ORDER : NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J. Heard Sri Shyam S.Agrawal, learned counsel for petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Labour on behalf of the 1 st respondent, Sri A.K. Jayaprakash Rao, learned counsel on behalf of the 4th respondent and Sri Ch. Omernathan, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent. 2. This Writ Petition challenges the validity and propriety of the order dated 22-09-2023 in I.A.No.14 of 2021 in M.P.No. 6 of 2019 on the file of the Additional Industrial Tribunal-cum-Additional Labour Court, Hyderabad (2 nd respondent). By the said order, petitioner was directed to deposit Rs.49,00,000/- to the credit of M.P.No.5 of 2019 within a period of four months from the date of the said order. 3. M.P.No.6 of 2019 was filed by the 3 rd respondent, M/s DBR Mills Karmika Sangh, in Form K-3 under Section 33C (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Act’), with a prayer to compute the amount allegedly due to the workers and direct petitioner to pay the same to the 3 rd respondent with accrued interest. Petitioner contends that an agreement dated 07-03-2017 was entered into under Section 12 (3) of the Act before the Conciliation Officer/Joint Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad, wherein they agreed to pay a total amount of Rs.7,00,000/- in two instalments as full and final settlement of all arrears, back wages, compensation, and other dues. Subsequently, the 3 rd respondent filed I.A.No.14 of 2021 under Section 11 of the Act seeking a direction to petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.49,00,000/- in compliance with the Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-2017. Petitioner filed a counter to the said Application, disputing the claim made by the 3 rd respondent. Petitioner states that agreement dated 07-03-2017 was followed by a memorandum of compromise and a compromise decree in O.S.No.69 of 2003 (earlier O.S.No.1201 of 1995) on the file of the XII Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Under the compromise, the 4 th respondent was to obtain title over Acs.16.00 of land, which was to be developed by petitioner as per a development agreement. Petitioner contends that it had the right to settle the workers' claims on behalf of the 4 th respondent pursuant to the compromise. Under the compromise, the 4 th respondent was to obtain title over Acs.16.00 of land, which was to be developed by petitioner as per a development agreement. Petitioner contends that it had the right to settle the workers' claims on behalf of the 4 th respondent pursuant to the compromise. However, the 4 th respondent, who was a tenant in DBR Mills property, opposed the compromise and initiated litigation by filing C.C.C.A.No.329 of 2003 before the High Court and later before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. This led to two rounds of litigation and eventual dismissal of SLP.No.5163-5164 of 2022 vide order dated 18-04-2022, resulting in the compromise decree being set aside and the 4 th respondent being treated as a tenant at sufferance. It is the case of petitioner that all parties, including workmen, were fully aware at the time of entering into the agreement dated 07-03-2017 that petitioner was not employer of the said workmen and that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to them. The said settlement itself narrated the nature of relationship, specifically referencing the development agreement dated 15-03-1999, based on which development rights were granted by the 4 th respondent to petitioner. Subsequently, the 4 th respondent repudiated the compromise. It is also stated, the 3 rd respondent filed O.S.No.293 of 2016 against petitioner for cancellation of registered documents executed by the original owners of the property in favour of petitioner. Despite attempts by petitioner to give effect to the compromise decree, including legal challenges, Appeal was dismissed and the subsequent Special Leave Petition also met with dismissal, thereby frustrating the compromise. It is the contention of petitioner that the 2 nd respondent - Tribunal was fully aware of the developments, including frustration of the compromise due to the conduct of the 4 th respondent and the pendency of litigation by the workers of the 4th respondent regarding wages which had originated in 2013 and continued even after the agreement dated 07-03-2017. The said M.P.No.1 of 2013 was eventually dismissed by the Tribunal by order dated 13-07-2021. Petitioner asserts that development agreement between petitioner and the 4 th respondent stood nullified due to the frustration of the compromise decree, which formed foundation of 12(3) agreement dated 07-03-2017. The said M.P.No.1 of 2013 was eventually dismissed by the Tribunal by order dated 13-07-2021. Petitioner asserts that development agreement between petitioner and the 4 th respondent stood nullified due to the frustration of the compromise decree, which formed foundation of 12(3) agreement dated 07-03-2017. Consequently, petitioner has become a third party with no employer-employee relationship and with no legal authority or authorisation from the 4 th respondent to settle any claims on its behalf. Therefore, imposing a legal liability on petitioner is impermissible under law. Petitioner further contended that upon being approached by workmen of the 4 th respondent for implementation of the agreement, the Assistant Commissioner of Labour-III, Hyderabad, was instructed to file a criminal complaint, and accordingly, they filed Crl.M.P.No.1722 of 2023 before the XII Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, seeking relief similar to the present proceedings. It is admitted that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and workmen of the 4th respondent, hence, petitioner states that the order impugned is without jurisdiction and therefore, is liable to be set aside. It is stated, the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad addressed letter dated 25-07-2018 to the Government Pleader seeking clarification with respect to agreement dated 07-03-2017. The said letter narrates the entire factual chronology and concludes that there were several objections raised by M/s DBR Mills Limited, workmen and petitioner. It was observed therein that since petitioner is a third party, the terms and conditions of the agreement cannot be enforced. Despite no opinion being received from the Government Pleader, the Joint Commissioner instructed the Assistant Commissioner to file a criminal complaint, which remains pending. Furthermore, the 4 th respondent addressed letter dated 04-12-2017 to the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad clearly stating that petitioner had no right to negotiate or settle the dues on behalf of the 4 th respondent. It is also submitted by petitioner that as per Section 12 of the Act, when an industrial dispute exists, the Conciliation Officer is to conduct proceedings and submit a report within 14 days and a settlement, if any is to be forwarded to the appropriate Government. Only upon satisfaction can the Government refer the matter to a Tribunal. In the instant case, there is no record of compliance with these procedural requirements. Only upon satisfaction can the Government refer the matter to a Tribunal. In the instant case, there is no record of compliance with these procedural requirements. It is also contended that there is also reference to an order of status quo dated 16-06-2008 in W.A.M.P.No.814 of 2008 in Writ Appeal No. 391 of 2008, where the Union of Employees was arrayed as the 7th respondent. It is further argued that a criminal complaint was filed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner on the same set of facts as the present dispute and parallel prosecution in two Courts on the same matter is not legally-permissible. Petitioner reiterates that it is not the management of DBR Mills, hence had no legal status or focus to enter into any 12(3) agreement with the workmen. It is emphasized that petitioner does not fall within the definition of ‘employer’ or ‘management’ under the Act and therefore cannot be subjected to its provisions. The definition of ‘settlement’ under Section 2(p) of the Act necessarily requires a valid employer-workman relationship, which is absent in the present case. Petitioner further states that it was the responsibility of the Conciliation Officer to provide proper legal guidance to workmen regarding the parties to any such settlement. Despite these legal shortcomings, the Tribunal passed the impugned order directing petitioner to deposit Rs.49,00,000/- in M.P.No.6 of 2019, which is illegal and contrary to law. It is finally stated that merely because petitioner had agreed to pay the amount which was due by the 4th respondent to the employees in view of their entering into development agreement in respect of the land covered by the 4 th respondent, they could not be directed to pay the amount 4. The Joint Commissioner of Labour filed counter stating that the present dispute pertains to petitioner and Respondents 3 and 4 and that subject matter lies exclusively between these parties. It was emphasized that the role of the Labour Department is purely formal in nature, therefore, no relief can be sought against the Labour Department in this context. 5. In the counter filed on behalf of the 4 th respondent it is stated that in M.P. No. 6 of 2019, petitioner being a signatory, had admitted the Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act, hence, they are liable to pay the agreed amount. 5. In the counter filed on behalf of the 4 th respondent it is stated that in M.P. No. 6 of 2019, petitioner being a signatory, had admitted the Settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act, hence, they are liable to pay the agreed amount. It was further asserted that the said Settlement is binding upon petitioner and the 3rd respondent, but not upon the 4th respondent, who was not a party or signatory to Settlement. It is argued that contentions raised by petitioner extend beyond the scope of the order passed by the Tribunal. 6. The 3 rd respondent - Union filed a counter stating that petitioner, in its counter to the original petition, admitted the Settlement under Section 12(3) and expressed willingness to deposit the agreed amount until disposal of the main miscellaneous petition. However, they raised objections, such as non-disclosure of number of workers by the Labour Department and claimed that it was willing to deposit and pay the agreed amount of Rs. 49,00,000/- if such information were provided. It was further stated that petitioner had earlier settled claims of some workers through the Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-2017. This indicates that petitioner, after convincing workers of a comprehensive financial resolution, delayed execution without reason and later, attempted to escape the liabilities voluntarily undertaken in the settlement when the matter was taken before the Tribunal. The Tribunal rightly held that petitioner’s objections and apprehensions lacked merit and that the amount should be deposited in court. It is the further case of the 3rd respondent that petitioner’s claim that Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-2017 became unenforceable due to dismissal of SLP Nos. 5163-5164 of 2022 on 18-04-2022 is false. Petitioner intentionally suppressed details of prior proceedings before the trial Court and the High Court before moving the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The SLPs. were dismissed at the threshold solely on the ground of limitation, due to a delay of 1691 days, and not on merits. Petitioner was accused of misrepresentation, abuse of process, and misleading the Court. Hence, they are not entitled to any relief. It was also submitted that parties and third parties to O.S. No. 69 of 2003 had filed C.C.C.A. Nos. 350, 74, 329 of 2003 and C.C.C.A. No. 131 of 2004 challenging the compromise decree dated 03-04-2003. All the appeals were dismissed by a common judgment dated 12-04-2004 confirming the compromise decree. Hence, they are not entitled to any relief. It was also submitted that parties and third parties to O.S. No. 69 of 2003 had filed C.C.C.A. Nos. 350, 74, 329 of 2003 and C.C.C.A. No. 131 of 2004 challenging the compromise decree dated 03-04-2003. All the appeals were dismissed by a common judgment dated 12-04-2004 confirming the compromise decree. The matter was remanded to the trial court solely for verifying the suit schedule property’s market value and court fee. SLP Nos. 13630 of 2005 and 13633 of 2005 were filed before the Supreme Court, which were dismissed on 21-08-2005. Review petitions against the dismissal were also dismissed on 24-08-2005. Post-remand, after multiple adjournments, suit was dismissed on 28-04-2015 by the XIII Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, as plaintiffs failed to pay the court fee. Petitioner later filed C.C.C.A. No. 66 of 2020 aggrieved by the dismissal judgment dated 28-04-2015, along with I.A. No. 1 of 2020 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 1691 days. This petition was dismissed on 07-01-2022. Petitioner filed SLP Nos. 5163-5164 of 2022, which were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 18-04-2022. Hence, petitioner’s claim that settlement dated 07-03-2017 became unenforceable is false. The petitioner was fully aware of the pending litigations related to DBR Mills, including those dismissed much before the date of settlement. The compromise decree in the Appeal by DBR Mills management was dismissed in 2004 ie. 13 years before the settlement. Therefore, petitioner cannot now cite this litigation to avoid the settlement. They voluntarily agreed to pay Rs. 7,00,000/- in two installments— Rs. 2,00,000/- on 31-03-2017 and Rs. 5,00,000/- on 14-08-2017, but defaulted in making the payment despite voluntarily settling worker claims under Section 12 (3) of the Act and Rule 60 of the Telangana State Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. Petitioner informed the Commissioner of Labour and entered into the Memorandum of Settlement on 07-03-2017, executed before the conciliation officer and the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad (Twin Cities), after the suit in O.S. No. 69 of 2003 (Old O.S. No. 1201 of 1995) was dismissed on 28-04-2015. Hence, it is argued that petitioner is precluded from pleading that settlement became unenforceable due to culmination of the said suit proceedings. It is alleged that the petitioner is abusing legal process and harassing the respondents by delaying legitimate claims. Hence, it is argued that petitioner is precluded from pleading that settlement became unenforceable due to culmination of the said suit proceedings. It is alleged that the petitioner is abusing legal process and harassing the respondents by delaying legitimate claims. It is contended that once the Memorandum of Settlement dated 07-03-2017 was executed under Section 12 (3), creating a pre-existing admitted liability, petitioner is barred from questioning the proceedings initiated under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. These proceedings were initiated after obtaining a recovery certificate under Section 33(C)(1). It is submitted that workers were subjected to harassment and mental turmoil due to false promises of financial relief and employment and that workers were forced to approach the Tribunal to enforce petitioner’s admitted liability. The proceedings before the Tribunal are legal and valid. The present Writ Petition is only a continuation of delay tactics by the petitioner. According to this respondent, petitioner did not inform the Tribunal about dismissal of SLPs. by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 18-04-2022 until 05-09-2023. The orders were submitted only during the hearing of an interim Application. Petitioner had already admitted in its counter affidavit before the Tribunal its obligation to pay and cited vague reasons for non-payment. It did not make any effort to obtain worker details from the Labour Department, revealing its lack of intention to comply. Furthermore, petitioner concealed filing of this Writ Petition and the order of stay obtained therein. They did not even file a memo to inform the Tribunal and falsely alleged that Tribunal was proceeding despite the stay. The trial had already commenced and cross-examination was completed by petitioner. To delay proceedings and avoid the outcome, petitioner approached this Court after four years. Petitioner, having voluntarily subjected itself to the provisions of the Act, cannot now claim that the Act is not applicable to it. 7. The Tribunal in the order impugned recorded that petitioner from the very inception honestly has been saying that they are ready to pay the amount to the workers who were working as on the date of closure of DBR Mills in1991. Though there is confusion with regard to number of workers to whom the payment is supposed to be made, at one stage, the number of workers as per the assessment made by the District Collector is 349, subsequently, the number is risen to 484. Though there is confusion with regard to number of workers to whom the payment is supposed to be made, at one stage, the number of workers as per the assessment made by the District Collector is 349, subsequently, the number is risen to 484. Petitioner also agreed to clear the payments to 349 workers based on the letter addressed by the District Collector dated 27.05.2016 which gesture was taken into consideration by the Tribunal. The Tribunal further observed that when such was the case, the present Petition filed by a few employees seeking deposit of the amount as a measure to secure the amount cannot be denied by petitioner. As is evident from the material and from the order impugned, the Union did not want to withdraw the amount, their endeavour is only to see to it that amount assured as per the memorandum of settlement should be secured. The amount which was agreed upon could not be disbursed yet. For the litigation between petitioner and respondents, workers should not be made to suffer. 8. Having considered the material on record and on perusal of the order of the Tribunal, it is clear that petitioner’s primary objection is the enforceability of settlement agreement citing frustration of the compromise decree in O.S. No. 69 of 2003 (earlier O.S. No. 1201 of 1995) and the related litigation. However, this argument overlooks the fact that petitioner voluntarily entered into the Memorandum of Settlement under Section 12 (3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Conciliation Officer and the Joint Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad. Petitioner, having voluntarily agreed to pay the workers the sum of Rs. 7,00,000/- as part of the settlement, cannot now seek to escape its obligations merely due to the complexities arising from other litigation. Furthermore, petitioner made admissions in its pleadings regarding the workers’ claims and its involvement in the settlement process. Therefore, despite the technical arguments raised by the petitioner regarding the lack of an employer-employee relationship, it is evident that they assumed responsibility for the workers’ claims and cannot now distance itself from the settlement. 9. Petitioner raises the issue of frustration of compromise decree, resulting from the dismissal of SLP Nos. 5163-5164 of 2022 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, despite the technical arguments raised by the petitioner regarding the lack of an employer-employee relationship, it is evident that they assumed responsibility for the workers’ claims and cannot now distance itself from the settlement. 9. Petitioner raises the issue of frustration of compromise decree, resulting from the dismissal of SLP Nos. 5163-5164 of 2022 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. However, this argument does not invalidate the settlement under Section 12(3) for it was made in compliance with the provisions of the Act and petitioner cannot now claim that it is unenforceable due to the outcome of the compromise decree in unrelated litigation. It is general principle of law of contract that when a party agrees to the terms of settlement and signs the agreement voluntarily, the said party is bound by the terms of settlement. It is not the case of petitioner that they were forced, coerced, threatened or misrepresented to enter into the memorandum of settlement. They have voluntarily undertaken the obligation to settle the workers’ claims, hence, the Tribunal is well within its jurisdiction to direct them to fulfil this obligation. 10. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Tribunal arguing that it is a third party and has no authority to be directed to deposit the amount. However, the Tribunal’s order is based on the legal obligations arising from the settlement. The Tribunal, having considered the claims of the workers and petitioner’s role in the settlement, rightly exercised its jurisdiction in directing the latter to deposit Rs. 49,00,000/-. Petitioner’s objections regarding the Tribunal’s jurisdiction are unsubstantiated and fail to establish any valid grounds for interfering with the Tribunal’s order. Despite acknowledging its liability and agreeing to pay the sum in installments, petitioner failed to make the payments in a timely manner. This delay has caused undue hardship to workers, who have been waiting for financial relief for several years. The Tribunal, in its order, rightly emphasized petitioner’s failure to fulfill its obligations and directed deposit of the amount to ensure that workers’ claims are addressed. 11. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that petitioner’s arguments do not merit interference with the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s direction to deposit Rs. 49,00,000/- is within its jurisdiction and is consistent with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . 11. In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that petitioner’s arguments do not merit interference with the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s direction to deposit Rs. 49,00,000/- is within its jurisdiction and is consistent with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 . The petitioner’s attempts to avoid its obligations based on technical and procedural arguments are without merit and are rejected. Therefore, Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. 12. The Writ Petition is accordingly, dismissed. No costs. 13. Consequently, the interim order dated 29.02.2024 shall stand automatically dissolved.