the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Commissioner to the tune of Rs.4,15,960/- is concerned, this Court is not interfered in the said amount. This Court is of the opinion that the said amount is just and proper.” 8. In light of the above referred decision, the present appeal being devoid of any merits, deserves to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. 9. It is observed that the amount of compensation deposited by the appellant Insurance Company before the learned Commissioner, Kachchh at Bhuj, is to be disbursed in favour of the original claimants i.e. respondent Nos. 1 to 5 herein alongwith interest accrued on it, after verifying their bank details through RTGS/NEFT. 10. Record and proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Court forthwith.