Order : CRLW No. 1731/2024 1. By way of filing this instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , the petitioner, a permanent resident of Udaipur, seeks redress from this Court for the unlawful and arbitrary acts committed by the accused, including the extortion of a sum of Rs. 1.83 crores by Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya and his associates. The petitioner contends that the actions of the accused have violated several fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19, 21, and 300A of the Constitution of India . Furthermore, the petitioner seeks appropriate directions for the investigation and transfer of the same to an impartial agency, such as the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), contending that the state police and other authorities have failed to ensure a fair and unbiased investigation, thereby shielding the accused from accountability. 2. The petitioner, a computer software developer, has been residing in Kuwait since 1993, where he has established a successful business, Pegasus Turn Solution Pvt Ltd, which operates in Kuwait, Dubai, and India. The petitioner has been sending money for his family’s livelihood in India since then. In 2007, the petitioner transferred funds to his brother, Neelesh Purbia, for the purchase of property in India, but his brother fraudulently inserted his name also in the purchase deed without contributing financially. Following the untimely death of his brother on 06.11.2019, the petitioner, on 13.02.2022, was approached by his sister-in-law, Loveleena, to sell the property at a price of five crores and to procure new property for him. However, Loveleena, in collusion with the police, staged a scenario that led to the petitioner’s arrest under fabricated charges on 17.02.2022. A subsequent FIR was lodged against him under sections 457, 380, and 120B of the IPC, which the petitioner vehemently disputes. 3. On 18.02.2022, police personnel led by SI Roshanlal and others visited the petitioner’s office and arrested an accountant and a security guard, further implicating the petitioner in the case. The petitioner approached the office of the Additional SP, Udaipur, where he was informed that the police had no right to intervene in a property dispute and that only proceedings under section 145 of the CrPC would apply. However, the petitioner was subsequently coerced by Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya and his associates into signing an agreement under duress, threatening him with imprisonment and the confiscation of his passport if he refused to comply. However, the petitioner was subsequently coerced by Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya and his associates into signing an agreement under duress, threatening him with imprisonment and the confiscation of his passport if he refused to comply. The petitioner, fearing wrongful detention, was compelled to pay a sum of Rs. 1.83 crores over a period of time to secure the withdrawal of the fabricated FIRs and regain control of his property. The entire sequence of events was documented through handwritten agreements, video footage, and remittance receipts. However, the situation worsened as the petitioner was continuously threatened and harassed by the accused, including demands for additional sums to resolve the matter. 4. The petitioner asserts that the acts committed by Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya and his associates, including threats, extortion, and wrongful confinement, amount to gross violations of the petitioner’s fundamental rights, particularly under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. The petitioner highlights that despite the filing of an FIR and subsequent charge sheet by the Anti Corruption Bureau (ACB), the state authorities, including ACB officials and the Department of Personnel (DOP), have failed to take appropriate action against the accused, allowing them to operate with impunity. The petitioner further points out that the suspension of Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya was unlawfully stayed, and the accused has been reinstated despite his involvement in serious criminal activities. The petitioner contends that this constitutes an attempt by the state machinery to shield the accused from the consequences of his actions, thereby obstructing justice. 5. Moreover, the petitioner asserts that the investigation into the extortion and corruption case has been tainted by the involvement of biased authorities. Despite the clear evidence of the accused’s involvement in multiple cases of extortion and corruption, the investigation has been transferred to officials with known connections to the accused, including Dy. S.P. Kailash Singh Sandoo, who previously granted a clean chit to Achaliya in 2016. The petitioner strongly believes that the reinvestigation is nothing more than an attempt to subvert the ongoing proceedings and protect the accused from legal repercussions. Given the gravity of the situation, the petitioner requests that this Court take cognizance of the systemic corruption within the state machinery and transfer the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or any other independent agency to ensure a fair and impartial investigation. 6. Given the gravity of the situation, the petitioner requests that this Court take cognizance of the systemic corruption within the state machinery and transfer the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or any other independent agency to ensure a fair and impartial investigation. 6. The petitioner further contends that the actions of the respondent authorities, including the delay in granting prosecution sanction against Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya, are in direct violation of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding the timely grant of prosecution sanction in corruption cases. The petitioner asserts that the continued delay and the shifting of the investigation to a biased officer are deliberate attempts to derail the legal process and protect the accused from facing trial. The petitioner, therefore, prays for this Court to intervene and ensure that the investigation and trial proceed in an impartial and transparent manner, in accordance with the law. 7. Heard the learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 8. The petitioner’s apprehension regarding the fairness of the investigation is acknowledged; however, it is imperative to note that the case has been repeatedly examined by higher ranking officers. The record demonstrates that the investigation has undergone multiple layers of scrutiny at various hierarchical levels, thereby eliminating any prima facie suspicion of arbitrariness or procedural impropriety. This Court has minutely analyzed the reports of both investigating officers involved in the first and second investigations, particularly noting the divergence in their opinions. Recognizing the gravity of the matter, this Court, in its endeavor to ensure absolute fairness and transparency, directed the Director General of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (DG-ACB) to join the proceedings through video conferencing. During the session, the DG-ACB was subjected to pointed queries by this Court to dispel any lingering doubts regarding the investigation's integrity and methodology. The Court meticulously examined the responses, cross-verifying them with the official records, in order to ascertain whether any procedural lapses or investigative discrepancies existed. 9. After a comprehensive evaluation, this Court is convinced that all aspects of the investigation have been thoroughly addressed by the concerned agency, leaving no scope for doubt. The exhaustive review conducted by the DG-ACB and his team further reinforces the conclusion that due process has been followed diligently. 9. After a comprehensive evaluation, this Court is convinced that all aspects of the investigation have been thoroughly addressed by the concerned agency, leaving no scope for doubt. The exhaustive review conducted by the DG-ACB and his team further reinforces the conclusion that due process has been followed diligently. The discrepancies noted in the initial stages of investigation were duly reconciled with a logical and legally sound rationale, and no manifest error, procedural infirmity, or mala fide intent has been detected that would warrant judicial interference. 10. The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) is a specialized investigative agency operating under the State Police, endowed with the requisite legal authority and expertise to probe matters of corruption and misconduct by public officials. The case at hand has been subjected to a rigorous inquiry by the ACB, under the supervision of its senior officers. The investigative findings, as presented before this Court, do not reflect any irregularity that would warrant the assumption of inherent bias or mala fides on the part of the investigating officers. Mere dissatisfaction with the investigative outcomes does not provide a sufficient legal basis to demand a transfer of the probe to another agency. Judicial interference in the investigative process must be predicated on compelling reasons and clear indications of bias or miscarriage of justice, which are absent in the present case. Frequent transfers would undermine public confidence in the regular legal process and diminish the significance of exceptional circumstances that justify the exercise of investigative transfer powers. 11. The jurisprudence surrounding the transfer of investigations from the State Police to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has been well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Court may exercise its constitutional authority to transfer an investigation under the following circumstances: 1. When high-ranking officials of the State authorities are involved; 2. When the accusation pertains to senior officials within the investigating agency itself; or 3. When the investigation is prima facie found to be tainted or biased. 12. However, in the present case, none of these conditions are satisfied. There exists no cogent evidence on record to suggest that high-ranking officials have influenced the investigation in a manner that compromises its integrity. Moreover, the accusations against Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya and others have already been scrutinized by senior officers, and appropriate legal proceedings have been initiated where necessary. However, in the present case, none of these conditions are satisfied. There exists no cogent evidence on record to suggest that high-ranking officials have influenced the investigation in a manner that compromises its integrity. Moreover, the accusations against Dy. S.P. Jitendra Achaliya and others have already been scrutinized by senior officers, and appropriate legal proceedings have been initiated where necessary. The argument that the investigation has been conducted with bias remains unsubstantiated by any material proof that would necessitate interference by this Court. 13. This Court, having meticulously examined the investigation’s trajectory, finds no demonstrable signs of partiality, undue influence, or deliberate suppression of material facts. The petitioner’s contention that the investigative process has been manipulated lacks evidentiary backing. A mere perception of injustice cannot form the foundation for judicial interference unless substantiated by concrete proof indicating a manifest failure of justice. Since no such evidence has been presented, the plea for transferring the investigation stands unmerited. 14. Given the aforementioned considerations, this Court finds no compelling ground to interfere with the ongoing investigation or to transfer the matter to the CBI or any other independent agency. The petitioner’s grievances, though serious, have been duly addressed by the designated authorities within the framework of law. There is no demonstrable miscarriage of justice or procedural infirmity warranting judicial intervention. 15. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed as being devoid of merit. 16. The stay petition is disposed of. CRLMP No. 1279/2023 (Luvleena), 2526/2023 (Nikhil Porwal), 5259/2023 (Rajesh kothari) 1. By way of filing these instant petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 507/2022 registered at Police Station Anti-Corruption (Special Unit), Jaipur, on 30.12.2022 for offences under Sections 7 and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 , and Section 120-B of the IPC, along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom. 2. The petitioner, Neeraj Purbia, had a property dispute with his deceased brother’s wife, Lovleena Purbia, leading to FIR No. 91/2022, lodged by Lovleena at Police Station Sukher on 18.02.2022. Following a settlement between the parties, a final report was submitted to the court on 16.11.2022. Meanwhile, Neeraj Purbia submitted an application to the ACB Headquarters on 07.11.2022, resulting in the registration of ACB Case No. 507/2022 on 30.12.2022 against Sub-Inspector Roshan Lal. Following a settlement between the parties, a final report was submitted to the court on 16.11.2022. Meanwhile, Neeraj Purbia submitted an application to the ACB Headquarters on 07.11.2022, resulting in the registration of ACB Case No. 507/2022 on 30.12.2022 against Sub-Inspector Roshan Lal. The investigation by Additional Superintendent of Police Pushpendra Singh found prima facie evidence against Roshan Lal, DySP Jitendra Kumar Anchaliya, and private individuals Manoj Shrimali and Ramesh Rathore under Sections 7 , 7A , 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018) and Sections 384, 120B IPC. However, further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC was kept pending against Lovleena Purbia, Ankit Mewada, Nikhil Porwal, and Rajesh Kothari due to a stay order on their arrest by this Court. 3. Heard the learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 4. A perusal of the case record reflects that the investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. was kept pending against certain individuals, including Lovleena Purbia, Ankit Mewada, Nikhil Porwal, and Rajesh Kothari, due to an interim order restraining their arrest or possibly for want of further evidence. Notably, the case stemmed from a long-standing property dispute between the petitioner, Neeraj Purbia, and his deceased brother’s wife, Lovleena Purbia. In this regard, FIR No. 91/2022 was lodged by Lovleena against Neeraj at Police Station Sukher, which was later settled, resulting in a final report submitted to the court. During the course of these proceedings, Neeraj Purbia submitted an application to the ACB Headquarters, leading to the registration of ACB Case No. 507/2022. The subsequent investigation initially found prima facie evidence against certain accused persons; however, the further inquiry by the investigating agency, based on witness statements, documentary evidence, and technical analysis, led to a determination that no offence was made out against Lovleena Purbia, Nikhil Porwal, Rajesh Kothari, and others. 5. Upon a meticulous and exhaustive inquiry, including a comprehensive review by high-ranking officers, as recorded in CRLMP No. 1731/2024, this Court finds the investigative process to be thorough and convincing. Furthermore, the investigative report now presented before this Court, after due deliberation with the Director General, appears to be satisfactory. A rigorous examination of the entire evidentiary material, including verification of transcripts, analysis of Call Detail Records (CDRs), and assessment of independent evidence, has led to the conclusion that no offence is established against the individuals concerned. Furthermore, the investigative report now presented before this Court, after due deliberation with the Director General, appears to be satisfactory. A rigorous examination of the entire evidentiary material, including verification of transcripts, analysis of Call Detail Records (CDRs), and assessment of independent evidence, has led to the conclusion that no offence is established against the individuals concerned. The closure report, having been duly submitted before this Court, is taken on record. Given that the allegations were found unsubstantiated, and a negative final report is set to be filed, no further deliberation is warranted. 6. As a measure of caution, it is directed that since the investigating agency, after conducting a full-fledged inquiry, has not found the petitioners culpable, no coercive measures shall be taken against them at any subsequent stage without a specific order of the trial court in this regard. The closure report concerning the three petitioners shall be submitted before the trial court within 60 days from the date of this order. The trial court may, if necessary, consider supplementary report along with annexed materials and make the same part of the judicial record. 7. In view of the above, the instant petitions stand finally disposed of. 8. The stay petition stands disposed of. CRLMP No. 3387/2023 (Jitendra), 905/2024 (Manoj Shrimali) 1. By way of filing these instant petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioners seek quashing of FIR No. 507/2022, registered on 30.12.2022 at Police Station CPS ACB Outpost, Jaipur, as well as Charge Sheet No. 83/2023 dated 06.04.2023, wherein the petitioners have been implicated for the alleged offences under Sections 7 , 7A, and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 , and Sections 384 and 120B of the IPC. 2. The dispute pertains to the complainant, Neeraj Purbia, and his deceased brother’s wife, Lovlina Purbia, over a property. Due to this dispute, Lovlina Purbia lodged FIR No. 91/2022 at Police Station Sukher on 18.02.2022, which was eventually closed through a compromise and a final report was submitted to the court on 16.11.2022. Subsequently, the complainant submitted an application at the ACB Headquarters on 07.11.2022, leading to the registration of ACB Case No. 507/2022 against Inspector Roshanlal on 30.12.2022. Upon investigation, an FIR was filed under the Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC Sections 384 and 120B against Inspector Roshanlal, Deputy Superintendent of Police Jitendra Kumar Anchalia, and private individuals Manoj Shrimali and Ramesh Rathore. Upon investigation, an FIR was filed under the Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC Sections 384 and 120B against Inspector Roshanlal, Deputy Superintendent of Police Jitendra Kumar Anchalia, and private individuals Manoj Shrimali and Ramesh Rathore. However, further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC was kept pending against Lovlina Purbia and others due to a stay order by this Court. The subsequent investigation found no incriminating evidence against Jitendra Kumar Anchalia, Manoj Shrimali, Ramesh Rathore, or other accused persons. It also highlighted contradictions in the complainant’s statements and a lack of independent evidence to establish coercion or bribery. The complainant’s allegations were deemed unreliable, and it was observed that the dispute primarily stemmed from a family property matter. The case file and evidentiary findings did not support the charges against the petitioners, leading to the conclusion that they were not involved in any criminal act. 3. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 4. The Court has meticulously examined the entire investigative trajectory undertaken by the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) in the instant matter, encompassing the primary charge sheet and the subsequent investigative reports furnished under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. It is a settled proposition of law that a supplementary report filed in furtherance of an investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. is not an independent document but is considered an extension of the original charge sheet. 5. The supplementary report and final investigative findings conclusively establish that from the inception to the culmination of the investigation, all material evidence was scrupulously scrutinized. A thorough assessment of the factual matrix unequivocally reveals that there was neither a demand for illegal gratification nor any act of acceptance or an attempt thereof. Furthermore, at the relevant point of time, no official work was pending before Jitendra Kumar Anchalia that could have given rise to a demand for illegal gratification. The sine qua non for the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is the demonstrable demand and acceptance of bribe, whether directly or indirectly. However, the investigative material, when examined with utmost diligence and legal scrutiny, does not indicate any such culpability on the part of the petitioners. 6. It is not uncommon for public servants, in certain cases, to direct complainants or witnesses to liaise with third parties, rather than seeking bribes directly. However, the present matter does not fall within such a category. 6. It is not uncommon for public servants, in certain cases, to direct complainants or witnesses to liaise with third parties, rather than seeking bribes directly. However, the present matter does not fall within such a category. The call data records of Roshanlal were minutely scrutinized, and nowhere do they reflect any communication indicating an assurance that he would ‘speak to his superior’ to facilitate any unlawful demand or arrangement. At the bare minimum, such corroborative evidence is essential before imputing criminal liability to a public servant. The mere oral assertions of an individual, unsupported by independent, unimpeachable evidence, cannot be the basis for jeopardizing the career and liberty of a public servant. The initiation or continuation of prosecution against a public servant on the strength of vague, unsubstantiated, and unverified allegations would not amount to prosecution but persecution, which the criminal justice system cannot countenance. 7. Initially, on a prima facie evaluation of the allegations, it appeared that the conduct of the petitioner, being a Circle Officer, was questionable to some extent. However, upon a deeper scrutiny of the records, it becomes evident that his actions do not fall within the contours of ‘misconduct’ as statutorily defined. The notion that he played a role or intervened in a private dispute does not ipso facto render his conduct illegal or unlawful. 8. This Court also sought a clarification from the Director General (DG) regarding the official role and conduct of the petitioner. The DG opined that in his capacity as a Circle Officer, if he sought to mediate a family dispute at any given point, such an act cannot be deemed illegal or beyond the scope of his assigned duties, as maintaining peace and law and order within his jurisdictional domain falls squarely within his official mandate. 9. The initial Investigating Officer, upon a limited assessment, inferred the commission of the alleged offences and proceeded to file a charge sheet. However, the investigation remained incomplete. The right of the investigating agency to conduct further inquiry under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. is indefeasible and well within the contours of lawful investigative procedure. The agency possesses the legitimate prerogative to gather additional material and submit a supplementary report, which was duly exercised in the present case. There exists no legal impediment to such a course of action. 10. The right of the investigating agency to conduct further inquiry under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. is indefeasible and well within the contours of lawful investigative procedure. The agency possesses the legitimate prerogative to gather additional material and submit a supplementary report, which was duly exercised in the present case. There exists no legal impediment to such a course of action. 10. The agency, after analyzing both the first and second Investigating Officers' reports, has found that the contradictory conclusions therein cannot be ignored. It is evident that the complainant, Neeraj Purbia, delayed filing his complaint with the ACB headquarters by nine months without any justified reason, nor did he approach any other authority during this period. Additionally, by June 2022, Jitendra Kumar Anchalia had already been transferred from his post as Circle Officer, and no official work related to the complainant was pending before him. The property dispute in question, which was settled amicably in his presence, did not involve any coercion or undue influence from him or any other accused. The complainant’s statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. contain inconsistencies regarding the alleged bribe demand, and no corroborative evidence—whether oral, documentary, or technical—substantiates the accusations against Anchalia or the other accused. Even the call data records and recorded conversations fail to indicate any demand or acceptance of illegal gratification. These crucial aspects further reinforce the conclusion that the allegations lack the necessary evidentiary foundation. 11. Before proceeding further, it is imperative to examine the legal principles governing supplementary reports under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors., ( (decided on 13 December 2012) ) , has elaborately discussed the concepts of fresh investigation, re-investigation, de novo investigation, and the powers of the Court and the Magistrate in such scenarios. The pertinent issue that arises is the legal standing of a supplementary report when it negates the findings, observations, and opinions recorded in the primary charge sheet filed under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. The question, therefore, is whether a supplementary charge sheet can override or render the primary charge sheet ineffective upon being submitted before the Court. The answer is unequivocally in the negative. Once an investigative report has been submitted before a Court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law, the investigating agency lacks the authority to unilaterally cancel or nullify the earlier report. In such situations, two contrasting investigative reports exist. The answer is unequivocally in the negative. Once an investigative report has been submitted before a Court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law, the investigating agency lacks the authority to unilaterally cancel or nullify the earlier report. In such situations, two contrasting investigative reports exist. The approach to be adopted by the Court in dealing with such reports is not a matter of juristic discretion but a legal necessity. If the subsequent report is also placed before the Court and the issue of framing of charges has not yet been determined, the Trial Court is required to meticulously assess both reports. The Court must then decide whether reasonable grounds exist to presume the accused’s guilt, necessitating a trial, or whether the accused should be discharged. This legal position has been extensively discussed in the judgment cited above. The relevant paragraphs addressing these issues are reproduced hereinbelow: “31. Having discussed the scope of power of the Magistrate under Section 173 of the Code, now we have to examine the kind of reports that are contemplated under the provisions of the Code and/or as per the judgments of this Court. The first and the foremost document that reaches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is the First Information Report. Then, upon completion of the investigation, the police are required to file a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will be appropriate to term this report as a primary report, as it is the very foundation of the case of the prosecution before the Court. It is the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, which are considered by the Court and then the Court of the Magistrate is expected to exercise any of the three options afore-noticed. Out of the stated options with the Court, the jurisdiction it would exercise has to be in strict consonance with the settled principles of law. The power of the magistrate to direct ‘further investigation’ is a significant power which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice. To provide fair, proper and unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the investigating agency and the Court in its supervisory capacity is required to ensure the same. The power of the magistrate to direct ‘further investigation’ is a significant power which has to be exercised sparingly, in exceptional cases and to achieve the ends of justice. To provide fair, proper and unquestionable investigation is the obligation of the investigating agency and the Court in its supervisory capacity is required to ensure the same. Further investigation conducted under the orders of the Court, including that of the Magistrate or by the police of its own accord and, for valid reasons, would lead to the filing of a supplementary report. Such supplementary report shall be dealt with as part of the primary report. This is clear from the fact that the provisions of Sections 173(3) to 173(6) would be applicable to such reports in terms of Section 173(8) of the Code. 32. Both these reports have to be read conjointly and it is the cumulative effect of the reports and the documents annexed thereto to which the Court would be expected to apply its mind to determine whether there exist grounds to presume that the accused has committed the offence. If the answer is in the negative, on the basis of these reports, the Court shall discharge an accused in compliance with the provisions of Section 227 of the Code. 33. At this stage, we may also state another well-settled canon of criminal jurisprudence that the superior courts have the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of the Constitution of India to direct ‘further investigation’, ‘fresh’ or ‘de novo’ and even ‘reinvestigation’. ‘Fresh’, ‘de novo’, and ‘reinvestigation’ are synonymous expressions and their result in law would be the same. The superior courts are even vested with the power of transferring investigation from one agency to another, provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it is also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by the superior courts very sparingly and with great circumspection. 34. We have deliberated at some length on the issue that the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code do not control or limit, directly or impliedly, the width of the power of Magistrate under Section 228 of the Code. Wherever a charge sheet has been submitted to the Court, even this Court ordinarily would not reopen the investigation, especially by entrusting the same to a specialised agency. Wherever a charge sheet has been submitted to the Court, even this Court ordinarily would not reopen the investigation, especially by entrusting the same to a specialised agency. It can safely be stated and concluded that in an appropriate case, when the court feels that the investigation by the police authorities is not in the proper direction and that in order to do complete justice and where the facts of the case demand, it is always open to the Court to hand over the investigation to a specialised agency. These principles have been reiterated with approval in the judgments of this Court in the case of Disha v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [ (2011) 13 SCC 337 ] . Vineet Narain & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. [ (1998) 1 SCC 226 ] , Union of India & Ors. v. Sushil Kumar Modi & Ors. [ 1996 (6) SCC 500 ] and Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [ (2010) 2 SCC 200 ]. 35. The power to order/direct ‘reinvestigation’ or ‘de novo’ investigation falls in the domain of higher courts, that too in exceptional cases. If one examines the provisions of the Code, there is no specific provision for cancellation of the reports, except that the investigating agency can file a closure report (where according to the investigating agency, no offence is made out). Even such a report is subject to acceptance by the learned Magistrate who, in his wisdom, may or may not accept such a report. For valid reasons, the Court may, by declining to accept such a report, direct ‘further investigation’, or even on the basis of the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, summon the accused. 36. The Code does not contain any provision which deals with the court competent to direct ‘fresh investigation’, the situation in which such investigation can be conducted, if at all, and finally the manner in which the report so obtained shall be dealt with. The superior courts can direct conduct of a ‘fresh’/‘de novo’ investigation, but unless it specifically directs that the report already prepared or the investigation so far conducted will not form part of the record of the case, such report would be deemed to be part of the record. The superior courts can direct conduct of a ‘fresh’/‘de novo’ investigation, but unless it specifically directs that the report already prepared or the investigation so far conducted will not form part of the record of the case, such report would be deemed to be part of the record. Once it is part of the record, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to exclude the same from the record of the case. In other words, but for a specific order by the superior court, the reports, whether a primary report or a report upon ‘further investigation’ or a report upon ‘fresh investigation’, shall have to be construed and read conjointly. Where there is a specific order made by the court for reasons like the investigation being entirely unfair, tainted, undesirable or being based upon no truth, the court would have to specifically direct that the investigation or proceedings so conducted shall stand cancelled and will not form part of the record for consideration by the Court of competent jurisdiction. 37. The scheme of Section 173 of the Code even deals with the scheme of exclusion of documents or statements submitted to the Court. In this regard, one can make a reference to the provisions of Section 173(6) of the Code, which empowers the investigating agency to make a request to the Court to exclude that part of the statement or record and from providing the copies thereof to the accused, which are not essential in the interest of justice, and where it will be inexpedient in the public interest to furnish such statement. The framers of the law, in their wisdom, have specifically provided a limited mode of exclusion, the criteria being no injustice to be caused to the accused and greater public interest being served. This itself is indicative of the need for a fair and proper investigation by the concerned agency. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the expression ‘fair and proper investigation’ in criminal jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose. Firstly, the investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in accordance with law. Secondly, the entire emphasis on a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth of the case before the court of competent jurisdiction. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the expression ‘fair and proper investigation’ in criminal jurisprudence? It has a twin purpose. Firstly, the investigation must be unbiased, honest, just and in accordance with law. Secondly, the entire emphasis on a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth of the case before the court of competent jurisdiction. Once these twin paradigms of fair investigation are satisfied, there will be the least requirement for the court of law to interfere with the investigation, much less quash the same, or transfer it to another agency. Bringing out the truth by fair and investigative means in accordance with law would essentially repel the very basis of an unfair, tainted investigation or cases of false implication. Thus, it is inevitable for a court of law to pass a specific order as to the fate of the investigation, which in its opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation of the settled principles of investigative canons. 38. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is how the provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and applied by the courts and investigating agencies. It is true that though there is no specific requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code to conduct ‘further investigation’ or file supplementary report with the leave of the Court, the investigating agencies have not only understood but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek permission of the courts to conduct ‘further investigation’ and file ‘supplementary report’ with the leave of the court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of the Court to conduct ‘further investigation’ and/or to file a ‘supplementary report’ will have to be read into, and is a necessary implication of the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such interpretation as the matters which are understood and implemented for a long time, and such practice that is supported by law should be accepted as part of the interpretative process. 39. Such a view can be supported from two different points of view. Firstly, through the doctrine of precedence, as afore- noticed, since quite often the courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the investigating agencies which have also so understood and applied the principle. 39. Such a view can be supported from two different points of view. Firstly, through the doctrine of precedence, as afore- noticed, since quite often the courts have taken such a view, and, secondly, the investigating agencies which have also so understood and applied the principle. The matters which are understood and implemented as a legal practice and are not opposed to the basic rule of law would be good practice and such interpretation would be permissible with the aid of doctrine of contemporanea expositio. Even otherwise, to seek such leave of the court would meet the ends of justice and also provide adequate safeguard against a suspect/accused. 40. We have already noticed that there is no specific embargo upon the power of the learned Magistrate to direct ‘further investigation’ on presentation of a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. Any other approach or interpretation would be in contradiction to the very language of Section 173(8) and the scheme of the Code for giving precedence to proper administration of criminal justice. The settled principles of criminal jurisprudence would support such approach, particularly when in terms of Section 190 of the Code, the Magistrate is the competent authority to take cognizance of an offence. It is the Magistrate who has to decide whether on the basis of the record and documents produced, an offence is made out or not, and if made out, what course of law should be adopted in relation to committal of the case to the court of competent jurisdiction or to proceed with the trial himself. In other words, it is the judicial conscience of the Magistrate which has to be satisfied with reference to the record and the documents placed before him by the investigating agency, in coming to the appropriate conclusion in consonance with the principles of law. It will be a travesty of justice, if the court cannot be permitted to direct ‘further investigation’ to clear its doubt and to order the investigating agency to further substantiate its charge sheet. The satisfaction of the learned Magistrate is a condition precedent to commencement of further proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. Whether the Magistrate should direct ‘further investigation’ or not is again a matter which will depend upon the facts of a given case. The satisfaction of the learned Magistrate is a condition precedent to commencement of further proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. Whether the Magistrate should direct ‘further investigation’ or not is again a matter which will depend upon the facts of a given case. The learned Magistrate or the higher court of competent jurisdiction would direct ‘further investigation’ or ‘reinvestigation’ as the case may be, on the facts of a given case. Where the Magistrate can only direct further investigation, the courts of higher jurisdiction can direct further, re-investigation or even investigation de novo depending on the facts of a given case. It will be the specific order of the court that would determine the nature of investigation. In this regard, we may refer to the observations made by this court in the case of Sivanmoorthy and Others v. State represented by Inspector of Police [ (2010) 12 SCC 29 ]. In light of the above discussion, we answer the questions formulated at the opening of this judgment as follows: The court of competent jurisdiction is duty bound to consider all reports, entire records and documents submitted therewith by the Investigating Agency as its report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. This Rule is subject to only the following exceptions; a) Where a specific order has been passed by the learned Magistrate at the request of the prosecution limited to exclude any document or statement or any part thereof; b) Where an order is passed by the higher courts in exercise of its extraordinary or inherent jurisdiction directing that any of the reports i.e. primary report, supplementary report or the report submitted on ‘fresh investigation’ or ‘re-investigation’ or any part of it be excluded, struck off the court record and be treated as non est. No investigating agency is empowered to conduct a ‘fresh’, ‘de novo’ or ‘re-investigation’ in relation to the offence for which it has already filed a report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It is only upon the orders of the higher courts empowered to pass such orders that aforesaid investigation can be conducted, in which event the higher courts will have to pass a specific order with regard to the fate of the investigation already conducted and the report so filed before the court of the learned magistrate. 41. It is only upon the orders of the higher courts empowered to pass such orders that aforesaid investigation can be conducted, in which event the higher courts will have to pass a specific order with regard to the fate of the investigation already conducted and the report so filed before the court of the learned magistrate. 41. Having answered the questions of law as afore-stated, we revert to the facts of the case in hand. As already noticed, the petitioner had filed the writ petition before the High Court that the investigation of FIR No. 10/2006 dated 9th February, 2006 be transferred to CBI or any other independent investigating agency providing protection to the petitioners, directing initiation of appropriate action against the erring police officers who have registered the case against the petitioner and such other orders that the court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. This petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the Code on 25th February, 2006. The High Court granted no order either staying the further investigation by the agency, or the proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. The Delhi Police itself filed a status report before the High Court on 4th April, 2006 and the Special Cell of Delhi Police filed the charge sheet before the trial court on 6th May, 2006. After perusing the status report submitted to the High Court, the High Court vide its Order dated 9th May, 2006 had noticed that the circumstances of the case had cast a suspicion on the case of the prosecution, in regard to the manner in which the accused were apprehended and recoveries alleged to have been made from them of articles like explosives and detonators. After noticing this, the Court directed that without commenting on the merits of the matter, it was of the opinion that this was a case where inquiry by some independent agency is called for, and directed the CBI to undertake an inquiry into the matter and submit its report within four weeks. Obviously, it would have been brought to the notice of the High Court that the Delhi Police had filed a report before the trial court. The status report had also been placed before the High Court itself. Obviously, it would have been brought to the notice of the High Court that the Delhi Police had filed a report before the trial court. The status report had also been placed before the High Court itself. Still, the High Court, in its wisdom, did not consider it appropriate to pass any directions staying proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. Despite pendency before the High Court for a substantial period of time, the CBI took considerable time to conduct its preliminary inquiry and it is only on 4th July, 2007 that the CBI submitted its preliminary inquiry report before the court. After perusing the report, the Court directed, as per the request of the CBI, to conduct in depth investigation of the case. 42. In the order dated 24th October, 2007, the High Court noticed that despite the fact that the CBI had taken considerable time for completing its investigation, it had still not done so. Noticing that the investigation was handed over to the CBI on 9th May, 2006 and despite extensions it had not submitted its report the Court granted to the CBI four weeks’ time from the date of the order to submit its findings in respect of the allegations made by the accused in the complaint and directed the matter to come up on 28th November, 2007. The significant aspect which needs to be noticed is that the Court specifically noticed in this order that ‘the trial of the case is not proceeding, further hoping that CBI shall file supplementary report or supplementary material before the trial court and the accused gets an opportunity of case being formally investigated. However, the pace at which the investigation is done by the CBI shows that CBI may take years together for getting the records….’ 43. This order clearly shows that the High Court contemplated submission of a supplementary report, which means report in continuation to the report already submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code by the Delhi Police. 44. On 28th November, 2007, the case came up for hearing before the High Court. Then CBI filed its closure report making a request that both the accused be discharged. The case came up for hearing before the High Court on 4th August, 2008, when the Court noticed that CBI had filed a report in the sealed cover and the Court had perused it. Then CBI filed its closure report making a request that both the accused be discharged. The case came up for hearing before the High Court on 4th August, 2008, when the Court noticed that CBI had filed a report in the sealed cover and the Court had perused it. Herein, the Court noticed the entire facts in great detail. The High Court disposed of the writ petition and while noticing the earlier order dated 4th July, 2007 wherein the accused persons had assured the court that they would not move bail application before the trial court, till CBI investigation was completed, permitted the applicants to move bail applications as well. 45. The application for discharge filed by the accused persons on the strength of the closure report filed by the CBI was rejected by the trial court vide its order dated 13th February, 2009 on the ground that it had to examine the entire record including the report filed by the Delhi Police under Section 173(2) of the Code. The High Court, however, took the contrary view and stated that it was only the closure report filed by the CBI which could be taken into consideration, and then the matter shall proceed in accordance with law. In this manner, the writ petition was finally disposed of, directing the parties to appear before the trial court on 14th September, 2009. The High Court had relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala and Others (supra) to say that once investigation stands transferred to CBI, it is that agency only which has to proceed with the investigation and not the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. 46. We are unable to accord approval to the view taken by the High Court. The judgment in the case of K. Chandrasekhar (supra), firstly does not state any proposition of law. It is a judgment on peculiar facts of that case. Secondly, it has no application to the present case. In that case, the investigation by the police was pending when the investigation was ordered to be transferred to the CBI. There the Court had directed that further investigation had to be continued by the CBI and not the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. 47. Secondly, it has no application to the present case. In that case, the investigation by the police was pending when the investigation was ordered to be transferred to the CBI. There the Court had directed that further investigation had to be continued by the CBI and not the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. 47. In the present case, report in terms of Section 173(2) had already been filed by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police even before the investigation was handed over to CBI to conduct preliminary inquiry. Furthermore, the final investigation on the basis of the preliminary report submitted by the CBI had also not been handed over to CBI at that stage. 48. Once a Report under Section 173(2) of the Code has been filed, it can only be cancelled, proceeded further or case closed by the court of competent jurisdiction and that too in accordance with law. Neither the Police nor a specialised investigating agency has any right to cancel the said Report. Furthermore, in the present case, the High Court had passed no order or direction staying further investigation by the Delhi Police or proceedings before the court of competent jurisdiction. 49. On the contrary, the court had noticed explicitly in its order that it was a case of supplementary or further investigation and filing of a ‘supplementary report’. 50. Once the Court has taken this view, there is no question of treating the first report as being withdrawn, cancelled or capable of being excluded from the records by the implication. In fact, except by a specific order of a higher court competent to make said orders, the previous as well as supplementary report shall form part of the record which the trial court is expected to consider for arriving at any appropriate conclusion, in accordance with law. It is also interesting to note that the CBI itself understood the order of the court and conducted only ‘further investigation’ as is evident from the status report filed by the CBI before the High Court on 28th November, 2007. 51. In our considered view, the trial court has to consider the entire record, including both the Delhi Police Report filed under Section 173(2) of the Code as well as the Closure Report filed by the CBI and the documents filed along with these reports. 52. 51. In our considered view, the trial court has to consider the entire record, including both the Delhi Police Report filed under Section 173(2) of the Code as well as the Closure Report filed by the CBI and the documents filed along with these reports. 52. It appears, the trial court may have three options, firstly, it may accept the application of accused for discharge. Secondly, it may direct that the trial may proceed further in accordance with law and thirdly, if it is dissatisfied on any important aspect of investigation already conducted and in its considered opinion, it is just, proper and necessary in the interest of justice to direct ‘further investigation’, it may do so." 12. A supplementary report filed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. forms an integral part of the initial investigative report, and both must be assessed holistically by the Trial Court while considering the question of discharge. The prosecution must present a legally sustainable case before subjecting an accused to the ordeal of a criminal trial, ensuring that the proceedings do not degenerate into an instrument of harassment or abuse of process. 13. When hearing on charge-framing the principles governing charge, mandate that a Judge is not a mere conduit for prosecutorial claims but must exercise judicial discretion in determining whether the evidence on record creates a strong suspicion warranting the continuation of proceedings. In the absence of substantive material pointing towards the culpability of the petitioners, forcing them to undergo the rigors of trial would be antithetical to the foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence. The mere lodging of an FIR, devoid of substantial and credible material evidence, cannot serve as a ground to initiate or perpetuate criminal proceedings against an accused. 14. In light of the foregoing, while this Court refrains from exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR No. 507/2022, registered on 30.12.2022 at Police Station CPS ACB Outpost, Jaipur, as well as Charge Sheet No. 83/2023 dated 06.04.2023, it directs the Trial Court to assess the entirety of the investigative material, including both the initial and supplementary reports, with due application of judicial mind. The Trial Court shall ensure that the petitioners are not subjected to a trial unless a prima facie case is established against them, and the order of charge framing or discharge shall be passed in strict accordance with the settled principles of law. The Trial Court shall ensure that the petitioners are not subjected to a trial unless a prima facie case is established against them, and the order of charge framing or discharge shall be passed in strict accordance with the settled principles of law. Consequently, the Trial Court, while deliberating upon the framing of charges or considering discharge, is duty-bound to scrutinize the entirety of the material placed on record, including both the initial charge sheet and the subsequent investigative findings, in conformity with the judicial mandate enunciated under Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. 15. Considering the observations recorded hereinabove, these petitions are disposed of. However, the petitioners are granted liberty to agitate all permissible legal and factual contentions before the Trial Court at the appropriate stage. The Trial Court is expected to pass a reasoned order in light of the material on record and judicial precedents governing the subject matter. The trial court shall also consider supplementary report along with annexed materials and make the same part of the judicial record besides the record available with it. 16. The stay petition stands disposed of accordingly.