JUDGMENT : (DEVASHIS BARUAH, J.) Heard Mr. N. Haque, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners and Mr. A. Sattar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution have been invoked to challenge the order dated 01.10.2021 passed by the learned Munsiff No.1, Barpeta (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned Executing Court’) whereby the Execution Proceedings being Title Execution Case No.33/2018 was dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation in terms with Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act of 1963’). 3. For deciding the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 01.10.2021, it is relevant to take note of the brief facts which led to the filing of the instant proceedings infra. 4. The Petitioners herein as Plaintiffs had filed a suit being Title Suit No.15/2000 before the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Barpeta (hereinafter referred to as, “the learned Trial Court”) seeking declaration of their right, title and interest over a plot of land specifically described in Schedule-B to the plaint which admeasured 2 Kathas 5 1/3 Lechas and for recovery of khas possession of the Schedule-B land thereby evicting the defendants i.e. the respondents herein. 5. The learned Trial Court vide a judgment and decree dated 24.09.2004 decreed the suit in favour of the Plaintiffs/Petitioners herein. Immediately thereupon, an Execution Proceedings was filed by the Petitioners which was registered and numbered as Title Execution Case No.29/2004 before the learned Executing Court. 6. The respondents herein who were the defendants preferred an Appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 24.09.2024 passed in Title Suit No.15/2000 before the learned Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Barpeta (hereinafter referred to as, “the learned First Appellate Court”) which was registered and numbered as Title Appeal No.3/2005. The said Appeal was dismissed on merits vide a judgment and decree dated 09.12.2005. No Second Appeal thereagainst was filed and as such the judgment and decree dated 09.12.2005 attained finality. Applying the doctrine of merger, the date of passing the Appellate judgment and decree dated 09.12.2005 is to be reckoned for the purpose of limitation under Article 136 of the Act of 1963. 7. No Second Appeal thereagainst was filed and as such the judgment and decree dated 09.12.2005 attained finality. Applying the doctrine of merger, the date of passing the Appellate judgment and decree dated 09.12.2005 is to be reckoned for the purpose of limitation under Article 136 of the Act of 1963. 7. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of certain other relevant dates which have importance for the purpose of disentangling the facts and to bring out the point in controversy. 8. The Execution Proceedings which was filed immediately after the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court i.e. Title Execution Case No. 29/2004 continued pursuant to the Appellate judgment and decree. In the said Execution Proceedings, an order was passed by the learned Executing Court on 17.06.2008 permitting the parties to measure the suit land and to submit their respective findings before the learned Executing Court for necessary order. The Petitioners herein who were the decree holders being aggrieved by the order dated 17.06.2008 passed in the Executing Proceedings filed an application before this Court by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court which was registered and numbered as CRP No.218/2008. This Court had issued notice in the said application and also called for the records of Title Execution Case No.29/2004 which was pending before the learned Executing Court. The records were sent to this Court by the learned Executing Court after passing necessary orders on 27.08.2008. 9. The proceedings being CRP No.218/2008 were disposed of by this Court vide an order dated 25.08.2011 whereby the order dated 17.06.2008 passed by the learned Executing Court was set aside and the Petitioners herein were permitted to file appropriate application before the learned Executing Court which would, upon receipt thereof, take immediate steps to ensure the execution of the decree at the earliest strictly in accordance with law. The learned Executing Court was also directed by this Court vide the order dated 25.08.2011 to complete the Execution Proceedings within a period of 6 (six) weeks. The Petitioners thereupon submitted the application as per the leave granted by this Court vide order dated 25.08.2011 and prayed for recovery of khas possession over the decreetal land. 10. The learned Executing Court was also directed by this Court vide the order dated 25.08.2011 to complete the Execution Proceedings within a period of 6 (six) weeks. The Petitioners thereupon submitted the application as per the leave granted by this Court vide order dated 25.08.2011 and prayed for recovery of khas possession over the decreetal land. 10. It is relevant to take note of that vide an order dated 27.09.2012, the learned Executing Court had dismissed the Execution Proceedings being Title Execution Case No.29/2004 for non-appearance of the Petitioners/decree holders. No steps thereagainst were taken for restoration of the Execution Proceedings by the Petitioners/the decree holders. Six years later, on 20.06.2018, a fresh application was filed seeking execution of the judgment and decree. It is pertinent herein to mention that though the said application sought for execution of the decree dated 24.09.2004 which was passed by the learned Trial Court, but in view of the fact that the learned First Appellate Court had decided the appeal on merits and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the decree passed by the learned Trial Court merged with the judgment and decree dated 09.12.2005 passed by the learned First Appellate Court. The subsequent application filed for execution of the decree was registered and numbered as Title Execution Case No.33/2018. 11. The respondents herein submitted written objection before the learned Executing Court contending that the application being Title Execution Case No.33/2018 was barred by limitation inasmuch as the said application was filed beyond the period of 12 years as permissible under Article 136 of the Act of 1963. The learned Executing Court vide the impugned order dated 01.10.2021 dismissed the Executing Proceedings being Title Execution Case No.33/2018 and it is under such circumstances, the present proceedings have been filed. 12. In the backdrop of the above facts which led to the filing of the instant proceedings, let this Court now take note of the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties. 13. Mr. N. Haque, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submitted that the learned Executing Court failed to take into account that the period from 27.08.2008 to 25.08.2011 ought to have been excluded by the learned Executing Court while computing the period of limitation. 13. Mr. N. Haque, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submitted that the learned Executing Court failed to take into account that the period from 27.08.2008 to 25.08.2011 ought to have been excluded by the learned Executing Court while computing the period of limitation. He submitted that this Court during this period had called for records of Title Execution Case No.29/2004 and as such the Petitioners herein could not pursue with the Execution Proceedings. He submitted that if this period is excluded, the fresh application so filed seeking execution of the decree was within time. In that regard, he referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Anandilal and Another Vs. Ram Narain and Others reported in (1984) 3 SCC 561 and submitted that the benefit under Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 ought to have been granted to the Petitioners inasmuch as, for the reasons, the Execution Proceedings being called for, the decree holders i.e. the Petitioners were prevented from executing the decree. He therefore submitted that in the instant case, as the Petitioners/decree holders were prevented from further proceedings of the execution, in view of the calling of the records by this Court in CRP No.218/2008, the period from 27.08.2008 till 25.08.2011 ought to have been excluded in terms with Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963. He further submitted that though while construing the Act of 1963, consideration of hardship and anomaly are out of place, nevertheless it is permissible to adopt a beneficial construction of a Rule of limitation if alternative constructions are possible. 14. Per contra, Mr. A. Sattar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of some of the respondents submitted that Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 specifically grants the benefit while computing the period of limitation for execution of a decree when the institution or execution is stayed by way of an injunction or order. He submitted that as in the instant case, there was no injunction or order passed whereby the Execution Proceedings were stayed or even partially stayed, the said period when the record was before this Court in connection with CRP Case No.218/2008 cannot be excluded while computing the period of limitation. In that regard, he referred the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratansingh Vs. In that regard, he referred the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratansingh Vs. Vijaysingh and Others reported in (2001) 1 SCC 469 as well as Chandi Prasad and Others Vs. Jagdish Prasad and Others reported in (2004) 8 SCC 724 . He further submitted that the judgment in the case of Anandilal (supra) cannot be made applicable to the present facts taking into account the issue involved in the said case before the Supreme Court was in relation of partial stay given by the Judicial Committee on 16.08.1940 and that stay order was vacated on 24.11.1944. He submitted that as there was no injunction or order even partially staying the executing proceedings, the Petitioners herein are not entitled to the benefit for the period from 27.08.2008 to 25.08.2011 while computing the period of limitation. 15. I have heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and have perused the materials on record. 16. Before entering into the dispute, it is relevant to take note of the provisions of Article 136 of the Act of 1963. The said provision is reproduced hereinbelow: Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 136 For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court Twelve years [When] the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation. 17. From the above quoted provision, it would be seen that for the purpose of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any Civil Court, the period is 12 (twelve) years when the decree or the order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place. 18. 18. In terms with the said provision and applying to the facts of the instant case, it would therefore be seen that as the appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 24.09.2004 in Title Suit No.15/2000 was heard on merits and the appeal was dismissed vide a judgment and decree dated 09.12.2005 in Title Appeal No.3/2005, the period of limitation for the purpose of execution of the said decree dated 09.12.2005 would start to run insofar as for delivery of possession of the Schedule-B property w.e.f. 10.02.2005 by applying Section 12(1) of the Act of 1963. The period within which as per Article 136 of the Act of 1963, the application was required to be filed was on or before 09.12.2017. Admittedly, the second execution application was filed in the year 2018 which was beyond the period mentioned in Article 136 of the Act of 1963. 19. This Court further finds it relevant to take note of Section 9 of the Act of 1963 which stipulates that once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute the suit or make an application steps in. Section 9 of the Act of 1963 is reproduced herein below: “9. Continuous running of time.— Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it: Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.” 20. Part-III of the Act of 1963 is with the heading “Computation of Period of Limitation”. Sections 12 to 24 of the Act of 1963 which are included within Part III of the Act of 1963 permits exclusion of certain periods or stipulates when the period would begin for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation. In the opinion of this Court, this Part III of the Act of 1963 creates an exception to the periods prescribed in the Schedule of the Act of 1963. For the purpose of instant dispute, Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 has relevance and as such Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the Act of 1963 is reproduced herein below: “ 15 . Exclusion of time in certain other cases. For the purpose of instant dispute, Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 has relevance and as such Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the Act of 1963 is reproduced herein below: “ 15 . Exclusion of time in certain other cases. – (1) In computing the period of limitation of any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.” 21. From the above quoted provision, it would be seen that while computing the period of limitation of any suit or application for execution of a decree, when such institution or execution have been stayed by injunction or order, the period from the date of the injunction or order and the date on which it was withdrawn is required to be excluded. In the backdrop of the above, the pivotal question which arises in the instant proceedings is whether the term ‘stayed by injunction or order’ would encompass a period where the decree holder could not proceed with the execution for reasons that the records of the Execution Proceedings were called for by this Court. 22. In Anandilal (supra) , the Supreme Court observed that execution of a decree would mean the enforcement of a decree which is known as process of execution. It was also held that all processes and proceedings in aid of or supplemental to execution would come within the meaning of the word execution as mentioned in Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963. At this stage, it is relevant to observe that in the judgment in the case of Anandilal (supra) the question which was decided therein pertained to whether a partial stay of the execution, would it come within the ambit of stay of the execution as mentioned in Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963. For the sake of clarity, this Court finds it pertinent to take note of that in the case of Anandilal (supra) the facts therein would show that the Judicial Committee passed an interim order dated 16.08.1940 directing that until further orders, the properties attached in execution shall continue to remain under attachment but further proceedings for sale thereof shall remain stayed. The said stay order stood dissolved when the Judicial Committee vide its judgment dated 24.11.1944 dismissed the appeal. The question therefore before the Supreme Court was whether without a complete stay to the execution but only a partial stay to the sale of the attached property, would it come within the ambit of Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963. The Supreme Court observed that the word “execution” in Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 is required to be given a wide construction and when there is an injunction or order which had prevented the decree holder from executing the decree, then irrespective of particular stage of execution, or the particular property against which, or the particular judgment debtor against whom execution was stayed, the effect of such injunction or order prolongs the life of the decree itself by the period during which the injunction or order remained in force. Paragraph No. 11 of the judgment in the case of Anandilal (supra) is reproduced herein below “ 11 . Agreeing with the Full Bench, we are inclined to the view that the word “execution” in Section 15(1) embraces all the appropriate means by which a decree is enforced. It includes all processes and proceedings in aid of, or supplemental to, execution. We find no rational basis for adopting a narrow and restricted construction on a beneficent provision like the one contained in Section 15(1). There is no reason why Section 15(1) should be given a restricted meaning as allowing the benefit to a decree- holder where there is a complete or absolute stay of execution and not a partial stay i.e. a stay which makes the decree altogether inexecutable. Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that in cases of partial stay, the benefit under Section 15(1) can be had only where an execution application is directed against the same judgment-debtor or the same property, as against whom an execution was previously stayed. Stay of any process of execution is therefore stay of execution within the meaning of the section. Stay of any process of execution is therefore stay of execution within the meaning of the section. Where an injunction or order has prevented the decree-holder from executing the decree, then irrespective of the particular stage of execution, or the particular property against which, or the particular judgment-debtor against whom, execution was stayed, the effect of such injunction or order is to prolong the life of the decree itself by the period during which the injunction or order remained in force. The majority view to the contrary taken by some of the High Courts overlooks the well settled principle that when the law prescribes more than one modes of execution, it is for the decree-holder to choose which of them he will pursue.” 23. A perusal of the above quoted paragraph would show that the Supreme Court had clearly observed that it is only when on account of an injunction or order, the process of the execution is stayed, then only the life of the decree is prolonged. This Court further finds it pertinent to observe that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the Code”) prescribes clearly when and how the Execution Proceedings can be stayed. The provisions of Order XLI Rule 5, Order XXI Rules 26 to 30 of the Code specifically mandate that when the Execution Proceedings can be stayed. Additionally, the Execution Proceedings also can be stayed by way of an injunction. But sans a specific order staying the execution by way of an injunction or order, in the opinion of this Court, the benefit under Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 cannot be allowed to the decree holder. It is the further opinion of this Court that if an interpretation is given to the words ‘stayed by injunction or order’ to include anything else other than a specific order of stay of the Execution Proceedings, it would amount to legislating the provisions of Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963, which the Legislature never intended as would be apparent from a perusal of Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 read with the Code. This Court finds it pertinent also to observe that if the interpretation so sought by the Petitioners is given to the provision of Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963, it would include all circumstances by which the Execution Proceedings could not proceed. This Court finds it pertinent also to observe that if the interpretation so sought by the Petitioners is given to the provision of Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963, it would include all circumstances by which the Execution Proceedings could not proceed. Just for example, it would also include circumstances viz. the Presiding Officer being absent on the date fixed for hearing; the judgment debtor seeking an adjournment on the date fixed for hearing, so on and so forth. It is the opinion of this Court that it was never the intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 to grant the benefit of Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963 unless there was a specific order or injunction staying the Execution Proceedings. 24. Coming to the facts involved in the instant case, it would be seen that the Execution Proceedings being Title Execution Case No.29/2004 was continued till its dismissal on account of default vide an order dated 27.09.2012. With effect from 10.12.2005, till 27.09.2012, there was no stay or injunction whereby the Execution Proceedings being Title Execution Case No.29/2004 was stayed. The records of Title Execution Case No. 27/2004 though called by this Court in connection with CRP No. 218/2008 and were sent on 27.08.2008 by the learned Executing Court and it remained with this Court till 25.08.2011 but there was no stay to the Execution Proceedings. Under such circumstances, the Petitioners herein were not entitled to the benefit of Section 15(1) of the Act of 1963. Taking into account that the time had begun to run w.e.f. 10.12.2005, and there was no stay or injunction to the Execution Proceedings, the period for filing the second execution application ended on 09.12.2017. The Execution Proceedings being Title Execution Case No. 33/2018 having been filed after the expiry of the said period of Limitation, the learned Executing Court was justified in dismissing the said application on the ground of delay vide the impugned order. 25. Before parting with the record, this Court finds it pertinent to observe that hardship or injustice may be relevant consideration in applying the principles of interpretation of the statues, but the said aspects have no relevance for extending the period of Limitation. 26. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the instant petition for which the instant petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 27. 26. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the instant petition for which the instant petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 27. The Registry is directed to forthwith return the LCR to the learned Court below.